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Attorney(S)
  • L.M Jhaveri, with H.S Bhat, for the petitioner.
  • Purshottam Tricumdas, K.N Dharap and H.R Pardiwalla, for the petitioners in companion applications.
  • C.K Daphthary, Advocate General, with B.G Thakor, Additional Assistant Government Pleader, for the State.
  • L.M Jhaveri, The applicant is being prosecuted under s. 18(1) of the Press Act. Portions of the Act have become void on coming into force of the new Constitution. The Press Act places several restraints on publication. One has to obtain permission of a Magistrate before publishing a news-sheet or to deposit security for keeping a printing press. As the Act now stands, there is a restraint on the publisher even of an innocuous article. Essence of freedom of press guaranteed by the Constitution is the absence of all previous restraint. Let the offender be punished if he has contravened any Press law but he cannot be restrained before he gives expression to his views. I submit that O. 18 of the Press Act has become void, and the prosecution should, therefore, be quashed.
  • C.K Dapthary, Advocate General.—Before the proceeding in the lower Court can be sent for by the High Court, we have to see whether the case falls under art. 228 of the Constitution. I submit there is no question as to interpretation of the Constitution involved in this case because it arose before the Constitution came into force. The General Clauses Act, 1897, has been specifically made applicable for the purpose of interpretation of the Constitution, and under s. 6 of the Act when any enactment is repealed a liability already incurred under the repealed enactment still subsists. There is no difference between a repealed Act and an Act declared to be void, and although art. 13(1) of the Constitution uses the word “void” the effect is the same as in the case of a repeal. The article does not say that the old laws shall be void and shall always be deemed to have been void. Therefore, the present proceedings are not affected by the new Constitution.
  • L.M Jhaveri, was called upon to argue the point raised by the Advocate General. I submit that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed Acts alone. When an Act becomes void, it becomes unenforceable from that date for all intents and purposes and no Court can give effect to it afterwards. The Constituent Assembly deliberately used the word “void” instead of the word “repealed” which shows intention on its part to terminate automatically all proceedings which are repugnant to the conception of fundamental rights. The applicant cannot be prosecuted any longer under a law which is void to-day. Refers to Maxwell on “Interpretation of Statutes” at p. 488.
  • Meaning of void is much more than that of repeal. Here something is declared as being totally repugnant to the Constitution and the Constitution makers did not want such thing to exist for any purpose. They were conscious of the difference between the two expressions and have used them with different intentions at different places. Refers to arts. 395 and 372.
  • C.K Dapthary, Advocate General. The real point is what is the meaning of the expression “void”. I submit no higher meaning is to be given to the word than the word “repeal”, because both of them mean annulment. Repeal also means rendered void as the dictionary meaning of both the words is the same. No doubt the Constitution uses the two words at different places, but there is no intention to interfere with the rights or wrongs of matters which have already taken place. Also there is no implication of moral indignation or abhorrence by the use of the word void. In art. 251 they have used the word “inoperative”. The use of the word repeal in art. 13 would have compelled the framers of the Constitution to enumerate the specific Acts which they wanted to annul.
  • Constitution is not an Act of the Legislature. It repeals only legislation of equal status, e.g, the Government of India Act. The effect of it on lesser legislations is left to be decided by the Courts.
  • The Government of India Act, 1935, had used the word “void” in s. 107. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominiona(1) the Privy Council treated the expression “void” on the same footing as “repealed”. Also refers to J.K Gas Plant & Co. v. Emperor.(2)
  • The present case is one of law becoming void after the coming into force of the Constitution and not of its being void at its inception. Before the Constitution came into effect, the law gave rise to certain rights and liabilities. Intention to disturb vested rights cannot be lightly attributed to the legislature. If the legislature desired condonation of offences that have already been committed, nothing would have prevented them from saying something like “shall be void and shall always be deemed to have been void”.
  • In the case of repeal, the statute has to be re-enacted if it is to be revived. But when a statute is declared to be void, it remains as if it were in abeyance for the time being. It can be revived without re-enactment by bringing about a change in the Constitution. This is the only difference between the two.
