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citation codes
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  • S. 12, Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947.24.
  • SECTION 11 A BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT
  • S. 31 or S. 32, Administrator General's Act, 1913,
  • certificate.38. S. 214, Indian Succession Act
  • Section 214, Indian Succession Act
  • S. 214, Indian Succession Act.41.
  • S. 214, Indian Succession Act.
  • Control Act, 57 of 1947
  • Indian Succession Act
  • Bombay Act 57 of 1947
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 12, Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947.24.
  • SECTION 11 A BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT
  • S. 31 or S. 32, Administrator General's Act, 1913,
  • certificate.38. S. 214, Indian Succession Act
  • Section 214, Indian Succession Act
  • S. 214, Indian Succession Act.41.
  • S. 214, Indian Succession Act.
  • Control Act, 57 of 1947
  • Indian Succession Act
  • Bombay Act 57 of 1947
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Civil Revision Applications Nos. 1564 & 1565 of 1953

Factual and Procedural Background

These revision applications arise from two Small Cause suits originally filed in the Court of Small Causes at Baroda:

  • Small Cause Suit No. 1425 of 1950 (filed 1-12-1950) — plaintiff sought possession (ejectment) of 14 rooms occupied by the defendant Bai Dahi, alleging tenancy, arrears of rent and nuisance; amount claimed for arrears was Rs. 2836-9-3.
  • Small Cause Suit No. 1210 of 1950 (filed 5-10-1950) — plaintiff sought recovery of rent in arrears.

The property in dispute consisted of 14 rooms used as a boarding house. The owner, Bai Mani, had leased the property to Bai Dahi in about 1944 at a contractual rent of Rs. 120 per month. A statute in the former Baroda State permitted an increase up to 50% for non-residential properties; enhanced rent had been recovered from Bai Mani pursuant to that statute. Bai Mani died in 1950, having made a will dated 26-10-1949 under which Ghansham Haridas (a minor at the date of the will and at the date of the suits) was constituted sole legatee. The suits were instituted by Ghansham's mother as his next friend.

At trial the learned trial Judge decreed suit No. 1210 (recovery of rent) and dismissed suit No. 1425 (ejectment). On appeal the District Judge reversed the trial Court on the rent claim and decreed both suits (decreeing the ejectment suit and setting aside the decree on the rent suit). The defendant Bai Dahi filed these revision applications to this Court against the District Court decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claim for arrears of rent in one suit was barred under Order II, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code because a prior suit for possession had been filed (i.e., whether the causes of action in the two suits were the same).
  2. Whether a decree could be granted for arrears of rent that accrued during the lifetime of the deceased owner (Bai Mani) without production of a succession certificate, probate, letters of administration or other representation as required by Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act.
  3. Whether the trial procedure followed (Small Cause procedure) was improper given that the claims exceeded Rs. 500 and should have followed the procedure for regular suits under the rules framed under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947.
  4. Whether the notice terminating the tenancy (service under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947) was valid and whether the plaintiff had complied with statutory preconditions for a suit for possession (service of notice, expiration of one month).
  5. Whether the court was justified in fixing the standard rent at Rs. 180/- per month (taking into account the pre-merger Baroda statute permitting a 50% increase over contractual rent and the post-merger application of the Bombay Act).
  6. Whether procedural and evidentiary objections (opportunity to lead evidence, refusal to allow evidence of improvements, competence of the plaintiff's next friend, and amendment of plaint) justified interference in revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant / Appellant (as advanced by Mr. Thakkar)

