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  • 3519 of 2000.11. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • provisions of Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • application.Rule 32 of A.P Civil Rules
  • CRP. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of the Rules
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citation codes
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  • 3519 of 2000.11. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • provisions of Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • application.Rule 32 of A.P Civil Rules
  • CRP. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of the Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of Civil Rules
  • Rule 32 of the Rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A decree was originally passed on 30-10-1992 by the I Additional District Munsif Court, Vijayawada in OS No. 1337 of 1988. Pursuant thereto a sale notice was issued to the respondent (the judgment-debtor) on 19-6-1997. The decree described the plaintiff as "Kamal Silk Mills, rep. by its Power of Attorney holder agent by name T. Mohan Rao." An execution petition (EP No. 62 of 1993) was filed to enforce that decree.

The respondent filed a counter in the execution proceedings alleging (a) that he had paid the decretal amount (claimed date of payment is recorded in the record) and (b) that the alleged General Power of Attorney (GPA) was not valid and had not been filed in Court, invoking Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice to contend that the EP was liable to be dismissed.

During the execution enquiry the decree-holder (petitioner) filed certified copies of the Power of Attorney and the original decree from the earlier suit files. The executing Court (Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally) rejected the execution petition as not maintainable in law on the ground that Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice had not been complied with (permission to the agent under Rule 32 was not on record). Aggrieved, the decree-holder filed the present civil revision petition.

It was also noted that between the same parties and on a similar question another execution matter (EP No. 69 of 1995 in OS No. 1333 of 1988) resulted in a civil revision petition (CRP No. 3519 of 2000) which had been dismissed by a learned single Judge on 19-9-2001.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice (permission/filing requirements for an agent other than an advocate) at the execution stage renders an execution petition non-maintainable.
  2. Whether the representation of the plaintiff by a General Power of Attorney holder (where the decree itself records such representation) can be treated as a curable irregularity rather than a ground to dismiss the execution petition.
  3. To what extent an executing Court may go behind the decree to examine objections to the validity of the decree or the authority of the person representing the decree-holder (i.e., whether principles in V.D. Modi v. H.A. Rehman apply in the execution proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (decree-holder) — primary contentions

  • The decree itself records that the plaintiff was represented by a Power of Attorney holder (T. Mohan Rao), and that representation should suffice at the execution stage.
  • Non-compliance with Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice is at best a curable irregularity and does not justify dismissal of the execution petition.
  • The petitioner relied on several judicial decisions to support the proposition that dismissal of an EP on this ground was unsustainable and that the defect could be rectified (cases cited in the record).

Respondent (judgment-debtor) — primary contentions

  • No permission in accordance with Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice was obtained from the original Court authorizing the agent to represent the plaintiff; therefore the execution petition was not maintainable.
  • The same view had been accepted by another learned single Judge in CRP No. 3519 of 2000 in a similar matter between the same parties, and thus there was no reason to differ from that order.
  • Additionally, the respondent asserted that the decretal amount had already been paid and relied on that contention in opposing execution (though no receipt was produced to the executing Court or to this Court, as recorded in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
K.A. Mangatayaramma v. Indian Bank, Madras, 1984 (1) ALT 55 (NRC) Relied upon by petitioner to support that non-compliance with Rule 32 is, at best, a curable irregularity. The petitioner relied on this decision; the Court noted the reliance but its principal application was to consider whether dismissal without opportunity to rectify was appropriate.
Janab Syed Kazim Sahab v. Janab Sayeed Bakaram Sahab, 1990 (1) An. WR 256 Relied upon by petitioner to argue curable irregularity and that dismissal was unsustainable. Listed among authorities relied upon by the petitioner; the Court recorded the reliance in its reasoning.
United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660 Relied upon by petitioner in support of the contention that non-compliance is curable. Included in the list of decisions the petitioner placed reliance upon; the Court noted the reliance.
Kakatiya Finance, Ramagiri, Nalgonda v. Nalamala Lingaiah…, 1998 (4) ALD 297 Relied upon by petitioner to show similar approach to representation/curable irregularity. Referred to in the opinion as among the petitioner’s authorities; the Court recorded this reliance.
N. Appalanarasamma v. N. Appa Rao, 1999 (1) ALD 345 Relied upon by petitioner to support that non-compliance can be cured and should not lead to dismissal. Mentioned among the authorities relied upon by the petitioner; the Court noted the citation.
V.D. Modi v. H.A. Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 : AIR 1970 SC 1475 Principle that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; execution Court must take the decree according to its tenor and cannot entertain certain objections to the decree (subject to limited exceptions where decree is a nullity or jurisdictional defects appear on the record). The Court expressly applied this Apex Court authority as a controlling principle: it relied on V.D. Modi to hold that the executing Court had erred in going behind the decree and dismissing the EP; this authority formed the principal basis to set aside the impugned order and restore the EP.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a stepwise examination of procedural posture, statutory provisions and evidence on record.