  • Art. 372 gives power to the President to repeal a law if it is void. This indicates that those laws are not to be taken as ab initio void. Refers to the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, s. 28.
  • My submission, therefore, is that if the pending prosecutions are saved, there is no question of interpretation of the Constitution.
  • L.M Jhaveri, in reply Art. 367 makes the General Clauses Act applicable to the Constitution subject to the context. Looking to the context, you will find that art. 13 appears in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The Constituent Assembly has made it a matter of public policy that certain laws shall be absolutely void and thereafter you cannot give effect to them in any manner. Refers to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at p. 193, and Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, at p. 221.
  • Purshottam Tricumdas. Repeal is the conscious act of the Legislature. There cannot be any implied repeal. The use of the word “void” cannot mean an implied repeal. The Constituent Assembly knew that the General Clauses Act would keep alive proceedings under the repealed Acts. Knowing full well the implications of the word “repeal”, the question is why did they not use it, if they wanted to save any proceedings?
  • K.N Dharap. My submission is that art. 13 should be so interpreted as to mean that all laws inconsistent with the Constitution never existed. The laws are declared to be void in the sense that they are invalid from the date of their inception.
  • H.R Pardiwalla. Interpreting a constitution is not the same thing as interpreting an ordinary legislation. Different rules apply to these two things. By making a constitution, we make a fundamental change in our conceptions, both moral and legal. Things which were good till that day were declared to be abhorrent by the people. Therefore, those things shall no longer exist nor can they be given effect to any more. The ordinary canons of interpretation regarding one law repealing the other cannot be applied to such cases.
Judges
  • Mr. M.C Chagla, C.J
  • Mr. Bavdekar
  • Mr. Shah, JJ.
Acts
  • s. 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931,
  • Act, in England s. 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889,
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • s. 18 of the Press Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • L.M Jhaveri, with H.S Bhat, for the petitioner.
  • Purshottam Tricumdas, K.N Dharap and H.R Pardiwalla, for the petitioners in companion applications.
  • C.K Daphthary, Advocate General, with B.G Thakor, Additional Assistant Government Pleader, for the State.
  • L.M Jhaveri, The applicant is being prosecuted under s. 18(1) of the Press Act. Portions of the Act have become void on coming into force of the new Constitution. The Press Act places several restraints on publication. One has to obtain permission of a Magistrate before publishing a news-sheet or to deposit security for keeping a printing press. As the Act now stands, there is a restraint on the publisher even of an innocuous article. Essence of freedom of press guaranteed by the Constitution is the absence of all previous restraint. Let the offender be punished if he has contravened any Press law but he cannot be restrained before he gives expression to his views. I submit that O. 18 of the Press Act has become void, and the prosecution should, therefore, be quashed.
  • C.K Dapthary, Advocate General.—Before the proceeding in the lower Court can be sent for by the High Court, we have to see whether the case falls under art. 228 of the Constitution. I submit there is no question as to interpretation of the Constitution involved in this case because it arose before the Constitution came into force. The General Clauses Act, 1897, has been specifically made applicable for the purpose of interpretation of the Constitution, and under s. 6 of the Act when any enactment is repealed a liability already incurred under the repealed enactment still subsists. There is no difference between a repealed Act and an Act declared to be void, and although art. 13(1) of the Constitution uses the word “void” the effect is the same as in the case of a repeal. The article does not say that the old laws shall be void and shall always be deemed to have been void. Therefore, the present proceedings are not affected by the new Constitution.
  • L.M Jhaveri, was called upon to argue the point raised by the Advocate General. I submit that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed Acts alone. When an Act becomes void, it becomes unenforceable from that date for all intents and purposes and no Court can give effect to it afterwards. The Constituent Assembly deliberately used the word “void” instead of the word “repealed” which shows intention on its part to terminate automatically all proceedings which are repugnant to the conception of fundamental rights. The applicant cannot be prosecuted any longer under a law which is void to-day. Refers to Maxwell on “Interpretation of Statutes” at p. 488.
