G. Radhakrishna Rao, J.:— These two revisions have come up for consideration on a reference that has been made by our learned brother N.D Patnaik, J.O.P 336 of 1979 on the file of the I Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, arose on account of a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, as there is a dispute regarding the title to the property acquired. In that an application has been filed by the respondent under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C to implead himself as a party. Petitioners, who were respondents 3 and 4 objected for impleading the respondent in the C.R.P No. 343/90 as a party. The learned Additional Judge by his order dated 30th October, 1989, impleaded him as one of the respondents and hold that the question whether he has got any right in the property can be decided in the reference which is pending before the Court. The learned Single Judge felt that there should be an authoritative pronouncement on the question as to whether a person who is not a party to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer can be impleaded as a party in the proceedings pending in the court on reference by invoking O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C Hence, he has referred the matter for decision by a Bench. So, the point that arises for consideration is whether O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C can be invoked by an interested person for the purpose of coming on record in a reference that has been made under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. On a previous occasion when a similar point arose for consideration, the matter has been referred to a Bench in Vadlamani Sarojini Devi v. T. Satyaranarayana Rao (1988 (2) APLJ 275 to decide whether O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C can be invoked by a ‘person interested’ so as to implead himself as a party to the proceedings. The Bench declined to answer that question. But on facts it found that the person, who was impleaded as a party on an application under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C, was already there on record during the award proceedings. The Bench found that the name of that person was not mentioned in the order of reference by mistake though he was a party to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore he is entitled to be impleaded as a party in the proceedings before the Civil Court. Relying on the above decision of the Bench, the learned Counsel for the respondents Mr. K. Raghava Rao contends that the Bench has found that O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C is applicable in a reference under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. To our mind, since the Bench has declined to answer the reference, the view taken by the Bench cannot be said that they have answered the reference implicitly thereby stating that O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C is applicable when a reference is made under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence, it is now for this Court to decide whether O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C can be invoked or not by a person who is not a party to the proceedings?

2. The learned Counsel for the respondents relying upon a decision of this Court in Lakshmi Bai v. State of A.P, 1984 (1) APLJ 242 contended that a third party to the proceedings can be impleaded as party-respondent by invoking O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C and that the same view has been expressed by different courts including that of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.C Coutinho, AIR 1980 SC 1118. He further submits that the restricted view that a person not a party to the reference made either under S. 18 or under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be joined as a party is no longer tenable in view of the above Supreme Court decision.

3. The learned counsel has also referred to a catena of decisions in support of his argument. In Kishan Chand v. Jagannath Prasad (1903) ILR 25 All 133 the Division Bench ruled:

“We see no reason for restraining the wide language of S. 53 and the provisions of S. 53 and the provisions of S. 32 of the C.P.C appear to us to be in no way an inconsistent with anything contained in Act No. 1 of 1994. To us it appears distinctly in the interest of all that the question which arises as to compensation to be paid for a piece of land taken up should be dealt with as far as possible at one and the same time.”

4. Construing a similar provision under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, it was held in Kalarikkal Lakshamikutty v. K.V.K Vellappa Nair, AIR 1973 Ker 79 as follows:

“So far as the court hearing a reference under S. 30 is concerned, by the express language of the Act itself the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable and, therefore, we think that under the provisions of O. 1, R. 10, it is open to the Court to implead any person interested in the controversy pending before the Court provided the nature of the dispute referred to is not enlarged or altered.”

5. In Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 305 a Division Bench of this Court observed (at pp. 307, 308):

“Once a reference is made, the question is whether a person who is not a party to the proceedings when the reference is made, can be made a party before the Court. In other words, has the Court jurisdiction to entertain the claim or the petition of such a person if any reference under S. 18 is made? It has no such jurisdiction. On the same parity of reasoning it will also have no such jurisdiction on a reference under S. 30. The Calcutta High Court has consistently taken the view that even under S. 30 a person not a party to the proceedings before reference, cannot be made a party, nor can he urg his claim on that reference.”

