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  • provisions of S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act.3.
  • S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act
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  • provisions of S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act.3.
  • S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chagla, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against an order of the learned Presidency Magistrate, 4th Court, convicting the accused under S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act and sentencing him to one month’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300 (in default rigorous imprisonment for four weeks).

The prosecution case was that accused No. 1 and his wife (the wife was acquitted by the learned Magistrate) were in possession of 17½ drams of rectified spirit. The appellant (accused No. 1) was the owner of a tailoring shop which was raided on 19 August 1949 at 8 p.m.; the raid took place in the presence of panchas and, according to the prosecution, the spirit was found in the rear portion of the shop.

The appellant’s defence was that the spirit was planted by the police through a rear door to the shop. The prosecution tendered evidence from head constable Mahomed Akram and a panch witness named Trivene Ramlakhan (and a panchnama recorded another panch who was not called). The Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and convicted; the present appeal challenges that conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence of the panch witness(es) in the raid—specifically the panch Trivene Ramlakhan—should be accepted, given concerns about independence and possible amenability to police influence.
  2. Whether, after excluding questionable panch evidence, the remaining evidence (principally the police officer's testimony) is sufficient to sustain a conviction under S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act.
  3. Whether the head constable who gave evidence was properly authorised to conduct the search under S. 118 (an objection raised, though the court did not decide the point because it disposed of the appeal on the merits).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The spirit was planted by the police through a rear door to the tailoring shop; this factual possibility was supported by two defence witnesses (a tailor employed with the accused, Mahomedkhan Ismailkhan, and a customer, Rita Joseph Fernandez) who said a rear door existed and that the appellant was innocent.
  • The appellant’s counsel urged that the head constable may not have had the authority under S. 118 to conduct the search.

Prosecution's and State's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution maintained that 17½ drams of rectified spirit were found in the rear portion of the shop during a raid witnessed by panchas, and relied on evidence of head constable Mahomed Akram and the panch Trivene Ramlakhan.
  • The Government Pleader argued that the mere fact a man had acted as a panch on several occasions should not, by itself, lead to the inference that he is a police agent; frequency of acting as panch is not decisive.
  • The Government Pleader also drew attention to the panchnama being signed by Sub‑Inspector Deshpande, who was cited as a witness but did not give evidence; this was invoked in response to the S. 118 authorisation point.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court emphasised the constitutional and statutory importance of search safeguards and the critical role of independent panch witnesses in protecting the liberty of the subject. It explained that courts must attach great importance to panch evidence only when the panch is independent, unbiased and not under police control. If a panch is likely to be a pliable agent of the police, his evidence cannot be relied upon.

The court set out factors to be considered in evaluating a panch witness:

  • The panch’s status and position in life (respectability).
  • Whether the panch frequently acts as a panch (because frequent acting may lead to the inference of amenability to police influence), though frequency alone is not conclusive against credibility.
  • The nature of the evidence given by the panch and whether objective facts asserted by the panch can be tested against other evidence.
  • Whether the panch may be reasonably viewed as a police agent or under the control of the police.

Applying those tests to the present facts, the court observed:

  • The panch in question was the owner of a coal shop located near the Phalton Road Police Station and had acted as a panch on multiple earlier occasions (including twice with the same police officer who investigated this offence and four times in other cases).
  • The panch was taken from Phalton Road to Dongri for this search; although S. 103 ordinarily contemplates panches from the locality, the court accepted that bringing men from another locality is not by itself fatal—yet it was a factor to consider here.
  • Crucially, the panch emphatically denied the existence of a rear door to the shop—an objective fact—while two defence witnesses affirmatively testified that a rear door existed. The Magistrate accepted that a rear door existed but nonetheless suggested the panch’s denial was a slip of memory or not having seen properly. The court rejected that explanation as implausible given the panch’s presence and the fact that the alleged contraband was found in the rear portion where a rear door would be relevant.
  • The court considered the panch’s denial of the rear door to indicate an attempt to support the prosecution by denying an objective and material fact, and concluded that the panch’s evidence was not acceptable in this case.

The court also noted that another panch (apparently a baker, shown in the panchnama) was not called as a witness. Although it is not obligatory to call both panch witnesses, when one panch’s credibility is undermined and his cross-examination shows prior panch activity and other infirmities, the absence of the other panch added weight to the view that reasonable doubt remained.

With the panch evidence eliminated, only the police officer’s testimony remained. The court held that a conviction could not properly rest on the sole evidence of the police-officer who conducted the raid. On the point of authorisation under S. 118, the court noted the objection that the head constable may not have been authorised; the panchnama bore the Sub‑Inspector's signature and the Sub‑Inspector was cited but did not give evidence. The court declined to express an opinion on the S. 118 authorisation issue, because it was disposing of the appeal on the merits.

