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Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 10 March 1990 a Buddha statue being transported in Hussain Sagar Lake, Hyderabad, sank while on a barge destined for a high platform called the Rock of Gibraltar; the incident caused considerable damage and some loss of life. The Government of Andhra Pradesh appointed Shri Justice P.A. Chowdary as a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 to investigate specified matters, including the circumstances of the accident, identification of persons responsible, lapses by officers or authorities, and whether the transport company was appointed after due consideration of its capacity and following proper procedure.

The Commission published a notice inviting affidavits (4-5-90), issued written notices (9-5-90) to certain parties including the third respondent (ABC India Limited), and called Commission witness No. 1 (CW 1), Shri D. Rajender Kumar (examined 7-9-90) particularly on the question of appointment and procedure (term of reference (iv)). The petitioner, a naval architect engaged by the third respondent, entered appearance through counsel (vakalat filed 5-9-90) and filed an affidavit (sworn 20-9-90, filed 24-9-90). The petitioner sought recall and cross-examination of CW 1; the Commission heard arguments on 11-10-90 and dismissed the applications by order dated 12-10-90.

The petitioner alleged that the presiding Judge of the Commission made derogatory remarks about the petitioner’s counsel on 11-10-90 and threatened to impose costs, and that the inquiry procedures required by section 8 were not followed, resulting in impermissible bias. The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking, inter alia, a mandamus declaring the inquiry illegal and contrary to principles of natural justice, quashing the 12-10-90 order, and directing the State to appoint another Judge as Inquiry Officer. The Commission's Secretary and the State filed counter-affidavits opposing the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged remarks and conduct of the presiding Judge (including an alleged threat to impose costs) amounted to impermissible bias disqualifying him and rendering the Commission's proceedings illegal or contrary to principles of natural justice.
  2. Whether the petitioner, as a person engaged by the contractor, was "likely to be prejudicially affected" within the meaning of section 8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act such that he had a right under section 8-C to cross-examine CW 1.
  3. Whether a Commission of Inquiry is subject to the strict doctrine of judicial bias applicable to courts or quasi-judicial bodies, and to what extent principles of natural justice constrain the Commission's conduct.
  4. Whether the Commission had the power to consider awarding costs and whether any discussion of costs during proceedings amounted to a disqualifying threat.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Shri A.T.M. Rangaramanujam)

  • The Commission has no power to impose costs and any threat to impose costs on the petitioner’s counsel was improper.
  • The presiding Judge's derogatory comments about the competency of the petitioner’s counsel and the alleged threat to impose costs constituted impermissible bias, disqualifying the Judge from continuing with the inquiry.
  • The petitioner was entitled to cross-examine CW 1 because at least one aspect of CW 1’s evidence required testing by cross-examination; the petitioner was a person likely to be prejudicially affected and hence had rights under section 8-B read with section 8-C of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
  • The Commission failed to formulate and notify procedure as required by section 8, and therefore the minimum requirements of natural justice were not met.

