Subba Rao, C.J:— This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the Order of the learned District Munsif of Narasapur dismissing I.A No. 1243 of 1953 in S.C.S No, 365 of 1953 filed by the petitioner on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
2. The facts that have given rise to this revision may be briefly stated. The respondent filed the aforesaid suit against the petitioner for recovery of a sum of Rs. 260-14-3, being the principal and interest due on a promissory note, dated 5th July,. 1950, executed by the petitioner in favour of the respondent, and obtained an ex parte decree therein on 20th August, 1953. On 25th August, 1953, the petitioner filed I.A No. 1243 of 1953 for setting aside the ex parte decree. Along with that petition, he also filed a draft security bond offering to give his immovable property as security for the suit amount. The respondent raised objections to the acceptance of the draft bond. On 2nd November, 1953, the objections were overruled and the petitioner was called upon to file the fair security bond. The petitioner, thereupon, put into Court a registered fair security bond, dated 12th November, 1953, on 14th November, 1953. The learned District Munsif held that, as the registered security bond was not filed into Court within thirty days from the date of which the petitioner had knowledge of the decree, the application was barred by limitation. Hence the revision. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, as the draft security bond was filed in time and as it was finally accepted by the Court, it should be held that security was given within the time prescribed. The question turns upon the construction of section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (Act IX of 1887) which reads:—
“The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:
Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.”
3. Under the proviso, giving security is a condition for the maintainability of the application to set aside the decree. What do the words “give such security” connote? Do they mean that the Court should accept the security before the time prescribed? Or, would it be sufficient if the security is offered in time, though it is accepted when the necessary formalities are complied with, after the prescribed time? On this question, there is a conflict of decisions. Ramesam, J., in Balakrishna Ayyar v. Pichumuthu Pillai . 1922 15 L.W 196., held that the mere filing of the draft bond was not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the proviso and that the security bond should, be accepted within the prescribed time of limitation. King, J., in Chathi yelan Kanna Kurup v. Raman Nayar . 1942 2 M.L.J 425., followed the view expressed by Ramesam, J. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Kalisetti Penchalu Setti v. Potireddy Subbareddi . 1943 2 M.L.J 671., has also expressed the same view. Sir Lionel Leach, C.J, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench, expressed their full agreement with the interpretation placed upon the provisions of section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by Ramesam, J., and King, J., in the earlier decisions. Two Judges of the Madras High Court, sitting alone, had, in applications under Order 41, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, construed the words “furnish security” as equivalent to “tender security”. The learned Judges, who decided Kalisetti Penchalu Setti v. Potireddy Subbareddi, though they noticed the earlier two decisions, expressed the view that it was unnecessary for the Court in that case to consider whether they were open to objection. Another Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Govinda Menon and Ramaswami, JJ., in Marimuthu v. Ponnammal . 1956 2 M.L.J 25 struck a different note and, though the learned Judges were not willing to go to logical limits, they held that if the security bond filed in the Court within the prescribed time was of such a nature that if ultimately accepted it should be sufficient to enforce the obligation, it would be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 17 of the Act. On the decided cases, three positions, among others, may arise:—
1. The defendant files a draft bond in time, but, to comply with the necessary formalities, some time may be taken by the Court or the party and the fair bond is filed after the time prescribed but is accepted by the Court.
2. The fair bond duly executed is filed within the prescribed time, but it is accepted by the Court after the time.
3. The security is finally accepted before the time prescribed.
4. In practice, it will be found that in most cases, for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner, the security will be accepted by the Court after the period of limitation. If the decision of the Division Bench in Kalisetti Penchalu Setti v. Potireddy be accepted as laying down the correct law, the object of section 17 of the. Act would be defeated in most of the cases. On the other hand, the decision in Marimuthu v. Ponnammal, may not help parties if the fair security bond is not filed in time. The filing of draft bond is only for the convenience of parties, and the fair bond would be filed after all the objections raised by the parties are heard and decided by the Court. There is no reason to treat the fair bond as a document different from the draft bond. It may, therefore, be reasonably argued—though we are not expressing our final opinion on the same—that the filing in time of the draft bond, if accepted by the Court after scrutiny, would be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. As this matter arises often and as there is a conflict of opinion on the point between two Division Benches of the Madras High Court, we think it necessary that an authoritative decision should be had by a Full Bench of this Court on the following question:—
“What is the meaning to be given to the words ‘give such security for the performance of the decree’ in the proviso to section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (Act IX of 1887)?”
