AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 9(3) and 10(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter called the Act.)2.
  • Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition act,
  • sub-section (1) k concerned, sub-sec. (2)
  • Section 9(3) as well as Section 10(1),
  • sub-section (3) when Section 10(1)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 10
  • sub-section (3) of Section 9
  • provisions of Section 10(2).
  • Section 9(3) and Section 10
  • Section 10(1) or Section 9
  • sections 9(3) and 10(1)
  • Section 4(1)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 9(3) and 10(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter called the Act.)2.
  • Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition act,
  • sub-section (1) k concerned, sub-sec. (2)
  • Section 9(3) as well as Section 10(1),
  • sub-section (3) when Section 10(1)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 10
  • sub-section (3) of Section 9
  • provisions of Section 10(2).
  • Section 9(3) and Section 10
  • Section 10(1) or Section 9
  • sections 9(3) and 10(1)
  • Section 4(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the owner of 3 acres and 6 cents of land in Survey Number 80/3, Prasadampadu Village, Vijayawada taluk, Krishna District. The petitioner alleges she was unaware of acquisition proceedings until she received a combined notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which she received on 19-8-1968. The respondents' counter-affidavit disclosed that a Section 4(1) notification and a Section 17(4) notification (dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A) were published in the Official Gazette on 29-9-1966 and a declaration under Section 6 followed thereafter, invoking urgency provisions to acquire land for housing purposes.

A single notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 dated 13-8-1968 fixed the date of enquiry as 2-9-1968; this notice was received by the petitioner only on 19-8-1968. The enquiry was not held on 2-9-1968 but was conducted on 14-10-1968, and the award was passed on 24-10-1968. The petitioner challenged the legality of proceedings taken pursuant to the Sections 9(3) and 10(1) notices on the ground that she was not given fifteen clear days' notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a notice served under Section 9(3) (and notice under Section 10(1)) must provide fifteen clear days' notice of the date fixed for the enquiry (Section 11) measured from the date of service.
  2. If fifteen clear days' notice is required, whether the notice actually served on the petitioner on 19-8-1968 (fixing enquiry on 2-9-1968) and the subsequent notice leading to the 14-10-1968 enquiry satisfied that requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Bhima Raju)

  • The notice under sub-section (3) of Section 9 should satisfy the same requirement as the notice under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2); specifically, it must give fifteen days' time because sub-section (3) requires the notice to be "to the same effect" as the notice under sub-section (1).
  • Because the combined notice was despatched on 13-8-1968 but actually received by the petitioner on 19-8-1968, there were only thirteen clear days' notice before the date of enquiry fixed on 2-9-1968; accordingly, proceedings subsequent to such notice are illegal.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by the Learned Government Pleader)

  • Sub-section (3) of Section 9 does not contemplate giving any specific time period (much less fifteen days) after service of the notice; the fifteen-day requirement in sub-section (2) applies only to the notice contemplated by sub-section (1).
  • The fifteen days' time, if relevant, should be reckoned from the date of despatch or posting of the notice (issuing of the notice) and not from the date of its actual service on the occupier.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
District Labour Officer v. Veeraghanta Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri, AIR 1931 Mad 50 Interpreting Section 9(3): notice served should direct appearance at a time "not earlier than 15 days" after the relevant date and that this requires fifteen clear days' notice. The court relied on this decision to support the view that Section 9(3) notice must afford fifteen clear days' notice to the occupier before the enquiry date.
Taraprasad v. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 Cal 471 Interpreted the meaning of "not earlier than 15 days" in relation to notices (as referenced in the Madras decision). The Madras Division Bench referred to Taraprasad and agreed with the Calcutta High Court's conclusion that fifteen clear days' notice is required; the present court adopts that reasoning as supportive authority.
Prasanna Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 Orissa 114 Held that in computing the fifteen days the day of service and the date fixed for hearing should be excluded; also described Section 9 as a clear and mandatory provision. The court cited this decision to reinforce that the day of service and the date of hearing are excluded from the fifteen-day computation and to treat Section 9 as mandatory.
Land Acquisition Collector v. Smt. Parvati Devi, AIR 1964 Him Pra 32 Held that the date of service and the date fixed for appearance are to be excluded in computing the period of fifteen days, and that absence of fifteen days makes the notice invalid. The court relied on this decision as further precedent supporting the conclusion that the notice given to the petitioner (served 19-8-1968 for an appearance on 2-9-1968) was invalid for lack of fifteen clear days.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step statutory and purposive analysis of Sections 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act:

