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    Sakarchand Satidas v. Narayan Savla Vani

    Chagla, C.J:—

    The question that has been referred to this full bench is as to what is the share in the property to which the plaintiffs in the suit are entitled. The facts are sufficiently set out in the referring judgment which was delivered by my brother Gajendragadkar and myself and we have also pointed out in that judgment the two conflicting views which have been taken and which can be taken on the question that we have to determine. Our attention has now been drawn to two earlier decisions of this Court reported in Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Sadashiv and Mahabalaya bin Parmaya v. Timaya bin Appaya. In the first case there was a mortgage by a member of an undivided Hindu family in 1848. The mortgagee obtained a decree in 1856 on his mortgage, and in 1871 there was a court-sale in which the mortgagor's right, title and interest was sold and the question which arose for determination was, what was the right, title and interest that passed to the purchaser, and Mr. Justice West took the view that the alienee's interest was to be determined in accordance with, the share that the alienor had in 1848 in the joint family at the date of the mortgage. This is a clear decision which supports the view taken in Naro Gopal v. Paragaudam and Shantaya v. Mallappa: Mallappa v. Basayyaw(4). The same learned Judge in Mahabalaya bin Parmaya v. Timaya bin Appaya reiterated the view taken by him in the earlier decision. Now, when we turn to the only case of this Court which has taken the contrary view, Gurlingapa v. Nandapa, we find that at p. 805 Chief Justice Farran refers to the two decisions in Pandurang Anandrav's case and Mahabalay's case without, with respect, attempting to distinguish those decisions. Then the learned Chief Justice relies on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Rangasami v. Krishnayyan.(5) We may point out that the Madras High Court has taken the contrary view in a subsequent full bench decision in Chinu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti.(6) As Mayne points out, with respect to the Madras Court, the position in law in Madras is rather uncertain because in a subsequent decision Sathapathiar v. Shivanarayana Pillai(7) a divisional bench has preferred to follow the decision in the earlier full bench case of Rangasami v. Krishnayyan rather than the subsequent decision in Chinu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti and there have been subsequent decisions of the Madras High Court after Sathapathiar's case which have preferred to take the view taken by the full bench in Chinu Pillai's case. Therefore, for the purpose of this full bench it would be more advisable to consider the decisions of our own High Court, and the position as far as this Court is concerned is clear. Ever since Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Sadashiv consistently, with one solitary exception in Gurligappa v. Nandapa this Court has taken the view that the share of the alienee is to be determined at the date of the alienation. Mr. Joshi says that this is not a logical approach to the question. Possibly he is right. But we must not overlook the fact that as it is we have departed from the strict principle of Hindu law by which a father cannot alienate except for legal necessity any portion of the joint Hindu family property including his own undivided share. Once we depart from that principle, then some workable principle has got to be accepted by which the share of the alienee has to be determined, and this Court has accepted a workable principle, namely that the share of the alienee is to be determined at the date of the alienation and not at the time when the alienee asks for an equitable partition. We are impressed by the fact that in taking a contrary view, even if the contrary view be more logical, we would be upsetting a series of decisions spread over a considerably long period, and in doing so we would be offending against the doctrine of stare decisis which is always more important and more to be respected than any logical doctrine resulting from a particular view as to the strict law. Therefore, we are of the opinion that Gurlingapa v. Nandapa, to the extent that it laid down that the share of the alienee is to be determined not at the date of the alienation but at the moment when the alienee seeks for a partition, was wrongly decided and the other Bombay decisions to which reference has been made were rightly decided.

    In our referring judgment we have pointed out that Scott C.J who delivered the principle judgment in the case of Naro Gopal v. Paragouda had assumed that the decision in Gurulingapa's case was inconsistent with the view expressed by the Privy Council in Jogeshwar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutti. We have also indicated that the decision of the Privy Council in the said case dealt with a different point altogether and the assumption made by Scott C.J that the said decision was inconsistent with Gurlingapa's case was strictly not accurate we must, however, in fairness add that is not the only ground on which Scott C.J refused to follow the decision in Gurlingapa's case. He has also referred to the earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Sadashiv and Mahabalaya bin Parmaya v. Timaya bin Appaya and has besides added that the Madras view expressed in Rangasami v. Krishnayyan, which was preferred by the learned Judges who decided Gurlingapa's case had been later dissented from by the Madras High Court itself in Chinnu Pallai v. Kalimuthu Chetti. Therefore, we must hold that the decision in Naro Gopal's case was on the whole justified and correct and as we have already pointed out the view there expressed has been consistently followed by this Court ever since.

    We, therefore, answer the question submitted to us that the share in the property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is one-half.

    Answer accordingly.
    J.G.R
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    Sakarchand Satidas v. Narayan Savla Vani
    (Aug 22, 1950)