  • The plaintiff had no right to sue unless the will (dated 26-10-1949) was proved and the executor appointed under the will had assented to the legacy in favour of the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff’s mother was not a proper next friend to represent the minor plaintiff; therefore the suits were not properly instituted or prosecuted.
  • The notice terminating the tenancy served by the plaintiff's next friend was not a proper notice; suit No. 1210/1950 was consequently not maintainable.
  • Suit No. 1425 of 1950 (for recovery of rent) was barred under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., relying on the judgment reported at AIR 1914 Bom 130 (Kashinath Ramchandra v. Nathoo Keshav).
  • The procedure followed by the trial Court was contrary to rules framed under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947, because both suits involved claims exceeding Rs. 500 and should have been tried as regular suits rather than under Small Cause procedure.
  • The defendant was not given an opportunity to lead evidence (despite numerous adjournments) and was compelled to change advocates; as a result the defendant could not properly present her case.
  • The trial Judge wrongly disallowed evidence to show that the defendant had made improvements to the property.
  • The learned trial Judge erred in fixing the standard rent at Rs. 180/- per month instead of treating the contractual rent (Rs. 120/-) as controlling for the relevant period (1-1-1950 to 31-8-1950).
  • The plaintiff had not produced a succession certificate (or other representation) to enable recovery of arrears of rent which fell due during the lifetime of Bai Mani, and therefore the decree for such arrears should not have been sealed.

Plaintiff / Respondent (as reflected in the record and submissions)

  • It was common ground in the courts below that the plaintiff Ghansham Haridas was constituted sole legatee under the will and the defendant had waived proof of the will; the defendant did not challenge that position at trial.
  • No objection was taken in the trial Court to the competence of the plaintiff's mother as next friend; therefore that point cannot be raised for the first time in revision.
  • The trial Judge found the eviction notice (Ex. 29) to be a "perfectly valid notice" and it was not shown how it was defective.
  • The District Judge held that the causes of action in the two suits were different — for arrears the cause arises when rent falls due and is unpaid, whereas for possession under the Bombay Act the cause arises after service of notice and expiry of one month — and the plaintiff was entitled to pursue both claims separately.
  • Although the Baroda State merged in the Indian Union on 1-1-1950, the courts below regarded the pre-merger recoverable rent (Rs. 180/- being 50% above contractual Rs. 120/-) as the standard rent, and S.11 of the Bombay Act permits the Court to fix standard rent having regard to the Act and circumstances.
  • Regarding trial procedure and adjournments, the plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that as many as 15 adjournments had been given to the defendant, but the defendant often did not appear to give evidence; thus no substantial injustice was shown from the procedure followed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kashinath Ramchandra v. Nathoo Keshav, AIR 1914 Bom 130 Held that where a landlord filed a suit for possession following forfeiture for non-payment of rent, a subsequent separate suit for recovery of rent (arising on the same contract) may be barred under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C.; the claim for possession and for rent ought to be enforced in one suit where both arise from the same contract. The Court considered and distinguished this authority: on its facts the causes of action for possession and for rent arose from the same contract, but in the present case the Court agreed with the District Judge that the causes of action were different (rent becomes due when payable; possession under S.12 of the Bombay Act arises after service of notice and expiration of one month), so the precedent did not bar the rent suit in the present factual matrix.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal evaluations, applying statutory provisions and reviewing the factual record and procedural history:

