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  • English rule in O. III, r. 6 of the Rules
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  • English rule in O. III, r. 6 of the Rules
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs issued a summons for judgment in a summary suit relying on three hundies (bills) dated April 9 and April 10, 1950, for Rs. 5,000, Rs. 500 and Rs. 2,000 respectively, drawn by the defendant upon Messrs Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria in favour of the Punjab National Bank Ltd. The plaint alleged agreements (two agreements referred to) under which the plaintiffs would accept and honour hundies drawn by the defendant and the defendant would pay the amounts on demand with interest. The hundies were annexed to the plaint and the plaintiffs’ affidavit asserted that Ramrikhdas and Chiranjilal were partners in the plaintiff-firm and that the hundies were honoured pursuant to the defendant’s instructions.

Conditional leave to defend was granted to the defendant (the appellant). The appellant failed to comply with the conditions attached to that leave, and the suit was placed on board for decree; a decree was passed by a Judge of the City Civil Court. The defendant appealed against that decree to the court delivering this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a summary suit is maintainable when the plaintiff's claim is based on an oral agreement (i.e., where proof of the agreement would require oral evidence).
  2. Whether the cause of action stated in the summons differs materially from the cause of action in the plaint, such that the summons alters the plaint's cause of action (specifically, whether stating that the hundies were drawn on an individual partner rather than on the plaintiff-firm changes the cause of action).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Nain)

  • The suit is based on three oral agreements and therefore is not maintainable as a summary suit.
  • The plaintiffs’ affidavit effectively relies on a third agreement (that the plaintiffs were liable for hundies drawn not upon the plaintiff-firm but upon the individual Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria), which means the claim depends on proving an oral agreement.
  • The cause of action set out in the summons differs from that in the plaint because, according to the plaint, the hundies should have been drawn on the plaintiff-firm, whereas the summons states they were drawn on an individual partner.

Plaintiffs' Assertions

  • The plaint alleges agreements under which the plaintiffs agreed to accept and honour hundies drawn by the defendant and the defendant agreed to pay the amounts on demand with interest.
  • The plaintiffs honoured three specified hundies (annexed to the plaint) pursuant to instructions from the defendant and seek recovery of the amounts paid.
  • The affidavit in support stated that Ramrikhdas and Chiranjilal were partners in the plaintiff-firm and that the hundies were honoured under the defendant's instructions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Appeal No. 16 of 1953 (Chagla, C.J. and Shah, J.) Earlier view that where a plaintiff must prove an oral agreement, enforcement by summary suit was not permissible. The court noted this earlier view but reconsidered it on a closer reading of the amended rule, declining to follow the earlier restrictive approach in favour of allowing summary suits in appropriate oral-contract cases.
Civil Revision Application No. 536 of 1953 (Chagla, C.J., sitting singly) Earlier statement consistent with the view in Appeal No. 16 of 1953 concerning oral agreements and summary procedure. Similarly noted and reconsidered; the court indicated the earlier position should be reconsidered in light of the amended rule and applicable principles.
Amended Order XXXVII, Rule 2 (High Court) Defines suits maintainable by summary procedure to include "all suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant ... arising on contract express or implied". The court relied on this rule to conclude that the contract need not be in writing and that a summary suit may be maintainable where a debt or liquidated demand arises from an oral (express or implied) contract.
Order III, Rule 6 (Rules of the Supreme Court) — English counterpart Source from which the amended High Court rule was borrowed; provides the conceptual framework for "debt or liquidated demand". The court cited the correspondence with the English rule to support the interpretation that the contract may be oral and still give rise to a liquidated demand suitable for summary procedure.
Annual Practice (page 18) — Commentary on "debt or liquidated demand" Sets out the test for "liquidated demand": (a) the amount demanded must be stated or be ascertainable by calculation; and (b) sufficient particulars of the contract must be given to disclose its nature. The court adopted this test and applied it to the plaintiffs' claim, holding that the specific sums of the hundies and the particulars in the plaint bring the claim within the definition of a liquidated demand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the amended wording of Order XXXVII, rule 2, which includes within summary procedure "all suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money ... arising on contract express or implied." The court reasoned that this language contemplates that the contract need not be in writing and may be implied. It therefore rejects the categorical exclusion of oral agreements from summary procedure.

The court applied the Annual Practice commentary's two-part test for "liquidated demand": (a) the amount must be stated or be a mere calculation, and (b) the plaint must give sufficient particulars of the contract to disclose its nature. The plaintiffs claimed specific sums—the amounts paid in respect of the three hundredis—and the plaint and annexed hundies supplied particulars. On that basis, the claim qualifies as a debt or liquidated demand even though the underlying agreement was oral.

