Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

W.P No. 17 of 1960

Judges

Chandra Reddy, C.J
Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Acts

provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. For instance, section 48(3)
Sections 44, 45, 57, 60, 63(2) and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act
Rules 152, 156, 159, 188, 189, 196 or 200(b) referred
SECTION 45 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
SECTION 60 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
sub-section (2) of Section 63,
Section 60 of the M.V Act.7.
Section 60 M.V Act

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a transport operator who operated a stage carriage (APC 520) on an inter-state route between Choudepalli and Gudiyattam. The portion of the route lying in the State of Andhra Pradesh was covered by a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Chittoor (the primary authority), and the portion lying in the State of Madras was counter-signed by the RTA, North Arcot (the countersigning authority).

On a report by the Motor Vehicles Taxation Sub Inspector of Vellore (North Arcot District) that the petitioner carried 27 passengers on 7-2-1958 without issuing tickets and in excess of the bus capacity, a charge memo (Rc. No. 3154.A2/58 dated 26-2-1958) was issued calling for an explanation. The petitioner denied the offence. The RTA, Chittoor found the petitioner guilty and, by proceedings dated 28-9-1958, suspended the permit for six months under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The petitioner appealed to the State Transport Authority, contesting the jurisdiction of the RTA, Chittoor to suspend a permit for alleged violation of conditions of the countersigned portion and again denied the offence. The State Transport Authority dismissed the appeal relying on G.O.Ms No. 1240 (dated 3-8-1957) of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, which was said to have conferred jurisdiction on the authority that granted the primary permit to act under Section 60 even where the alleged violation related to the counter-signed portion. A revision petition under Section 64-A was filed to the Government and stay of the suspension was sought on 14-12-1959, but no orders were passed. Apprehending enforcement of the suspension, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the primary authority that granted a permit may suspend or revoke that permit under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act for breach of permit conditions committed in a different State within the territorial jurisdiction of the countersigning authority (i.e., whether the primary authority has jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits when the permit has been countersigned by the authority of another State).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

Shri G. Suryanarayana (for the petitioner) argued that Section 60 authorises the transport authority which granted the permit to cancel or suspend the permit for breach of any of the conditions of the permit and for other specified reasons; he framed this so as to assert that jurisdiction to cancel/suspend for breaches outside the State vests in the primary authority alone.
He further argued that under Section 63 the countersigning authority may impose conditions other than those contained in the primary permit; therefore, the countersignature is tantamount to granting an independent permit in respect of the countersigned area, and the jurisdiction of the countersigning authority is not necessarily co-extensive with the primary authority.
He relied on Sections 44, 45, 57, 60, 63(2) and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder, and cited authorities (Lion Automobile Service Co. v. State Transport Authority, Madras; M.A. Khadir v. State of Uttar Pradesh; B.K Association v. S.T.A) to support points including that violation of conditions of a temporary permit does not entitle suspension of a pucca (permanent) permit.
He pointed to what he described as a potential anomaly: if the primary permit allows standing passengers but the countersigning authority prohibits standing, a breach in the countersigning area might not be treated as a breach of the primary permit unless the countersigning authority's power is characterized as granting an independent permit.

State / Government Position (as reflected in the opinion)

