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  • Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC or Section 47 of the CPC
  • opinion.11. Section 64 of the CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC
  • decrees.14. Sub-section (2)
  • Order 21, Rules 58
  • Order 21, Rule 63
  • Order 21, Rule 58
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC or Section 47 of the CPC
  • opinion.11. Section 64 of the CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC
  • Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC
  • decrees.14. Sub-section (2)
  • Order 21, Rules 58
  • Order 21, Rule 63
  • Order 21, Rule 58
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal) — Chief Justice Chandra Reddy

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant originally filed O.S. No. 89 of 1947 in the District Munsifs Court, Tenali, against respondents 2 and 3 and obtained an attachment of the property in dispute before judgment. While that suit was pending, the same property was sold in execution of an award (by the Co-operative Deputy Registrar, Vijayawada) in respect of a debt owed by the judgment-debtor (2nd respondent) to the Chowtapalli Vijayalaxmi Vilas Co-operative Credit Society. The first respondent purchased the property at that sale on 27 June 1950; the sale was confirmed on 8 August 1950 and a sale certificate (Ex. A.4) was issued on 19 September 1952.

O.S. No. 89 of 1947 was decreed and the subject property was being brought to sale. At that stage the first respondent filed a claim petition (E.A. No. 468 of 1952) under Order 21, Rule 58, CPC; that petition was dismissed on the ground that the property had been attached in 1947 before judgment and that the subsequent sale in favour of the first respondent did not affect the prior attachment. The first respondent then instituted O.S. No. 319 of 1953 in the District Munsif's Court, Gudivada, seeking a declaration of his title to the property and setting aside the order on the claim petition.

The defence raised included: (a) that the execution sale was collusive, and (b) that the prior attachment rendered the sale void. The trial court overruled these objections and decreed the suit, holding the sale valid and that Section 64, CPC did not bar the sale. The Subordinate Judge confirmed the decree on appeal. The decree-holder (appellant in this second appeal) sought and obtained a referral to a Bench of this Court because an important question of law was represented to be involved.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsistence of an attachment before judgment is a bar to the same property being sold in execution of a decree obtained subsequent to that attachment.
  2. Whether Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure operates as an absolute prohibition on such a sale, or only renders private transfers void as against attachments.
  3. Whether the purchaser at the execution sale (the first respondent) could sustain relief under Order 21, Rule 58 or Order 21, Rule 63, or whether the correct remedy was a petition under Section 47, CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (decree-holder in O.S. No. 89 of 1947) contended that the first respondent should have been non-suited because the first respondent had no interest in the property at the relevant time and therefore could not object to the attachment.
  • According to the appellant, the claim petition filed under Order 21, Rule 58 had been rightly dismissed and the scope of a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 could not be wider than Order 21, Rule 58.

First Respondent's Arguments / Pleas

  • The first respondent sought declaration of title to the property and setting aside of the order on the claim petition; the trial pleading included denials that the sale was collusive and asserted the validity of the sale to him.
  • It was also pleaded that the first respondent could not object to the attachment at the material time because he had no interest; later in the proceedings his counsel conceded that the remedy was misconceived and that the correct remedy would have been a petition under Section 47, CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dhaiapuram Janopakara Nidhi Ltd. v. Lakshmmarayana Chettiar (1939) 1 Mad. L.J. 802; A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 456 (Full Bench) Illustration that if the judgment-debtor's title is extinguished before sale, a decree in favour of a decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 63 may be futile or misleading to purchasers. The Court relied on the Full Bench's observation to support the proposition that a declaration under Order 21, Rule 63 would be futile where the judgment-debtor's title had been extinguished by a prior valid sale.
Srinivasachariar v. Appavoo Reddy, 47 Mad. L.J. 720; A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 889 Authority for the proposition that an auction-purchaser can resist subsequent execution and claim as representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor (invoking Section 47). The Court cited this case as supporting authority for permitting the purchaser to object to further execution under Section 47.
Seetharaman v. Chidambaram, A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 166 Authority for the proposition that purchaser can assert rights under Section 47 as representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor. Used to support the Court's conclusion that the auction-purchaser could claim the benefit of Section 47 and hence prevent further execution.
Venkatasami Naidu v. Guruswami Aiyar, 38 Mad. L.J. 441; A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 626 Authority for the same principle permitting an auction-purchaser to assert rights against subsequent execution. Relied upon as further authority for the position that the purchaser can object under Section 47.
Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan, ILR 43 Mad 107; A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 324 (Full Bench) Another authority cited for the proposition that a purchaser's rights can be asserted to resist subsequent execution. Also cited to demonstrate the established line of authority permitting a purchaser to use Section 47 as the appropriate remedy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a sequence of discrete legal determinations:

