Shah, J.:—

This is a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge for Greater Bombay, recommending that the committal of the three accused to the Court of Sessions to stand their trial for offences under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code be quashed.

The Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court, Bombay, committed the three accused to the Court of Sessions for Greater Bombay to stand their trial for two offences. The first offence, according to the prosecution, was committed by the three accused between September 15, 1953, and November 27, 1953, in that they in furtherance of the common intention of all fradulently or dishonestly used as genuine a document to wit, a declaration, in proceedings before a Sales Tax Officer exercising the powers of a Collector under the Bombay Sales Tax Act and thereby committed an offence under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The second offence, according to the prosecution, was that between September 15, 1953 and November 27, 1953, the three accused, in furtherance of the common intention of all, cheated one Shantikumar R. Modi, Sales Tax Officer, by producing before him false declaration in certain proceedings for assessment of Sales Tax and thereby dishonestly induced the Officer to grant a rebate of tax amounting to Rs. 74-7-0, and committed an offence under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The three accused claimed to be tried before Sessions Court and a common jury was empannelled for their trial. Evidence of the prosecution witnesses was led and the statements of the accused also were recorded. While the Public Prosecutor was addressing the Jury, it occurred to learned Judge that the charge framed against the accused was in respect of an offence which fell within the terms of s. 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the absence of a complaint from the officer before whom the declaration was produced or given in evidence, the trial was without jurisdiction. The learned Judge, heard the Public Prosecutor and Counsel appearing for the accused on that question and he made this Reference recommending that the committal order passed by the Presidency Magistrate should be quashed as being without jurisdiction.

It is the case of the prosecution that the three accused, who are partners of the United Match Corporation, were called upon by the Sales Tax Officer, Bombay, to produce their account-books in proceedings relating to assessment for sales tax payable by the United Match Corporation. The accused produced before the Sales Tax Officer one Udhar Nondh Book among other documents and Ex. H, a bill, along with a declaration purporting to be singed by a purchaser. The Sales Tax Officer relied upon the declaration which accompanied Ex. H and gave rebate of Rs. 74-7-0. It is the case for the prosecution that the declaration was a forged declaration and the accused knowing or having reason to believe that the declaration was forged dishonestly and fraudulently presented it before the Sales Tax Office and hereby induced him to give rebate of Tax and committed an offence under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also an offence under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Now, s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in so far as it is material for this Reference, in sub-s. (1) that:

“No Court shall take cognizance (c) of any offence falling under s. 471 of the Indian Penal Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.”

Sub-section (2) provides that:

“in cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1), the term “Court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.”

Section 195 evidently debars a Court from taking cognizance of certain offences when they are alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence, except on the complaint in writing of such Court. In the present case, a charge for offences under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against all the three accused and the graveness of the charge was that the three accused, who were parties to a proceeding before the Salas Tax Officer, had produced a forged document in that proceeding. The question that falls then to be determined is whether the Sales Tax Officer is a Court within the meaning of s. 195, sub-s. (1).

Evidently, a Sales Tax Officer is not a Civil or a Criminal Court. The learned Sessions Judge has held that the officer is a Revenue Court. The Bombay Sales Tax Act (III of 1953) authorises the State Government, by s. 3, to appoint a person to be a Collector of Sales Tax for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The powers of the Collector may be delegated to officers appointed under Rules framed under the Act. It is undisputed that the powers of the Collector of Sales Tax under s. 3 had been delegated to Mr. S.R Modi, the Sales Tax Officer before whom the three accused had produced the declaration with Ex. H. Section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, imposes upon every registered dealer and every other dealer whose turnover of sales or turnover of purchases the Collector has reason to believe exceeds the limits specified in s. 5 of the Act when required by notice to do so a duty to furnish returns. Section 14 enables the Collector to assess the amount of tax payable by dealers on the returns so made, and in the absence of correct returns, he is entitled to make a best judgment assessment. For carrying out his duties, the Collector is by s. 23 of the Act authorised to call upon dealers to produce before him accounts, or documents, or to furnish information, relating to the stocks of goods of, or purchases, sales and deliveries of goods, by the dealer or other information, relating to his business. By s. 28, the Collector has the same powers as are vested in Courts in respect of (a) affidavits, (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (c) compelling the production of documents and (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Against the order of the Collector assessing the amount of tax payable, an appeal lies to the prescribed authority.

Now, s. 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code defines the expression “Court” as including a Revenue Court. The functions of the Sales Tax Officer are preeminently connected with the assessment and collection of revenue due to the State as sales tax, and for that purpose, the officer is entitled to exercise powers which are normally exercisable by Courts. That is expressly so provided by s. 23 of the Sales Tax Act. In a Full Bench judgment of this Court In Re Punamchand Maneklal(2), it was held that:

“an Income-Tax Collector is a Revenue Court within the meaning of that term as used in cls. (b) and (c) of s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.”

Scott C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed that (p. 651):

“the term ‘Revenue Court’ is not in general use but it has been used occasionally by local legislatures in this country in connection with the decision of questions relating to revenue by officers specially and exclusively empowered to decide them.”

He further pointed out that (p. 652):

“the inquiries conducted according to the forms of judicial procedure under Chapter IV of the Income Tax Act and execution proceedings under Chapter V are proceedings in a Revenue Court.”

That the Sales Tax Officers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, are authorised to decide questions relating to revenue cannot be denied and the jurisdiction of other Courts to deal with those Questions has been expressly excluded by s. 29 of that Act. It is clear therefore that the Sales Tax Officers have jurisdiction to decide questions relating to revenue by officers specially and exclusively empowered to decide them. The Sales Tax Officers having been invested with powers which are the normal attributes of a Court or a Tribunal authorised to adjudicate upon disputed questions of law or fact relating to rights of citizens must be regarded as a Revenue Court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The trial of the three accused for the offence under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code without a complaint in writing by the Sales Tax Officer or by some other Court to which he was subordinate was therefore without jurisdiction, and the proceedings taken against the three accused in that behalf must be quashed. The order of commitment for the charge under s. 471 read with s. 467, I.P Code, recorded by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court, Bombay, must also be quashed.

It must, however, be pointed out that the learned Presidency Magistrate committed the three accused to stand their trial for offences under s. 471 read with s. 467 and s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Qua the charge under s. 471 read with s. 467 the proceedings are without jurisdiction. But the committal of the accused for trial for an offence under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not without jurisdiction. Section 420 is not one of the sections mentioned in s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A complaint for an offence under s. 420, I.P.C may be lodged by any person. The offence being cognizable, the police may investigate the offence and lodge a charge sheet in a Court competent to enquire and try the offence. The order of committal of the three accused for the offence under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, therefore, cannot be interfered with by us. It is unfortunate that neither in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, nor in the Court of Sessions, objection to the trial of the accused for the offence under s. 471 read with s. 467 of the Indian Penal Code was raised before the evidence for the prosecution was led and the accused were examined.

As we held that there has been proper committal of the accused in respect of the offence under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code, we would have the option of either to direct the learned Judge and the Jury to proceed with the trial in respect of the offence under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code or to quash the proceedings. As however evidence in respect of the charge under s. 471 read with s. 467 of the Indian Penal Code has already been led before the Jury on a substantive charge, we think it should be proper to exercise our powers under s. 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code and we direct that the proceedings form the stage of empanelling the Jury before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bombay, be quashed, and that the Sessions Court proceed to try the three accused before a fresh Jury for the offence under s. 420 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Order accordingly.

G.N.V