  1. Statutory and procedural context: The Court observed that Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with recognized agents and pleaders, and that there is no specific provision in Order XXI of the Code dealing with the exact issue at the execution stage. The Court repeatedly cited Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice (the Rule governing party appearance by agent) and reproduced its text.
  2. Nature of the decree and objection: The decree itself recorded that the plaintiff was represented by its Power of Attorney holder. The respondent challenged the execution on the ground that Rule 32 had not been complied with and that permission authorizing the agent had not been recorded by the original Court.
  3. Lower Court's action: The executing Court dismissed the EP as not maintainable solely on the ground that Rule 32 had not been complied with and that permission was not on the record. The appellate record showed the respondent also pleaded discharge, but no receipt or material proving discharge was produced.
  4. Preliminary view and procedural direction: Initially, a learned Judge (P.S. Narayana, J.) inclined to refer the matter to a Division Bench because another single Judge had expressed an opinion in a similar matter. The matter was then heard by the Chief Justice (Dr. A.R. Lakshmanan), who directed the petitioner to produce an affidavit by the principal (Mrs. Kamaladevi) to verify that the Power of Attorney remained in force.
  5. Evidence produced: Pursuant to the direction, Mrs. Kamaladevi filed a sworn affidavit stating that the Power of Attorney in favour of T. Mohan Rao was in force and had not been withdrawn, that the EP was filed with the principal's consent, and that the respondent's claim of payment was false.
  6. Application of precedent and legal principle: The Court relied on V.D. Modi v. H.A. Rehman (Apex Court) which holds that an executing Court ordinarily cannot go behind a decree between the parties or their representatives and must take the decree according to its tenor; objections to the decree generally must be raised by appropriate proceedings (appeal/revision) unless the decree is shown to be a nullity or a jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the record.
  7. Conclusion from facts and law: Given (a) the decree’s tenor indicating representation by a Power of Attorney holder, (b) the affidavit by the principal confirming that the Power of Attorney was in force at the time of filing the EP, and (c) the absence of acceptable evidence substantiating the respondent’s plea of discharge, the Court held that the executing Court erred in dismissing the EP as not maintainable and in going behind the decree.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The impugned order of the Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally dated 24-7-2000 dismissing EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1988 was set aside and the execution petition was restored to file as EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1998.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The matter is remitted to the executing Court (the Court below) which is directed to dispose of the execution petition in accordance with law.
  • The judgment-debtor (respondent) remains at liberty to raise substantive defenses available in law in the execution proceedings, including the plea of discharge; however, such defenses must be supported by admissible evidence (the Court noted no acceptable evidence was placed to substantiate the alleged discharge in this record).
  • The Court applied the principle in V.D. Modi to restrict the executing Court from re-opening the decree except in the limited situations recognized by law; the decision does not purport to create a new general precedent beyond applying that principle to the facts before it.

No broader or novel legal doctrine was announced; the decision reversed the executing Court's dismissal and restored the EP for further adjudication in accordance with existing principles.

    Kamal Silk Mills v. Kuncham Mohana Rao

    P.S Narayana, J.:— Heard Sri V.S.R Anjaneyulu, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner and Sri Srinivas, the leaned Counsel representing Sri M.V.S Suresh Kumar on behalf of the respondent.

    2. The civil revision petition in filed as against an order in EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1988, dated 24-7-2000 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally. Originally, the decree was passed by the I Additional District Munsif Court, Vijayawada on 30-10-1992 and on 19-6-1997 the Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally had issued sale notice to the respondent-Judgment-debtor and the Judgment-debtor had filed a counter contending that he paid the EP amount on 1-11-993 and the alleged GPA is not valid and the Power of Attorney was not filed into Court and in view of the specific bar imposed by Rule 32 of Civil Rules of Practice, the EP is liable to be dismissed. The revision petitioner-decree-holder during the course of enquiry had filed a certified copy of the Power of Attorney in OS No. 1335 of 1988 and also a certified copy of the judgment in OS No. 1337 of 1988 on the file of I Additional District Munsif Court, Vijayawada and the respondent had opposed for receipt of those documents on the ground that no permission was granted under Rule 32 of Civil Rules of Practice by the original Court to the GPA to represent the original plaintiff. The Court below after discussing the objection at paragraphs 10 to 15 had ultimately dismissed the EP as not maintainable in law and aggrieved by the said order, the present civil revision petition is filed.