  1. The Court first observed that it was unnecessary to decide the broader question of the ambit of Order 21, Rule 63 because the appeal could be disposed of on other grounds raised in the record (para 9–10).
  2. The Court examined Section 64, CPC and held that it does not enact an absolute prohibition on sale of property subject to attachment; rather it renders private transfers or deliveries of attached property void as against claims enforceable under the attachment. A private sale can be avoided by the attaching creditor, but that statutory rule does not preclude the property being brought to sale in execution of another decree (para 10–12).
  3. The Court then turned to Section 63, CPC. It quoted sub-section (1) (mechanism for determining claims when property is under attachment in execution of decrees of more than one court) and sub-section (2), which states that nothing in the section shall be deemed to invalidate proceedings taken by a court executing one of such decrees (para 13–16). The Court read sub-section (2) as implying that attachment in one suit does not oust the jurisdiction of another court to bring the property to sale; the section provides machinery for adjudicating competing claims and does not automatically invalidate sales made in execution by another court.
  4. From this statutory reading the Court concluded that the execution sale to the first respondent was properly held and that title passed to the auction-purchaser; as a result the judgment-debtor's title was extinguished (para 14–16).
  5. The Court then addressed the practical consequence: if title had been extinguished by the execution sale, the decree-holder in the earlier-attaching suit could not proceed to sell the property because there would be nothing of the judgment-debtor's left to sell; continuing execution would be futile (para 15–17). The Court endorsed the Full Bench reasoning from Dhaiapuram (quoted) that a declaration under Order 21, Rule 63 may be futile or misleading where the judgment-debtor's title has been extinguished before the sale (para 16–17).
  6. The Court analyzed the appropriate procedural remedy for the purchaser who wishes to stop further execution. It held that Order 21, Rule 58 could not be relied upon by the purchaser in the circumstances because the property had been properly liable to attachment at the relevant time and the attaching creditor was entitled to attach. Thus objections under Order 21, Rules 58 and 61 could not be maintained (para 18).
  7. However, the Court held that the purchaser could object to further sale under Section 47, CPC on the ground that he had already purchased the property; the purchaser is the representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor and may claim the benefit of Section 47 (para 18–19). The Court supported this position by citing a series of authorities.
  8. The Court noted that the first respondent had in fact pursued a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 rather than a petition under Section 47. Counsel for the first respondent conceded that this was a misconceived remedy and requested the Court to treat the suit as a petition under Section 47. The Court found this request to be sound because the suit was instituted within less than a year and the same court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition; therefore conversion was appropriate (para 20–26).
  9. On that basis the Court ordered the petition for conversion of O.S. No. 319 of 1953 into a petition under Section 47 (C.M.P. No. 7326 of 1960) and dismissed the second appeal. The Court also directed that parties bear their own costs (para 26–27).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The second appeal is dismissed. The Court ordered conversion of O.S. No. 319 of 1953 into a petition under Section 47, CPC (C.M.P. No. 7326 of 1960 was allowed). Parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Immediate implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The execution sale in favour of the first respondent was held to have been properly conducted and title to the property vested in the auction-purchaser, extinguishing the judgment-debtor's title so that there was nothing left for the earlier decree-holder to sell.
  • The claim petition under Order 21, Rule 58 was properly dismissed in the factual circumstances; objections labelled under Order 21, Rules 58 and 61 could not be maintained because the attaching creditor had been entitled to attach originally.
  • The appropriate remedy for the purchaser who seeks to stop subsequent execution is a petition under Section 47, CPC; the Court converted the existing suit under Order 21, Rule 63 into a petition under Section 47 and proceeded accordingly.
  • The second appeal was dismissed and no relief was granted to the appellant; the first respondent's procedural remedy was regularized by conversion to Section 47.

Broader precedent: The opinion resolves the dispute on statutory construction and established authorities cited, but it does not purport to announce any novel departure from existing principles; the Court applied existing statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts and addressed the correct procedural remedy. (The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new, general precedent beyond the statutory and cited authorities.)