Respondents' and Other Parties' Arguments

  • On behalf of the State (Advocate-General): A Commission of Inquiry is a fact-finding body and not a court; it has no adjudicatory functions and the strict procedural rules of courts (including Evidence Act procedures) do not apply. The doctrine of bias applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, and thus does not strictly apply to a Commission.
  • The presiding Judge, notwithstanding the alleged remarks, had followed principles of natural justice and conducted the inquiry fairly; any observations directed at an advocate do not necessarily amount to bias against the party who engaged the advocate.
  • The petitioner, being engaged by the contractor (third respondent), was not a person likely to be prejudicially affected by CW 1's evidence and therefore had no right to cross-examine under section 8-C. The contractor itself did not seek cross-examination of CW 1.
  • The Secretary to the Commission denied the allegations of disrespect and threatened costs and explained that discussion about the Commission's scope to impose costs constituted a permissible inquiry into its powers; in any event no costs were awarded by order dated 12-10-90.
  • Other counsel (for respondent No. 5) supported the petitioner's pleas in argument before the Court (as recorded).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 Authority for the proposition that a Commission of Inquiry is not a court and does not have adjudicatory power. Used as part of a group of authorities to establish that Commissions are fact-finding bodies whose findings do not bind anyone.
State of J. & K. v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 Support for the principle that a Commission of Inquiry is not a court. Relied upon to reinforce the non-adjudicatory, inquisitorial nature of Commissions.
K. Ballabh v. Commission of Inquiry, AIR 1969 SC 528 Authority cited in the context that a Commission is not a court and cannot render definitive judgments. Cited to show established case law that Commissions are fact-finding bodies distinct from courts.
Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. Susheel Kumar, AIR 1983 AP 69 Decision cited as further authority that a Commission is not a court. Included in the group of authorities relied upon to characterize the Commission's nature.
Bali Ram v. Justice B. Lentin, AIR 1988 SC 2284 Explains that a Commission is a fact-finding body appointed by Government 'for the information of its mind' and is not required to adjudicate rights; its findings do not bind the Government. Quoted at length to underline the Court's view that a Commission is inquisitorial, not adjudicatory, and that ministerial/non-binding character of its recommendations follows.
Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1947 (2) All ER (HL) 289 Definition and scope of the doctrine of bias — limited to judicial or quasi-judicial offices which must act with an independent mind. Adopted as the leading authority on bias; the Court used it to explain that strict bias doctrine applies to judicial/quasi-judicial bodies and thereby to delimit its application to Commissions.
G. Nageswara Rao v. APSRT Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308 (at 327) Supreme Court approval of the Franklin statement regarding bias. Cited to show that the definition of bias in Franklin has been recognized and applied by the Supreme Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, following the pleadings and authorities cited:

  1. Nature of a Commission of Inquiry: The Court reiterated established case law (including Ramkrishna Dalmia, State of J. & K., K. Ballabh, Mohd. Ibrahim Khan and Bali Ram) that a Commission of Inquiry is not a court, has no adjudicatory jurisdiction to render definitive judgments, and its findings do not bind the Government. The Commission is an inquisitorial, fact-finding body appointed to inform the Government.
  2. Doctrine of bias and its applicability: Relying on Franklin and the Supreme Court approval in G. Nageswara Rao, the Court explained that the strict legal doctrine of bias applies to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which must adjudicate between parties. Because a Commission is not a court and does not adjudicate rights, the strict legal principles of bias do not apply in the same manner to a Commission. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that a Commission must act fairly; principles of natural justice and fair play are implicitly required because the Commission’s findings may have significant repercussions.
  3. Assessment of the allegations of bias (remarks and threat to impose costs): The petitioner alleged disrespectful comments and a threat to impose costs by the presiding Judge. The Secretary to the Commission denied these allegations and stated he was present; the presiding Judge did not file a counter-affidavit because he was not made a party eo nomine. The Court agreed with the Advocate-General that the Judge was not obliged to file a counter-affidavit for that reason, and observed that absence of the Judge's counter-affidavit did not increase credibility of the petitioner's allegations. Importantly, the petitioner participated in subsequent proceedings and his own affidavit reflects engagement with the Commission after the alleged events, which the Court took into account.
  4. On the issue of costs: The Court noted that there was some discussion on 11-10-90 about the Commission's power to impose costs (as shown by the Secretary's counter-affidavit), and held that an examination of the scope of the Commission's right to impose costs does not amount to a threat. The Court observed that in any event no costs were awarded by the Commission's order dated 12-10-90.
  5. Right to cross-examine CW 1 under sections 8-B and 8-C: The Court analysed the relevant statutory provision (section 8-B). It extracted the language of sub-sections (a) and (b) — that a person is entitled to be heard if the Commission considers it necessary to enquire into that person's conduct, or forms the opinion that the person's reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected. The Court found that neither sub-section (a) nor (b) was attracted in the petitioner's case: the Commission had not considered it necessary to enquire into the petitioner's conduct nor had it formed the opinion that the petitioner's reputation would be prejudicially affected. The Court further examined CW 1's evidence (including a remark that designs "could have been better from technical point of view to have got the designs and structural details of the barge checked by Garden Reech of Calcutta, Hindustan Shipyard, etc.") and concluded that such evidence would not prejudice the petitioner.
  6. Conclusion on entitlement to cross-examine: Given that neither statutory trigger in section 8-B applied and the evidence of CW 1 did not prejudice the petitioner, the Court held that the petitioner had no right under section 8-C to cross-examine CW 1.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that (a) the strict doctrine of bias applicable to judicial/quasi-judicial bodies does not apply to a Commission of Inquiry in the same manner because a Commission is a fact-finding (inquisitorial) body and not a court; (b) nonetheless a Commission must act fairly and conform to principles of natural justice; (c) the allegations of impermissible bias (derogatory remarks and threat to impose costs) were not established on the material before the Court; and (d) the petitioner was not entitled to cross-examine CW 1 under section 8-C because neither limb of section 8-B was attracted.

