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  • Sections 2 to 5, 7 and 15 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 (for short the Act) by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991
  • clause (i) of Section 3(subsection (1) of Section 3), clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 5
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • principal Act of 1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • clause (9-A) of Section 2, Section 3 and Section 5,
  • Clause (9-A) in Section 2, necessarily, Sections 3
  • provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
  • provisions of sub-sec. (3).8. Section 15
  • clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 3
  • clause (2) of Section 3.6. Section 5
  • clause (b) of Sec. 4.7. Sub-section (3)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 3,
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • FINANCE NO 2 ACT 1991
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citation codes
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  • Sections 2 to 5, 7 and 15 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 (for short the Act) by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991
  • clause (i) of Section 3(subsection (1) of Section 3), clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 5
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • principal Act of 1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • clause (9-A) of Section 2, Section 3 and Section 5,
  • Clause (9-A) in Section 2, necessarily, Sections 3
  • provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
  • provisions of sub-sec. (3).8. Section 15
  • clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 3
  • clause (2) of Section 3.6. Section 5
  • clause (b) of Sec. 4.7. Sub-section (3)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 3,
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • FINANCE NO 2 ACT 1991
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M. N. Rao, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions challenges the constitutionality of amendments made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991 to Sections 2 to 5, 7 and 15 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 ("the Act"). Most petitioners are hoteliers; one petitioner (W.P. No. 14175 of 1991) is a practising advocate. Because the petitions raise common questions, the court dealt with them by a single, common judgment.

The 1987 Act originally levied a tax on certain hotel expenditures (Section 3 set threshold: room charges of Rs. 400 or more per day per individual; Section 4 fixed tax at 20% on chargeable expenditure; Section 5 defined "chargeable expenditure"; Section 7 made the hotelier responsible for collection; Section 15 provided penalties for failure to collect or pay). The 1991 amendments (effective 1-10-1991) extended the Act to restaurants equipped with or having access to air-conditioning, inserted clause (9-A) in Section 2 defining "restaurant", introduced a 15% tax rate for restaurants (clause (b) of Section 4), and amended Sections 3, 5 and 7 to deal with restaurants and collection procedures.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amendments made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991 to the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 are constitutionally valid.
  2. Whether Parliament had legislative competence to enact the impugned amendments (i.e., whether the measure intrudes into State subjects such as "taxes on sale or purchase of goods" in Entry 54 of List II).
  3. Whether the amended scheme violates Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an arbitrary or unintelligible classification (air-conditioned restaurants outside hotels being taxed while certain restaurant expenditure within hotels is excluded).
  4. Whether the impugned legislation violates fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) (right to carry on business) by imposing onerous restrictions and an excessive tax burden.
  5. Whether the tax infringes Article 21 (right to life with dignity) by making essential food services inaccessible or unaffordable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Petitioners (counsel: Sri M. V. K. Moorthy, Sri Man Mohan, Sri Firdos)