  1. Common ground and preliminary points:
    • The Court noted it was common ground that the plaintiff had been constituted sole legatee under the will and that the defendant had waived proof of the will; accordingly the defendant could not raise for the first time in revision the objection that the will had not been proved or that the executor had not assented to the legacy.
    • Similarly, objections to the competence of the plaintiff's mother as next friend, not raised at trial, could not be entertained in revision.
  2. Validity of notice and statutory prerequisites for possession:
    • The trial Judge had examined the eviction notice (Ex. 29) and held it to be a "perfectly valid notice"; the Court observed that the sufficiency or propriety of the notice, where not argued below in detail, is not a matter ordinarily to be raised in revision unless substantial injustice is shown.
    • The Court recited the statutory requirements under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947 (noting S.12): to maintain a suit for possession the plaintiff must prove termination of tenancy according to law, that he served the statutory notice calling upon the defendant to pay arrears, and that one month had expired from service of such notice; only upon proof of these facts does a cause of action for possession arise.
  3. Whether the rent claim was barred by Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C:
    • The Court analyzed the authority cited (AIR 1914 Bom 130) and the factual basis of that judgment. It distinguished the present facts from that case on the ground that in the cited case the right to sue for rent and for possession arose on the same contract and were mutually connected (forfeiture and rent claims), whereas in the present case the cause of action for arrears of rent arises when rent falls due and remains unpaid, while the cause of action for possession under the Bombay Act arises only after statutory notice and the expiry of one month. On that basis the Court agreed with the District Judge that the causes of action here were not the same.
  4. Procedure and Small Cause Court rules:
    • The Court considered the contention that because the claims exceeded Rs. 500, Small Cause procedure was inappropriate. It observed that even assuming Small Cause procedure had been followed, the defendant had not shown how any injustice resulted nor that any evidence tendered was omitted from the record. Technical objections to procedure without demonstration of substantial injustice would not be permitted in revision.
  5. Adjournments, opportunity to lead evidence and improvements:
    • The record indicated up to 15 adjournments had been granted to the defendant, but the defendant often failed to appear to give evidence. The Court was unwilling to interfere with the trial Court's discretion to refuse further adjournments where, despite repeated opportunities, the defendant was not ready.
    • On the question of improvements, the Court noted that the defendant alleged a contract entitling reimbursement for repairs; but if no contract was proved, there was no scope to lead evidence merely to show expenditure on repairs. The refusal to admit improvement evidence was thus tied to a failure to prove the underlying contractual entitlement.
  6. Fixing of standard rent:
    • The contractual rent was Rs. 120/- per month as of 1-9-1940. The Court noted that under the statute in force in the former Baroda State a landlord could recover an enhanced rent up to 50% over contractual rent; accordingly, before merger the plaintiff could recover Rs. 180/- per month.
    • The Court cited S.11 of the Bombay Rents Act, 57 of 1947, which empowers Courts to fix the standard rent in any proceeding "having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case." The Courts below had concluded that the pre-merger recoverable rent (Rs. 180/-) should be regarded as the standard rent after merger, and the High Court accepted this as a conclusion the courts could reach as being just in the circumstances, unless the rent were so excessive as to require interference.
  7. Succession certificate requirement for arrears that fell due in deceased's lifetime:
    • The Court examined Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act which prohibits a Court from passing a decree against a debtor of a deceased person in favor of a person claiming by succession unless the claimant produces probate, letters of administration, a certificate under S.31 or S.32 Administrator General's Act, or a succession certificate under Part X of the Indian Succession Act specifying the debt.
    • The Court concluded that rent which accrued during Bai Mani's lifetime prima facie constitutes a "debt" within S.214 and is not excluded as agricultural rent; therefore the District Judge erred in passing a decree without production of a succession certificate or equivalent representation for arrears of rent that fell due before the death of Bai Mani.
  8. Remedies and directions:
    • The Court discharged the rule in Civil Revision Application No. 1564 of 1953.
    • In Civil Revision Application No. 1565 of 1953 the Court made the rule absolute, set aside the District Court's decree awarding arrears that fell due during Bai Mani's lifetime, and remanded the matter to the District Court with a direction that the decree awarding such arrears be sealed only after the plaintiff produces a succession certificate or other representation contemplated by S.214 of the Indian Succession Act.
    • If the plaintiff obtains and produces the necessary succession certificate (or equivalent), the District Judge is directed to include the costs of this Court in the costs awarded to the plaintiff. If no such representation is produced, the plaintiff will receive a decree only for rent that accrued after Bai Mani's death.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The rule in Civil Revision Application No. 1564 of 1953 is discharged with costs.
  • The rule in Civil Revision Application No. 1565 of 1953 is made absolute. The decree of the District Judge in favour of the plaintiff awarding arrears of rent which fell due during the lifetime of Bai Mani is set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the District Court with a direction that such arrears be decreed and the decree sealed only after the plaintiff produces a succession certificate or other representation contemplated by Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act.

