1. This Revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the District Forum under Consumers Protection Act at Anantapur in C.D No. 47 of 1991.

2. The 1st respondent filed a complaint before the District Consumer Forum, Anantapur under the Consumer Protection Act alleging that he had placed an order with the petitioner for supply of some packaging machinery and paid an amount of Rs. 29,000/- by way of two Demand Drafts, but the petitioner did not supply the machinery and requested the District Forum to direct the petitioner either to supply the machinery or refund the advance paid by him together with compensation. The petitioner did not appear before the District Forum inspite of notice being given to it and therefore the Consumer Forum ordered the petitioner to refund the advance amount paid by the first respondent with in terest, with an option to the petitioner to delivery the machinery at the old rate after collecting the price by deducting the advance paid by the 1st respondent and also ordered payment of Rs. 10,000/- by way of compensation.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the dispute between the parties is purely regarding breach of contract which has to be adjudicated by a competent Civil Court and the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the case and hence the District Forum ought not to have entertained the complaint since it has no risdicti on to adjudicate the dispute and therefore the order is liable to be set aside.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India is not maintainable for the reason that the District Forum under the Consumers Protection Act is not a Tribunal subordinate to the High Court. His other contention is that the Consumer Protection Actprovides an appeal to the State Commission against the decision of a District Forum under Section 15 of the Act and from the decision of the State Commission an appeal is provided to the National Commission and against the decision of the National Commission an appeal is provided to the Supreme Court. Therefore by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is ousted.

5. Since the questions involved in this Revision Petition are of general importance, I have requested Sri P.S Narayana, Advocate to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae and I am thankful to him for the valuable assistance rendered by him.

6. The first question to be considered is whether a Revision Petition can be entertained by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the decision of the District Forum under the Consumers Protection Act. The District Forum is constituted under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of the District. Forum. Section 12 deals with the manner in which the complaint shall be made. Section 13 deals with the procedure on receipt of the complaint. Section 14 deals with the finding of the District Forum. The procedure under the Act provided that notice shall be given to the opposite party and after hearing the opposite party, the District Forum can pass its orders. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec.(2) of Section 30 of the Act the Government of Andhra Pradesh framed certain Rules called the A.P State Consumer Protection Rules, 1987 which also deal with the procedure to be followed by the District Forum and also by the State Commission. Rule 4 deals with the procedure to be followed by the District Forum. A reading of the provisions of the Act and the Rules make it clear that the District Forum on receipt of a complaint has to issue a notice to the opposite party and after hearing the objections of the opposite party decide the matter and Ihere fore it performs the adjudicatory functions.

7. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874 the Supreme Court has pointed out:

“Article 136(1) refers to a Tribunal in contradiction to a Court. The expression ‘a Court’ in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State's in her entjudicial powers. The Tribunal has distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi-judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense. The Tribunal, according to thed ictionary meaning, is a seat of justice; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characterstics of the Court. A domestic Tribunal appointed in departmental proceedings, for instance, or instituted by ar. Industrial employer cannot claim to be a Tribunal under Article 136(1) purely Administrative Tribunals are also outside the scope of the said Article. The Tribunals which are contemplated by Article 136(1) are clothed with some of the powers of the Courts. They can compel the witnesses to appear, they can administer oath, they are required to follow certain rules of procedure: the proceedings before mem are required to comply with rules of natural justice, they may not be bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence, but, nevertheless, they must decide on evidence adduced before them; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law, but their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent with the general principles of law. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. The procedural rules which regulate the proceedings before the Tribunals and the powers conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them, are sometimes described as the ‘trappings of a court’ and in determining the question as to whether a particular body or authority is a Tribunal or not, sometimes a rough and ready test is applied by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a Court.”

8. In the light of the principles laid down in the decision referred to above and having regard to the nature of functions performed by the District Forum in adjudicating the complaints fileci under the Act, there is no doubt that the District Forum is a Tribunal and therefore the High Court has got jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

9. I shall now consider the next contention that the since the Act provides a hierarchy of appellate authorities, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Section 15 of the Act provides for an appeal from the decision of the District Forum to the State Commission and Section 19 of the Act provides an appeal from the decision of the State Commission to the National Commission and there is an appeal under Section of the Act from the decision of the National Commission to the Supreme Court. Section 24 of the Act provides that every order of a District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Act, be final. The learned counsel for the respondent has, therefore, contended that since the Act provides a hierarchy of authorities before whom the appeals can be filed, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Consritution to set aside the order of the District Forum.

10. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim 1983 4 SCC 566 in which it is pointed out:

“The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was wholly misconceived. An appeal lay from an order under Order 21 Rule 92 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order 43, Rule 1(i) to the District Judge. That apart, the application made by the petitioner claiming to be the legal representative of the surety, the judgment debtor's representative on the one hand and the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder's representa tive, on the other alleging that there had been a fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder in causing the sale to be held with a prayer for recording satisfaction of the decree under Order 21, Rule 2, raised a question relating to the execution, dischargeor satisfaction of the decree and therefore fell within the purview of Sec. 47 which prior to February 1, 1977 was appealable because then a decision under Sec. 47 was deemed to be a decree under Section 2(2) of the Code and therefore the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal to the District Judge. Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under Sec. 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, under Art. 22? of the Constitution.

11. In the decision reported in Maneck Custodji v. Sarafazali 1977 1 SCC 227 it was held thai the respondent has clearly a legal remedy available to him by way of an appeal against the decree of the City Civil Court and that remedy was not ronly adequate but was more comprehensive than the one under Art 227 of the Constitution. It is true that, despite the exist ance of an alternative legal remedy, the High Court may interfere in favour of an applicant under Article 227 of the] Constitution, but this was certainly not one of Such extraordinary ca;es. In that case, there wa's a dispute between the respondent who was inducted as a paying guest in a flat who contended that he was deemed to be a tenant by virtue of the amendment of the Bombay Rent Control Act and filed a suit in the Small Cause Court, Bombay claiming that he is deemed to be a tenant in respect of that flat and praying for fixation of standard rent. The appellant filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay for recovery of possession on the ground that ther espondent was only a paying guest. The City Civil Court decreed the suit and the respondent filedapetition under Article 227 of the Constitution for settingaside the decree of the City Civil Court.

12. In these two cases, the disputes are purely of a Civil nature whtire appea Is or revisions were available under law to the higher Courts and that instead of filing the appeals or revisions, the decisions were challenged by way of petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution.

13. Here is a case where the petitioner contends that there is total lack of jurisdiction in the District Forum because the Act itself does notapply to the case on hand i.e, the complaint filed by the 1st respondent.

14. In State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh . AIR 1958 SC 86. the Supreme Court had stated in paragraph 11 as follows:

“On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivable be cases-and the instant case is in point-where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or Tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or Tribunal of first in stan ceacts wholly with out jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or maifestly conducts the pr Dceedings before it in a Manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of Certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or Tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or recourse was had to it, confirmed what ex facie, was a nullity for reasons afore-mentioned”.

15. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the decision cited supra is that even if an inferior Court or a Tribunal acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of the jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, the superior court may exercise power to is sueprer og ative writ even if anappealis provided to another inferior Court or Tribunal.

16. In Nagendmnath v. Commissioner of Hills Division AIR 1958 SC 338. it is pointed out that the powers of judicial interference under Article-227 with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature are not greater than the powers under Article 226, that under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing the impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record and that under Article 227 the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.

17. I had an occasion to consider a similar question in Ass. Director of Mines and Geology v. Taraka Rama labour Contract Co-op. Society 1991 1 ALT 258.. After considering various decisions and following the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh . (4 supra) and Mohd Yumis v. Mohd Musiaaim (2 supra), I held that in cases where the Actisn otapplicable and the District Forum has no jurisdiction to pass the order the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and interfere.