    3. It was also brought to my notice by both the Counsel that as against an order dated 24-7-2000 in EP No. 69 of 1995 in OS No. 1333 of 1988 on the file of Junior civil Judge, Sathupally between the same parties involving the same question by an order dated 19-9-2001 in CRP No. 3519 of 2000 another learned single Judge had dismissed the CRP. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice dealing with the aspect of party appearing by agent reads as follows:

    Party appearing by Agent:—(1) When a party appears by any agent, other than an advocate, the agent shall, before making or doing any appearance, application, or act, in or to the Court, file in Court the Power of Attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorizing him or a properly authenticated copy thereof together with an affidavit that the said authority still subsisting, or, in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of a party, without a written authority, an affidavit stating the residence of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of the same with the subject-matter of the suit, and that no other agent is expressly authorized to make or do such appearance, application, or act.

    (2) The Judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party; and unless and until the said permission is granted, no appearance, application, or act, of the agent shall be recognized by the Court.

    4. Order 3 of the CPC deals with recognised agents and pleaders. It is pertinent to note that there is no specific provision dealing with this aspect under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also interesting to note in the present case that the decree itself reads “Kamal Silk Mills, rep. by its Power of Attorney holder agent by name T. Mohan Rao, S/o. Ramanadhan, R/o Vijayawada.” The objection now raised by the respondent-Judgment-debtor is that though the decree specifically specifies that the plaintiff is represented by Power of Attorney holder, again at the stage of execution the procedure under Rule 32 of Civil Rules of Practice has to be followed. The learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner had placed reliance on several decisions like K.A Mangatayaramma v. Indian Bank, Madras, 1984 (1) ALT 55 (NRC), Janab Syed Kazim Sahab v. Janab Sayeed Bakaram Sahab, 1990 (1) An. W.R 256, United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660, Kakatiya Finance, Ramagiri, Nalgonda… v. Nalamala Lingaiah…., 1998 (4) ALD 297 and N. Appalanarasamma v. N. Appa Rao, 1999 (1) ALD 345 and had strenuously contended that at the best it is only a curable irregularity and dismissing the E.P on that ground is totally unsustainable. The learned Counsel for the respondent however contended that the fact remains that no permission had been obtained in accordance with Rule 32 of Civil Rules of Practice and this view was accepted in a similar matter between the same parties by another learned Judge in CRP No. 3519 of 2000 and hence there are no valid reasons to differ from the order already made in a same matter by another learned single Judge and hence this civil revision petition has to be dismissed.

    5. As already discussed supra, there is no specific provision under Order 21 CPC relating to this aspect. No doubt much stress was placed on Rule 32 of Civil Rules of Practice. Even otherwise, it was held to be a curable irregularity. The Court below instead of giving opportunity to rectify the defect if any, since putting a decree into execution is a substantive right and it cannot be dismissed on a procedural technicality, unfortunately had dismissed the very EP itself. Be that as it may, here is a case where another learned Judge had expressed an opinion in a similar matter in CRP No. 3519 of 2000. Hence, I am inclined to refer the CRP in toto to be decided by an appropriate Division Bench on the questions discussed supra, which need not be repeated again, for an appropriate decision.

    6. Accordingly, I direct the Office to place papers before the Honourable the Chief Justice for obtaining appropriate orders in this regard.

    CASES CITED

    Janab Syed Kazim Sahab v. Janab Saveed Bakaram Sahab, 1990 (1) An. WR 256 (Para 8) K.A Mangatayaramma v. Indian Bank, Madras, 1984 (1) ALT 55 (NRC) (Para 8) Kakatiya Finance, Ramagiri, Nalgonda… v. Nalamala Lingaiah…., 1998 (4) ALD 297 (Para 8)

    N. Appalanarasamma v. N. Appa Rao, 1999 (1) ALD 345 (Para 8) United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660 (Para 8) V.D Modi v. H.A Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 : AIR 1970 SC 1475 (Para 17)

    Dr. A.R Lakshmanan, C.J:— Heard Sri V.S.R Anjaneyulu, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.V Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent.

    7. This civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 24-7-2000, passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, in EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1988.

    8. On 30-10-1992, a decree was passed by the I Additional District Munsif at Vijayawada in OS No. 1337 of 1988. Pursuant thereto, a sale notice was issued to the respondent-Judgment-debtor on 19-6-1997. The respondent filed counter contending that he paid the EP amount on 1-1-1993 and the alleged General Power of Attorney, which was not filed into Court, is not valid, and having regard to provisions of Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice, the EP is liable to be dismissed. The petitioner-decree-holder during the course of enquiry filed certified copies of the Power of Attorney in OS No. 1335 of 1988 and the judgment in OS No. 1337 of 1988 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada. The respondent opposed receiving of the said documents on the ground that no permission was granted under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice by the original Court permitting Sri. T. Mohan Rao to act as General Power of Attorney on behalf of the plaintiff.