Direct consequences and implications: The immediate result is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs. The opinion does not purport to create or announce a new precedent beyond applying and reaffirming existing authorities on the nature of Commissions and the limited applicability of the strict doctrine of bias; it confines its decision to the facts and statutory interpretation before it.

    Arun Shridhar Bondale v. Government Of A.P And Others

    M.N Rao, J.:— On 10th March, 1990, in the Hussain Sagar Lake of Hyderabad City a tragic event occured. The biggest statute of Lord Budha was to be erected on that day in the centre of the lake on a high platform specially constructed and named the Rock of Gibraltor. When the statute was put on a barge for being taken to the Rock of Gibralter, the statute sank resulting in considerable damage: some lives also were lost. In connection with that incident; the government of Andhra Pradesh, by G.O.Rt No. 1049, General Administration Department, dt. 13-3-90 appointed Shri Justice P.A Chowdary, a retired Judge of this court, as Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952. The terms of reference of the Commission, as notified in the Government Order, are as follows:—

    “(i) to find out circumstances leading to the accident resulting in sinking of the Budha Statute and other equipment and also loss of life in the Hussain Sagar Lake at Hyderabad on 10th March, 1990:

    (ii) to identify the person or persons, if any responsible for the above incidents,

    (iii) to point out lapses on the part of any officer or authority or persons if any in connection with the above incidents; and

    (iv) to find out whether the transport company was appointed after due consideration of its capacity to organize transport of the statute upto Gibralter rock and whether the procedure for its appointment was followed properly”.

    2. Pursuant to the notification the Commission of Inquiry commenced its proceedings; a publication was issued in newspapers on 4-5-90 by the Commission inviting interested persons involved in the matter to file their affidavits. As the response was poor the Commission sent written notices on 9.5.90 to the third respondent ABC India Limited the petitioner a naval architect engaged by the third respondent in connection with designing the modular barge on which the statute was to be transported from the shore to the rock of Gibraltar, and certain other persons including the Chief Engineer (Mechanical), Hyderabad: In respect of point.

    (iv) of the terms of reference relating to the question whether the third respondent transport company was appointed after due consideration of its capacity to take up that work and whether proper procedure was followed in its appointment one Shri D. Rajender Kumar Engineer-in-Chief (Retired) was examined as CW 1 (Commission witness No. 1) on 7-9-90. Notices were not issued to other parties: only respondent No. 3 was served with a notice about the date of his evidence. The petitioner who was engaged by the third respondent for fabrication of the modular project in response to the notice issued by the Commission of Inquiry on 9-5-90 entered appearance through a counsel Shri ATM Rangaramanujam, who filed his vakalat on 5-9-90.