Implications:

  • Direct practical effect: the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree in respect of rent that fell due during the deceased owner's lifetime unless the plaintiff produces the statutory proof of succession (probate, letters of administration, certificate under Administrator General's Act, or a succession certificate under the Indian Succession Act). If such proof is not produced, the plaintiff's entitlement is limited to arrears accruing after the date of the owner's death.
  • On the question whether suits for possession and for rent were barred by Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., the Court agreed with the District Judge that the causes of action were different in the factual circumstances of this case, so the rent suit was not barred on that ground.
  • The opinion confines its directions to the parties and the specific record; it does not purport to lay down any novel general principle beyond the application of S.214 of the Indian Succession Act and the established distinctions between causes of action for rent and for possession under the Bombay Rents Act.

Order as recorded: V.R.B — Order accordingly.

    Bai Dahi v. Ghanashyam Haridas

    These two revision applications arise out of two proceedings which were originally filed in the Court of Small Causes at Baroda. Civil Revision Application No. 1564 of 1953 arises out of Small Cause Suit No. 1425 of 1950 filed by the plaintiff on 1-12-1950 for an order against the defendant Bai Dahi in ejectment on the allegations that the defendant was a tenant, that she was in arrears of rent, and that her conduct amounted to a nuisance to the neighbourhood.

    2. Small Cause Suit No. 1210 of 1950 out of which Civil Revision Application No. 1565 of 1953 arises was filed by the plaintiff on 5-10-1950, for a decree for recovery of rent which had fallen in arrears. The claim of the plaintiff in suit No. 1425 of 1950 was for recovery of Rs. 2836-9-3 from the defendant. The two suits were resisted by the defendant Bai Dahi in the trial Court. The defendant contended that she was not in arrears, that in any event the plaintiff was not entitled to file a suit for possession of property against her, and that suit No. 1425 of 1950 was barred under O. II, R. 2, Civil P.C

    3. The learned trial Judge decreed suit No. 1210 of 1950 and dismissed suit No. 1425 of 1950. Appeals were preferred against the two decrees passed by the trial Court in the two suits. In appeal the learned District Judge decreed both the suits. The defendant Bai Dahi has applied to this Court in its revisional jurisdiction against the decrees passed by the District Court in the two suits.

    4. Few facts which give rise to this litigation may be stated. The property of which possession is claimed in suit No. 1210 of 1950 consists of 14 rooms and is situate in the town of Baroda. It is used as a boarding house by the defendant Bai Dahi. One Bai Mani was the owner of the property, and she leased out the property to Bai Dahi sometime in the year 1944. The agreed rent was Rs. 120/- per month.

    5. It appears that subsequently there was brought in force a statute in the former Baroda State under which a landlord was entitled to enhance the rent in respect of properties used for non-residential purposes upto 50 per cent over the contractual rent. Enhanced rent was recovered from Bai Mani accordingly. Bai Mani died sometime in 1950 having made and published a will dated 26-10-1949.

    6. Under the will the plaintiff Ghansham Haridas was constituted the sole legatee of the 14 rooms which are in dispute in the present case. Ghansham was at the date of the will and even when the suits were filed a minor, and the suits were instituted by his mother acting as his next friend. As I have stated earlier suit No. 1210 of 1950 was filed for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and on the ground that the conduct of the defendant Bai Dahi amounted to a nuisance to the neighbours.

    7. Suit No. 1425 of 1950 was filed for recovery of rent part of which had accrued due during the lifetime of Bai Mani and the balance after her death. In the trial Court the plaintiff's right to the property under the will of Bai Mani does not appear to have been denied. As the learned trial Judge has pointed out it was common ground between the parties that the plaintiff Ghansham Haridas had been constituted a sole legatee of the 14 rooms.

    8. The learned trial Judge did not accept the contention of the plaintiff that the defendants' conduct amounted to a nuisance. He held that the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit premises and that the defendant was his tenant, and the defendant being in arrears the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession of the property. The defendant had in the two suits raised a contention that the standard rent payable by her was less than the rent demanded by the plaintiff and the trial Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that the standard rent for the suit premises must be regarded as Rs. 180/- per month.

    9. In suit No. 1425 of 1950 the learned trial Judge held accepting the plea of the defendant that the plaintiff's suit was barred under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C He held in suit No. 1210 of 1950 that the plaintiff should have claimed arrears of rent which had accrued due till 31-8-1950 and which were claimed in suit No. 1425 of 1950.