  1. The court first observed that Section 9(3) is mandatory in wording: the collector "shall" serve a notice on the occupier and Section 10(1) empowers the Collector to require a person in occupation to make or deliver a statement. The court emphasized the statutory scheme which uses publication (Section 9(1)) to alert all persons interested and individual service (Section 9(3)) to reach the occupier who is likely to have particular knowledge.
  2. The court interpreted the phrase "to the same effect" in Section 9(3) to mean that the individual notice must be of the same nature as the notice under sub-section (1) and its time requirement under sub-section (2). In the absence of an express time provision in sub-section (3), the court held it is reasonable to read into sub-section (3) the fifteen-day requirement from sub-section (2).
  3. The court reinforced this interpretation by reference to Section 10(1), which itself requires time (not earlier than fifteen days) when the Collector requisitions a statement; this confirmed that Section 9(3) and Section 10(1) both contemplate a fifteen-day period.
  4. On the temporal question, the court rejected the respondents' contention that the period should be reckoned from dispatch or posting. The court emphasized that sub-section (3) refers to service, not mere sending, so the relevant point of commencement is the date of actual service. Similarly, the fifteen days in sub-section (2) is to be reckoned from the date of publication (i.e., when it is made available), and by analogy the fifteen days under sub-section (3) should be reckoned from service.
  5. The court accepted that the fifteen days required are "clear days" (excluding the date of service and the date of enquiry), a position the Government Pleader did not dispute.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the court found the notice served on the petitioner on 19-8-1968 fixing the enquiry for 2-9-1968 did not provide the required fifteen clear days. The later notice (served 8-10-1968) also failed because the enquiry in pursuance of that notice was held on 14-10-1968 — six days later — and therefore lacked fifteen days' notice as well.
  7. The court addressed the respondents' submission that the petitioner actually appeared on 14-10-1968 and filed objections, and rejected it: because Section 9(3) is mandatory, strict compliance is required and failure to comply vitiates subsequent proceedings irrespective of asserted lack of prejudice. The court observed it was not shown the petitioner had a full opportunity to present all objections within the short time available.
  8. On that basis the court concluded there was no valid notice under Sections 9(3) and 10(1) when the Section 11 enquiry was held, and therefore the subsequent proceedings (including the award) were vitiated.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that notices under Section 9(3) and Section 10(1) must afford fifteen clear days' notice to the occupier, reckoned from the date of service (excluding the date of service and the date of enquiry). The court found the notices served on the petitioner did not meet this requirement and were therefore invalid.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The court quashed the proceedings taken subsequent to and in pursuance of the invalid Sections 9(3) and 10(1) notices, including the award passed in pursuance of those notices.
  • The respondents were directed to forbear from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings in pursuance of the said invalid notice.
  • The writ petition was allowed with costs; advocate's fee of Rs. 100/- was awarded.

The opinion did not assert that it was establishing a new precedent beyond applying and following earlier authorities; its holding directly invalidated the specific proceedings against the petitioner and ordered the respondents to refrain from proceeding further on the basis of those invalid notices.

    Velagapudi Kanaka Durga v. District Collector, Krishna District Chilakapudi

    1. The question that has to be answered in this writ petition is whether there should be fifteen clear days notice for holding an enquiry under Section 11 after issuing a notice or notices under sections 9(3) and 10(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter called the Act.)