It is further observed, after referring to Mahananda Roy v. Srish Chandra (1910) Ind Cas 10 (Cal) and Prabhal Chandra v. Peary Mohun ((1908) 12 Cal WN 987), as follows:

“The Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate any decision by the Special Court unless, reference is made by the Collector. The addition of parties by the Civil Court, who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector, is wholly inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, the Civil Court cannot add such parties to a land acquisition proceeding before it nor can it award any compensation to one who joined in the proceeding for the first time in the Court of the Special Judge without applying to the Collector for any order of reference.”

So, dissenting from Kishan Chand's case (1903) ILR 25 All 133) he held that the application of O. 1, R. 10 and the addition of the parties who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector is unwarranted and is without jurisdiction being wholly inconsistent with the Act and therefore not covered by S. 53.

6. In Sakalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh, AIR 1967 Pat 243, A Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that the provisions under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C are clearly attracted to a case of reference under S. 30 before the Court when the nature of the dispute under reference does not change.

7. In Manjur Ahmed v. Rajlakshmi, AIR 1956 Cal 263, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a person who did not apply and who did not obtain a reference under S. 18 and his right to apply for a reference had become time-barred by virtue of the proviso to S. 18, cannot be allowed to be added as a party under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C

8. In Tejdhari v. Baul, AIR 1981 All 47 a learned Single Judge held that S. 53 applies to provisions of the C.P.C only to the extent that it is not inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. The scheme of the Act read as a whole would show that the Act does not contemplate for moving of an application for impleadment by a person who was not a party before the Collector and to get his right decided under S. 30 of the L.A Act. The disputants must be before the Land Acquisition Officer and once he makes a reference, the Civil Court has a right to decide the title only of those persons whose claims have been referred to by the Collector.

9. In Niranjan Singh v. Amar Singh, AIR 1984 Punj & Har 250 a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court held that a person who had not filed any claim in response to a notice issued under S. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act and who had not participated in the enquiry and who had not raised any dispute for the apportionment of the compensation before the Collector, cannot be impleaded by the Court as a party to the proceedings on a reference made by the Collector under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned, Judge entirely agreed with the views expressed by the Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh High Courts in Manjur Ahmed v. Rajlakshmi, AIR 1956 Cal 263 (cited supra) and Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 305).

10. In Basalingappa v. Nagamma, AIR 1969 Mys 313 it was held that a Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to implead a person for the first time in the proceedings before him after reference by the Land Acquisition Officer.

11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contented that except the Patna High Court, all the other High Courts, viz., Mysore, Allahabad, Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana High Courts, have held that a person who is not a party before the Land Acquisition Officer cannot invoke the provisions of O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C so as to implead himself as a party in the proceedings under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

12. Before acceding with his contention, we shall now examine the language adopted in S. 53 of the L.A Act. Section 53 of the Act reads as follows:

“Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act.”

13. A similar point whether the provisions of C.P.C are made applicable under special enactment has fallen for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao v. Kidanbi Radhakrishnamacharyulu, 1978 (1) APLJ 308 : (AIR 1978 Andh Pra 319). The Full Bench while considering the definition of the ‘Landlord’ and having regard to the provisions contained in O. 22, R. 10, C.P.C found that the provisions of C.P.C in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Rent Control Act may be applied to the proceedings under the said Act. Following the decision in Har Kishan Singh v. B. Narayana (1959 (2) APLJ p. 290) they further held that even if the provisions of C.P.C are strictly not applicable, the principles underlying them can be applied to proceedings under the Rent Control Act so long as they are not inconsistent with any provision of the Act or the Rules made thereunder.

14. A Division Bench of this Court in G. Manikyamma v. T. Seetharamaiah, 1987 (2) APLJ 387 while following the Full Bench decision in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao v. Kadanbi Radhakrishnamacharyulu (AIR 1978 Andh Pra 319) (cited supra) has gone further and said that even in a case where there is no provision at all or where the provision is silent on the point and where there is no conflict between the said Act and the Rules and the provisions of C.P.C can be applied and that the provisions of C.P.C will be inapplicable only when there is an express provision either in the Rent Control Act or the Rules made thereunder governing the situation.

