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  • Schedule. Section 128 provides:(1)
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  • Schedule. Section 128 provides:(1)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Chagla, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from an application to extend the time ordered by a learned Judge of the City Civil Court for making a deposit under summary suit procedure (Order XXXVII) in a suit on a promissory note. The learned Judge had directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 9,500 by a specified date. The petitioner filed a civil revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging that order. The revision was admitted by Mr. Justice Shah and heard finally by Mr. Justice Bavdekar, at which stage the petitioner sought to amend the petition to raise a constitutional challenge to the rules by which this High Court extended the provisions of Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court, contending those rules were ultra vires and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Because a constitutional question was raised, the matter came before the bench that delivered this opinion.

The petitioner, through Mr. Palkhivala, also sought an order that proper notice be served on the Advocate General and/or the Attorney General under Order XXVII-A of the Civil Procedure Code before the petition was heard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rules made by this High Court extending Order XXXVII (summary suit procedure) to the City Civil Court are ultra vires or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (i.e., whether the selection of the City Civil Court for summary procedure constitutes an irrational or discriminatory classification).
  2. Whether Order XXVII-A requires service of notice on the Advocate General or the Attorney General in this case (i.e., whether the petition involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution falling within Clause (1) of Article 132 read with Article 147).
  3. Whether the High Court had power under Sections 122 and 128 of the Civil Procedure Code to make rules applying Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court, or whether that power would improperly affect the jurisdiction (as distinct from the procedure) of subordinate courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • The rules framed by the High Court extending Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court are ultra vires and offend Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an irrational or discriminatory classification.
  • An order under Order XXXVII which compels a defendant in a summary suit to make a deposit is drastic, and selecting only certain courts (like the City Civil Court) to have that summary procedure amounts to unequal treatment.
  • Service of notice on the Advocate General and/or the Attorney General should be required under Order XXVII-A before hearing the constitutional challenge.
  • The High Court lacked power under Sections 122 and 128 to make a rule applying Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court because, the petitioner argued, that would concern the jurisdiction of the court rather than its procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ambalal Purusottamdas & Co. v. Jawarlal [1953 A.I.R. Cal. 758] Support for treating commercial litigation differently (i.e., upholding special procedure for commercial matters and summary suits). The court noted that the Calcutta High Court reached the same conclusion; the bench expressly agreed with the views in that judgment when justifying differential treatment of commercial litigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct parts addressing the points raised by the petitioner:

  1. Notice to Advocate General / Attorney General (Order XXVII-A):

    The court emphasised the limited scope of Rule 1 of Order XXVII-A: notice to the Advocate General or Attorney General is required only where the case involves a question referred to in Clause (1) of Article 132 read with Article 147 of the Constitution — in other words, a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The court held that not every constitutional question — however frivolous or vexatious — triggers that notice requirement; it must be a substantial question of constitutional interpretation. The court considered the question raised in this petition to be unsubstantial in that sense and therefore not requiring notice under Order XXVII-A.

  2. Article 14 challenge (classification rationality):

    The court reiterated the established principle that Article 14 does not demand uniformity of law, but prohibits classifications that lack a rational basis or are discriminatory in substance. The court explained that the legislative scheme conferring summary suit jurisdiction primarily upon certain High Courts (Fort William, Madras and Bombay) with power to extend procedure to subordinate courts permits rational classification.

    The court accepted that the underlying justification for summary procedure is the need for expeditious disposal of commercial disputes to give confidence and security to commercial persons and the commercial life of a region. Given the special commercial character and importance of Bombay, and the fact that the City Civil Court performs work akin to what the High Court historically did on the Original Side, the selection of the City Civil Court for summary procedure had a clear and reasonable basis and was not arbitrary or discriminatory.

  3. Selection between kinds of litigation (commercial vs non-commercial):

    The court addressed the contention that differential treatment of commercial litigation offended Article 14. It held that commercial litigation, by its nature, legitimately requires different treatment — notably quicker and more summary disposal — than ordinary long causes. Therefore applying Order XXXVII to commercial suits (and courts handling commercial causes) is a rational classification consistent with Article 14.

    The court referred to the Calcutta High Court decision in Ambalal Purusottamdas & Co. v. Jawarlal and expressly agreed with its reasoning.