    9. The Court below after discussing the objections, dismissed the EP holding as not maintainable under law. Aggrieved by the said order, this civil revision petition is filed.

    10. The matter, earlier was heard by Sri P.S Narayana, J., and it was brought to his notice that as against an order dated 24-7-2000, passed in EP No. 69 of 1995 in OS No. 1333 of 1988, by the learned Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, between the same parties, involving the same question, a learned single Judge of this Court by an order dated 19-9-2001, dismissed CRP No. 3519 of 2000.

    11. Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice, which deals with the aspect of party appearing by agent reads:

    Party appearing by Agent:—(1) When a party appears by an agent, other than an advocate, the agent shall, before making or doing any appearance, application, or act in or to the Court, file in Court the Power of Attorney or written authority, thereunto authorizing him or a property authenticated copy thereof together with an affidavit that the said authority is still subsisting, or, in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of a party, without a written authority an affidavit stating the residence of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of the same with the subject-matter of the suit, and that no other agent is expressly authorized to make or do such appearance application, or act.

    (2) The Judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party; and unless and until the said permission is granted, no appearance, application, or act, of the agent shall be recognized by the Court.

    12. Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) deals with recognized agents and pleaders. There is no specific provision dealing with this aspect under Order XXI of the Code. In the instant case, the decree reads:

    Kamal Silk Mills, rep. by its Power of Attorney holder agent by name T. Mohan Rao Ramanadhan, S/o. Ramanadhan, R/o. Vijayawada.

    13. The objection now raised by the respondent is that though the decree specifically indicates that the plaintiff is represented by Power of Attorney holder, yet at the stage of execution the procedure contemplated under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice has to be followed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission that the decree at best is a curable irregularity and dismissing the EP on that ground is wholly unsustainable, placed reliance upon several decision K.A Mangatayaramma v. Indian Bank, Madras, 1984 (1) ALT 55 (NRC), Janab Syed Kazim Sahab v. Janab Sayeed Bakaram Sahab, 1990 (1) An. WR 256, United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660, Kakatiya Finance, Ramagiri, Nalgonda… v. Nalamala Lingaiah…., 1998 (4) ALD 297 and N. Appalanarasamma v. N. Appa Rao, 1999 (1) ALD 345. The learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the fact remains that no permission was obtained in accordance with Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice. This view was accepted in a similar matter between the same parties by a learned single Judge of this Court in CRP No. 3519 of 2000, and as such, there are no valid reasons to differ from the order already made, and hence, the CRP has to be dismissed.

    14. The learned single Judge upon noticing that there is no specific provision under Order XXI of the Code relating to this aspect, observed that the Court below instead of giving opportunity to rectify the defect, if any, since putting a decree into execution is a substantive right and cannot be dismissed on a procedural technicality, unfortunately dismissed the very EP itself.

    15. For the foregoing reasons, the learned single Judge was inclined to refer this civil revision petition in toto to be decided by an appropriate Division Bench of the questions discussed in the order. That is how, the matter is before us.

    16. We have perused the order dated 24-7-2000, passed by the Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, in EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1988. The EP was dismissed as not maintainable in law.

    17. According to the petitioner-decree-holder, as contemplated by Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice, the General Power of Attorney is still in force. The petitioner filed the EP without filing any affidavit showing that the Power of Attorney, said to have been executed by the original decree-holder, is still in force. Since the affidavit, as also the original Power of Attorney was not filed along with the EP, the Court dismissed the same on the ground that the provisions of Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice have not been complied with. It can be seen from the order passed by the Court below that a specific contention was raised by the respondent-judgment-debtor that the entire decree amount was discharged and he need not pay any amount towards the decree in the suit, and to that effect the petitioner-decree-holder has also issued a receipt. This statement was denied by the petitioner. Though such a contention was raised by the judgment-debtor, he failed to place before the Court below the receipt, said to have been issued by the petitioner. Further, the Court below dismissed the EP observing that no permission was granted by the original Court under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice permitting the petitioner to act as General Power of Attorney on behalf of the original plaintiff, and as such, the EP is not maintainable in law. In paragraph 8 of its judgment, the Court below referred to the contention of the judgment debtor that no permission was obtained from the original Court under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice authorizing the General Power of Attorney holder to represent on behalf of the original decree-holder as long as the General Power of Attorney is in force. The Court below, unfortunately, failed to notice that no such contention was ever raised in the suit. This plea having not been raised at an earlier point of time, we are of the opinion, that the judgment-debtor, cannot be permitted to raise such a plea at the stage of execution of the decree. Therefore, in our opinion, dismissing the EP on the ground that it is not maintainable in law, is wholly illegal and not tenable in law.