    3. On 24-9-90 the petitioners affidavit averring the details about the work entrusted to him and other related matters which was sworn to on 20-9-90 was filed in the Commission. On 7-9-90 the recording of evidence of CW 1, Shri Rajender Kumar, was over. A memo was filed on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel before the Commission stating “the petitioners advocate was present today at 10.30 a.m and was told that the Honourable Judge is not sitting today and hence it is humbly prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to hold the enquiry on next date on which date the counsel for the petitioner wants to cross-examine CW 1 Shri Rajender Kumar who was examined in the case in the interests of justice”. Two similar applications were filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. On these petitions arguments were heard on 11-10-90 by the Commission and they were dismissed by a reasoned order dt. 12-10-90. Alleging that on 11-10-90 when arguments were heard on the application filed by the petitioner to recall CW 1 for cross examination, the learned Judge who presided over the Commission commented in the open Court-hall of the Commission about the competency of the counsel whether he know the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act and also whether he knew any law and further threatened my advocate that he will impose costs of rupees ten thousands for having filed the petition on 5-9-90 for recalling Mr. Rajender Kumar for the purpose of cross-examination on my behalf, this writ petition was filed inter alia, seeking a mandamus declaring that the enquiry conducted by the Commission is illegal and opposed to principles of natural justice and the order passed on 12-10-90 rejecting the application to recall CW 1 for cross-examination is also illegal and consequently direct the first respondent, State Government, “to appoint some other Judge as the Inquiry Officer”. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, apart from the other allegations, it was averred that the learned Judge showed disrespect to the counsel in the court-hall and when the petitioner met the presiding Judge on 26-10-90, he was informed by the Judge that costs between rupees five thousands and rupees ten thousands would be imposed “in the event of my Advocate insisting on cross-examination of Mr. Rajender Kumar (CW 1) and others”. The order passed on 12-10-90 rejecting the request for cross-examination of CW 1 was also not communicated. Without formulating any procedure as required u/s. 8, the Commission commenced its proceedings. The entire proceedings it was averred, were vitiated because of impermissible bias.

    4. The learned Judge, who was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Commission of Inquiry, was not made party eo nomine. The second respondent in the writ petition is described in the cause title as “Commission of enquiry into sinking of Budha Statue in Hussain Sagar lake at Hyderabad presided over by Honourable Shri Justice P.A Chowdary, Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad?”. No counter-affidavit was filed by the learned Judge. The Secretary to the Commission of Inquiry, one Shri J. Francis, filed counter-affidavit on behalf of the second respondent asserting that he was present at the time when the arguments were heard and he denied the specific allegations of bias attributed to the learned judge. Shri Rajender Kumar CW 1, was examined in respect of question No. 4 (No. iv in the terms of reference) which related to matters concerning the appointment of third respondent for organising the transportation of the statue and the procedure followed in relation thereto, as the petitioner, on his own showing, was engaged by the third respondent after appointment as the agency to organize the transportation of the statue, “is not and cannot in any manner be concerned with the enquiry on question No. 4 of the terms of reference………It is significant to note that even the contractor, respondent No. 3, who had employed the petitioner, did not seek to cross-examine CW 1 as there is obviously nothing in his evidence which could effect their interests. When the main contractor himself did not intend to cross-examine CW 1 there can be no justification whatsoever for the petitioner to seek cross-examination of CW 1”. “The petitioner not being a person prejudicially affected by the evidence of CW 1, has no right to cross examined CW 1 under section 8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act”. Even after dismissal of the application on 12-10-90, the petitioner “has taken part in the subsequent proceedings of the commission without raising any question of unfairness or bias or violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the enquirys”. There is no obligation cast on the Commission to supply copies of proceedings or evidence to parties but the same will be furnished only on request and payment of necessary charges.

    5. On behalf of the first respondent the State Government a counter-affidavit was filed opposing the petitioner's prayer taking the stand that the filing of the present writ petition has affected the enquiry and that the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.

