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Case Number

First Appeal No. 212 of 1949

Attorney(S)

S.M Shah with K.T Pathak, for the appellant.
S.T Desai with C.K Shah and C.C Vaidya, for the respondent.

Judges

Mr. Rajadhyaksha
Mr. Vyas, JJ.

Acts

provisions of the Bombay Rent Control Act
s. 50 effected by Bombay Act III of 1949,
s. 28 of the Bombay Rent Control Act.
Bombay Rent Control Act of 1947.
s. 50 of the Rent Control Act
Rent Control Act of 1947
Rent Control Act

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Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of Opinion — Rajadhyaksha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) and defendant entered into tenancy arrangements evidenced by a rent-note dated 5 January 1939 and, after five years, another rent-note dated 6 February 1944. The rent was Rs. 135 per month and tenancy began on 3 January 1944. The rent-note required one month's notice to obtain possession. The plaintiff served a notice to vacate on 2 October 1945. When the defendant did not vacate, the plaintiff initiated an ejectment suit (No. 1770 of 1945) by filing on 12 December 1946.

In that earlier suit the defendant asserted that the property belonged to Chaturbhuj Temple and that the plaintiff was only an officiating Vahivatdar — thus challenging the plaintiff's title and the maintainability of the ejectment suit. That suit was dismissed on 27 September 1947 because the court found the notice to quit defective and because it had been served on the defendant's constituted attorney rather than the defendant personally.

After the prior dismissal, on 10 November 1947 the plaintiff gave notice forfeiting the lease on the ground of the defendant's disclaimer of title. The defendant replied on 27 November 1947 explaining that he did not intend to disclaim title and that the earlier statement had been made under a mistaken belief. The plaintiff then filed the present suit on 1 December 1947, basing his cause of action on the alleged disclaimer of title.

In answer the defendant raised multiple defences (mistaken belief, waiver by the plaintiff, retraction of the disclaimer), all of which were found against him. Separately, the defendant relied on the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, claiming statutory tenant status and protection from eviction under s. 12(1) while he remained ready and willing to pay fixed rent.

The trial judge held that the defendant was protected by the Rent Control Act (being a tenant within s.5(11)) and accordingly refused to order eviction; the judge awarded the plaintiff arrears of rent (Rs. 3,361-3-0) and ordered that each party bear its own costs. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the suit, decided on 1 October 1948 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, was tried by a Court that lacked jurisdiction in view of the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 (particularly s. 28 and the transfer proviso in s. 50).
How the proviso to s. 50 of the Rent Control Act should be construed after the amendment (addition of the words “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be”) made by Bombay Act III of 1949 and given retrospective effect by s. 13 of that amending Act.
Whether the added words validate continuance of proceedings in Courts that otherwise lacked jurisdiction under s. 28, or instead mean that proceedings pending in proper courts should continue there while proceedings in improper courts must be transferred.
Whether the decree of the lower Court should be set aside and the suit remitted for trial to the appropriate Court (identified after amendment as the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The trial was conducted by a Court without jurisdiction after the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 came into force; s. 28 confines jurisdiction to specific courts and s. 50 required transfer of pending suits to those courts.
Because the suit was pending when the Act took effect, the proviso to s. 50 required transfer to the appropriate Court (the Civil Judge, Junior Division, or ultimately the Court of Small Causes), but no transfer was made; therefore the trial and decree were without jurisdiction.