18. There are three decisions of Division Benches of this Court rendered subsequent to that decision. In the case reported in Tulsi Enterprises v. A.P State Consumer Commission, Hyderabad AIR 1991 A.P 326., a Writ petition was filed by the-appellants for the the issue of a Writ of Certiorari declaring that the State Commission under Consumer Protection Act had no jurisdiction to entertain a Consumer Dispute. The learned single Judge having dismissed the Writ petition, Writ Appeal was filed. The Division Bench has pointed out in paragraph 10 as follows:

“It is true that whenever the Legislature creates a separate tribunal with a hierarchy of appeals, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to deal with the orders passed by the said Tribunals is not and cannot be ousted. It is also true that whenever questions of jurisdiction are raised, the High Court normally permits such questions to be raised under Art. 226 of the Constitution and examines whether the applications or the other proceedings fjled before the Tribunal are within the jurisdiction of the said Tribunal oifriot. But the High Court has a discretion to entertain the writ petitions and, in particular, to decide, for example, any questions of jurisdiction unless they involve serious or disputed questions of fact. It isnotas if the High Court is bound to entertain every writ petition which raises a question of jurisdiction of a tribunal.

19. In para 11 the Division Bench referred to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act which provides a hierarchy of Tribunals and observed;

“……The District Forums are presided over by the Principal District Judge, while the State Commissions are presided over by no less a person than one who has been a Judge of the High Court or is a sitting Judge of the High Court. Surely, a litigant cannot be permitted to say that a District Judge at the level of the District Forums, or a retired or sitting Judge of the High Court at the level of the State Commission, is not competent to decide the question of jurisdiction. The entire intention of the Parliament was to give a speedy and effective remedy before these authorities. This intention will be defeated if parallel proceedings are permitted before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of matters pendingbe fore the bodies under the Consumer Act. We are saying that merely because a question of jurisdiction is raised, the High Court should not feel it imperative to admit the writ; petition. Ifawritpetition is permitted on the question of jurisdiction or other similar grounds, the parties would naturally have a remedy of Letters Patent Appeal and then a further appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. After the question of jurisdiction or other preliminary question is decided in proceedings arising in a writ petition and are carried to the highest court should it be held that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the District For urn or the j State Commission, as the case may be. This would obviously entail, extraordinary delay and would defeat the very purpose of the Act…The High Court is already burdened with heavy arrears and that is the precisereason why aseparateheirarchyoftribunals has been created. It would therefore, be not wise for the High Court to take upon itself the, burden of deciding disputes even if they relate to the jurisdiction which could be decided by the District Forum, presided over by District Judges or by the State Commission, presided over by sitting or retired High Court Judges.”

20. But in paragraph No. 12, the learned Judges held:

“What we have stated above is to be the normal rule. We are saying that merely because a question of jurisdiction is raised, the High Court should not normally intervene in the matter pending before these bodies. There may indeed be rare cases where there may be, apart from the question of jurisdiction other situations compelling interference by the High Court. Those rare cases apart, we are of the view matnormally the High Court should not intervene.”

21. Ultimately in paragraph 13, they have stated that:

“For all these reasons, we are of the view that the High Court should not entertain any writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in regard to matters filed before the District Forums or the State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, except in the rarest of the type of cases referred to above.”

22. But in another case reported in Dy. Commissioner of Endowments v. Saibaba Samasthanam AIR 1991 A.P 253 in which the dispute was whether the A.P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act applies to the temple of Sri Sai Baba of Shirdiat Chader ghat, Hyderabad. The Division Benchhad overruled the objection that since an appeal is provided against the orcler of the Deputy Commissioner to the District Court, interference by way of a writ petition is not called for. The Bench held that even though a remedy by way of appeal is available under the Act, still the order can be questioned by way of writ petition if it relates to the very applicability of the Act and touches upon the jurisdiction of the authorities.

23. In another case viz., Sadha Industries v. President, District Forum 1991 2 An.W.R 291, two contentions were raised before the Division Bench. One is that the Additional District Judge cannot perform the functions of a District Judge as the President of District Forum in the absence of the District Judge and the order passed by the District Forum is liable to be set aside on that ground. The second contention was that the nature of the dispute is outside the purview of the Act and therefore, ther ebeing no consumer dispute, the District Forum has no jurisdiction. The Division Bench rejected the first contention and held that in the absence of a District Judge, the Additional District Judge shall discharge the functions of a President of District Forum and disposed of the writ petitions with a direction that it is open to the writ petitioner to raise all legal pleas including the question that the dispute before the Forum is not Consumer dispute and whether the District Forum in exercise of its powers can invoke the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C and directed the District Forum to consider all the pleas raised by the petitioner and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. So much so, there is no decision by the Division Bench on the second contention that the dispute is outside the purview of the Act and so the District Forum has no jurisdiction.