15. Following the above decisions, we are of the firm view that the provisions of C.P.C in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. In order to see whether there is any inconsistency or not, we have to see the scheme of the Act. We shall now see the different provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act.

16. After complying with the provisions with regard to the Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act as well as the declaration under S. 6 of the L.A Act, Section 9 provides for an enquiry into the area of the land acquired by giving a public notice stating that the Government intend to take possession of the said land and that the claims to compensation for all interests in such land made be made to the Collector. Under S. 11 of the Act, the Collector shall enquire into the objections if any, which any person has stated pursuant to the notice given under S. 9 and shall make an award setting out the true area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. Under S. 12 of the said Act, the Award shall be filed in the Collector's Office and shall become final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. With regard to limitation also a separate provision has been made in the case of persons who appeared before the Collector and in the case of persons who have received notice but who have not appeared before the Collector. The land vests free from all encumbrances when possession is taken under S. 16 of the Act. Section 48 authorises the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken under S. 18, the Collector is enjoined to refer for determination of the Court with regard to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. Part IV of the Act deals with the apportionment of compensation. If there are several persons interested and if such persons agree in the apportionment of the compensation, the particular of such apportionment shall be specified in the award and if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the Court. So, there are two important provisions, that is, S. 18(1) and S. 30 which empowers the Collector to refer to the Court as to the apportionment of the compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable on an application within the time prescribed by the persons interested who have not accepted the award. If any dispute arises with regard to the apportionment of the compensation or to the persons to whom it is payable, under S. 30 the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. But a person who has not appeared before the Collector, can raise a dispute or the person can apply to the Collector for a reference for determination of his right of compensation which may have existed before the award or may have devolved upon him under the award. Under S. 18, it must be made within a particular time but there is no such period prescribed under S. 30 of the Act.

17. So, the language and the scheme of the Act, in particular, Ss. 18 and 30 of the Act, have to be read together which envisages that an application has to be filed before the Collector after the passing of the award and if any dispute arises with regard to the apportionment or to the person to whom it is payable or with regard to the title, it has to be referred under S. 30 of the Act. On such an application, if it is referred under S. 30 of the Act, it must be deemed that the reference has got a shape. That means, the dispute that has to be decided has already been formulated in a particular form. When the same has been communicated to the court by the authority vested under the Land Acquisition Act and the authority who has received the same has to dispose of the same with reference to the dispute that has been raised and referred. When he is authorised to answer the reference, can it be said that he is authorised to implead some other person wherein a new case has been made out? The catena of decisions, which have already been cited above, particularly that of the Calcutta High Court's decision in Manjur Ahmed v. Rajlakshmi Desai (AIR 1956 Cal 263) show that a person who did not apply and did not obtain a reference under S. 18 and his right to apply for a reference had become time-barred by virtue of the proviso to S. 18, cannot be added as a party in a reference pending at the instance of other parties as the same would give rise to new questions, not covered by the reference. So, if the provisions of O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C have to be applied, it means giving a scope for determination of some other additional matter which is not raised or referred.