  • Sri Moorthy: Initially contended lack of parliamentary competence but did not press it hard after being shown Supreme Court precedent (Federation). Main attack premised on violation of Article 14 — classification is irrational because separate expenditure in air-conditioned restaurants within hotels (where room tariff is Rs. 400 or more) is excluded while standalone air-conditioned restaurants are included. Also contended that food is essential and taxing it violates Article 21 (right to life with dignity). Alleged excessive rate of tax would drive away customers and harm business, violating Article 19(1)(g).
  • Sri Man Mohan: Contended the amendments are in pith and substance a tax on food and drinks supplied in air-conditioned restaurants; the tax is arbitrary and excessive and thus violative of Article 14. Argued that air-conditioned restaurants are necessary in some areas (where ordinary hotels are unavailable), and taxing them would harm ordinary people (also referenced power failure and health/pollution considerations).
  • Sri Firdos (for the advocate petitioner, W.P. No. 14175/1991): Contended that tax was collected from a customer who consumed food in a non-air-conditioned section of a hotel that had an air-conditioned section, and that collecting tax from such customers is unreasonable (i.e., taxing persons not actually given air-conditioning is unjust).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India, 1989 178 ITR 97 (SC) Upheld constitutionality of the principal Expenditure Tax Act, 1987; rejected challenges that it was a disguised State subject or violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The court treated the Federation decision as authoritative and relied on it to reject challenges to parliamentary competence, Article 14, and Article 19(1)(g) in respect of the 1991 amendments. The court noted that an identical contention had been advanced and negatived in that Supreme Court decision.
Union of India v. S. H. Dillon, 1972 83 ITR 582 (SC) When dealing with a Central Act, courts must enquire whether it legislates in respect of any matter in List II (State list); if a Central Act does not enter these forbidden fields, it is unnecessary to determine exact List I or III entries. Principle allows examination of whether a Central Act invades State fields. The court followed Dillon as authority for the proposition that it may inquire whether the Central legislation enters the prohibited fields of List II; relying on the same line of reasoning helped the court reject the competence challenge to the amendments (i.e., the expenditure aspect falls within Union power and is distinct from State power over sales).
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1912 AC 571 (PC) Authority cited for the view that different aspects of the same matter may fall under different legislative powers and overlap may be incidental but must be real in law. Quoted via Dillon; used to support the proposition that legislative competence must be ascertained by asking whether the Central Act enters a List II field and that incidental effect on another field does not make the law invalid.
Ranganathan, J.'s separate but concurring judgment in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India (cited) Expresses the object of a luxury tax is to tax enjoyment of certain benefits and to discourage unproductive expenditure; to encourage society to cater better to those who cannot afford such facilities. The court adopted this underlying purposive rationale to explain and justify that the impugned tax targets the potentiality/ability to incur "wasteful expenditure" and thus is constitutionally permissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the challenge in a structured way, relying on the statutory text, legislative history, and controlling precedents already addressing the principal Act.

Statutory framework and effect of the 1991 amendments

  • The 1987 Act taxed certain expenditures in hotels (Section 3 threshold: room charges Rs. 400 or more per day). Section 4 originally fixed the tax at 20% for hotels; Section 5 defined "chargeable expenditure"; Section 7 set out collection responsibilities; Section 15 provided penalties.
  • The Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991 added clause (9-A) to Section 2 to define "restaurant" as premises (not being a restaurant situated in a hotel referred to in Section 3(1)) where sale of food/drink is carried on and which, at the beginning of any month, are equipped with or have access to air-conditioning facilities. The Act was amended so that chargeable expenditure in such restaurants is taxed at 15% (clause (b) of Section 4), and Sections 3, 5 and 7 were adapted to cover restaurants and specify collection responsibilities.

Legislative competence (State vs Union powers)

  • Counsel argued the amendments are, in substance, a tax on sale or purchase of goods (Entry 54, List II), a State subject, and thus beyond Parliament's competence. The court observed that a materially identical argument had been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India, which followed the earlier decision in Union of India v. S. H. Dillon.
  • Relying on those precedents and the principle that a Central Act should be examined to see whether it actually legislates in respect of any List II matter, the court held that the expenditure aspect of the transaction falls within Union power and is distinct from a tax on sale or purchase. Therefore, Parliament had competence and the competence challenge was rejected.

Article 14 (arbitrariness / classification)

  • The petitioners contended that the classification is arbitrary because separate expenditure in air-conditioned restaurants within hotels (meeting the Rs. 400 tariff threshold) is excluded while standalone air-conditioned restaurants are included. The court found this to be a misapprehension.
  • The court read Section 3(1) together with Section 5 and noted that "any other services at the hotel" (Section 5(1)(d)) already covered separate expenditure incurred in air-conditioned restaurants located within hotel premises. Hence, there was no exclusion of such expenditure from the principal 1987 Act; the 1991 amendment brought standalone air-conditioned restaurants within the charge as well. On that textual reading, the classification is sustainable and Article 14 is not violated.

Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 (right to carry on business and right to life with dignity)

  • The court rejected the submission that the tax imposes unreasonable restrictions on carrying on business under Article 19(1)(g). It relied on Federation where the Supreme Court observed that mere excessiveness of a tax, or the fact that imposition might diminish earnings or profits, does not by itself violate Article 19(1)(g).
  • The court also rejected the Article 21 argument that food sold in restaurants is essential and taxing it infringes the right to live with dignity. The court viewed such submissions as "imaginary and fanciful" extrapolations of Article 21's content in this context. The court emphasized that the statute targets the potentiality or capacity to incur wasteful expenditure and that the object of the tax is to curb unproductive/wasteful expenditures, not to deny essential sustenance.
  • The court noted there was no evidential showing by petitioners of specific losses or reduction in profits attributable to the legislation when compared to previous years.

Application to the individual advocate petitioner (W.P. No. 14175/1991)

  • The petitioner complained of being charged the expenditure tax despite consuming food in the ordinary (non-air-conditioned) section of a hotel that had an air-conditioned section. The court rejected that contention, holding the tax legitimately targets the capacity/potential to avail air-conditioning facilities and that the propensity to incur such expenditure is what the law brings to tax.

Overarching rationale

  • The court endorsed the view that the legislative object is to curb "unproductive" or "wasteful" expenditure and to tax the enjoyment/potential to enjoy certain benefits (a rationale echoed in Ranganathan, J.'s concurring judgment in Federation). This purposive approach informed the court's conclusion that the impugned amendments are constitutionally permissible.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All the writ petitions are dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioners' challenges to the 1991 amendments to the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 were rejected and the writ petitions were dismissed. The amendments extending the tax to air-conditioned restaurants and the related collection and penalty provisions remain valid as applied.
  • Precedential effect: The court's decision follows and applies existing Supreme Court authority (notably Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India and Union of India v. S. H. Dillon). The judgment does not purport to overrule or create a new precedent but applies controlling precedents to the 1991 amendments.
  • Scope of review emphasized: The court reaffirmed that taxation measures aimed at curbing wasteful/unproductive expenditure and targeting the potentiality to incur such expenditure are constitutionally sustainable, and that mere economic hardship or diminution of profits does not, without more, render such a tax violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21.

End of summary based solely on the provided opinion text.

    M. Srinivas And Others v. Union Of India, Rep. By The Secretary To Govt. Of India, Ministries Of Law, Justice, Company Affairs And Finance, New Delhi And Others

    M.N Rao, J.:— The constitutionality of the amendments made to Sections 2 to 5, 7 and 15 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 (for short “the Act”) by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991 is under challenge in this batch of writ petitions. Except in W.P No. 14175 of 1991, the petitioners in the other writ petitions are hoteliers; in W.P No. 14175 of 1991, the petitioner is a practising advocate. Because of commonality of questions involved for adjudication, we are inclined to dispose of all the writ petitions by this common judgment.

    2. The Act of 1987, as it stood prior to the amendment Act of 1991, was enacted to provide for the levy of a tax on expenditure incurred in certain hotels. Section 3 laid down that the Act shall apply:

    “in relation to any chargeable expenditure incurred in a hotel wherein, the room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at the time of the incurring of such expenditure are four hundred rupees or more per day per individual.

    (2) Where a composite charge is. payable in respect of residential accommodation and food, the room charges included therein shall be determined in the prescribed manner.

    (3) …………

    3. It was provided by Section 4 that the tax was 20% of the chargeable expenditure. Section 5 contained the meaning of ‘chargeable expenditure’. Section 7 provided that in respect of a hotel in relation to which chargeable expenditure was incurred, the hotelier was responsible for collection. Section 15 dealt with the penalty for failure to collect or pay the expenditure tax. The constitutionality of the Act fell for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Fedrn. of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India . 1989 178 ITR 97 SC.. On three grounds the Act was attacked: (i) In its true nature and character it is not an Act relating to expenditure tax, but in pith and substance, it is a tax on luxuries falling within Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule or a tax envisaged in Entry 54 of List II and, therefore, clearly outside the legislative competence of the Union Parliament, (ii) It was violative of Article 14 in that the classification of hotels for the purpose of imposition of tax was arbitrary and unintelligible without any rational nexus with the taxing policy; and (iii) the Act was violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) as it imposed unreasonable and onerous restrictions on the petitioners-hoteliers-to carry on their business. All the three contentions were negatived by the Supreme Court.

