Chagla, C.J:—
An interesting question arises in this revision application as to whether the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was in force on May 27, 1950 when the first opponent filed a suit under the D.A.R Act.
Now, in order to properly construe s. 56 it is necessary to have the background of the previous legislation. Under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1939, it was provided, by s. 85 that the D.A.R Act should cease to have force in such areas where the Board was established on the date when the Board was so established, but s. 86 of the Act kept the D.A.R Act in force for special purposes for three years from the date of the establishment of the Board. In this particular area with which we are dealing the Board was established on May 1, 1945. Therefore, under s. 85 the D.A.R Act would cease to have force, but by reason of s. 86 it would continue to be in force up to April 31, 1948. Then the old D.A.R Act was repealed and the new Act came into force on May 27, 1947 and the result of the repeal of the old Act was or would have been that the D.A.R Act would no longer have been in force as provided in s. 86 of the old act. Therefore, in this particular case on May 27, 1947, the D.A.R Act would not have been in force for the purpose of s. 86 of the old act as on that date the new Act came into force. In order to get over that difficulty an amending Act was passed in 1948 which was Act LXX of 1948 and by that amendment s. 56(1) was made to run as follows:
“Notwithstanding the repeal of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act by the B.A.D.R Act of 1939, the first mentioned Act shall, in so far as it applies to transactions and proceedings to which this Act does not apply, be deemed to have been re-enacted with effect from the date of the coming into operation of this Act and shall continue to be in force for a period of three years from the said date.”
Therefore, the Legislature, feeling that the D.A.R Act ceased to be in force after 1947, made good that lacuna in the legislation by the amending Act of 1948 and retrospectively re-enacted the D.A.R Act from May 27, 1947. In other words, by reason of this amendment there was to be no break whatever in the continuance of the D.A.R Act.
Now, let us see what is the language used by the Legislature and what effect should be given to that language, because if the language is clear then I agree with Mr. Limaye that whatever the legislative background may be the intention of the Legislature can only be gathered by the words used. The material words which call for construction at my hands are “re-enacted with effect from the date of the coming into operation of this Act”, and the contention of Mr. Limaye is that in construing this expression I must exclude May 27, 1947, the date on which the new Act came into force, and calculate the three years from May 28, 1947, in which case the suit as filed on the May 27, 1950 would be in time. On the other hand, Mr. Chitale's contention is that May 27, 1947, should not be excluded in calculating the period of three years and if May 27, 1947 is included then the period expired on the midnight of May 26, 1950, and the suit filed is out of time. Section 10 of the Bombay General Clauses Act provides that in any Bombay Act made after the commencement of this Act it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. Mr. Chitale says that this section only applies when the Legislature has used both the expressions “from” and “to”. I am not prepared to accept that contention. The two parts of s. 10(1) are independent and the Legislature has laid down how “from” is to be interpreted when used in a certain context and how “to” is to be interpreted when used in a certain context. Therefore, if you have a series of days or a period of time mentioned after the word “from”, the first day has got to be excluded. That is clear from s. 10(1) and this is what is most strongly relied upon by Mr. Limaye. Mr. Limaye says, here you have a period of time mentioned, three years, you have the date mentioned, viz., May 27, 1947, and therefore, applying s. 10(1) of the General Clauses Act, you must exclude May 27, 1947, in which case the three years commenced from May 28, and not from May 27. It is clear that s. 10(1) applies when the Legislature intends to exclude the first day from a series of days or the period of time used for a particular purpose. Instead of making it clear in every legislation it is sufficient for the Legislature to use the word “from”. In my opinion, the Legislature has made it amply clear in s. 56(1) that it has not used the word “from” in the sense in which it is indicated in s. 10(1) of the General Clauses Act because the language used is not “from the date of the coming into operation of the Act”, but the language is “with effect from the date of the coming into operation of the Act.” In my opinion, the expression “with effect” are the key words to this sub-section and they give a clear indication of the intention of the Legislature. A certain Act is being re-enacted with retrospective effect and the Legislature wants to give validity to that re-enactment and therefore, the Legislature says that the D.A.R Act will be valid from the date which it itself has mentioned, viz., the date of the coming into operation of the Act, and, therefore, the Legislature says that the D.A.R Act is re-enacted with effect form that date. Whatever force Mr. Limaye's contention might have had if the words “with effect” did not appear in the sub-section, their presence in that sub-section to my mind is conclusive as to the intention of the Legislature, and this interpretation receives further support and further emphasis from the legislative history of this legislation to which I have drawn attention. It is impossible to believe that the Legislature intended that the D.A.R Act should not be in force on one solitary day, viz., May 27, 1947, because till May 26, 1947, it was in force by virtue of the old act. on may 27, 1947, the old act was repealed and the new Act came into force. By the amendment, according to Mr. Limaye, the D.A.R Act was re-enacted as from May 28, 1947. The result would be that you will have one, as it were, dies non on which the D.A.R Act would not be in force. I do not think that would be a proper interpretation to put upon this section. Mr. Limaye says that the Legislature has again used the expression “from”, in the latter part of this sub-section when it says, “and shall continue in force for a period of three years from the said date.” But I cannot overlook the fact that the expression “with effect” is used in the earlier part of the sub-section and the meaning to be given to the expression “with effect” in the earlier part of the sub-section must be the meaning which must be given to the expression “from” in the latter part of s. 56(1). Therefore, in my opinion the learned Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion that the D.A.R Act was in force on May 27, 1950. The result is that the right of the plaintiff to maintain a suit under the D.A.R Act no longer existed on May 27, 1950. Therefore, the suit as filed is not maintainable.
Result is that the order of the learned Judge will be set aside and the suit will be dismissed with costs. Rule absolute with costs.
Rule absolute.
M.W.P