  • Meaning of void is much more than that of repeal. Here something is declared as being totally repugnant to the Constitution and the Constitution makers did not want such thing to exist for any purpose. They were conscious of the difference between the two expressions and have used them with different intentions at different places. Refers to arts. 395 and 372.
  • C.K Dapthary, Advocate General. The real point is what is the meaning of the expression “void”. I submit no higher meaning is to be given to the word than the word “repeal”, because both of them mean annulment. Repeal also means rendered void as the dictionary meaning of both the words is the same. No doubt the Constitution uses the two words at different places, but there is no intention to interfere with the rights or wrongs of matters which have already taken place. Also there is no implication of moral indignation or abhorrence by the use of the word void. In art. 251 they have used the word “inoperative”. The use of the word repeal in art. 13 would have compelled the framers of the Constitution to enumerate the specific Acts which they wanted to annul.
  • Constitution is not an Act of the Legislature. It repeals only legislation of equal status, e.g, the Government of India Act. The effect of it on lesser legislations is left to be decided by the Courts.
  • The Government of India Act, 1935, had used the word “void” in s. 107. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominiona(1) the Privy Council treated the expression “void” on the same footing as “repealed”. Also refers to J.K Gas Plant & Co. v. Emperor.(2)
  • The present case is one of law becoming void after the coming into force of the Constitution and not of its being void at its inception. Before the Constitution came into effect, the law gave rise to certain rights and liabilities. Intention to disturb vested rights cannot be lightly attributed to the legislature. If the legislature desired condonation of offences that have already been committed, nothing would have prevented them from saying something like “shall be void and shall always be deemed to have been void”.
  • In the case of repeal, the statute has to be re-enacted if it is to be revived. But when a statute is declared to be void, it remains as if it were in abeyance for the time being. It can be revived without re-enactment by bringing about a change in the Constitution. This is the only difference between the two.
  • Art. 372 gives power to the President to repeal a law if it is void. This indicates that those laws are not to be taken as ab initio void. Refers to the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, s. 28.
  • My submission, therefore, is that if the pending prosecutions are saved, there is no question of interpretation of the Constitution.
  • L.M Jhaveri, in reply Art. 367 makes the General Clauses Act applicable to the Constitution subject to the context. Looking to the context, you will find that art. 13 appears in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The Constituent Assembly has made it a matter of public policy that certain laws shall be absolutely void and thereafter you cannot give effect to them in any manner. Refers to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at p. 193, and Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, at p. 221.
  • Purshottam Tricumdas. Repeal is the conscious act of the Legislature. There cannot be any implied repeal. The use of the word “void” cannot mean an implied repeal. The Constituent Assembly knew that the General Clauses Act would keep alive proceedings under the repealed Acts. Knowing full well the implications of the word “repeal”, the question is why did they not use it, if they wanted to save any proceedings?
  • K.N Dharap. My submission is that art. 13 should be so interpreted as to mean that all laws inconsistent with the Constitution never existed. The laws are declared to be void in the sense that they are invalid from the date of their inception.
  • H.R Pardiwalla. Interpreting a constitution is not the same thing as interpreting an ordinary legislation. Different rules apply to these two things. By making a constitution, we make a fundamental change in our conceptions, both moral and legal. Things which were good till that day were declared to be abhorrent by the people. Therefore, those things shall no longer exist nor can they be given effect to any more. The ordinary canons of interpretation regarding one law repealing the other cannot be applied to such cases.
Judges
  • Mr. M.C Chagla, C.J
  • Mr. Bavdekar
  • Mr. Shah, JJ.
Acts
  • s. 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931,
  • Act, in England s. 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889,
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • s. 18 of the Press Act
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chagla, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is prosecuted before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for an alleged contravention of s. 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The petitioner filed an application asking that the prosecution be quashed on the ground that s. 18(1) is void for contravening Article 19 of the Constitution.