    4. By the amendments brought about by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991 with effect from 1-10-1991, the sweep of the Act was extended to encompass restaurants equipped with or having access to facilities for air-conditioning. Clause (9-A) inserted by the amendment Act in Section 2 defines ‘restaurant’ in the following terms:

    “restaurant means any premises, not being a restaurant situated in a hotel referred to in clause (1) of Section 3, in which the business of sale of food or drink to the public is carried on and such premises, at the beginning of any month, are equipped with, or have access to facilities for air-conditioning.”

    5. As a consequence of the insertion of Clause (9-A) in Section 2, necessarily, Sections 3 to 5 also had to be amended. The application of the Act in relation to any chargeable expenditure, by sub-section (2) of Section 3, was extended to the expenditure incurred in a restaurant. The rate of tax in relation to the expenditure incurred in a restaurant is fifteen per cent as provided in clause (b) of Section 4. It reads:

    “4. Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be charge onand from:

    (a) ………….

    (b) the 1st day of October, 1991, a tax at the rate of fifteen per cent of the chargeable expenditure incurred in a restaurant referred to in clause (2) of Section 3.”

    6. Section 5 explains what is meant by chargeable expenditure. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 says that chargeable expenditure “in relation to a restaurant referred to in clause (2) of Section 3 means any expenditure incurred in, or payments nade to, a restaurant in connection with the provision of food and drinks by the restaurant, whether at the restaurant or outside, or by any other person in the restaurant, but does not include any expenditure referred to in sub-clauses (ii) and (iv) of clause (1)”. Section 7 concerns with collection and recovery of expenditure tax. Sub-section (1) deals with chargeable expenditure incurred in a hotel. Sub-section (2) says:

    “(2) Where any chargeable expenditure is incurred in a restaurant referred to in clause (2) of Section 3 in relation to any services specified in clause (2) of Section 5 and where such services are—

    (a) provided by the restaurant, the person who carries on the business of such restaurant; and

    (b) provided by the other person, such other person

    shall collect the expenditure-tax at the rate specified in clause (b) of Sec. 4.”

    7. Sub-section (3) mandates that the tax collected during any calendar month in accordance with sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 10th of the month immediately following the calendar month. Sub-section (4) lays down:

    “Any person responsible for collecting the tax, who fails to collect the tax in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, not withstanding such failure, be liable to pay the tax to the credit of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (3).”

    8. Section 15 prescribes penalties for failure to collect or pay the tax.

    9. M/s. M.V.K Moorthy, Man Mohan and Firdos, learned Counsel, advanced arguments on behalf of the petitioners.

    10. Although, Sri Moorthy, learned Counsel for the petitioners in W.P Nos. 14573, 16207 of 1991 and 2362 of 1992, has advanced arguments, initially, that the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the law in question, when his attention was drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Fedrn. of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. (1 supra), the argument was not seriously pressed. The main attack of Sri Moorthy was based on Article 14 of the Constitution. According to him, separate expenditure incurred in air-conditioned restaurants situated within the premises of a hotel where the daily room tariff for residential accommodation is not less than Rs. 400/- per day is excluded, but air-conditioned restaurants unconnected with any hotel are brought within the sweep of the Act. There is no discernible rationality in this type of classification. The articles of food sold in restaurants are essential for human existence and if they are subjected to tax, the same would be violative of Article 21: the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity. Because of the excessive rate of tax, the petitioners would lose their business as the tax would act as a disincentive to attract customers.

