Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.:— These two appeals arise out of common facts and raise similar question of law. Therefore, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The parties will be referred to as they are arrayed in C.M.A No. 164 of 1993.

2. The appellant and respondents 1 to 3 constituted a partnership firm in the name and style of ‘Kuchipudi Enterprises’ to run a Cinema Theatre called “Durga Theatre”. Disputes arose between the parties. In accordance with the arbitration clause in the partnership deed, the disputes were referred to an arbitrator, who passed the award on 9-12-1991. The arbitrator filed the award in the Court for passing a decree in terms of the award. The first respondent filed an Original Petition under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to set aside the award; and the appellant filed an Original Petition to make the award rule of the Court. While so, the first respondent filed O.S No. 317 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry, praying for a decree dissolving the partnership firm (first defendant therein) and for a direction to defendants 2 to 4 therein to render accounts. In the said suit the appellant herein filed I.A No. 67 of 1992 under Section 34 of the Act praying that the said suit be stayed till the award is made rule of the Court. By order dated 16-4-1992 the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the said application. It is the correctness of that order that is assailed in this appeal, namely, C.M.A No. 164 of 1993.

3. Similarly, in another suit (O.S No. 319 of 1991) filed by the first respondent praying for the same relief on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry, the appellant filed I.A No. 70 of 1992 under Section 34 of the Act. That was also dismissed on 16-4-1992. The correctness of that order is assailed in C.M.A No. 165 of 1993.

4. Mr. V.L.N.G.K Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant in these two appeals, contends that the purpose of Section 34 of the Act is to bind the parties to the arbitration agreement, which includes award as well as the decree that would be passed in terms of the award by making it a rule of the Court. So, till the award is made a rule of the Court Section 34 of the Act can be invoked to stay the proceedings in a suit wherein the very same relief, which is the subject matter of arbitration agreement, is claimed. Mr. M.S.K Sastry, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, contends that the scope of Section 34 of the Act is very limited. It applies to a case where the parties, in stead of referring the dispute to the arbitrator, approach the Court. In such a situation alone the Court has the power to stay the suit for the purpose of directing the parties to approach the arbitrator.

5. To appreciate the rival contentions of both the parties, it would be relevant to refer to Section 34 of the Act, which reads as under:

“Where any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming under him in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending; and if satisfied that there is sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such authority may make an order staying the proceedings.”

6. On a perusal of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act, extracted above it is clear to us that in any legal proceedings any of the parties to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him may apply to the judicial authority, before whom the proceedings are pending, before filing his written statement, to stay the proceedings which relate to the same subject-matter in respect of which the parties have agreed to refer the same to an arbitrator. On such an application being filed, the judicial authority will have to be satisfied that there is no sufficient reason for not referring the matter to the arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration agreement provided that the applicant therein is ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration both at the time of commencement of the proceedings and at the time of passing the order. On recording such a satisfaction, the judicial authority has the discretion to pass an order staying the proceedings. Thus, it is seen that the scope of Section 34 of the Act is limited. It can be invoked to stay the judicial proceedings, to compel the other party to act in accordance with the arbitration agreement and refer the dispute to arbitration and the arbitrator has passed his award. Section 34 of the Act is out of place. We may observe here that the scope of Section 34 of the Act is very narrow when compared to the scope of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7. In this case admittedly the parties have already referred their dispute to the arbitrator who passed his award on 9-12-1991 and petitions are pending to make the award rule of the Court and to set aside the award by the respective parties. At this stage, in our view, Section 34 of the Act cannot be invoked. We are supported in our view by a Division Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court in Jowahir Singh v. Fleming Show and Co., AIR 1937 Lah 851. In that case Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1899, which is analogous to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 fell for consideration of the Court. The Division Bench of the Lahore High Court has observed that the objection of passing an order staying the suit under Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1899 (Sec. 34 of the present Act) is to allow the parties to proceed with the arbitration but, if before the application for stay is made or has been disposed of, the arbitrators have already made the award, there would be no point in making the stay order and that in that event the proper course for the opposite party would be to plead the award in bar of the suit and not to obtain an order staying the suit pending arbitration which has already terminated.

8. In B. Raghuveeriah v. N.S.I Corporation, 1970 Lab IC 493 a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court also took the same view.

9. In V. Subramanyam Raju v. V. Chandramauli Raju, AIR 1987 Orissa 23 a learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court also dismissed an application under Section 34 of the Act wherein stay of suit was prayed for, on the ground that the provisions of Section 34 could not be invoked after the arbitrator had already passed the award.

10. We are entirely in agreement with the judgments referred to above. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the appeals. They are accordingly dismissed; but having regard to the circumstances we make no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.