    10. The learned trial Judge relying upon a judgment of this Court reported in — ‘Kashinath Ramchandra v. Nathoo Keshav’, AIR 1914 Bom 130 (A), held that the plaintiff's suit for recovery of arrears of rent was bound to fail when the plaintiff had previously filed a suit for possession. In the view of the learned Judge the cause of action to claim the arrears of rent and possession was complete on 5-10-1950, and if at that date the plaintiff did not file a compromise suit for possession and recovery of rent the subsequent suit for recovery of rent was liable to fail.

    11. As I have stated earlier, the decree passed in suit for ejectment, i.e, suit No. 1210 of 1950 by the trial Court was confirmed by the District Court, and the learned District Judge reversed the decree passed by the trial Court in suit No. 1425 of 1950. In the view of the learned District Judge the causes of action in the two suits were different.

    12. The learned Judge pointed out that in order to sustain the claim in suit No. 1210 of 1950 the plaintiff, had to prove three facts (i) that the tenancy alleged by him had been terminated according to the law of the land, (ii) that the plaintiff himself had served notice under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947 calling upon the defendant to pay the arrears of rent and (iii) that one month had expired from the date of service of such notice; and it is only when these three facts were proved that a cause of action would be deemed to arise in favour of the plaintiff for a suit for possession.

    13. But said the learned Judge in the other suit, i.e suit No. 1425 of 1950, which was a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, the plaintiff was required only to prove that the rent had fallen due on a particular date, and that the rent in arrears had not been paid. On the view taken by him the learned District Judge set aside the decree passed in suit No. 1425 of 1950, and decreed suit No. 1210 of 1950.

    14. In these two revision applications Mr. Thakkar on behalf of the petitioner has sought to raise a large number of contentions some of which were not raised even in the courts below. Mr. Thakkar has contended that the plaintiff had no right to file a suit unless he proved the will dated 26-10-1949 and further proved that the executor appointed under the will of Bai Mani had assented to the legacy in favour of the plaintiff.

    15. As I have pointed out earlier it was common ground between the parties that the plaintiff was a legatee under the will of Bai Mani and the defendant Bai Dahi waived proof of the will. It is not now open to the defendant to raise in revision applications a contention which does not appear to have been raised in the Courts below. It is true that under the will of a Hindu, the property on the death of the testator vests in the executor, and so long as the executor has not assented to a legacy in favour of the legatee the property continues to be vested in him and the right to sue would also continue to be vested in the executor.

    16. But as objection to the right of the plaintiff to sue because there was no assent of the executor to the legacy in favour of the plaintiff before the date of the suit does not appear to have been raised in the courts below and I do not think that I can allow that contention to be raised in these revision applications.

    17. Then Mr. Thakkar contended that the plaintiff's mother was not a proper next friend to represent the plaintiff who could have maintained the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. In my view that contention is futile. If the mother of the plaintiff has as his next friend filed the suits and no objection has been taken in the trial Court to her filing and prosecuting the suits on behalf of the plaintiff, it is not open to the defendant thereafter to raise any contention in that behalf.

    18. It was then urged by Mr. Thakkar that the notice served upon the defendant by the plaintiffs next friend terminating the tenancy was not a proper notice and the plaintiff consequently had no right to file suit No. 1210 of 1950. Even assuming that the notice served upon the defendant was not a proper notice, the question as to the propriety of the notice or sufficiency or otherwise of the notice is not a question which can be raised in a revision application.

    19. Even though an objection was raised in the written statement of the defendant as to the sufficiency and propriety of the notice, no arguments appear to have been advanced before the learned trial Judge as to the ground on which the notice served upon the defendant by the plaintiff was defective. The learned trial Judge in para 10 of his judgment in suit No. 1425 of 1950 has observed that

    “the notice of eviction is at Ex. 29. It is a perfectly valid notice and it is not shown how it is in any way defective”.