The prosecution and the alleged offending act predated the commencement of the Constitution, and prosecution was already pending when the Constitution came into force. The High Court was asked to consider the petition while the criminal proceeding remained pending before the Magistrate. The Court also recorded the issuance of a certificate under Article 132(1) and ultimately dismissed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction at this stage to consider the petition while the criminal case was pending before the subordinate court, relying on Article 228 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether Section 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, is void as contravening Article 19 of the Constitution (the petitioner's central substantive challenge).
  3. Assuming Section 18(1) is void under Article 13(1), whether proceedings, vested rights and liabilities that accrued or were pending under that provision before the commencement of the Constitution are affected (i.e., whether Article 13(1) and the characterization of such laws as "void" operate so as to terminate pre-existing or pending proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Jhaveri)

  • Section 18(1) is inconsistent with fundamental rights under Part III (specifically Article 19) and therefore void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution.
  • Because the Act is declared void, all proceedings taken under it, all vested rights, and all liabilities incurred under it must automatically come to an end when the Constitution commenced.

Advocate General's Arguments

  • The case before the Chief Presidency Magistrate does not necessarily involve a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 228 (i.e., the High Court should not withdraw the case on that basis).
  • Article 13(1) does not affect vested rights, liabilities already incurred, or proceedings already taken under a law that was valid prior to the commencement of the Constitution.

Other Counsel and Submissions

  • Mr. Purshottam argued that "repeal" implies a legislative process in which the Legislature applies its mind to specific legislation (citing Article 395 where the Constituent Assembly expressly repealed listed Acts); he urged a distinction between repeal and declaration of "void".
  • Mr. Dharap urged that Article 13(1) should be read as invalidating the laws in question from their very inception (i.e., ab initio), which the Court rejected as inconsistent with the text of Article 13(1) which contemplates laws being valid until the commencement of the Constitution.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first considered whether it had jurisdiction at this stage to determine the constitutional challenge while the criminal prosecution was pending before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, referring to Article 228 which allows the High Court to withdraw a case pending in a subordinate court when it involves a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution necessary for disposal of the case. The Advocate General contended no such constitutional question arose for the purposes of Article 228.

The Court then moved to the central legal question arising from Article 13(1): the provision declares that laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as inconsistent with Part III, "shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void." The issue was whether that characterization as "void" meant that proceedings pending under such a law prior to the commencement of the Constitution would necessarily terminate, and whether vested rights and liabilities would be extinguished.

The Court examined the established rule that when an Act is repealed, ordinarily vested rights and proceedings taken under the repealed Act are saved by express saving provisions. It noted that in England s. 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 expressly saved prior operation of a repealed enactment and pending legal proceedings; India has an analogous provision in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which saves vested rights and pending proceedings on repeal unless a different intention appears.

The Court relied on Article 367, which makes the General Clauses Act applicable for interpretation of the Constitution (subject to adaptations under Article 372). The narrow question was whether s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies where a law is rendered void because of inconsistency with Part III of the Constitution, thereby saving proceedings that were already pending under such law before the Constitution came into force.

The Court addressed the semantic and substantive distinction urged by counsel between a statute being "repealed" and being declared "void." It observed that the Constituent Assembly could not list every law inconsistent with Part III in advance and therefore used the mechanism of declaring inconsistent laws "void" upon commencement of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that in substance there is no effective difference between an Act being repealed and an Act being declared void: in both situations the law ceases to be operative.

The Court further held that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act is not limited to instances of express repeal by name; it applies when a subsequent law has the effect of making an earlier law of no effect. The Constitution (a later and higher instrument) by operation of Article 13 can be seen as such subsequent legislation that causes earlier laws to cease to operate. The Court therefore found no reason to limit the operation of s. 6 only to express repeals, and no reason to give the word "void" in Article 13(1) a special temporal or retroactive efficacy that would invalidate past proceedings and vested rights ab initio.

The Court also compared other uses of the term "void" elsewhere in the Constitution (for example Article 254) and noted that different expressions ("inoperative" in Article 251) are used in different contexts, which undermined the argument that "void" in Part III must carry a special retrospective meaning. The Court referred to Article 372 and the scheme that prior laws were continued in force subject to alteration or repeal, except as modified by Article 13 for inconsistency with Part III. The Court found it unlikely the Constituent Assembly intended that all vested rights and pending proceedings under laws declared void by Article 13 would be disturbed.

On that basis, the Court concluded that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to laws rendered void under Article 13(1), and therefore proceedings that were already taken before the Chief Presidency Magistrate before the commencement of the Constitution are not affected by any subsequent declaration that s. 18(1) of the Press Act is void for inconsistency with Part III.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to laws which have become void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, and consequently a proceeding that was pending under the Press Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution is not affected by the declaration of voidness of s. 18(1).

Implications

Direct effect on the parties: the petition seeking to quash the prosecution was rejected and the criminal prosecution pending before the Chief Presidency Magistrate remains extant and unaffected by the contention that s. 18(1) is void under Article 13(1).

