Patel, J.:— This appeal is by the plaintiff who has failed substantially in the District Court. The appeal arises under the following circumstances. The plaintiff was appointed on March 24, 1955, as Medical Officer in charge of Infirmary Dispensary at Dhulia. Over and above his scheduled salary, he was entitled to get Es. 10 per month on account of the loss of private practice. A departmental inquiry was held against him by the Collector and he was dismissed from service with effect from November 1, 1955 on October 31, 1955. He raised suit No. 10 of 1957 on January 2, 1957, contending that the order was illegal and ineffective and he continued to be in service. This suit was decreed on January 4, 1958. The appeal to the District Court, being Appeal No. 63 of 1958, was dismissed and a second appeal to this High Court, being Second Appeal No. 1126 of 1959, was dismissed on December 4, 1959. The plaintiff was reinstated by an order dated July 13, 1960. The plaintiff has not even cared to produce the reinstatement order. On September 1, 1960, the plaintiff resigned. Thereafter the plaintiff gave notice, exh. 21, on September 22, 1960, demanding arrears of his pay. He gave a second notice, exh. 23, on March 7, 1961, in connection with the same. On June 23, 1961, Government passed a resolution at exh. 33 sanctioning his pay from November 1, 1957, minus such amounts as lie was earning during the period in question. Eventually, he was paid a sum of Es. 2,351.29 nP. for that period which, as the receipt exh. 31 passed by him shows, he accepted under protest. Thereafter he filed the present suit for arrears of salary on September 7, 1961. He claimed his salary from November 1, 1955, until date minus the payment made by the Government.

2. In the trial Court he also made a claim for damages on the ground of mental and bodily suffering, because of the dismissal order and also on the ground of expenses incurred by him in the prosecution of the earlier suit. The trial Court decreed his claim to the extent of Es. 4,917.16 nPs. which included the claim for mental and bodily suffering and towards legal expenses towards prior suit. The State appealed to the District Court. The District Court applied art. 102 of the Limitation Act and awarded only such part of salary or allowance as fell within three years prior to the date of the suit. It rejecetd the claim of the plaintiff regarding mental and bodily suffering and also regarding the expenses of the previous trial. The plaintiff appeals and limits his claim now to a sum of Rs. 3,000 which Mr. Lalit says, is the arrears claimable by him in respect of the period in question i.e from November 1, 1955, to the date of reinstatement. Mr. Vaidya relies on two decisions of this Court. In Smt. Mandodaribai S. Deshmukh v. State of Bombay . 1962 First Appeal No. 430 of 1958, decided by Patel and K.K Desai JJ., on December 17, 1962 Unrep.., a Division Bench, of which I was a member, decided that to such a suit art. 102 of the Limitation Act applies and the salary accrues due from month to month as and when it became payable. In another case, Laxman Shridhar Kulkarni v. State of Bombay . 1963 First Appeal No. 648 of 1957 decided by Patel and chitale JJ., on October 31, 1963 Unrep.., again a Division Bench of this Court, where I was a party, decided that such a suit as the present was governed by the provisions of O. II, r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. A plaintiff who challenges the order of dismissal as being illegal and void is also bound to ask for arrears of the salary to the date of the suit, and if he has not so asked, the provisions of O. II, r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code apply, and a second suit for arrears prior to that date would not be competent. We also applied art. 102 and held that salary was recoverable from month to month and only such portion of the salary after the earlier suit could be awarded as fell within three years before the date of the second suit.

3. Mr. Lalit contends that certain legal aspects were not considered by us in the earlier judgments and, therefore, the question should be reconsidered. His argument is that the Civil Services Rules make substantial difference in the application of art. 102 of the Limitation Act.

4. Article 102 of the Limitation Act provides a period of three years for a suit for wages and the starting point is “when the wages accrue due”.

5. In this connection, we are referred to Rules 24, 150 and 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. Rule 24 reads:

“24. Subject to any exceptions specifically made in these rules, a Government servant commences or ceases to be entitled to the pay and allowances of a post with effect from the date he assumes or relinquishes charge of the duties of that post, if he assumes or relinquishes charge of those duties in the forenoon of that day; otherwise from the following day.”

6. Exceptions are not necessary for our purposes.

7. Rule 150 reads:

“150. The pay and allowances of a Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service cease from the date of such dismissal or removal.”

8. Rule 152 is as follows:

“152.(1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order

(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty; and

(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.

(2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be.

(3) In other cases, the Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe:

Provided that the payment of allowances under clause (2) or clause (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.”