The State Transport Authority dismissed the petitioner's appeal relying on G.O.Ms No. 1240 dated 3-8-1957, which was said to confer jurisdiction on the authority that granted the primary permit to take action under Section 60 in respect of alleged violations that occurred in the countersigned area.
The opinion records a Government memorandum and subsequent directions (including a composite Madras State instruction dated 10-11-1951 and a later Government order treating those instructions as cancelled) reflecting administrative positions. The later Government direction stated that where a breach of conditions common to the primary permit and the countersignature is committed in the area of the countersigning authority, the Transport Authority which granted the primary permit should take action under Section 60 (the text notes a likely typographical issue in the word “also” which should read “alone”).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lion Automobile Service Co. v. State Transport Authority, Madras (1958-2 M.L.J. 300 @ 302)	Authority for a right of appeal against refusal to countersign a permit under Section 63.	The Court held this precedent is limited to the proposition about an appeal right on refusal to countersign and is not germane to the core question whether the primary authority may cancel/suspend a permit for breaches occurring in the countersigned area.
M.A. Khadir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1960 Allahabad 228)	Proposition that the countersignature is not a mere formality.	The Court observed that while the case states countersignature is not a mere formality, it does not indicate that countersignature ousts the jurisdiction of the primary authority to act under Section 60 for breaches of permit conditions.
B.K Association v. S.T.A (1957 Calcutta 186)	Decision concerning inter-authority relations in the context of regional transport authorities (as cited by counsel).	The Court noted this case concerned two regional transport authorities in the same State and found nothing in that judgment that assists the petitioner's contentions in the present inter-state context.
W.P. Nos. 1065 & 1066 of 1959 (Seshechalapati, J.)	Held (per the opinion) that Section 60 permits the RTA to cancel a permit for breach committed outside the State (noted to be based on a concession in that case).	The Court acknowledged that Seshechalapati, J. had taken that view but observed the earlier judgment was based on a concession and did not persuade the present Bench to accept the petitioner's contentions.
W.P. No. 280 of 1954 (Madras High Court) — referenced in Government orders	As described in administrative instructions: stated that only the countersigning authority can take action under Section 60 in respect of breaches committed in the countersigned region and that the primary authority cannot act for breaches in that region.	The Court noted this Madras High Court judgment was not before it; the Government treated its earlier administrative instructions as in conflict with that judgment and later cancelled those instructions. The present Court did not rely upon that judgment because it was not produced.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory interpretation of relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the practical effect of permit grant and countersignature in an inter-state context. The reasoning proceeded in identifiable steps:

The Court read Section 45 to determine which authority has jurisdiction to grant a permit where a vehicle is to be used in multiple regions and across State boundaries. For inter-state use, the application is to be made to the RTA of the region where the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. The legislative design shows an intention to vest jurisdiction in the authority that has control over the applicant by reason of domicile or principal business.
The Court observed that the countersignature under Section 42 is dependent upon the grant of the primary permit. If the primary permit is cancelled by the granting authority, the vehicle cannot lawfully ply in the region of the countersigning authority; conversely, cancellation of the countersignature alone would not preclude plying outside that countersigned area.
The court distinguished between two categories of conditions:
- Conditions forming part of the primary permit which are merely countersigned for effect in the other State; and
- Independent conditions attached by the countersigning authority under Section 63(2).
For breaches of independent conditions imposed by the countersigning authority, only that countersigning authority can cancel the countersignature. However, where conditions are those of the primary permit and merely countersigned, cancellation or suspension by the primary authority is an effective and appropriate means of control and therefore the primary authority retains jurisdiction to act under Section 60 even if the breach occurred in the countersigned region.
The Court examined the structure of the Act and other provisions cited (Sections 48(3), 50, 59(3), 60(1), and Section 63(2)) and reasoned that the presence of powers in the countersigning authority to attach conditions or to cancel a countersignature does not logically or textually remove the power of the primary authority to cancel or suspend the primary permit under Section 60. In particular, the phrase in Section 63(2) “may attach to the permit any conditions which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit” reflects that the countersigning power is distinct and conditional upon the primary grant, not co-equal or exclusive.
The Court further noted that certain rules cited (Rules 152, 156, 159, 188, 189, 196 and 200(b)) deal with procedural matters related to countersignature, transfers and similar processes and do not advance the petitioner’s substantive jurisdictional argument.
In addressing the authorities relied upon by the parties, the Court confined their application to the precise propositions they support (for example, treating the Lion Automobile decision as authority only on the right of appeal against refusal to countersign), and concluded that none of the cited authorities compelled the outcome urged by the petitioner.
The Court also reviewed relevant administrative directions and Government memoranda, noting that an earlier composite Madras State instruction had stated that only the countersigning authority can take action for breaches in its region, but that the Government later treated those instructions as cancelled and directed that the primary authority should act under Section 60 in cases where breaches of conditions common to both the primary permit and countersignature occurred in the countersigned area. The Court was not provided with the Madras High Court judgment said to underlie those administrative positions, and therefore declined to base its decision on that unavailable material.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that the regional authority which granted the primary permit has jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the permit under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act for breach of the conditions of the permit committed in the area of the countersigning authority where the conditions concerned are those of the primary permit (i.e., when the primary-permit conditions are merely countersigned).