    6. Shri ATM Rangaramanujam, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the Commission of Inquiry has no power to impose costs and the observations made by the learned Judge on 11-10-90, insinuating the competency of the counsel are highly derogatory in nature and the same constitute impermissible bias rendering the learned Judge disqualified from proceeding further with the enquiry. The cross examination of CW 1 was necessary since at least one aspect of what was stated in the evidence was required to be tested by way of cross-examination. When it was obligatory on the part of the Commission to formulate the procedure for conducting the enquiry the learned judge did not choose to notify any procedure, and therefrom, the minimum requirement on the part of the learned Judge was to comply with the principles of natural justice. The petitioner's right to cross examine CW 1 flows from the language of section 8-B read with sec. 8-C of the Commissions of Inquiry Act since he is a person likely to be prejudicially affected and, therefore, he has aright to cross-examine the witness. Opposing this contention, the learned Advocate-General submitted that the Commission of Inquiry is a fact finding body, that no obligation is cast on the Government to accept its findings, it is not a court and therefore the procedural intricacies of the Evidence Act have no application. The doctrine of bias applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and as the Commission of Inquiry answers the description of neither the doctrine has no application. Even so the learned Judge has followed the principles of natural justice and has been conducting the enquiry conforming to the principles of fair-play. The petitioner was engaged by the third respondent and as the evidence of CW 1 rested only to the engagement of the third respondent by the Government as a contractor in connection with the transportation of the statue, he is not a person likely to be prejudicially affectcd within the meaning of section 8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act and therefore he has no right u/s. 8-C to cross-examine CW 1. It is within the scope or the power of the Commission to make inquiries whether it has power to award costs and in the context of the circumstances, namely, the urgency to complete the proceedings, the endeavours made by certain parties to procrastinate the inquiry, there is no basis to draw the inference that the Commission was biased against the petitioner. In fact the petitioner was not present at the time when the alleged remarks were made but he claims that his counsel has informed him as to what transpired “in the court-hall of the Commission”. Any observations made by the Commission directed against an advocate, even if true, do not constitute bias against the party who engaged the counsel. As the learned Judge was not made party-respondent co-nomine there is no need for him to file any counter-affidavit traversing the allegations contained in the petitioner's affidavit, Shri S.S.N Prasad, the learned counsel for the fifth respondent, addressed arguments supporting the pleas raised by the petitioner.

    7. Before considering the rival contentions urged before us it is necessary to notice the basic facts which are not in controversy. On 23-7-90, the office of the Commission of Inquiry addressed a letter, by registered post acknowledgement due, to the petitioner bringing to his notice the appointment of Shri Justice P.A Chowdary as the Commission of Inquiry and sought certain particulars from him namely:

    “1. The design calculations of the modular barge including stability calculation;

    2. The loadout procedures as adopted on 9-3-90 and 10-3-90.

    3. Classification certificate obtained from Bureau veritas: and

    4. All other information regarding the circumstances that led to drowning of Buddha Statue into Lake”.

    8. He was requested to attend the Commission on 7-8-90 and 8-8-90 to discuss on the above subject in detail. Enclosed to the above letter were copies of the affidavits dt. 19-5-90 and 31-5-90 filed by ABC India Limited, the third respondent. In reply to that, the petitioner sent a letter dt. 4-8-90 requesting for another date, preferably in the last week of August or in the first week of September, to appear before the Commission. He also requested the Commission to furnish him “all the other affidavits and the documents filed before the Commission in respect of the enquiry”. A reply was sent to him by the secretary to the Commission on 9-8-90 informing “we have so far received two affidavits………”. Thereafter, on 5-9-90, Shri Rangaramanujam filed vakalat on behalf of the petitioner. CW 1 was examined on 7-9-90. The memo filed by Shri Rangaramanujam, learned counsel for the petitioner, seeking recall of CW 1 for cross-examination was on 24-9-90. On the same day the petitioner's affidavit, sworn to on 20-9-90, adverting to the facts claimed to be within his knowledge in respect of the matters within the purview of the Commission of Inquiry, was also filed. Arguments were heard on the memo for recalling CW 1 on 11-10-90 and the same was dismissed on 12-10-90. At the time when the alleged remarks were made by the Commission of Inquiry on 11-10-90, when arguments were heard on the application for recall of CW 1, the petitioner was not present. The allegations mentioned by him in the affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition are based upon the information which his advocate has passed on to him.

    9. A Commission of Inquiry, it is now firmly established by a plethora of case law, is not a Court, (see; Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1) AIR 1958 SC 538, State of J. & K. v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad (2) AIR 1967 SC 122, K. Ballabh v. Commission of Inquiry (3) AIR 1969 SC 528, and Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. Susheel Kumar (4) AIR 1983 AP 69. It has no power to render any definitive judgment. Its findings do not bind anyone, not even the Government which appoints it. The nature of the judicial process, as customarily understood, has no application so far as the Commission of Inquiry is concerned, it is inquisitorial and not adversative in nature. Reviewing the entire case-law on this aspect, the Supreme Court, in a recent decision, in Bali Ram v. Justice B. Lentin (5) AIR 1988 SC 2284 held;

    “A Commission of Inquiry is not a Court properly so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government ‘for the information of it mind’ in order for it to decide as to the cause of action to be followed. It is therefore, a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer the oath will not impart to it the status of a Court:”

    10. The doctrine of bias comes into play only in adjudications before a judicial body or quasi-judicial body. In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (6) 1947 (2) All England Reports (HL) 289, a leading authority on the principle of application of bias, Lord Thankarton, of the House of Lords, observed:

    “My Lords, I could with that the use of the word “bias” should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute.”