9. Sub-rules (4) and (5) are not relevant for our purposes.

10. It is at once apparent that no cause of action can be founded in the present case on Rule 152, because it does not create a right in the dismissed Government servant to the pay for the entire period during which lie stood dismissed until the decree of the Court. It only prescribes that the competent authority must consider the question as to what should be paid to him and whether or not for the whole or a part of the period, he should be treated as being on duty. By sub-rule (2), where a Government servant is fully exonerated or where in the case of suspension, it is held that suspension was wholly unjustified, it is provided that he would be entitled to full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed or suspended, as the case may be. In such a case, it is possible to argue that though originally cause of action may have accrued every month when the salary became payable, on the exoneration of the Government servant, a fresh cause of action accrued by reason of sub-rule (2). This question does not arise in the present case and we do not decide it. In the present case, the only argument of Mr. Lalit could be and has been that as Rule 150 provides that from the date of dismissal the pay and allowances of a dismissed Government servant shall cease until the dismissal was held to be invalid or inoperative, the plaintiff was not entitled to any part of the salary and, therefore, he could not file a suit in respect of the same. It is this contention that must now be examined.

11. It is a fundamental rule of procedure that a party who comes to Court comes 011 allegations on which he is entitled to relief and on the basis of which he can claim relief. It need not be that his rights must be admitted or must have been declared to be true. It is on this footing that where it is alleged that a tenancy is terminated that the landlord files a suit for possession and mesne profits. It is again 011 this principle that where it is alleged that a defendant is a trespasser, he claims possession and mesne profits. Similarly, in the case of a contract where a breach is alleged by the defendant, the plaintiff asks for relief based on his allegation and so also in the case of a tort. In each case, the Court has to decide whether or not the allegation made by the plaintiff that the tenancy is terminated, that the defendant is a trespasser, that the contract is broken or that a tort is committed, is true. If that issue is found in his favour then the plaintiff is entitled to the relief. It is sufficient to say, therefore, that in every case in order to be entitled to relief, it is not necessary for the plaintiff that the defendant must accept or admit his right to the relief and in the absence of such admission, there should first be a declaration by the Court that the right that is claimed exists.

12. The question is whether in the suit that the plaintiff filed, could he claim arrears of salary? The relief of declaration was founded on the allegation that there was a breach of the provisions of art. 311 of the Constitution and further that he continued to be in service. Whether or not this allegation was true, he was bound to have asked for salary during the period between the dismissal and the filing of the suit since according to him he would be entitled to salary and it was wrongfully withheld. Order II, r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that every suit must include the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of his cause of action. The plaintiff is at liberty to relinquish a part of the claim in order to bring the suit within jurisdiction of the Court. Sub-rule (2) of r. 2 provides that if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards one in respect of the portion of his claim so omitted or relinquished. Similarly, if a plaintiff is entitled to ask for more than one relief in respect of his cause of action, he must sue for all such reliefs. But if he omits to sue for any relief to which he is entitled, except with the leave of the Court, he would not be entitled to sue for such relief.

13. On the ground that his dismissal was invalid and he continued to be in service, he was entitled to the reliefs (1) a declaration that the order of dismissal was invalid and (2) that payment of arrears of his salary. In Province of Punjab v. Tara Chand . 1947 49 Bom. L.R 697, F.C, the Federal Court was dealing with a case of dismissal alleged to be contrary to the provisions of s. 240(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Federal Court held that in such a case, the plaintiff had a right to maintain a suit for a declaration that the dismissal was void and also for relief by way of recovery of pay which may have become due to him. The Federal Court pointed out that as the order was contrary to the provisions of s. 240(2) of the Government of India Act, the order was utterly void and was in the eye of law no more than a piece of waste paper and that he was entitled to draw his salary for the period of his service after March 19, 1938. This decision clearly illustrates that in a suit for declaration that the order of dismissal is void, the plaintiff is entitled to claim arrears of salary and if he is entitled to so claim but if he omits to sue for the same, O. II, r. 2 must apply. The decision in Madhav v. State of Mysore . [1962] A.I.R S.C 8. gives effect to the above principles. In that case one M who held the substantive Grade of First Grade Mamlatdar was officiating as District Deputy Collector. Subsequently, as a result of departmental inquiry for misconduct, he was reverted to his original rank as Mamlatdar. He filed a suit for a declaration that the order of reverter was void and also for arrears of salary. The order was made on August 11, 1948. He filed the suit against the State of Bombay on August 2, 1954 for a declaration that the order of 1948 was void and for recovery of Rs. 12,866 and odd on account of the arrears of salary and allowances etc. The Supreme Court following Tara Chand's case applied art. 102 of the Limitation Act and decreed salary only from June 2, 1951, which included also the notice period.