    18. The plea of discharge has also not been established by the respondent by any acceptable evidence. If the plea of discharge is true, the Court below ought to have recorded the payment made towards the discharge of the decree. No material was placed either before the Court below or before us to substantiate the said plea of discharge.

    19. When this reference came up before us on 28-11-2001, we passed the following order:

    We heard this matter for some time. Before the lower Court an affidavit was filed by the Power of Attorney himself stating that he is the Power of Attorney of the plaintiff as on the date of filing the application.

    Rule 32 of A.P Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders 1990 (for short ‘the Rules’) specifically provides that ‘when a party appears by any agent, other than an advocate, the agent shall, before making or doing, any appearance, application, or act, in or to the Court, file in Court the Power of Attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorizing him or a properly authenticated copy thereof together with an affidavit that the said authority still subsisting’.

    It is the specific contention of the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor that Rule 32 of the Rules has not been complied with and that the affidavit has been filed only by the Power of Attorney holder and not the principal.

    In order to satisfy ourselves that the person who filed the affidavit is real Power of Attorney and Power of Attorney is still in force, we direct Mrs. Kamaladevi w/o Damodarprasad Bhattad, Suart, to file an affidavit duly notarized by Notary, before this Court. The affidavit shall be filed within three weeks from today.

    Call this matter on 19-12-2001 as part-heard.

    20. Pursuant to the above directions, Mrs. Kamaladevi w/o Damodarprasad Bhattad, has filed an affidavit stating in paragraph 2 as under:

    I respectfully submit that for the purpose of representing the petitioner firm on our behalf, we have given Power of Attorney in favour of Sri. T. Mohan Rao. He has filed the suit OS No. 1337 of 1998 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, Khammam District to act on our behalf. The Power of Attorney executed in his favour is in force. The Power of Attorney given to him has not been withdrawn till date and it is still in force. He has filed EP before the executing Court with our consent only. The contention of the respondent that he has paid the decretal amount to us is not correct and the said contention is nothing but a conconcted one to harass us on one ground or the other.

    21. From the above, it is obvious that Mrs. Kamaladevi w/o Damodarprasad Bhattad for the purpose of representing the petitioner firm Kamala Silk Mills on their behalf, have appointed Sri T. Mohan Rao, as their Power of Attorney, who has filed the suit OS No. 1337 of 1998 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, Khammam District, and that the Power of Attorney executed in his favour is still in force and has not been withdrawn till date, and that the EP was filed with their consent only. Kamala Silk Mills has executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Sri. T. Mohan Rao, who filed the suit and obtained a decree, and thereafter, filed EP in his capacity as the Power of Attorney of the said firm. The General Power of Attorney is still in force, and under its strength the EP was filed before the Court below. This is quite evident from the sworn affidavit filed by Mrs. Kamaladevi w/o Damodarprasad Bhattad pursuant to the directions of this Court. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the dismissal of the EP by the Court below as not maintainable in law, is incorrect and liable to be set aside.

    22. In this context, we may usefully refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in V.D Modi v. H.A Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 : AIR 1970 SC 1475. The Apex Court upon considering the objection raised as regards the validity of the decree for putting it to execution, held:

    A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties.

    When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record, where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised. The execution Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.

    23. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and having regard to the judgment of the Apex Court in V.D Modi, we are of the opinion that the Court below has miserably failed in entertaining the objection taken by the judgment debtor that the decree was incorrect in law, and the General Power of Attorney was not in force when the suit was laid. The Court below in our opinion cannot go beyond the decree between the parties or their representatives, and it must take the decree according to its tenor and proceed further. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned order and restore the EP to file with its original number being EP No. 62 of 1993 in OS No. 1337 of 1998 and direct the Court below to dispose of the same in accordance with law. The judgment debtor is at liberty to raise the plea of discharge and such other pleas as are available to him in law and also file proof of discharge, in opposition to the EP, if any.

    24. The plea of discharge has also not been established by any acceptable evidence. If the plea of discharge is true, the Court ought to have recorded the payment made towards the discharge of the decree. No material was placed before us to substantiate the said plea of discharge.

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    Comments

    Kamal Silk Mills v. Kuncham Mohana Rao
    (Dec 26, 2001)