24. If we consider the principle laid down by the two Division Benches referred to above i.e, Deputy Commissioner of Endowments v. Saibaba Samasthanam (8 supra) and Tulasi Enterprises v. A.P State Consumer Commission Hyderabad (7 supra), normally the High Court will not interfere with the decision of the Tribunal merely because a question of jurisdiction is raised. But in exceptional cases, where the Court finds that the Forum has no jurisdiction at all on the ground that the Act is not applicable to the complaint or there are other situations compelling interference by the High Court, it can interfere notwithstanding the fact that the Act provides for appeal. This is also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P State v. Mohd Noon (4 supra).

25. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above, let us examine the question whether there is total lack of jurisdiction in the District Forum in the present case. As stated above, the 1st respondent filed a complaint alleging mat he placed an order with the petitioner for supply of machinery and paid some advance. But the petitioner did not supply the machinery. The question is does this complaint come within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act. To appreciate this question, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. The expression ‘Consumer’ is defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. It defines “Consumer” means any person who,

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has ben paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such useismade with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for re-sale or for any commercial purpose, or

(ii) hires any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any systenj of deferred payment when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person;

26. ‘Consumer dispute’ is defined in Clause (e). It means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint.

27. ‘Complaint’ is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. It means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that

(i) as a result of any unfair trade practice adopted by any trader, the complainant has suffered loss or damage;

(ii) the goods mentioned in the complaint suffer from one or more defects;

(iii) the services mentioned in the complaints uffer from deficiencyinany respect;

(iv) a trader has charged for the goods mentioned in the complainta price in excess of the price fixed by or under any law for the time being in force or displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods, with a view to obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;

28. Clause (f) defines ‘defect’. It means any fault, imperfection or short coming in the quality, quantity, potency, purity or standard which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or as is claimed by the traders in any manner whatsoever in relation to any goods.

29. Clause (g) defines ‘deficiency’ meaning any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality etc.

30. A reading of these provisions would show that a complaint can be filed with respect of the four clauses mentioned in Clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act provides that if after conducting the proceedings, the District Forum is satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to take one or more of the following things, namely:—

(a) to remove the defect pointed out by the appropriate laboratory from the goods in question: (b) to replace the goods with new goods of similar description which shall be free from any defect

(c) to return to the complaint the price, or as the case may be, the charges paid by the complainant;

(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party.

31. Therefore, a combined reading of these provisions will indicate that: the dispute under the Act covers the defect in the goods purchased or deficiency in the service rendered and complaint can be made for that. In the present case though an order was passed for supply of certain goods, only one item was Supplied, but not the rest of the items. But there is no allegation that even the item which was supplied is defective. Section 2(c) of the Act defines ‘complaint’ and Clause (ii) which is the relevant clause refers to the fact that the goods mentioned in the complaint suffer from one or more defects. In the absence of any such allegation, it does tiot come within the complaint as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. With out there being a complaint as defined under the Act, the District Forum cannot entertain a consumer dispute. Therefore since there is no complaint as per the provisions of the Act, I agree with the contention that the Act has no application and the District Forum had no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer dispute and so the order of the District Forum is liable to be set aside as totally lacking in jurisdiction.

32. Since the Consumer Protection Act has been passed for protecting the interests of consumer, no doubt a liberal interpretation has to be given while construing the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted under the Act. But at the same time, it must be borne in mind that when there is no complaint at all as defined under the Act, the District Forum cannot exercise jurisdiction. It is, therefore, necessary for the pistrict Fora constituted under the Act to examine the complaints filed before them tinder the Consumer Protection Act and see whether such complaints fall within the scope of the Act and if so entertain the applications. In case where the District Fora feel that the complaints do not attract the provisions of the Act, they would do well not to entertain the complaint because by entertaining the complaints where they have no jurisdiction, they will be encroaching on the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts or other Tribunals and thereby clutching at jurisdiction which they do not have.

33. The Revision Petition is, therefore, allowed and the order of the District Forum is set aside. No order as to costs.