The court addressed procedural consequences: if a defendant does not answer a properly endorsed summons, the defendant is deemed to admit the plaint's averments and a decree may follow without oral evidence. When the defendant does appear and files affidavits, the court must consider whether to grant unconditional leave to defend. The court acknowledged that where an oral contract is expressly denied on affidavits, ordinarily unconditional leave should be granted so the contract can be proved orally; but affidavits may sometimes establish the contract by surrounding circumstances or the defendant’s conduct.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found the defendant admitted receipt of the moneys corresponding to the three hundies and did not deny receiving consideration. The defendant's only substantive defence was that the hundies were drawn in the name of a partner rather than the plaintiff-firm; the plaintiffs asserted they honoured the hundies under the defendant's instructions. Given the defendant’s admission of receipt and the plaintiffs’ averments, the court concluded there was little real defence to the claim and that the City Civil Court judge was justified in granting conditional leave (requiring deposit) rather than unconditional leave.

On the contention that the cause of action in the summons differed from the plaint, the court held that stating the actual fact (that the hundies were drawn on the individual partner) did not alter the cause of action and was not a substantive change that would affect maintainability.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The decree of the City Civil Court was upheld and the appeal failed.
  • The court held that a summary suit is maintainable where the plaintiff's claim is a debt or liquidated demand arising on an express or implied contract, even if that contract is oral—provided the claim satisfies the definition of a liquidated demand (specific sum and sufficient particulars). This means that an oral contract can, in appropriate circumstances, be enforced by summary procedure when the required conditions are met.
  • Where a defendant appears and files affidavits denying an oral contract, the court should ordinarily grant unconditional leave to defend so oral evidence can be led, unless the affidavits and surrounding circumstances suffice to establish the contract; in such cases conditional leave (e.g., deposit) may be appropriate.

    Gokuldas Poddar v. Ramrikhdas Parasrampuria And Co.

    Chagla, C.J:—

    This is an appeal against a decree passed by a Judge of the City Civil Court on a summary suit. A summons for judgment was taken out by the plaintiffs and conditional leave to defend was granted to the defendant who is the appellant before us. The appellant failed to comply with the conditions on which he could defend the suit. Therefore the suit was placed on board for a decree and a decree was passed. It is against that decree that this appeal is preferred.

    The first contention of Mr. Nain on behalf of the appellant is that the suit is based on three oral agreements and therefore it was not maintainable as a summary suit. Now, the two agreements are referred to in the plaint and these two agreements are that the defendant saw Ramrikhdas, a partner of the plaintiffs at Muttra and it was then agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should accept and honour Hundis drawn by defendant against the plaintiffs and that the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs on demand the amounts of the said Hundies with interest thereon from the dates of payment at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, and paragraph 3 of the plaint goes on to state that in pursuance of the said agreement and under instructions from the defendant, the plaintiffs honoured and paid three Hundies respectively dated April 9, 1950, April 10, 1950 and April 10, 1950 for the respective sums of Rs. 5,000, Rs. 500 and Rs. 2,000 drawn by the defendant against Messrs Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria in favour of the Punjab National Bank Ltd. The Hundies are annexed to the plaint and they show that they were not drawn in favour of the plaintiff-firm but they were drawn upon Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria. In the affidavit in support of the summons the plaintiffs stated that in the plaintiff-firm Ramrikhdas and Chiranjilal are partners and the Hundies were drawn upon Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal pursuant to the instructions of the defendant, and therefore Mr. Nain says that really in this affidavit the plaintiffs are relying on a third agreement which is that the plaintiffs were liable for Hundis not drawn upon the plaintiff-firm but upon the individual Ramnikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria.

    Now, the question raised by Mr. Nain is of considerable importance because this question often arises where leave to defend is either refused or conditionally granted. The question we have to consider is whether a summary suit would lie when the plaintiff's claim is not based upon any written agreement but is based upon an agreement in order to prove which evidence would have to be given by the plaintiff. It seems that a view was taken in Appeal No. 16 of 1953 by myself and my brother Mr. Justice Shah and also in Civil Revision Application No. 536 of 1953 by me sitting singly that where the plaintiff has got to prove an oral agreement he could not enforce that agreement by a summary suit. It seems to us that the view should be reconsidered on a more careful consideration of the rule framed by us with regard to the filing of a summary suit. Now, the High Court has amended O. XXXVII, r. 2, and the amended rule to the extent that it is material runs as follows:

    “All suits upon bills of exchange, hundies or promissory notes and all suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest, arising on contract express or implied, or on an enactment where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money.”