    2. The petitioner Is the owner of Ac. 3-06 cents of land In Survey Number 80/3 in Prasadampadu Village. Vijayawada taluk in Krishna District. She alleges that until she was given the notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act which was received by her on 119-8-1968, she was not aware of any acquisition proceedings in respect of this land of Ac. 3-06 cents. It however transpires and the same is evident from the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents that Section 4(1) notification and also the one under Section 17(4) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A were published in the official Gazette dated 29-9-66. It was stated that the land was acquired urgently for providing houses to the houseless poor Harijans and consequently the urgency provisions of the Act were invoked. It is not disputed that the declaration under Section 6 followed afterwards. It is common case that a single notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act dated 13th August, 1968 fixing the date of enquiry to 2nd September, 1968 was received by the petitioner only on 19-8-1968. From the counter-affidavit it appears that the enquiry was not held on 2-9-1968 but was conducted on 14-10-1968 and the award Was passed on 24-10-68. In view of these facts, Shri Bhima Raju appearing for the petitioner urges before me that all the proceedings taken subsequent to and in pursuance of Section 9(3) and Section 10 notices are illegal, for the reason that the petitioner was not given fifteen clear days notice of the enquiry to be held. It is to be noted that though the notice was despatched on 13-8-1968 fixing the date of enquiry to 2-9-1968, it was actually received by the petitioner on 19-8-1968 and when that is so, there was only thirteen clear days notice and not fifteen clear days notice from the date of service. Shri Bhima Raju contends that the notice given under sub-section (3) of Section 9 should also satisfy the requirements of the notice under sub-section (1) as laid down by sub-section (2). In so far as a notice contemplated by sub-section (1) k concerned, sub-sec. (2) lays down that such notice shall fix the time for appearance of the claimants which is not earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice. Then sub-section (3), which provides for service of individual notices on the occupiers of such land in addition to the publication of the notice under Section 9(1), says that the said notice should be to the same effect as the notice under sub-section (1). The argument of the learned counsel Is that it is clear from the words “to the same effect” occurring in sub-section (3) that fifteen days time should, be given even for a notice under sub-section (3).

    3. Learned Government Pleader on the other hand, contends that subsection (3) does not contemplate giving of any time, much less fifteen days time after the service of the notice. The requirement under sub-section (2) of giving fifteen days time applies only to the notice contemplated by sub-sec. (1) Therefore, according to him, there is no prescription of any time whatever under sub-section (3). He further argues that, in any case, the fifteen days time has to be reckoned only from the date of the despatch of posting of such notice and not from the date of its service on thg occupier of the land.

    4. It has to be noticed even at the outset that the notice issued to the petitioner is not only under Section 9(3) but also under Section 10(1) of the Act. Reading Sections 9 and 10 and also noticing the context in which they occur, it is clear to my mind that the requirement of sub-section (3) is a mandatory one The notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 are required to be published in the Official Gazette. In addition, the Collector is required to cause public notice of the substance of Section 4(1) notification to be given at convenient places in the locality of the land that is sought to be acquired. After the declaration under Section 6 Is published, the appropriate Government is enabled to acquire the land in the manner provided in the subsequent provisions of the Act (vide section 6(3)). Then the actual award proceedings start by publishing notices to persons interested calling upon them to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place mentioned in the notice and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land” and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests and their objections, if any, to the measurements made under Section 8. Such notice should be published at convenient places on or near the land to be taken. A separate notice should be served on the occupier of such land. Further, Section 10 of the Act empowers the Collector to require any person, who Is in occupation of the land, to make ©r deliver to him a statement containing the names of all persons possessing any interest in the land and the nature of their interest, and of the rents and profits, if any, received from the land. It is pertinent to note that sub-section (2) of Section 10 lays down that every person required to make such a statement under Section 10(1) or Section 9 shall be deemed to be legally bound to do so within the meaning of Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code. The actual award enquiry should be conducted as per the provisions of Section 11 on the date fixed under the notices or on any other date to which the enquiry stands adjourned. It is thus clear that the Act accords great importance to the service of notice on the persons in occupation of the land so that all available information in respect of such land could be secured during the course of the enquiry. It may be difficult to learn about all the persons interested in such land but it is not so to know the person or persons in actual occupation of such land. A person in occupation can reasonably be supposed to have all the necessary particulars about the property of which he is in possession. That is why sub-section (3) clearly insists upon the service of a notice on the occupier of land and Section 10(1) empowers the Collector to require any such person to make or deliver to him a statement containing particulars relating to the land and the persons interested therein. It is obviously the surest way of gathering the necessary information about the land. The notice contemplated by subsection (1) of Section 9 is intended to give intimation to all persons interested and that is required to be published in or near the land to be taken because it is in several cases, difficult to know all the persons interested. The case of the occupier of the land is, however, obviously different, because his occupation is certain. It is for that reason the word “shall” is used in sub-section (3) making It obligatory on the part of the Collector to serve notice on the occupier. Once a person is required to make a statement either under Section 9 or under Sec. 10, he is deemed to be legally bound to do so as per the provisions of Section 10(2). therefore, there cannot be any doubt that Section 9(3) is a mandatory provision and the notice provided thereunder is an integral and essential part of the land acquisition proceeding.