Respondent/Defendant's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

In the substantive ejectment suit, the defendant argued that the property belonged to Chaturbhuj Temple and that the plaintiff lacked title, which would make the ejectment action not maintainable until title was established (this underpinned earlier proceedings and the events leading to the present suit).
In the present suit the defendant also argued statutory protection under the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 — asserting that he was a statutory tenant under s.5(11) and protected from eviction under s.12(1) while willing to pay fixed rent.
Before this Court, Mr. Desai (for the respondent) conceded that the construction advanced by the appellant (that the amended words did not validate continuance in courts without jurisdiction) was a reasonable construction, i.e., he did not contest that interpretation as unreasonable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Nilkanth Ramchandra Chandole v. Rasiklal Mulchand Gujar (Full Bench)	The Full Bench held that the retrospective effect of the Rent Control Act, 1947 was confined to what was expressly stated in s. 50 — i.e., to suits which were transferred and continued before the proper Courts.	The Court relied on the decision to explain why the amendment (addition of “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be”) was introduced: to remedy an anomaly identified by the Full Bench. The precedent supported the interpretation that the added words were not intended to validate proceedings in Courts without jurisdiction but to clarify that suits pending in proper courts should continue there while suits pending in improper courts must be transferred to the appropriate courts under s. 28.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence tied to statutory interpretation and jurisdictional rules in the Rent Control Act:

The Court noted s. 28 of the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 prescribes which Courts have jurisdiction to try landlord-tenant suits relating to rent or possession: in Greater Bombay the Court of Small Causes; elsewhere the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having jurisdiction, or if none, the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction.
Section 50 contained a proviso dealing with suits pending when the Act came into force: those suits "shall be transferred to and continued before the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act" and the Act and its rules were to apply to them.
The present suit was pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad when the Act took effect. Under the literal text of the proviso the suit ought to have been transferred to the Civil Judge, Junior Division (the Court with jurisdiction under s. 28). The necessary transfer, however, had not been effected and the suit was tried and decided by the Civil Judge, Senior Division.
The proviso was later amended (by Bombay Act III of 1949, s.10) to add the words "or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be." Section 13 of the amending Act made the amendments retrospective to the date the Act originally came into force (13 February 1948). This created a question of construction: whether the added words validate continuance of proceedings even in Courts that lacked jurisdiction under s. 28, or whether they serve another purpose.
The Court considered and rejected the construction that the added words validate proceedings in Courts without jurisdiction. It reasoned that the amendment was introduced to remedy the anomaly pointed out by the Full Bench in Nilkanth Ramchandra Chandole v. Rasiklal Mulchand Gujar, namely that retrospective effect as originally worded in s. 50 could not properly cover suits already pending in the Courts that were the proper Courts under s. 28. The added words therefore clarified that suits pending in proper Courts should continue there, while suits pending in improper Courts must be transferred to the proper Courts.
The Court supported this interpretation by linguistic and contextual analysis: the use of the plural "such Courts" in the amended text refers back to the plural "Courts which would have jurisdiction" and thus indicates the courts having jurisdiction under the Act rather than validating continuance in a single court lacking jurisdiction. This reading aligns with the statutory scheme and legislative purpose underlying the amendments.
The respondent's counsel conceded that the Court's construction was reasonable. Applying this construction, the Court concluded that continuance and trial of the suit by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, after the Rent Control Act came into force was without jurisdiction. Consequently, the decree of the lower Court could not stand and the matter required retrial by the appropriate Court.
The Court identified the appropriate forum following the amendments (for Ahmedabad) as the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, and ordered that the case be sent back for trial before that Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The Court set aside the decree of the lower Court and ordered that the suit be retried by the appropriate Court. The core ruling is stated as: THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT IS SET ASIDE AND THE SUIT IS REMITTED FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE LEARNED JUDGE OF THE SMALL CAUSES COURT, AHMEDABAD.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

The decree previously entered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad is vacated.
The case is to be tried afresh by the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad (the appropriate Court under the amended statutory scheme).
The costs of the appeal are ordered to be costs in the cause.

Wider Implications:
The opinion interprets the proviso to s. 50 of the Bombay Rent Control Act (as amended) to mean that pending suits must either be transferred to the proper Courts designated by s. 28 or, where already pending in those proper Courts, continue there; it rejects a construction that would validate continuance in Courts that otherwise lack jurisdiction. The opinion does not expressly state that it is laying down a new precedent beyond this statutory interpretation, so the practical effect described above is the direct outcome on the parties rather than the announcement of a broader novel legal doctrine.

Result: Appeal allowed. Costs in the cause.