    20. Then Mr. Thakkar urged that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that suit No. 1425 of 1950 was not barred under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C, and he relied upon a judgment of this Court in AIR 1914 Bom 130 (A). That was a case in which the landlord had let out the land for a period of five years on condition that if the tenant failed to pay rent every year the lease was to be void. The tenant failed to pay rent for the second year and the landlord became entitled to two reliefs, viz., the right to sue for recovery of rent and also for possession of the land on the ground that the lease had become void.

    21. The landlord then filed a suit for possession and asked for permission to bring a separate suit for recovery of rent and arrears of rent for two years. But no such permission was given to the landlord. Subsequently the landlord plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of rent for two years and it was held that the suit for rent was barred under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C as the claim in the suit for rent upto the date of forfeiture arose upon the same contract as did the landlord's right to forfeiture for non-payment of rent and that there was no necessity or reason which existed for a separate suit for rent where there had been forfeiture for non-payment and that the claim for possession and the claim for rent ought to be enforced in one suit.

    22. It is evident from the facts in the case that the right to sue for recovery of rent and possession arose on the same contract and Breach of some of the covenants and the court held that the suit having been filed for possession and liberty not having been reserved for recovery of rent in a separate suit, the suit for possession was not maintainable. In the present case, however, I agree with the view of the learned District Judge that the causes of action in the two suits were not the same.

    23. In the case of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent the cause of action arises when the rent falls due and is not paid; whereas in the case of a suit for possession under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 the cause of action arises on the expiration of one month from the date on which a demand for possession is made as required by S. 12, Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947.

    24. Then Mr. Thakkar contended that the trial of the two suits by the learned trial Judge was contrary to the rules framed under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947. Mr. Thakkar contends that in both the suits the claim exceeded Rs. 500/- and the procedure which should have been followed in the trial of the two suits by the learned trial Judge was the procedure followed in trial of regular suits and not as in case of suits tried under Small Cause Courts Act.

    25. But by following the procedure which is followed in case of small cause Court trials, assuming that it had been followed in the case of the two suits, what injustice has been caused to the defendant has not been indicated to me. It is not suggested that all the evidence which was tendered before the trial Court has not been recorded. The learned trial Judge has given adequate reasons also in support of his conclusions.

    26. Even if there is any substance in the contention raised as to the procedure followed at the trial of the two suits, it is a technical contention which cannot be permitted to be raised in these revision applications, unless it is shown that substantial injustice has resulted by reason of infringement of the rules as to the trial of suits.

    27. Then Mr. Thakkar contended that the plaintiff at one stage wanted to amend the plaint, but the plaintiff did not press the application for amendment of the plaint. How that conduct of the plaintiff can conceivably be a cause of grievance for the defendant, I am unable to appreciate. It was for the plaintiff to amend or not to amend her plaint, and evidently the defendant cannot compel the plaintiff to amend the plaintiff the plaintiff does not desire to do so.

    28. Then Mr. Thakkar contended that the defendant was not given an opportunity to lead evidence. The two suits were filed in 1950, and they were disposed of in 1952; and I am informed by Mr. Karlekar who appears on behalf of the plaintiff, that even though as many as 15 adjournments were given the defendant did not remain present in Court to give evidence. Mr. Thakkar says that the adjournments were necessitated by reason of the fact that the defendant was required to change her lawyer, and the lawyer who came on the scene ultimately was not properly instructed as to the progress of the suits.

    29. The question whether adjournments should or should not be granted in the circumstances of the case is within the discretion of the Court, and with the exercise of that discretion this Court would be loath to interfere. When as many as 15 adjournments had been given to enable the defendant to remain present in Court and to lead evidence if the defendant is still not ready and the Court of first instance refuses to grant further adjournment, this court would certainly not interfere with the exercise of that discretion by the Court of first instance.

    30. Mr. Thakkar then contended that the defendant wanted to lead evidence to show that she had made improvements upon the property, but the learned trial Judge did not allow that evidence to be led. But on turning to the record of the trial Court it appears that the defendant had raised a contention that there was a contract under which she was entitled to make repairs and to be reimbursed for expenses incurred and she had to prove the existence of the contract. If the contract was not proved there was no scope for leading evidence to show that the defendant had spent for repairs.