Broader implications: the opinion reasons that the saving mechanism of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to laws made void by Article 13(1), but the opinion does not elaborate broader constitutional doctrines beyond this case-specific application. The opinion itself does not assert that it is creating a broader precedent beyond the legal conclusions it reaches in this matter.

Disposition

Petition dismissed. Certificate issued under Article 132(1).

This summary is confined strictly to the contents and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Keshav Madhav Menon, In Re

    Chagla, C.J:—

    The petitioner is being prosecuted before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate for having contravened s. 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and the application of the petitioner is that the prosecution should be quashed inasmuch as s. 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, is void and of no effect as contravening art. 19 of the Constitution.

    Now, before we consider whether s. 18(1) contravenes a fundamental right which has been granted to the subject under our Constitution, we have to decide whether we have any jurisdiction at this stage to consider this matter when the case is still pending before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate. Reliance is placed by the petitioner upon art. 228 of the Constitution, and that article provides:

    “If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a Court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw the case and shall deal with it as laid down in that Article.”

    and the submission made to us by the Advocate General is that the case pending before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate does not involve any question as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Turning to art. 13(1), it lays down that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Now, the offence was alleged to have been committed in this case before the Constitution came into force and the prosecution was also launched by the Government before the Constitution came into force. Therefore, on the date when the Constitution came into force, the prosecution against the petitioner was pending before a criminal Court, and the question that we have to consider is, assuming that s. 18 of the Press Act is void, whether a proceeding which was pending under that section of the Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution is affected by the section being void as a result of the coming into force of the Constitution. The contention of Mr. Jhaveri is that inasmuch as the Act is declared to be void, being inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, all proceedings which were taken under that Act, all rights which have accrued and all liabilities that have been incurred, must automatically come to an end along with the Act becoming void on the coming into force of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Advocate General's contention is that art. 13(1) does not affect either vested rights or liabilities that have been incurred or proceedings that have been taken under a law which was valid prior to the commencement of the Constitution. These are the two rival contentions which we have to consider.

    Now, when an Act is repealed and ceases to be of any effect, ordinarily the vested rights which have come into existence under the repealed Act and anything done or any proceedings taken come to an end with the repeal of the statute. In order to save vested rights and in order not to affect what was done under an Act, in England s. 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, was enacted which expressly saved the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it and any legal proceeding which was pending under the Act. Similarly in India we have s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which is practically identical in terms to the section I have just referred to of the Interpretation Act, and that section provides that where this Act or any regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect various vested rights and proceedings which are set out in detail in the various sub-clauses of that section. Turning to art. 367 of the Constitution, that article provides that,

    “Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.”

    Therefore, the very narrow question that we have to consider is whether by reason of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, which has been in terms made applicable for the purpose of interpretation of this Constitution, the proceeding which was pending under the Press Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution has been saved notwithstanding the fact that the Act itself or a part of it might become void as a result of the enactment of the Constitution.

    Now, emphasis is placed upon the expression used by the Legislature in art. 13(1) of the Constitution. The expression used is not that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be repealed, but the Constituent Assembly has chosen to use the expression that such laws shall be void, and it is argued that by using this expression in its context, viz., in Part III which deals with fundamental rights, the object of the Constituent Assembly was that s. 6 should not apply as far as these particular laws were concerned and all proceedings taken under such laws which might have been pending at the date of the commencement of the Constitution should automatically come to an end. It is argued that the Constituent Assembly was conferring fundamental rights upon the subject, and if a particular statute was inconsistent with fundamental rights, it is inconceivable that the Constituent Assembly would countenance the continuance of a prosecution for contravention of a law which has been declared to be void and contrary to the fundamental rights. Put in that form, the argument appears to be very attractive, but we have to consider, looking to art. 13 itself and to the other articles to which I shall presently draw attention, whether the Constituent Assembly contemplated a distinction being made between a repealed statute and a statute which it declared to be void, or, in other words, whether it was in the contemplation of the Constituent Assembly when it declared certain laws to be void under art. 13(1) that it did not intend, that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act should apply to such laws. In the first place, we have to consider whether there is any difference in substance between a repealed statute and a statute which is declared void by a Legislature or a Constituent Assembly. It is true, as urged by Mr. Purshottam, that repealing an Act implies a legislative process by which the Legislature applies its mind to specific pieces of legislation and puts an end to their lives. In this very Constitution we have art. 395 where the Constituent Assembly has repealed certain Acts mentioned in that article. It will be noticed that by that legislative process the Constituent Assembly applied its mind to those specific pieces of legislation and put an end to their lives. When we turn to art. 13(1), it was impossible for the Constituent Assembly to know which laws would be inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, it could not specifically repeal certain laws as it did in the case of art. 395. Under those circumstances, all that the Constituent Assembly could do was to declare that any law or any part of the law which is inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution would be void. Mr. Purshottam is right that it will be for the Courts of law to determine which law is inconsistent with the Constitution. But in substance and in its effect there is no difference between an Act which is repealed and an Act which is declared void. In both cases the Act ceases to be operative. The law is annulled.