    11. This statement of law was quoted into approved by the Supreme Court in G. Nageswara Rao v. APSRT Corporation (b(a)) AIR 1959 SC 308 at 327. Before a Commission of Inquiry there is no lis nor any dispute to be adjudicated by rendering a definitive judgment. Its findings do not bind anyone. Therefore, the strict legal principle of bias does not apply to a Commission of Inquiry. Even so, it cannot be said that a Commission of Inquiry functions outside the purview of the principles of natural justice. The duty to act fairly is always inferred in respect of the functioning of a Commission of Inquiry. This duty is implicitly present for the reason that, the Commission of Inquiry, being an inquisitorial body, its recommendations of findings often-times have larger repercussions. When the Commission conducts its proceedings openly and when the advocates are permitted to represent parties, it must act fairly. Any observations made by it must be tempered with discretion and propriety. It is advisable to avoid provocating criticism as to the manner of its functioning.

    12. The petitioner alleges that the learned Judges behaved in a disrespectful manner towards his advocate on 11-10-90 by commenting that “whether he (the advocate) knew the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act and also whether he knew any law and further threatened the advocate to impose costs of Rupees ten thousands for having filed the petitioner to recall CW 1.” The Secretary to the Commission, in his affidavit, denies these allegations and asserts that he was present at the time when arguments were heard. The learned Judge has not filed a counter-affidavit. We see considerable force in the submission of the learned Advocate General that the learned Judge was not required to file a counter-affidavit since he was not made a party by name.

    13. Absence of the counter of the learned Judge in this regard, in our view, will not add any further credibility to the allegations contained in the petition. What is more is that the petitioner himself has participated in the subsequent proceedings as can be seen not only from the counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary to the Commission but also in the affidavit filed by the petitioner himself wherein he stated that:

    14. I was asked to inspect the barge by the second respondent and the second respondent on 26-10-90 when I met him told me…………”. (Paragraph 16)

    15. It appears there was some discussion on 11-10-90 during the course of the arguments whether the Commission of Inquiry had power, to impose costs. This is evident from the counter-affidavit, filed by the Secretary to the Commission;

    “Any examination by the Commission of the scope of its right to impose costs and look for the principles and precedents on the matter cannot amount to offering a threat.”

    16. Such an enquiry is undoubtedly within the scope of the functioning of the Commission. No such costs have been awarded is evident from the order dt. 12-10-90.

    17. CW 1 was examined on 7-9-90 His examination pertained to question No. 4 relating to the contract awarded to the third respondent. But the third respondent, which had received notice about the evidence of CW 1, did not choose to cross-examine. The petitioner himself was appointed subsequently by the third respondent for fabrication of the modular barge. It is true that in the course of his evidence CW 1 stated;

    “It could have been better from technical point of view to have got the designs and structural details of the barge checked by Garden Reech of Calcutta, Hindustan Shipyard, etc.”

    18. The above evidence, in our view, would not have the effect of causing any prejudice to the petitioner. Sec. 8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act reads;

    “Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard.—If, at any stage of the enquiry, the commission:

    a) Considers it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person: or

    b) is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry, the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in his defence:

    Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.”

    19. Neither sub-sec. (a) nor sub-sec. (b) is attracted. The Commission did not think it necessary to inquire into the petitioner's conduct nor has it formed any opinion that the petitioner's reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. The evidence of CW 1, including the above extracted portion, would not in any manner cause prejudice to the petitioner. In such circumstances, the petitioner has no right to cross-examine CW 1 under Sec. 8-C of the Commission of Inquiry Act. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition fails and accordingly it is dismissed. No order as to costs.

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    Arun Shridhar Bondale v. Government Of A.P And Others
    (Jul 11, 1991)