    Parachuri Veerayya v. Yalavarti Veeraraghavayya And Others

    Chandra Reddy, C.J:— This Second Appeal was referred to a Bench by our learned brother, Manoher Pershad, J., on the representation of the counsel on either side that an important question of law is involved in this case.

    2. The principal question raised by the appeal is whether the subsistence of an attachment before judgment of some property is a bar to the same property being sold in execution of a decree obtained subsequent to the attachment. The facts material for the purpose of this enquiry may be shortly related. The appellant filed O.S No. 89 of 1947 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Tenali, against respondents 2 and 3 and attached the property in dispute before judgment. During the pendency of the suit, this very property was brought to sale in execution of an award granted by the Co-operative Deputy Registrar, Vijayavada, in respect of a debt due by the judgment-debtor (2nd respondent) to Chowtapalli Vijayalaxmi Vilas Co-operative Credit Society and was purchased by the first respondent on 27th June, 1950. The sale was confirmed on 8th August, 1950 and the sale certificate Ex. A.4, was issued to the court-auction-purchaser on 19th September, 1952.

    3. O.S No. 89 of 1947, the suit filed by the appellant, was decreed, and the subject matter of the appeal was being brought to sale. At that juncture the first respondent intervened with a claim petition (E.A No. 468 of 1952), under Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC. It was dismissed on the ground that the property in dispute was attached in 1947 before judgment, that the subsequent sale of that property in favour of the first respondent did not affect the prior attachment and that, therefore, the attachment could not be raised.

    4. Thereupon, the first respondent laid the action (O.S No. 319 of 1953 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Gudfvada), which has given rise to this appeal, for declaration of his title to the suit property and for setting aside the order on the claim petition.

    5. The suit was resisted on the defence that the sale was a collusive one and that the existence of prior attachment rendered that sale void. Incidentally, it was also pleaded by the first defendant that the plaintiff first respondent could not object to the attachment, as, at the material time, he had no interest in the property.

    6. The trial court, over-ruling the opposition, decreed the suit. It was held by the District Munsiff that the sale in favour of the first respondent was not vitiated by collusion and it was valid. He also held that Section 64 of the CPC did not stand in the way of the suit property being brought to sale. No issue was raised as to the effect of attachment of this property in another suit before the sale in question. Nor was this point argued before the trial court or the lower court.

    7. On appeal the Subordinate Judge confirmed the decree and judgment of the District Munsiff.

    8. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant, i.e, the decree-holder in O.S No. 89 of 1947, brought a second appeal to this Court. When it came for hearing before our learned brother, Manohar Pershad, J., the parties requested the learned Judge to have the matter posted before a Bench urging that an important point of law was involved in the case.

    9. The only contention urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff-first respondent ought to have been non-suited because no objection to the attachment of the property could be taken by him, he not having acquired any interest thereon at the relevant time, and as such the claim petition filed by him was rightly dismissed and that the scope of the suit under Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC could not be wider than the one under Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC.

    10. As we have already remarked, this point was not argued in either of the courts below or even before our learned brother, though this was pleaded in the written statement. But it is unnecessary for us to give any decision on the ambit or Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC as the appeal could be disposed of on another ground. As mentioned supra, the claim of the first respondent was contested inter alia on the plea that Section 64 of the CPC was a bar to the holding of sale of this property which was attached earlier. This objection was held untenable by the courts below and, rightly, in our opinion.

    11. Section 64 of the CPC does not enact an absolute prohibition of the sale of the property on which the attachment was subsisting. It only says that a private alienation of such property does not bind the attaching creditor or persons claiming under him. It recites:

    “Where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against att claims enforceable under the attachment.”

    12. A private sale of property subject to attachment could be avoided by the attaching creditor or his representatives-in-interest. This does not preclude the same property from being brought to sale in execution of another decree.

    13. That this is permissible could be easily gathered from Section 63 of the CPC which is as under:—

    “(1) Where property not in the custody of any court is under attachment in execution of decrees of more courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realise such property and shall determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the court of highest grade, or, where there is no difference in grade between such courts, the court under whose decree the property was first attached.

    (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a court executing one of such decrees.”

    14. Sub-section (2) clearly implies that the attachment of the property does not operate to oust the jurisdiction of another Court to bring that property to sale. This section provides the machinery for adudicating claims and objections to the attachment of the same property in two or three courts. Sub-section (2) lays down that even if a sale is held contrary to the procedure indicated in sub-section (1), it is not invalidated for that reason. That being the position, the sale in question was properly held and title passed to the auction-purchaser. In other words, the title of the judgment-debtor was extinguished.