    Now, this case falls in the category of a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest arising on the contract express or implied. Therefore the rule itself assumes that the contract on which the plaintiff is suing need not be a contract in writing. It may even be an implied contract. But so long as there is a debt or liquidated demand which becomes payable under such a contract, the plaintiff is entitled to sue for the amount due under the contract. This amended rule has been borrowed from the corresponding English rule in O. III, r. 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and we find at page 18 of the Annual Practice a commentary on the expression “debt or liquidated demand” and this is what the learned Commentator says:

    “In order to come within the definition ‘liquidated demand’ a claim on a contract must (a) state the amount demanded, or be so expressed that the ascertainment of the amount is a mere matter of calculation; and (b) must give sufficient particulars of the contract to disclose its nature. It is the nature of the contract on which the claim is based, as well as the fact that a specific sum is claimed which brings the claim, or fails to bring it, within the definition.”

    Now, here a specific sum is demanded by the plaintiffs which is the amount of the Hundis honoured by the plaintiffs under an agreement with the defendant. Therefore there can be no doubt that on this interpretation of the rule the plaintiffs are suing on a debt or liquidated demand which arises on an express contract although the contract is oral and not in writing. In our opinion, therefore, a summary suit would be maintainable although it is based on an oral agreement or contract. It would be maintainable even if the contract or agreement is not admitted by the defendant. It may be said that if that were so the plaintiffs would be bound to lead oral evidence to prove the contract. But the scheme of filing a summary suit is that when the summons is served upon the defendant which contains the cause of action—in England it is a specially endorsed writ—if he does not answer to the summons, he is deemed to admit the averments contained in the plaint and therefore if the plaintiffs relies on an oral contract and the defendant does not appear in answer to the summons, the Court would pass a decree in such a suit because the defendant has admitted the claim of the plaintiff by failing to appeal in answer to the summons. When the defendant does appear and files an affidavit and the matter is to be decided upon by affidavits by the Court, then the question that has to be considered is not with regard to the maintainability of the suit, but with regard to the question as to whether unconditional leave should be granted to the defendant. Now, we do feel that there is considerable force in Mr. Nain's argument that when a plaintiff is relying on an oral agreement which is denied by the defendant on affidavits, ordinarily the Court should grant unconditional leave; but there may be cases where the Court may hold the contract established after perusing the affidavits. It may be held to be established by surrounding circumstances or it may be held to be established from the conduct of the defendant. But where the affidavits do not clearly establish the oral contract relied upon by the plaintiff, it may well be that the Court should grant unconditional leave in order that the plaintiff should establish the contract by oral testimony to be tested by the Court.

    Now, in this case the position seems to us to be very clear. The amounts of the three Hundies which were paid by the plaintiffs are admitted to have been received by the defendant. So he has received consideration in respect of the three Hundis, on which in a sense this suit is based. His only defence seems to be that the Hundis were to be drawn in the name of the plaintiffs, according to the agreement pleaded by the plaintiffs, whereas in fact the Hundis were drawn in the name of a partner in the plaintiff-firm. To that the answer given by the plaintiffs is that they honoured the Hundis although they were drawn in the name of a partner under instructions given by the defendant. It seems to us that there is hardly any defence to the suit when the defendant clearly and unequivocally admits the receipt of the moneys on the Hundis; nor does the defendant deny the contract. All that he says is that the Hundis were not drawn pursuant to the contract and in respect of that it was open to the Court to consider the conduct of the defendant and the averment of the plaintiff that the Hundis were honoured under instructions from the defendant. Therefore, it seems to us that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was justified in taking the view that this was not a case where unconditional leave should be granted, but that the defendant should have the right to defend the suit only on his depositing the sum mentioned in the order on the summons for judgment.

    There is not much force in the other contention raised by Mr. Nain that the cause of action mentioned in the summons is different from the cause of action in the plaint. The cause of action in the summons really sets out the three Hundis and mentions that they were drawn on Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria. Mr. Nain's quarrel with this is that in the plaint according to the agreement the Hundis should have been drawn on the plaintiff-firm and not on Ramrikhdas Chiranjilal Parasrampuria, but the summons states the actual fact and the cause of action is not altered by the summons stating that the Hundis were drawn not on the plaintiff-firm but on the individual mentioned in the summons. In our opinion, there is not much substance in this appeal.

    The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.
    G.N.V
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    Comments

    Gokuldas Poddar v. Ramrikhdas Parasrampuria And Co.
    (Nov 17, 1954)