    11. Sri Man Mohan's, learned Counsel for the Petitioner in W.P No. 14490 of 1991, contention is that in pith and substance, the impugned amendments impose tax on food and drinks supplied in air-conditioned restaurants. Out of necessity commoners have-to go to air-conditioned restaurants especially in areas where ordinary hotels are not located, and they have to pay high charges for the food and drinks consumed because of the excessive nature of the tax. According to him, the impost is arbitrary and, therefore, has to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He also contended that Hyderabad city, often times, experiences power failure and even then, customers who go to air-conditioned restaurants have to pay higher prices. From the point of view of safe guarding the health of the people, air-conditioned restaurants are necessary; the wide-spread pollution is endangering human lives and the air-conditioned hotels and restaurants ensure a pollution-free atmosphere.

    12. The petitioner in W.P No. 14175 of 1991 is a young practising advocate, a bachelor living in a room taken on rent in Puthlibowli area of Hyderabad city. According to his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, he went to Shanbagh Hotel, Basheer Bagh on 21-10-1991 and ordered for food and also a parcel of four rotis. When the checked-up the bill, he found that the cost was increased by Rs. 4-60 and on enquiry, he was told that the addition was because of the expenditure tax imposed with effect from 1-10-1991. There are two portions in the hotel-one is air-conditioned and the other an ordinary one-and the food he consumed was in the ordinary Section. Sri Firdos, appearing for the petitioner, says that collection of tax from customers who are not given the facility of air-conditioning is unreasonable.

    13. Although Sri Moorthy has not seriously pressed the contention relating to Parliament's lack of legislative competence, since the other counsel have reiterated the same contention we are inclined to briefly advert to this.

    14. As the tax is imposed and collected under the impugned provisions only in respect of sale of food and drinks served in air-conditioned restaurants, it amounts to tax imposed on sale or purchase of the same but not a tax on the expenditure incurred. In every case where a customer buys food or drinks in a restaurant he incurs expenditure; what is essential to be noted is that the expenditure incurred is incidental to the sale or purchase. As entry 54 of List II speaks of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods, the impugned measure squarely falls within the sweep of this entry and therefore Parliament cannot, in exercise of its residuary power under Entry 97 of List I, rob the State legislature of its power to legislate.

    15. This argument squarely applies to the principal Act enacted in 1987. As already mentioned supra, the constitutionality of the 1987 Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in Fedeti. of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India (1 supra). A contention identical to the present one with greater elaboration was advanced before the Supreme Court by Sri N.A Palkhiwala. The Supreme Court followed the earlier ruling in Union of India v. S.H Dillon . 1972 83 ITR 582 SC. wherein it was held (at page 119), while referring to the observations of Lord Loreburn in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada . 1912 AC 571 at 581 PC.,”……………we are unable to see why we should not, when dealing with a Central Act, enquire whether it is legislation in respect of any matter in List II for this is the only field regarding which there is a prohibition against Parliament. If a Central Act does not enter or invade these prohibited fields, there is no point in trying to decide as to under which entry or entries of List I or List III a Central Act would rightly fit in. Stating that different aspects of the same matter may fall under different legislative powers, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) in a separate judgment rendered by him on behalf of himself and three other Judges, expressed the view (at page 116):

    “Indeed, the law “with respect to” a subject might incidentally “affect” another subject in some way; but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject-. There might be overlapping; but the overlapping must be in law. The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects.”

    16. Holding that the expenditure aspect of the transaction fell within the Union power and is clearly distinguishable from the legislative competence to impose a tax thereon, the contention based on want of legislative power was negatived. In view of this authoritative pronouncement on the question of legislative competence of Parliament to enact a law imposing a tax on expenditure, we unhesitatingly reject the contention relating to the competence of Parliament.