  4. Power of High Court under Sections 122 and 128 (procedure vs jurisdiction):

    The court rejected the petitioner's contention that framing rules to extend Order XXXVII was an exercise affecting jurisdiction rather than procedure. It explained the distinction: jurisdiction concerns the power of a court to entertain a suit (territorial or pecuniary limits), whereas summary procedure under Order XXXVII concerns the manner in which a court disposes of suits once it has jurisdiction. Thus Order XXXVII is procedural; it prescribes a mode of trial applicable only when the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Consequently, the High Court's rule-making power under Sections 122 and 128 encompassed extending Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the application. The rules made by the High Court extending Order XXXVII to the City Civil Court were upheld as valid and not in violation of Article 14; notice to the Advocate General/Attorney General under Order XXVII-A was not required in this case; and the High Court had power under Sections 122 and 128 to make the relevant rule.

Direct consequences imposed by the court:

  • The application was dismissed and costs were awarded against the petitioner.
  • The court granted an extension of time for making the deposit — specifically, a fortnight (two weeks) from the date of the judgment.
  • The petitioner, through counsel Mr. Palkhivala, undertook not to make any further application in the City Civil Court or in this High Court for any additional extension of time.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion confined itself to upholding the rule-making power and the rationality of the classification involved; it did not purport to lay down a novel principle expanding constitutional law beyond applying established tests for Article 14 and distinguishing jurisdiction from procedure. No broader or new precedent was explicitly claimed as being set by this decision beyond its reasoning and its agreement with the cited Calcutta High Court authority.

    Laxmidas Devidas Kapadia v. Mathuradas Dwarkadas

    Chagla, C.J:— This is one of those usual applications which seek to extend the time granted by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court for making a deposit in a summary suit. The only difference between this application and others is that it is a little more ingenious than the others we have dealt with in the past.

    2. A civil revision application was preferred to this Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging an order made by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court in a summary suit on a promissory note directing that the petitioner should make a deposit of Rs. 9,500 by a certain date. The civil revision application was admitted by Mr. Justice Shah and the application came up for final hearing before Mr. Justice Bavdekar. At that stage the petitioner contended that he challenged the rules framed by this Court under which the provisions of O. XXXVII were made applicable to the City Civil Court and his contention was that these rules were ultra vires as they offended against art. 14 of the Constitution and also that they were invalid. Mr. Justice Bavdekar granted leave to the petitioner to amend the petition, and as it raised a constitutional question, it has come up before us for disposal. The first application of Mr. Palkhivala, which is again obviously intended for further delay, is that proper notice should be served upon the Advocate General and/or the Attorney General under O. XXVII-A of the Civil Procedure Code and that the hearing of this petition should be postponed until such notice has been served. It is important to lay down the proper procedure with regard to the necessity of serving a notice upon the Advocate General and the Attorney General under O. XXVII-A. It was never the intention of the Legislature, and it could not be the intention of the Legislature, that in every frivolous and vexatious application made challenging a State law or a Union law the Advocate General or the Attorney General should be served with a notice. We are sure that the Advocate General and the Attorney General have got more important things to do than to attend to such frivolous and vexatious applications. But this is not a mere matter of our conjecture as to what the intention of the Legislature was, because O. XXVII-A itself states in r. 1 that the case where a notice has to be served is a case where a question referred to in cl. 1 of art. 132 read with art. 147 of the Constitution is involved, and when we turn to art. 132, the case there referred to is a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, it is not every question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, however frivolous, however vexatious, however untenable, that requires the Court to serve a notice upon the Advocate General or the Attorney General, but it must be a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which must be substantial, and it is difficult to conceive of any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which is more unsubstantial than the question raised in this application. Order XXXVII which deals with summary suits only applies to the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras and Bombay. Under s. 122 of the Code, High Courts have been given the power to make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the civil Courts subject to their superintendence, and in the exercise of this power they may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule. Section 128 provides:

    “(1) Such rules shall be not inconsistent with the provisions in the body of this Code, but, subject thereto, may provide for any matters relating to the procedure of Civil Courts.”

    3. It is under this power conferred upon the High Court that we framed a rule by which we extended the provisions of O. XXXVII to the City Civil Court, and it is urged by Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the petitioner that in conferring that jurisdiction upon the City Civil Court we have offended against art. 14 which provides for equality before the law.