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Ranchhodlal Maneklal Vyas v. Maneklal Pranjivandas Shah

Rajadhyaksha, J.:—

This is an appeal against a decree passed by the Third Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, in a suit which the plaintiff filed in ejectment. The few facts that are necessary for the purpose of disposing of this appeal are these. On January 5, 1939, the defendant passed a rent-note in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. After the expiry of five years, he passed another rent-note on February 6, 1944. The rent reserved was Rs. 135 per month. The tenancy actually began on January 3, 1944. The rent-note made a provision for the giving of one month's notice for the purpose of obtaining possession. On October 2, 1945, the plaintiff gave a notice to vacate. As the defendant did not vacate, the plaintiff filed a suit, No. 1770 of 1945, against the present defendant on December 12, 1946. In the written statement, which the defendant filed in that suit, the defendant contended that the suit property belonged not to the plaintiff, but to Chaturbhuj Temple of which the plaintiff was only an officiating Vahivatdar. He added that so long as the plaintiff did not establish his title relating to the suit property, the plaintiff's suit in ejectment was not maintainable. The plaintiff's suit actually came to be dismissed on September 27, 1947, because the Court held that the notice to quit which had been given by the plaintiff was not in order and because the notice had been served not on the defendant himself, but on his constituted attorney. When the plaintiff found that his title was denied by the defendant, he gave a notice on November 10, 1947, forfeiting the lease on account of the disclaimer of the title on the part of the defendant. To that notice the defendant gave a reply on November 27, 1947, in which he stated that he did not intend to disclaim the plaintiff's title and that the statement made in the earlier suit was made under a mistaken belief. Thereupon the present suit was filed by the plaintiff on December 1, 1947, basing his cause of action on the disclaimer of title by the defendant.

In answer to this suit, the defendant raised several contentions. He stated that the disclaimer had been made under a mistaken belief, that the disclaimer had subsequently been waived by the plaintiff, and that there was no subsisting cause of action at the date of the suit as the disclaimer had been subsequently retracted by the defendant. All these issues were found against the defendant. But there was one defence which was put forward by the defendant and that was based on the Bombay Rent Control Act of 1947. The defendant alleged that by reason of the Act, he was a statutory tenant and that under s. 12(1) of the Act, he was not liable to be evicted so long as he was ready and willing to pay the rent which was fixed.

The learned Judge took the view that the defendant was entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act as he was a tenant within the definition of the term in s. 5(11) of the Act and as such he was entitled to the protection given by s. 12 of that Act. Having come to that conclusion, the learned Judge declined to pass an order for eviction in favour of the plaintiff, but he merely decreed in favour of the plaintiff an amount of Rs. 3,361-3-0 which was the arrears of rent up to the date of the suit. He directed the parties to bear their own costs. Against that order the plaintiff has come in appear.

The first point which has been raised by Mr. Shah on behalf of the appellant, and which goes to the very root of the matter, is that the suit has been tried by a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it. The suit was decided on October 1, 1948. At that time the Bombay Rent Control Act of 1947 was in force. Under s. 28 of the Act, only certain Courts had jurisdiction to try the suits under the Act. Section 28 is in the following terms:—

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction.

(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay;

(b) elsewhere, the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is no such Civil Judge, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply.”

Clause (aa) has been added to this section by an amendment effected by Bombay Act LVIII of 1949 which gives jurisdiction, in the areas in which a Court of Small Causes is established, to that Court to hear suits between landlords and tenants relating to the recovery of rent and possession of any premises to which the provisions of the Bombay Rent Control Act apply. Then there is s. 50 of the Rent Control Act which made a provision regarding the proceedings which were pending at the time when this Act came into force. The present suit was pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad. The proviso to s. 50 read as follows:—

“Provided that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery or fixing of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply…………which are pending in any Court, shall be transferred to and continued before the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act and all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings.”