    17. The second contention is based on Article 14; air-conditioned restaurants unconnected with any hotel are brought within the sweep of the Act while the separate expenditure incurred in air-conditioned restaurants situated within the premises of a hotel where the daily room tariff for residential accommodation is more than Rs. 400/- is excluded. This contention is based on a misapprehension. Even prior to the amendment in question such type of expenditure was brought to tax under the principal Act of 1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 says that this Act shall apply in relation to any chargeable expenditure incurred in a hotel wherein the room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at the time of incurring of such expenditure are four hundred rupees or more per day per individual. This sub-section (1) has to be read in conjunction with Section 5 which explains the meaning of “Chargeable expenditure”. In relation to a hotel referred to in clause (i) of Section 3(subsection (1) of Section 3), clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 says that the chargeable expenditure means “any other services at the hotel, either by the hotel or by any other person, by way of beauty parlour, health club, swimming pool or other services”. The words “any other services at the hotel” take in their ambit the separate expenditure incurred in an air-conditioned restaurant located separately in the hotel premises. There is no exclusion of such separate expenditure from the purview of the Act. After the amendment, restaurants not situated in the class of hotels referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 3 are brought within the sweep of the Act. From a reading of clause (9-A) of Section 2, Section 3 and Section 5, it is clear that in respect of hotels where the daily room tariff per individual is Rs. 400/- and more, on any expenditure-incurred in connection with room rent, food or drinks or catering contract or eating in a restaurant attached to the hotel even if the person is not staying in the hotel, expenditure tax is leviable.

    18. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is, therefore, in no way violated.

    19. We do not find any merit in the argument advanced for the petitioners thatbecause of the impugned legislation the petitioners have lost their business; the number of customers has dwindled because of the increase in the rate as a consequence of the addition of expenditure tax. In the Feden. of Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v. Un ion of India (1 supra), an identical contention was rejected observing (at page 126), “………..the mere excessiveness of a tax or even the circumstance mat its imposition might tend towards the diminution of the earning or profits of the persons of incidence does not, perse, and without more, constitute violation of the rights under Article 19(1)(g).” In passing we might mention that none of the petitioners has stated how much loss or reduction in profits was sustained by him because of the impugned legislation compared to the position in the previous years.

    20. The arguments of Sri Moorthy and Sri Man Mohan, that air-conditioned restaurants are necessary even for ordinary people in order to enjoy the facility of pollution-free atmosphere and if expenditure tax is levied the persons who would otherwise enjoy that facility would be deprived of it and as the right to live guaranteed under Article 21 includes right to live with dignity and comfort, the impugned legislation is bad in law, in our considered view, are based upon imaginary and fanciful notions of the content of the right guaranteed under Article 21. By no stretch of reasoning can it be said that in our society air-conditioned restaurants but for the expenditure tax would have been within the reach of ordinary people. The object of the Act is to curb unproductive expenditure. It is the potentiality of the individuals to incur expenditure in air-conditioned restaurants that is brought to tax. It matters little whether at a particular point of time because of power failure the restaurant was not in a position to provide the facility of air-condition. People of higher economic status alone can afford to go to air-conditioned restaurants. The possibility of enjoying air-condition facility even if such facility is not available by reason of power failure, is subjected to tax. We, therefore, reject the contention of Sri Firdos, learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P No. 14175 of 1991, that the petitioner therein was unjustly sought to be burdened with expenditure tax even though he consumed food in the non-air-condition section of the air-conditioned Hotel Shan Bagh. As the propensity to incur wasteful expenditure is sought to be curbed by the impugned legislation, the hotel industry as such is not taxed but the enjoyment of potentiality/capacity to incur wasteful expenditure is brought within the purview of the tax net. As observed by Ranganathan, J., in his separate but concurring judgment in the Feden. of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. v. Union of India (1 supra at page 139), “the object of a tax on luxury is to impose a tax on the enjoyment of certain types of benefits, facilities and advantages on which the Legislature wishes to impose a curb. The idea is to encourage society to cater better to the needs of those who cannot afford them”.

    21. For these reasons, all the writ petitions fail and accordingly they are dismissed.

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    M. Srinivas And Others v. Union Of India, Rep....
    (Nov 22, 1994)