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the suspension order of the Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor (the authority which granted the primary permit) is sustained and the writ petition is rejected; the petitioner was ordered to pay costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100). The Court explained that the statutory scheme permits the primary authority to act to cancel or suspend the primary permit in such circumstances because that is the effective means of control over inter-state stage carriage operations; the countersigning authority retains the ability to cancel or suspend its countersignature for breaches of independent conditions it imposes, but that does not oust the primary authority’s Section 60 jurisdiction in respect of the primary permit.

The opinion does not purport to lay down an absolute new principle beyond the statutory interpretation applied here; it addresses the specific inter-play of Sections 42, 45, 48(3), 50, 59(3), 60(1), and 63(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act as applied to the facts of the case and to the administrative materials cited.

Disposition

Writ Petition dismissed. Costs awarded: Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

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A. Annamalai Petitioner v. State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad, And Others

The Order of the Court was delivered by

Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

In view of the legal point involved in this case one of us referred the matter to a Bench. The short point that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the primary authority granting the permit can suspend or revoke a permit for breach of the conditions in a different state beyond its jurisdiction where the permit has been counter-signed by the countersigning authority of that other state. In other words, does the primary authority has jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits to suspend or cancel the permit for the breach of any condition by the permit holder within the jurisdiction of the countersighing authority.

2. In this case, the petitioner is a transport operator plying one of his stage carriage APC 520 on an inter-state route between Choudepalli and Gudiyattam. The permit relating to the portion lying in the State of Andhra Pradestr was granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor and for the portion lying in the State of Madras, it was counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot. On a report made by the Motor Vehicles Taxation Sub Inspector of Vellore, North Arcot District to the Regioual Transport Authority, Chittoor that the petitioner was carrying 27 passengers on 7-2-1958 to whom tickets were not issued and in excess of the capacity of the bus, a charge memo Rc. No. 3154.A2/58 dated 26-2-1958 was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to submit an explanation for violation of the conditions of the permit. The petitioner in his explanation denied the alleged offence, but the Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor found him guilty of the said breach and by proceedings dated 28-9-1958 suspended the permit for a period of six months under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioner appealed to the State Transport Authority questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor to suspend the permit granted by the said Authority for an alleged violation of the conditions of the counter permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot. He further denied the offence. The State Transport Authority, dismissed the appeal relying on G.O.Ms No. 1240 dated 3-8-1957 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh under which the jurisdiction was alleged to have been conferred on the Authority which granted the primary permit to take action under Section 60 of the Act in respect of the alleged violation of the conditions of the counter permit granted by a different authority. A revision petition under Section 64-A of the Act to the Government was preferred and stay of the operation of the order pending disposal of the revision petition was sought for on 14-12-1959, but since no orders were passed and as it was apprehended that the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority would take steps to enforce the order of suspension, this writ petition was filed.