18. When the appellant herein allowed the two persons, in whose favour the property has been sold, to participate in the award proceedings and the authorities concerned recognised them as the persons interested in the property concerned by virtue of the sales set up by them, which have been confirmed by the High Court in different orders to the knowledge of the appellant herein, he cannot be permitted to participate in the award proceedings. He himself kept silent without participating in the award proceedings and allowed the persons who have purchased the same to participate in the award proceedings and since a dispute has been raised, their case has been referred. A person, who kept silent allowing the things to go on, i.e, allowing the persons to come on record, he cannot be permitted to come on record after reference, by filing an application under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C and ask the court after reference to decide the case on the ground that there is inter se dispute between him and the persons who purchased his property under registered sale deed which sales have been approved and confirmed by the High Court. Since that dispute is outside the scope of the reference, the Civil Court after reference is not entitled to allow such person to come on record with a plea to decide the dispute which is out side the scope of the reference. The dispute as such, as raised by the appellant who has sold the properties can only be decided by means of filing a suit and not in the reference. In the case of persons, whose names are found in the award and whose cases have not been referred, their remedy is to approach the Collector for reference. In the case of persons whose names ought to have been there and who have no knowledge about the proceedings they have to approach the Collector. So in either of the two cases or in any other case if a person claims that he is interested he has to come on record through the order of reference that has been passed by the Collector. When a competent authority is invested with the power under the Act to refer a dispute and the power of the civil Court is restricted only to decide the dispute that has been referred, the Civil Court has no authority to enlarge the scope of the reference by impleading the persons under the guise of the plea of interested persons. The enlargement of the scope of the reference to be decided by the Civil Court has never been contemplated by adding persons or putting some other new plea or a case through an application under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C or otherwise.

19. Reliance was placed on the decision in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V Coutinho (AIR 1980 SC 1118) (cited supra) by the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Raghava Rao as the same case has been relied upon by a single Judge of this Court in Smt. Lakshmi Bai v. State of A.P (1984 (I) APLJ 242). There, a case arose before the Supreme Court that if the land is acquired for the benefit of a company or for some other agency, whether that Agency or the company can be termed as a person interested and whether it can be allowed to come on record. Who is a ‘person interested’ has been decided by giving a liberal interpretation. In the above cited case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows:

“It seems to us that the definition of ‘a person interested’, given in S. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation.”

They further held:

“Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of ‘person interested’ must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience.”

In Grant v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 237) the right to compensation devolved after filing of award. In this case, when the land was originally acquired, the person interested was the original owner. Subsequent to the land ceiling legislation, the land vested in the Government. So, the point whether the Government can be brought on record has fallen for consideration. Viewing from that angle, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have answered stating that it was open to the State to claim a reference not because the State was a person interested in the compensation but because of the right that has arisen since the award was made. The Supreme Court found that liberal interpretation is required with regard to the ‘persons interested’. To find out as to who is a ‘person interested’, we must go by the contents of the application filed by the parties and that is the only criteria to decide whether the ingredients of S. 18 of the Act are attracted for reference to the court directly or for reference under S. 30 of the Act. In this context, the language that has been used in S. 30 for reference is identical with reference to the language used in S. 18. Considering the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above as well as the views expressed by the Allahabad, Mysore, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Calcutta, Punjab and Haryana High Courts, we are of the firm opinion that ‘the person interested’ must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation and he can be permitted to prosecute or participate in the further proceedings after reference as the scope of the proceedings has not been enlarged in either way. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the aggrieved party, if his case was not already referred, can approach the Collector for reference and the Collector alone is competent to pass an order whether to refer the matter or not to refer the matter and that the Civil Court is not competent to entertain an application under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C and to allow a party to be impleaded after reference to the court either under S. 18 or under S. 30 as it is inconsistent with the scheme of reference that has been made or contemplated under Ss. 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The remedy of the person whose case has been rejected by the Collector on an application filed for reference is only to approach the competent civil Court. If his case was not already referred, and his case has not been considered by the Collector, his remedy is to approach the Collector, but not the Civil Court. The question of applying O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C by a civil Court after the case was referred to it by a Collector does not arise as S. 53 contemplates that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the court under this Act.

20. Sri K. Raghava Rao, relying upon Maxwell's Interpretation of Laws, contended that a reasonable construction of the provision has to be made and should not entertain the idea of outsting the jurisdiction of the court or restrict the claim of the parties. We are unable to agree with his contention that rejecting the application under O. 1, R. 10 amounts to outsting the jurisdiction or going away from the reasonable construction that has been made in the light of the views expressed by Maxwell.

21. For the foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed and the orders of the lower Court are set aside. No costs.

Petition allowed.