14. Mr. Lalit relies on two decisions of the Madras High Court and one of the Orissa High Court, where it was said that a rule similar to Rule 150 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules would make a difference to the commencement of the date of the cause of action. The decisions are: Union of India v. R. Akbar Sheriff . [1961] A.I.R Mad. 486., State of Madras v. Anantharaman . [1963] A.I.R Mad. 425. and Dr. Jnanendra Nath v. State of Orissa . [1964] A.I.R Orissa 241.. In the first and the third cases, there is not much of reasoning and in view of what we have stated, we need not go into the facts of these cases. The decision in the State of Madras v. Anantharaman has a bearing on the question in issue. fundamental rule 52 as in force in Madras State is similar to Rule 150 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. The Court recognised that normally the salary for every month will be payable at the beginning of the next month, but observed that where a public servant had been dismissed or removed, his pay and allowance would cease from the date of such dismissal or removal. It is further observed that the terminus a quo for a suit under that provision is the accrual of the salary. By reason of fundamental rule 52 the right to salary ceases the moment an order for dismissal or removal is made, and it would not be open to the employee to recover the salary earned without having the order of dismissal set aside. It is not necessary to consider the arguments which were made by the Government Pleader in that case as they do not commend to us. But with great respect we feel that a rule like fundamental rule 52 has nothing to do with the question at issue. It must always be remembered as we have stated at the beginning, that, the plaintiff who comes to the Court does not always come with his right accepted by the other side and asks relief merely on the basis of that accepted case. Once it is admitted that it is neither necessary that the facts or allegation of the plaintiff must be accepted by the other side or must be adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction, a right to relief arises, it is evident a rule of the type has no bearing on the question. This rule provides for nothing-extraordinary which is a deviation from the normal result in such cases. In every case when the tenancy is terminated, no right exists as between landlord and tenant, and similarly where contract is terminated or broken, no right exists between the two contracting parties as such and large number of illustrations can be given in this respect. Ride 52 or any such rule provides only normal consequences of breaking off of relationship of master and servant and nothing more. The assumption that termination of service is a valid termination is implicit in this rule. It does not give a starting point of limitation. Having regard to these aspects of the matter, it is not, with respect, necessary to go to the question of the effect of an order which is declared to be void by the Court. The learned Judges distinguished the decision in Tara Chand's case by saying that applicability of fundamental ride 52 was not considered, and the decision in Manhav v. State of Mysore, on the ground that the plaintiff still continued to be in service and was not a case in which fundamental rule 52 prevented the accrual of salary. With respect, the judgment of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court cannot be distinguished on this ground. As we have stated, fundamental rule 52 does not lay down any new principle. The consequence must follow from the termination of the relationship whether or not such a provision exists. Apart from this, the decision in the later case has not, in our view, been rightly distinguished. Rule 24, of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, clearly provides that a government servant is entitled to such emoluments as are attached to his office. As soon as, therefore, there is an order of reverter, the Government servant would be entitled only to the salary attached to his reverted post, and not to the salary of his higher post. It could be had only if the order of reverter was declared void, which the Supreme Court did. If the contention that the cause of action accrued on the date of declaration that the order is invalid, were right, since the plaintiff had asked for the payment of the arrears in that very suit, the claim could never have got barred by time because of rule 24. We are, therefore, of the view that a declaration that the order is invalid or void does not give a fresh starting point unless when probably the case falls under Rule 152(2) which point we do not decide.

15. As a last resort, Mr. Lalit relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Venkatesh Narahar v. H.K Mulla . [1966] A.I.R S.C 1085.. The question was one of construction of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, the question being when would the cause of action for an application under s. 29(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act would accrue to a landlord who had terminated the tenancy of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. The question was whether the time would begin to run from the date of sub-letting or the date of termination of the tenancy. This is entirely a different question and has no bearing on the question of applicability of art. 102 of the Limitation Act. It is obvious that the right to apply under s. 29(2) could only accrue if a notice terminating the tenancy is given to the tenant, which is the condition precedent for the making of the application and the Supreme Court, therefore, held that it is the date on which the tenancy is terminated that gives the right to possession, and not mere subletting of the property. We, therefore, are of the view that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief except the one granted by him. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.

16. Appeal dismissed.