3. Shri G. Suryanarayana, on behalf of the petitioner, contends that Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act which authorises the Transport Authority which granted the permit to cancel or suspend the permit for such period as it thinks fit for breach of any of the condition of the permit and for other reasons specified therein would vest jurisdiction in the primary authority alone to cancel, suspend or revoke the permit for breaches of conditions outside the State. He further contends that inasmuch as Section 63 of the Act states that the counter-signing authority has also been vested with jurisdiction to impose conditions other than those contained in the permit, his counter-signature would tantamount to the grant of an independent permit with the conditions of permit imposed by the primary authority as well as any additional conditions that may be imposed by the counter-signing authority, According to him, the jurisdiction of the countersigning authority is not co-extensive with that of the primary authority inasmuch as under Section 63(1) unless there is a counter-signature, the bus cannot ply in that region or State over which the primary authority has no control. ??? under sub-section (2), the Regional Transport Authority when counter-signing the permit can attach to the permit any condition which it might have Imposed if it had granted the permit, and may likewise vary any condition attached to the permit by the Authority by which the permit was granted. According to this provision, it is argued, that the conditions in the primary perm, it may be varied, as such if the contention of the Government Pleader is to be accepted, it would present an anomalous position, in that, where the primary permit authorises a bus owner to take standing passengers and the counter-signing authority prohibits it, the breach of this condition in the other State could not authorise the primary authority to cancel the permit, because there is no breach of the condition at all. Reference is made to Sections 44, 45, 57, 60, 63(2) and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the several rules made thereunder and to the cases of Lion Automobile Service Co. v. State Transport Authority Madras . 1958-2 M.L.J 300 @ 302., M.A Khadir v. State of Uttar Pradesh . 1960 Allahabad 228. and B.K Association v. S.T.A . 1957 Calcutta 186., as justifying the view that the violation of conditions of a temporary permit does not entitle the authority to suspend a pucca permit. We may however, state that our brother Seshechalapati, J. in his judgment in W.P Nos. 1065 and 1066 of 1959 held that Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act would permit the Regional Transport Authority to cancel the permit for broach of conditions even outside the State. But it is contended that this judgment is based on the point being conceded before him. Be that as it may, we do not find any justification for the contentions advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner.

4. Where a route runs through several areas, that authority within whose jurisdiction the permit-holder generally resides or has his principal place of business would have jurisdiction to grant a permit. Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939) says that every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle, or vehicles; provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies or if the route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles: provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different states, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. From a reading of this section it is seen that were the vehicle is to be used in two or more regions in the same State, that authority is given jurisdiction in which the majority of the route is to be operated or if the route is equally divided between two regions in the same State, that authority has jurisdiction where the vehicle is kept. When it becomes to the jurisdiction of the authority where the vehicle is plying between two States, the Legislature has vested jurisdiction in that authority where the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. There is a clear indication in this section to vest the jurisdiction in that ??? which has control over the applicant by reason of his being domiciled within that state. The counter signature by the countersigning authority under Section 42 is dependent upon the grant of the primary permit. If the permit is cancelled by the primary authority, the vehicle cannot possibly be plied in the region of the counter-signing authority; but if the counter-signature is cancelled for any breach of the conditions imposed by the countersigning authority, the vehicle can be plied up to that region. In such circumstances, therefore, the anomaly to which the learned advocate for the petitioner has adverted does not in fact exist, because, for breach of any independent conditions imposed by the countersigning authority, which conditions are not the conditions imposed by the primary authority, it is only the countersigning authority that can cancel the counter signature. But if the conditions of the permit issued by the primary authority are merely counter signed, then the jurisdiction to cancel the permit for any breach of the conditions in the region of the countersigning authority would vest in the primary authority also, because such suspension or cancellation would be the only effective method of control over such stage carriage permit holder. The cancellation of the countersignature, as we have already indicated, would be ineffective. That this is the intention of the Legislature can be gathered by a reference to some of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. For instance, section 48(3) authorises the imposition of the conditions specified in clauses (I) to (XXIII) by the Regional Transport Authority which grants the stage carriage permit. While Section 59(3) specifies the conditions that are attached to very permit, similarly the conditions to be attached to Contract Carriage permit and Private Carrier Permit and Private and Public Carrier Permit have been specified in the Act. Section 50 prohibits the transfer of a permit from one person to another, except with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted the permit. The replacement of the vehicle by another vehicle of the same nature and capacity as that covered by the permit can only be affected by the authority which granted the permit. Again under Section 60(1) only the authority which granted the permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period a it thinks fit for any of the reasons specified therein. The mere fact that the Regional authority which counter-signs the permit is given the power under Section 63(2) to attach to the permit any conditions which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit and may likewise vary any conditions attached to the permit by the authority which granted the permit, does not justify the inference that the authority which granted the permit has no jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the permit. True it is that the counter-signing authority is also vested with the power to cancel or suspend the counter-signature but that does not take away the power of the Primary Authority to cancel the permit. The words in sub-section (2) of Section 63, namely, “may attach to the permit any conditions which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit” empower it to attach other conditions which the Primary Authority has not attached to it. Further, it makes a clear distinction between the authority which granted the permit and the counter-signing authority by the words ‘if it had granted the permit’. Where therefore the section clearly empowers the regional authority which granted the permit to cancel or suspend it for breach of the conditions attached to the permit, there is no justification, merely by an inference, to limit it only to breaches committed within the region over which it has jurisdiction. In our view, there is nothing in Rules 152, 156, 159, 188, 189, 196 or 200(b) referred to by the learned advocate which advances the case of the petitioner inasmuch as these rules deal with the procedure to be followed for counter-signature, transfer of vehicles etc.