    5. When that is so, could it be said that the statute leaves it wholly to the sweet will and pleasure of the Collector to issue notice to the occupier of the land at any time he likes. To hold so would be, in my opinion, illogical and unjust. When fifteen days notice Is contemplated even under Section 9(1) it is difficult to hold that the same requirement need not apply to a notice to the occupier of the land. The words to the same effect occurring in subsection (3) are also important. They Indicate that the notice provided under sub-section (3) should be of the same nature as the one contemplated by subsections (1) and (2). In the absence of any other provision as to the time factor in sub-section (3), it is reasonable to hold that the words “to the same effect” take in the requirement of fifteen days notice as provided by the earlier sub-section. To hold that no time limit should be Imported into the service of notice under sub-section (3) would be wholly unreasonable and unjust. It may result in several cases in the occupiers of the land and persons known or believed to be interested in the land not participating in the award enquiry at all. As I have said It is exactly to avoid such a contingency that the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 have been made.

    6. Moreover, Section 10(1) reiterates that at least fifteen days time should be given to the persons to whom a requisition is made by the Collector to make or deliver a statement containing the required particulars. If the requirement as to time prescribed by subsection (2) does not apply to the notice under sub-section (3), there is no reason whatever for absence of any provision as to the time limit In sub-section (3) when Section 10(1) also provides for such a time limit. Further, the notice given to the petitioner is not only under Section 9(3) but also under Section 10(1). Section 10(1) clearly provides that the time granted to the persons in occupation should not be earlier than fiffeen days after the date of the requisition. It, therefore, follows that both for the purposes of Section 9(3) as well as Section 10(1), there should be fifteen days notice to the petitioner. The first objection of the learned Government Pleader that no time limit is prescribed for notice under Section 9(3) therefore, fails.

    7. The second argument of the learned Government pleader need not detain me long. His argument that the time should be reckoned from the date of the issuing of the notice is wholly unwarranted. It is significant that subsection (3) refers to the service of the notice on the occupier and not sending notice to him. It insists upon service and not merely sending one. The purpose of a notice under Section 9(3) is to give intimation to the occupier and persons known to be interested in the land. When intimation is the purpose, service of the notice becomes relevant and important. Further even the time of fifteen days provided under sub-section (2) has to be reckoned from the actual publicaton, that is, from the date of making the notice available to public inspection. If the same principle is applied, to a notice under Section 9(3) it is clear that the fifteen days time should be reckoned from the date of service only. Such a construction seems to me to be not only logical but also just and reasonable.

    8. There Is no dispute before me that the fifteen days notice contemplated by Sections 9 and 10 is fifteen clear days notice, excluding the date of service and the date of enquiry. The learned Government pleader does not dispute this position and rightly, in my opinion.