    4. It has often been stated that art. 14 does not require uniformity of application of law. What art. 14 prohibits is a classification which is not upon any rational basis. Article 14 does not prevent the Legislature from providing that laws shall apply differently to different persons or to different localities if in so providing the Legislature has in mind a rational classification. Article 14 prohibits a classification which has no rational basis or which is in substance discriminatory in character. The very expression “discriminatory” means that you apply one law to one party or to one locality and a different law to another party or a different locality without there being any reasonable object in doing so, and the question that we have to consider is whether, when the Legislature conferred the jurisdiction of trying summary suits only upon the High Court and left it to the High Court to apply this provision to any civil Court subordinate thereto, it was passing a law which was discriminatory in character and preventing litigants from enjoying the protection of art. 14. The very basis of summary suits is that where there is commercial litigation commercial men should get expeditious justice in respect of documents and transactions which are commercial in their nature and which require a quick disposal in order to give security and confidence to commercial men who are to a large extent responsible for the prosperity of the particular region or city where they reside and where they carry on their business or commerce. If that be the correct view of the reason why special jurisdiction with regard to summary suits is conferred upon the High Court, then it cannot be disputed that the city of Bombay is an important commercial city and that special procedure is necessary in suits involving commercial transactions in the High Court of Bombay. We have, for instance, rules with regard to commercial causes which make it possible for those causes to be decided more quickly than ordinary long causes. If Mr. Palkhivala's contention were right, even those rules would offend against art. 14. But in our opinion there is a clear logical reason why the Legislature enacting the, Civil Procedure Code conferred this special power upon the High Court with regard to summary suits.

    5. Turning to the conferment of this jurisdiction upon the City Civil Court, it should be borne in mind in the first instance that the City Civil Court is doing the same work which the High Court used to do on the Original Side before the City Civil Court was set up, and therefore if special procedure with regard to commercial matters is justified in the High Court, it is equally justified in the City Civil Court. But even assuming the City Civil Court was not doing the same kind of work, the City Civil Court is a Court in the city of Bombay and in matters which are within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and which are not of such extensive value as are entertained by the High Court, commercial men come to the City Civil Court as much as they go to the High Court and therefore this High Court thought it desirable that commercial men going to the City Civil Court should have the same facilities that they have when they come to the High Court and no distinction should be made whether the suit is below Rs. 25,000 or above Rs. 25,000. In our opinion, therefore, there is a clear reasonable basis why the City Civil Court in Bombay was selected by the High Court for conferment of this jurisdiction, whereas the other Courts in the State of Bombay were not included in the ambit of O. XXXVII.

    6. It is then said that this rule also offends against art. 14 on a different ground that a selection is made between one kind of litigation and another kind of litigation, and that whereas a defendant in a suit to which O. XXXVII does not apply is not compelled to make a deposit, a defendant in a suit to which summary procedure applies has to comply with this drastic provision of an order for deposit contemplated by O. XXXVII. The answer to this contention is what we have already suggested that commercial litigation in its very nature requires to be differently treated from non-commercial litigation, and it is no use suggesting that any ordinary suit which is tried as a long cause should have the same procedure as a suit in respect of a commercial transaction which requires a quick and effective disposal. The Calcutta High Court considering the same question has come to the same conclusion and the judgment is of Mr. Justice Mukharji which is reported in Ambalal Purusottamdas & Co. v. Jawarlal . [1953] A.I.R Cal. 758.. With respect, we entirely agree with the views expressed by the learned Judge.

    7. The second contention urged by Mr. Palkhivala is that the rule is invalid because we have no power to frame this rule under s. 128 read with s. 122, and the argument is put this way that s. 128 permits the High Court to frame rules with regard to matters relating to the procedure of civil Courts and it is said that the power to dispose of suits in accordance with the provisions of O. XXXVII is a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the Court and not relating to its procedure. The contention is obviously untenable. Jurisdiction goes to the question of the power of a Court to entertain a suit. Jurisdiction has either a territorial or a pecuniary aspect and some suits may not be entertained because there is no territorial jurisdiction and other suits may not be entertained by a Court because they are beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. Summary procedure has nothing to do with the right of a Court to entertain a particular suit. The Court must have jurisdiction to entertain the suit before the question arises as to whether it can apply the summary procedure. Therefore O. XXXVII is purely procedural and it empowers the Court to try a suit by one kind of procedure rather than another, but it only comes into operation provided the Court which applies O. XXXVII has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance in this contention either.

    8. The result is that the application fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    9. Time for making the deposit extended for a fortnight from today.

    10. Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of his client undertakes that he will not make any application in the City Civil Court or in this Court for any extension of time.

    11. Application dismissed.

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    Laxmidas Devidas Kapadia v. Mathuradas Dwarkadas
    (Sep 21, 1955)