    Now, turning to s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, it applies to cases where any Act repeals any other Act. The repeal need not necessarily be by the legislative process on which Mr. Purshottam is relying. Section 6 is not confined to cases where the Legislature expressly repeals a named legislation. Section 6 must apply even to those cases where the effect of a subsequent legislation is to make an earlier legislation of no effect, and therefore when we turn to art. 13 it is a subsequent piece of legislation undoubtedly of high import being a part of our Constitution which by its operation puts an end to certain laws which were in existence and which ceased to be in operation from a particular date. I fail to understand why s. 6 should only be applicable to a case where the Legislature uses the expression “repeal” and not to a case where the Legislature uses the expression “void,” if in substance the effect of using these two expressions is exactly the same. Mr. Dharap has urged that we must read art. 13(1) as invalidating the laws referred to in that sub-clause from their very inception and from the time when they were enacted. It is impossible to accept that contention because in terms art. 13(1) provides that these laws although valid when they were enacted and valid up to the date of the commencement of the constitution, become void when the Constitution comes into force by reason of the inconsistency with the fundamental rights laid down in Part III.

    It is clear that no particular efficacy attaches to the expression “void” used in art. 13(2), when one looks at another article in which the same expression has been used, and that article is 254. That deals with the inconsistency that there may be between laws made by Parliament and the laws made by the Legislature of the States, and it declares that to the extent that there is such an inconsistency the laws made by the Legislature of the State shall be void. Therefore any argument based upon the fact that the expression “void” used in the particular context of Part III should be given a special meaning loses much of its force when one finds the same expression used by the Constituent Assembly in art. 254 which has nothing to do with any fundamental right. It is instructive to note also that in art. 251, which again deals with inconsistency between the laws made by Parliament and the laws made by the Legislature of the States, the expression used by the Constituent Assembly is “inoperative” and not “void”. Therefore the Constituent Assembly has used different expressions in different Parts of the Constitution to indicate that a particular law has ceased to have any effect and is no longer in operation. There is no reason why we should apply s. 6 of the General Clauses Act only to art. 395 where the expression “repealed” is used and not to other articles where different expressions are used, although in substance the meaning and the connotation of this expression is the same.

    Our attention has also been drawn by the Advocate General to art. 372. Looking to arts. 395, 13 and 372, the scheme seems to he that the Constituent Assembly has repealed the old Constitution Act and under art. 372 it has continued in force all the laws which were in force before the commencement of the Constitution subject to their being altered or repealed by a competent. Legislature or other competent authority. But this is subject to art. 13 which makes an exception in the case of those laws which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, and sub-cl. (2) of art. 372 gives the power to the President for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force into accord with the provisions of the Constitution and to make adaptations and modifications. It is difficult to believe that the Constituent Assembly contemplated that with regard to the laws which it was declared to be void under art. 13, all vested rights and all proceedings taken should be disturbed or affected by particular laws ceasing to be in force as a result of any inconsistency which the fundamental rights guaranteed to the subject.

    We are therefore of the opinion that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to those laws which have become void as a result of their being inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, and inasmuch as the proceeding before the Chief Presideny Magistrate which has been challenged by this petition was already taken before the Constitution came into force, that proceeding cannot be affected by the result of s. 18(1) being declared to be void under article 13(1) of the Constitution.

    The result is that the petition fails and must be dismissed. Certificate under art. 132(1).

    Petition dismissed.
    M.W.P
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    Comments

    Keshav Madhav Menon, In Re
    (Apr 12, 1950)