    9. This view I have taken, finds support from some decided cases. In District Labour Officer v. Veeraghanta Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri, AIR 1931 Mad 50, a Division Bench was dealing with a notice under Sec. 9(3) which was served upon the claimant on the 19th August, 1925 directing Mm to appear on 3rd September, 1925. The learned Judges observed that

    “Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition act, directs the collector to serve notice on the claimant to the same effect as the notice in sub-clause (2). The notice In sub-clause (2) is to notify the claimant to appear before the acquiring officer.

    “at a time and place mentioned therein, such time not being-earlier than 15 days after the date of publication of the notice.”

    10. When that is applied to sub-section (3) it would mean that the notice to be served upon the claimant should direct him to appear at a time not earlier than 15 days after the service of notice. The Question is whether “not earlier than 15 days means that the claimant is to have 15 days clear notice before he need appear, i.e, before the date of the enquiry or whether the date of enquiry may be on the 15th day.” Having posed this question, the judgment proceeds, after referring to the decision in Taraprasad v. Secy, of State, AIR 1930 Cal 471, to agree with the Calcutta High Court in holding that there should be fifteen clear days notice.

    11. In Prasanna Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 Orissa 114, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court held that in computing the fifteen days, the day of service and the date fixed for hearing should be excluded. It was further observed that Section 9 is a clear and mandatory provision. Then the learned Judges said at page 122:

    “The notices were ordered on 16-6-1955. Assuming that they were served on the earliest day, i.e, the next day (which in my view is not possible considering the large number of persons to be served and the many particulars to be noted in the notices) which is 17-6-55 and the date for hearing objections being fixed on 2-7-1955, there are no fifteen days between the notice and the date of hearing as required by the section.”

    12. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh has also taken the same view In The Land Acquisition Collector v. Smt. Parvati Devi, AIR 1964 Him Pra 32. There, the notice was served on the claimant on 25-10-1956. She was directed to appear before the Collector on 9-11-1956. Holding that the date of service of the notice and the date fixed for the appearance are to be excluded while computing the period of fifteen days, the learned Judge held that the time given to the claimant was less than fifteen days and therefore the notice was not valid. There is, therefore, no doubt that the notice given to the petitioner on 19-8-1968 does not satisfy the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and is therefore, an invalid one. Even so, the learned Government Pleader submits that there was a second notice served on the petitioner on 8-10-1968, as no enquiry had been held on 2-9-1968 as contemplated by the earlier notice. But on a perusal of the record, it is manifest that even this notice does not satisfy the legal requirements because the enquiry In pursuance thereof was held only six days later, i.e, on 14-10-1968. There was no fifteen days notice even on the later occasion. Thus, there was no valid sections 9(3) and 10(1) notice to the petitioner when the enquiry under Section 11 was held.

    13. It is however, urged that this lack of notices did not really prejudice the petitioner for the reason that she did, in fact, appear before the Land Acquisition Officer on 14-10-1968 and file her objections. This attempt to salvage the proceedings is futile because Section 9(3), as I have already held, is a mandatory provision. Strict compliance with such a provision is expected and insisted upon by the statute. Failure to do so would vitiate the subsequent proceedings. The question of prejudice does not arise in cases of failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of law. Further, it is not shown to me whether the petitioner has had full opportunity to place all her objections before the Land Acquisition Officer within the short time made available to her. It is not therefore possible to hold that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. It should also be noted in this connection that there had been no Section 5-A enquiry because it had been dispensed with. In the circumstances failure to give a valid notice under Ss. 9(3) and 10 vitiates the proceedings taken subsequent to and in pursuance of Ss. 9(3) and 10 notice. These proceedings including the award passed in pursuance of the said notice are hereby quashed and the respondents are directed to for bear from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings in pursuance of the said invalid notice.

    14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-

    15. Petition allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Velagapudi Kanaka Durga v. District Collector, Krishna District Chilakapudi
    (Jun 10, 1970)