By reason of this provision the present suit which was pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, had to be transferred to the Civil Judge, Junior Division, who alone had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the suit under s. 28 of the Bombay Rent Control Act. It appears, however, that the requisite transfer was not made, and the suit ultimately came to be disposed of by the Civil Judge, Senior Division. It is true that by an amendment of s. 50 effected by Bombay Act III of 1949, certain words have been added to this section. These words are, “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be” after the words “try such suits or proceedings under this Act.” These words were inserted, as I have stated before, by Act III of 1949, and the relevant section of the Act which introduced these words was s. 10. Under s. 13 of that Act, amendments made by ss. 10 and 11 were given retrospective effect. The actual words of s. 13 are as follows:—

“The amendments made by sections 10 and 11 of this act shall be deemed to have been made and come into force on the date on which the said Act came into force and shall always be deemed to have been made and in force from such date.”

There is, therefore, no doubt that these amendments must be deemed to have been incorporated in the original section from the date when the Rent Control Act came into force, viz. February 13, 1948. At that time the present suit was pending. Therefore, the question arises as to what is the correct interpretation of the amended s. 50 of the Rent Control Act. With the amendment, the proviso to s. 50 reads as follows:—

“Provided that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery or fixing of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply…………which are pending in any Court, shall be transferred to and continued before the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be, and all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings.”

It is a possible construction of this section that the words which have been subsequently added, viz., “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be” merely validate the proceedings, even if they are pending in the Court which is not the Court which is authorised to hear the suits under the Act But, in our opinion, this construction is not correct. These words were added presumably as a result of a decision of this Court in Nilkanth Ramchandra Chandole v. Rasiklal Mulchand Gujar. It was held by a Full Bench in that case that the retrospective effect of the Rent Control Act of 1947 was confined only to what was expressly stated in s. 50 of the Act, viz., to the suits which were transferred and continued before the proper Courts. An anomalous situation immediately arose by reason of the fact that the retrospective effect of the Act could not be given to the suits which were actually pending in the Courts which were the proper Courts under s. 28 of the Act. In order to remedy this defect, these words “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be,” were added. The result was that if the proceedings were pending in the Courts which were not the Courts with jurisdiction under s. 28 of the Act, the suits had to be transferred to the proper Courts; whereas in the case of suits pending in the proper Courts, they were to continue in such Courts, and the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder were to apply to all such suits and proceedings. Therefore, it is not correct to contend that the words “or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be,” were intended to validate the proceedings even if they were pending in the Courts which had no jurisdiction under s. 28 of the Act. If they were pending in Courts which had no jurisdiction, they had to be transferred and continued before the Courts which had jurisdiction, and, by reason of the amendment, if they were already pending in the Courts which had jurisdiction, they were to be continued in such Courts. This construction, in our opinion, also gains strength from the fact that the word “such Courts” is used in plural. Now, the word “Courts” which is used in plural in the earlier part of the section is with reference to the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try the suits and the proceedings pending under the Act. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to validate the continuance of the proceedings even in a Court which had no jurisdiction, then the word would have been used in the singular, for the words “in a Court” in the earlier part of the section have been used with reference to the Courts which had no jurisdiction to try the suits, but the proceedings before which had to be transferred to the appropriate Courts under the Act of 1947. Therefore, the words “such Courts” clearly have reference to the Courts which have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings under the Act and are not intended to validate the continuance of the proceedings even in Courts which had no jurisdiction to try them. Mr. Desai who has appeared for the respondent has very fairly conceded that is a reasonable construction; if that is the correct construction, then the continuance of the proceedings before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, after this Act came into force would be without jurisdiction and the suit should have been transferred to the appropriate Courts. We must, therefore, hold that the trial of the suit by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad, was without jurisdiction and we must, therefore, set aside the decree of the lower Court and send the case back for trial by the appropriate Court. After the amendment in 1949, the appropriate Court, so far as Ahmedabad is concerned, is the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad. We must, therefore, send the case back for trial by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad.

The result, therefore, is that the decree of the lower Court is set aside and the suit is sent back for trial before the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad.

The costs of the appeal will be costs in the cause.

Appeal allowed.

K.B.S

Ranchhodlal Maneklal Vyas v. Maneklal Pranjivandas Shah

Analytical Summary of Opinion — Rajadhyaksha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent/Defendant's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ranchhodlal Maneklal Vyas v. Maneklal Pranjivandas Shah

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