Considering all the foregoing, the court concluded that the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused and that the conviction could not stand.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The order of conviction and sentence is set aside; the accused is to be acquitted and discharged.

Immediate consequences ordered by the court (direct, case-specific effects):

  • The accused is acquitted and discharged.
  • Any fine paid is to be refunded.
  • Bail bond is cancelled.
  • The appeal is allowed.

Broader implications and guidance contained in the opinion:

  • The court articulated standards for evaluating panch witness credibility and independence (status, frequency of acting as panch, nature of the evidence, and risk of being a police agent) and warned police and investigating officers to avoid repeatedly using the same persons as panch witnesses so as to preserve the independence of search witnesses.
  • The court reaffirmed that a conviction should not be based solely on the evidence of the police officer who conducted the raid when independent panch evidence is discredited.

The opinion did not express a definitive ruling on the separate issue of whether the head constable was authorised under S. 118 to conduct the search, because the court resolved the appeal on the merits (acquittal).

This summary is limited strictly to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add external information or inferences beyond that text.

    Simon Kaitan Fernandez Accused v. State

    Chagla, C.J:— This is an appeal against an order passed by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 4th Court, by which he convicted the accused under S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act and sentenced him to one month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300, in default rigorous imprisonment for four weeks.

    2. The case for the prosecution was that accused No. 1 and his wife, who was acquitted by the learned Presidency Magistrate, were in possession of 171/2 drams of rectified spirit and this possession was contrary to the provisions of S. 66(b) of the Prohibition Act.

    3. Accused No. 1, the appellant before us is the owner of a tailoring shop and that shop was raided on August 19, 1949, at 8 p.m The raid took place in the presence of panchas, and according to the prosecution in the rear portion of the shop 17½ drams of rectified spirit was found. The defence of the accused was that this spirit was planted by the police through the rear door and he was innocent of the offence with which he was charged. The prosecution case was supported by the head constable Mahomed Akram and the panch witness Trivene Ramlakhan.

    4. It has been contended before us that in this case we should not accept the evidence of the panch who supports the police-officer and who deposes to the finding of the contraband liquor. It is very necessary that in this case we should lay down clearly how the evidence of panch witnesses should be appreciated. This point is frequently raised before us and conflicting judgments are being cited on this point. It is unnecessary to state how important and how valuable for the liberty of the subject the provisions with regard to search are, and the law provides that the house or the shop of a citizen cannot be searched in the absence of panchas. The Courts are bound to attach the greatest importance to the evidence of panch witnesses, and in order that the Court should attach such importance to panch witnesses it is essential that panch witnesses should be independent witnesses, unbiased & without being in any way under the control of the police. It is only when panch witnesses are independent that the liberty of the subject can be safeguarded as far as searches are concerned. If it is established that a panch witness is likely to be a pliable agent in the hands of the police or is likely to be amenable to the influence of the police or he may be looked upon as a police agent, it is clear that the evidence of such a witness cannot be relied upon. Primarily it is for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion whether a panch witness suffers from the infirmity to which we have just drawn attention. He has to appreciate evidence and, as I said, primarily it is for him to say whether the evidence of a particular panch witness should be believed or not. But the Court of appeal must be vigilant in seeing that convictions are not based upon the evidence of panch witnesses whose evidence should not be accepted as suffering from the infirmity of being in a position where they might be looked upon as police agents. In deciding whether the evidence of a panch witness should be believed or not, undoubtedly, his status and position in life should be considered. It should also be considered as to whether he is in the habit frequently of acting as a panch, because the very fact that a man constantly acts as a panch may lead to the inference that he is easily available to the police and he would be prepared to be amenable to their influence. The nature of the evidence given by the particular panch witness should also be borne in mind. The Government Pleader is right when he suggests that the mere fact that a man has acted on several occasions as a panch witness should not be sufficient by itself to lead to the inference that the man is a police agent. Take the case of a highly respectable man holding a status in life and who out of a sense of his duty to the State has gone and acted as a panch. Can it be said that a man like this should be disbelieved merely because what is established against him is the frequency with which he has acted as a panch witness?