5. The case of Lion Automobile Service Co. v. State Transport Authority, Madras is only an authority for the proposition that there is a right of appeal against the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit under section 63 and it is not germane to the point at issue. Further, the case of M.A Khadir v. State of Uttar Pradesh, merely states that the counter-signature is not a mere formality, but that does not indicate that the counter-signature takes away the jurisdiction of the Primary Authority in respect of a breach of the conditions of the permit committed by the permit holder. The case of B.K Association v. S.T.A appears to be concerned between two regional transport ??? in the same State and there is nothing in that judgment which lends assistance to the contentions of the learned advocate for the petitioner. We have sufficiently indicated the reasons for holding that the regional authority which granted the primary permit has jurisdiction to cancel a permit for breach of the conditions of the permit committed in the area of the counter-signing authority.

6. The impugned order also would indicate that it is as a result of the Madras High Court that it passed the order. That order is in the following terms:

“In Memo No. 135164-Tr. 11/51 Home dated 10-11-1951 instructions were issued by the composite Madras State that only the authority which counter-signed a permit can take action under Section 60 M.V Act in respect of a breach of a condition committed in the region to which the counter-signature extends and that the Regional Transport Authority which granted the original permit in respect of a different region cannot take action under Section 60 M.V Act for a breach of coalition committed in the region of the counter-signing Authority.

2. On a reference from the Transport Commissioner, the question whether action against the primary as well as the countersigning Anthority is possible for an offence of unauthorised plying and in all other cases where the authority in whose jurisdiction the condition is violated can take action has been examined by the Government with reference to the instructions issued in para I above and the judgment of the Madras High Court in W.P No. 280 of 1954 in which it has been held that the power of the countersigning authority to punish permit holder for breach of any of the conditions of the permit whether the condition was imposed by the Transport Authority that countersigned the permit is limited to the suspension or cancellation of the countersignature also.

3. The Government consider that the instructions referred to in para 1 above are in conflict with the judgment of the Madras High Court. They therefore direct that these instructions be treated as cancelled. The Government also direct that in all cases where a breach of conditions common to the primary permit as well as the counter-signature is committed in the area or jurisdiction of the countersigning authority only, the Transport Authority which granted the primary permit should take action under Section 60 of the M.V Act.

7. The Transport Commissioner is questioned to issue suitable instructions to all Regional Transport officers in this regard. The word “also” in the second paragraph appears to be a mistake for the word “alone”. The judgment of the Madras High Court in W.P No. 280 of 1954 is not before us and we are not in a position to say what that case actually decided, except that the Government on a consideration of that judgment passed the present order. We have given time to the learned Advocate for the petitioner to produce the judgment, but he has not been able to do so.

8. In the view we have taken we have no hesitation in rejecting this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

Writ Petition dismissed.

A. Annamalai Petitioner v. State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad, And Others

Summary of Opinion delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

State / Government Position (as reflected in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Disposition

A. Annamalai Petitioner v. State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad, And Others

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