    15. If that were so, could the same property be brought to sale in execution of another decree merely on the ground that the decree-holder had attached that property earlier? It is true that there was no obstacle to his attaching the property at the relevant time but he could not proceed to sell it when the property was already disposed of and the judgment-debtor had not retained any interest therein. Consequently, there is nothing to be sold and it will be futile to continue the execution proceedings.

    16. As observed by Varadachariar J., who delivered the opinion of the Full Bench in Dhaiapuram Janopakara Nidhi Ltd. v. Lakshmmarayana Chettiar, (1939) 1 Mad. L.J 802 : (A.I.R 1939 Mad. 456 (S.B))

    “……..if by reason of the extinction of the judgment debtor's title before the sale, there would be nothing to be sold, a declaration in the decree holder's favour in the suit under Order 21, Rule 63 will not only be futile but sometimes even be mischievous, as it may mislead an unwary purchaser into thinking that he was buying a subsisting interest.”

    17. Therefore, the person who purchased the property, could bring this fact to the notice of the Court and stop further execution in regard to that court.

    18. This leads us to the question whether this could be done by invoking Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC or Section 47 of the CPC In our opinion, Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC could not be resorted to, for, the claim petition could not be sustained as the property in question was liable to attachment at the relevant time. The attaching creditor was originally entitled to attach the property. Consequently, any objection on the basis of Order 21, Rules 58 and 61 could not be maintained. But the purchaser could object to the sale under Section 47 of the CPC on the ground that he had already purchased the property. Such a purchaser is the representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor and hence he could claim the benefit of Section 47 of the CPC

    19. This position is not contested. If authority is needed for this proposition, it is furnished by Srinivasachariar v. Appavoo Reddy, 47 Mad. L.J 720 : (AIR 1924 Mad 889), Seetharaman v. Chiidkmbaram, AIR 1933 Mad 166, Venkatasami Naidu v. Guruswami Aiyar, 38 Mad. L.J 441. (AIR 1920 Mad 626) and Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan, ILR 43 Mad 107 : (AIR 1920 Mad. 324 (F.B)). In this situation, the petition under Order 21, Rule 58 of the CPC was rightly dismissed. The aggrieved first respondent, instead of filing a petition under Section 47 of the CPC which it was competent for him to do so as could be seen from A.I.R 1933 Mad. 166, filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal, to set aside the order on the claim petition, under Order 21, Rule 63 of the CPC.

    20. It is now conceded by the counsel for the first respondent that his client had misconceived his remedy and that he ought to have filed a petition under Section 47 of the CPC For this reason, the learned counsel requests us to treat the suit filed by his client under Order 21, Rule 63, as a petition under Section 47 of the CPC If a petition under Section 47 of the CPC was filed, there could be no opposition to it, since the appellant could not proceed with the execution of his decree, as title to the property had already vested in another person and the auction-purchaser could have resisted the former's execution petition.

    21. Does the fact that the first respondents chose to file a suit instead of filing a petition under S. 47 stand in the way of his getting an appropriate relief? It is submitted by Sri Suryanarayana, counsel for the 1st respondent, that had this objection been raised in the courts below he would have requested the courts to treat the suit as a petition under Section 47 of the CPC

    22. The necessity for this request arose because of our permitting the counsel for the appellant to raise in this court the question as to whether a suit would lie to set aside the order on the claim petition, having regard to the fact that at the material time the first respondent had no interest in the property. We think there is force in this argument and it must be given effect to.

    23. In addition to making this request, counsel for the first respondent had filed a petition for conversion of O.S No. 319 of 1953 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Gudivada, into a petition under Section 47 of the CPC It is unnecessary for us to send the matter back to the trial court, as there is nothing further to be done by the courts below for the reason that even the petition under Section 47 of the CPC would have been in time as the suit was filed within less than a year, and the court which entertained the suit had jurisdiction to take cognisance of the petition also.

    24. The petition for conversion (C.M.P No. 7326 of 1960) is ordered. In the circumstances, the second appeal is dismissed. Parties will bear their Own costs throughout.

    LD/K.S.B

    25. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Parachuri Veerayya v. Yalavarti Veeraraghavayya And Others
    (Aug 12, 1960)