    5. Now, applying these tests to the present case, we find that the panch witness is the owner of a coal shop. The learned Presidency Magistrate takes the view that this establishes the status of the panch. This witness has his shop near the Phalton Road Police Station. He has admitted that he acted as a panch in two cases with the same police-officer who investigated this offence and who made the raid, and he has also admitted that he acted as a panch in four other cases under other officers. Therefore we have here a man whose shop is situated near the police station and who has acted on some occasions as a panch prior to the case in question. We have also this important fact that although the raid took place in Dongri and the shop was situated in Dongri, the panch is taken from Phalton Road to Dongri to witness the search. Although S. 103 requires that ordinarily panch witnesses should be respectable men of the locality, we have had occasion to point out in the past that it is not always possible for the police to get men from the same locality, and therefore the mere fact that men are taken from one locality to another should not be looked upon as a factor militating against the respectability of the panch witness. But in this particular case we have a man who has acted as a panch on several occasions and who is prepared to leave his own shop and go to Dongri in order to witness a search. There is one other important factor in this case which has got to be considered in order to decide whether we should accept the evidence of the panch witness. As I said before the defence put forward by the accused was that the liquor was planted by the police in the shop through the rear door, and in support of this evidence he called two witnesses, a tailor working with him, one Mahomedkhan Ismailkhan and a woman by the name of Rita Joseph Fernandez who was a customer and who said that she was present at the time when the raid took place. The panch was asked in cross-examination whether there was a rear door to the shop and the panch denied the fact of there being a rear door. Whether there is a rear door to a shop or not is an objective fact. The Government Pleader seems to think it is a matter of argument. I should have thought that nothing could be more objective than a door and nothing could be more objective than the question whether such a door exists or not. It is clear from the evidence of the panch that according to him and according to his knowledge no such door existed. Both the defence witnesses have stated that there was a rear door to this shop and the learned Magistrate in his judgment has accepted that finding, although he has disbelieved the defence theory of planting. From the point of view of the defence it will be realised that the existence of a rear door was very important because the whole defence theory was based on the existence of this rear door and the police bringing in the liquor through the rear door and leaving it in the shop and then having a search and trying to hold the accused guilty of being in possession of this liquor. Therefore it is rather significant that this panch witness whom we are asked to believe should have so emphatically denied the existence of this rear door. The learned Presidency Magistrate concedes in his judgment that the panch witness made a mistake about this door, but he tries to explain this mistake by saying “…………but it is perhaps due to not seeing things properly with which he was not concerned or it may be a slip of memory.” With great respect to the learned Magistrate, this mistake could not have been due to not seeing things properly. I should have understood the panch witness saying that he did not notice whether there was a rear door or that he did not remember whether there was a rear door or he could not say whether there was a rear door. But what the panch witness says is that there was no rear door to the said shop. As I said, it is clear evidence as to the knowledge of the panch witness, and his knowledge is that there was no rear door. It is also difficult to believe that he could not have noticed whether there was or there was not a rear door because the liquor was found in the rear portion of the shop, the search took place there, the panchnama was prepared there, the panchas were present there, and therefore the panch witness should have known whether there was or there was not a rear door. This is not a minor point nor a point of no importance, because this shows that the panch witness was anxious to support the prosecution case by denying something which was patently false. Taking all these factors into consideration we do not feel that in a case like this we should accept the evidence of the panch.

    6. We would like to sound a note of warning to the police and to the investigating officers that as far as possible they should avoid utilising persons as panch witnesses when these persons have already acted as panchas. The city of Bombay is very large, it contains a very large population, and ordinarily there should not be much difficulty in the way of the police having different people to act as panch witnesses. This would obviate any comment from the accused that the persons acting as panch witnesses are not independent witnesses. We appreciate also the difficulty of the police and there may be cases where it may be difficult for the police to avail themselves of the services of people whom they do not know. But as far as possible they should have panch witnesses who have had nothing to do with the police at all, whom the police-officer does not know at all and about whose independence and impartiality there can be no question at all.

    7. If we eliminate the evidence of the panch in this case we are only left with the evidence of the police-officer, and obviously we cannot convict the accused for possession of liquor on the evidence of the police-officer who raided the shop. There was also another panch who is supposed to be a baker judging by what appears in the panchnama. He was not called. It is not obligatory upon the police to call both the panch witnesses, but when one panch witness is cross-examined and when it is elicited in his cross-examination that he has acted as a panch witness before and when his evidence suffers from other infirmities, we do not see why the police should not have called the other panch witness so as to remove any doubt in this case. This is certainly a case where the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused.

    8. There is one other point which has been raised before us, and that is that the head constable was not authorised under S. 118 to conduct the search. It is perfectly true that the head constable without the necessary authority would not be entitled to raid the tailoring shop. But the Government Pleader has drawn our attention to the panchnama which says that it is signed by Mr. Deshpande, Sub-Inspector, and Mr. Deshpande was also cited as a witness. But for some reason Mr. Deshpande did not go into the witness-box and only the head constable Mahomed Akram went into the witness-box. The learned advocate for the accused has found some strength for his argument from the fact that the head constable says in his evidence that he raided the tailoring shop and does not refer to Sub-Inspector Deshpande at all. It is urged that even Sub-Inspector Deshpande was not authorised to raid the shop. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this point because in our opinion the accused is entitled to an acquittal on the merits of the case.

    9. The result is that the order of conviction and sentence is set aside and the accused directed to be acquitted and discharged. Fine, if paid, to be refunded. Bail bond cancelled.

    10. Appeal allowed.

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    Simon Kaitan Fernandez Accused v. State
    (Jun 28, 1951)