    31. Then Mr. Thakkar contended that the learned trial Judge was in error, in fixing the standard rent at Rs. 180/- per month in respect of the suit premises. Mr. Thakkar says that the contractual rent on 1-9-1940, which is the relevant date, was Rs. 120/- per month, and the courts below were not entitled to ignore the contractual rent and arbitrarily fix the rent at Rs. 180/- per month.

    32. In my view there is no substance in that contention also. The contractual rent, it is true, was-Rs. 120/- on 1-9-1940; but relying upon the provisions of the statute in force in the former Baroda State the plaintiff was entitled to an increase of 50 per cent over and above the contractual rent and so long as the Baroda State was not merged in the Indian Union the increased rent could be recovered.

    33. Mr. Thakkar says that the Baroda State merged in the Indian Union on 1-1-1950 and the question has to be decided under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947 as to what the proper amount of standard rent can be and that question can only be decide ed by reference to the period commencing from 1-1-1950 and ending on 31-8-1950 for which period only the arrears of rent have been claimed.

    34. Now under S. 11, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947, if there is any dispute between the landlord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent in any suit or proceeding the Court may fix it at such amount as having regard, to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case, the Court deems just.

    35. The Courts below have taken the view that because under the law in operation in the Baroda State before its merger in the Indian Union the plaintiff was entitled to recover rent at the rate of Rs. 180/- per month, the amount of Rs. 180/- per month must be regarded as the standard rent even after the merger of the Baroda State in the Indian Union. That conclusion of the Courts below must be regarded as a conclusion arrived at ‘having regard to the provisions of the Act (57 of 1947) and the circumstances of the case and what the Courts deemed just.

    36. In my opinion it would be doing injustice to the plff. not to declare the standard rent at the figure at which before the date of merger the plff. was entitled to recover rent, unless that rent was so excessive that it required to be interfered with by the Court.

    37. Finally Mr. Thakkar contended that the claim for arrears of rent includes a claim for rent which fell due during the lifetime of Bai Mani & also for rent which fell due after her death and in respect of rent which fell due during the life time of Bai Mani the plff. has not obtained any succession-certificate. Now rent when it becomes due becomes a debt, and before a decree for that debt would be sealed the Court must insist upon production of a succession certificate.

    38. S. 214, Indian Succession Act provides that

    “No Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, except on the production, by the person so claiming, of either a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or a certificate; under S. 31 or S. 32, Administrator General's Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein, or a succession certificate granted under Part X of the Indian Succession Act and having the debt specified therein.”

    39. Prima facie it appears that the rent which accrued due during the lifetime of Bai Mani must be regarded as ‘debt’ within the meaning of S. 214, Indian Succession Act. It is not rent payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes and is therefore not excluded under sub-s. (2) of S. 214 from the operation of the section. The learned District Judge was therefore in error in passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff without production of either a succession certificate or probate, or letters of administration, or a certificate under S. 31 or S. 32, Administrator General's Act, 1913, in respect of the arrears of rent which fell due during the lifetime of Bai Mani.

    40. The rule in civil Revision Application No. 1564 of 1953 will be discharged with costs. In Civil Revision application No. 1565 of 1953 the rule will be made absolute and the decree passed by the learned District Judge in favour of the plaintiff will be set aside and the proceedings remanded to the District Court with a direction that the decree awarding arrears of rent which fell due during the lifetime of Bai Mani will be sealed only after the plaintiff produces either a succession certificate or any other representation contemplated by S. 214, Indian Succession Act.

    41. On the succession Certificate or any other representation contemplated by S. 214, Indian Succession Act being obtained and produced by the plff. and the decree being sealed the learned Dist. Judge will include in the costs awarded by him to the plff. the costs of this Court against the defendant. If the necessary succession certificate or any other representation as contemplated by Section 214, Indian Succession Act is not produced by the plff. there will be a decree in favour of the plff. only for the amount of rent which accrued due after the date on which Bai Mani died.

    V.R.B
    Order accordingly.
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    Bai Dahi v. Ghanashyam Haridas
    (Sep 1, 1955)