5. We, therefore, refer the above question to a Full Bench.
6. In pursuance of the above Order of Reference, when this petition came on for hearing before the Full Bench, the Opinion was pronounced by
Satyanarayana Raju, J.:— The following question has been referred to the Full Bench.
“What is the meaning to be given to the words ‘give such security for the performance of the decree’ in the proviso to section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (Act IX of 1877)?”
7. The facts which have given rise to this reference may be briefly stated. The respondent filed S.C.S No. 365 of 1953 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Narasapur, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 260-14-3 on foot of a promissory note. On 20th August, 1953, an ex parte decree was passed in his favour. Within five days thereafter, the petitioner filed I.A No. 1243 of 1953 for setting aside the ex parte decree. Along with that application, he filed a draft security bond offering to give his immoveable property as security for the suit amount. The respondent raised objections with regard to the adequacy of the security, but on 2nd November, 1953, his objections were overruled and the petitioner was called upon to file the fair bond. On 14th November, 1953, the petitioner filed in Court a registered security bond. The learned District Munsif held that as the registered security bond had not been filed within thirty days from the date on which the petitioner had knowledge of the decree, the application for setting aside the decree was barred by limitation. It is this order that is the subject-matter of the revision.
8. It is contended for the petitioner that as the draft security bond was filed in time and as it was finally accepted J?y the Court, he must be deemed to have furnished the security as required by section 17 of the Act within the time prescribed.
9. Now, section 17(1), which prescribes the procedure to be followed in a Court of Small Causes, after its amendment in 1935, is in the following terms:—
“(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:
Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.”
10. Prior to its amendment, the Proviso ran thus:—
“Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree, as the Court may direct.”
11. The expression “give security to the satisfaction of the Court as the Court may direct”, gave rise to ambiguity and there was a good deal of controversy in the High Courts as to whether the Proviso was directory or mandatory. One view was that the words “at the time of presenting his application” were incongruous with the words “as the Court may direct”, and that therefore, they must be taken as directory and not mandatory, and if an applicant made the deposit or gave the security within the time fixed by the Court, though after the expiry of the period prescribed, the requirements of the Proviso were sufficiently complied with. A second view was that the words in the Proviso were mandatory and an applicant should, at the time of making his application, deposit the decretal amount or tender the security for payment of the same. Another view was that though an application was unaccompanied by the deposit or the tender of security, still if before such application was rejected and before the time prescribed, such deposit was duly made, the application might be regarded as satisfying the requirements of law. This conflict of views was sought to be a set at rest by the Legislature by enacting the amendment in 1935. The terms of the Proviso to section 17(1) are now mandatory, and it is incumbent on a party seeking to have an ex parte decree set aside either to deposit the decretal amount at the time of presenting the application or to furnish security as directed by the Court on a previous application made for that purpose.
12. Under Article 164 of the Limitation Act, a period of thirty days is allowed for an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte. This period is reckoned from the date of the decree or, where the summons is not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree. That being so, the question is whether the filing of a draft security bond, along with an application to set aside an ex parte decree, within the period prescribed by Article 164 of the Limitation Act, in a sufficient compliance with the terms of the Proviso.
13. Three possible situations may be envisaged:—
(1) where the draft security bond filed by the applicant is tested and found acceptable and the fair bond is actually filed within the prescribed time;
(2) where the draft bond is filed in time but is found unacceptable after the time prescribed; and
(3) where the draft bond is filed in time but is ultimately accepted by the Court after the time prescribed.
14. The cases falling under the first and the second categories present no difficulty. In the cases falling under the first category the requirements of the Proviso are complied with. Equally in the second category of cases, there is no compliance with those requirements. It is really the third category of cases that we are now concerned with and in respect of which there is a divergence of judicial opinion.
15. We shall briefly notice the cases of the Madras High Court which have considered this question.
16. In Assan Mohamed Sahib v. Rahiman Sahib, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act are mandatory but are sufficiently complied with by satisfying the requirements of the section before the time prescribed for such application in the Limitation Act has elapsed.
17. In Balakrishna Ayyar v. Pichamuthu Pillai, the facts were as follows: A small-cause suit was decreed ex parte on 26th January, 1920, and the application to set it aside was made on the 27th without the necessary deposit or security as required by the Proviso to section 17, but on 6th February, 1920, the defendant filed a draft security bond which was tested and found acceptable on 9th March, 1920, and the actual bond was executed on 1st April, 1920. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the mere filing of the draft bond was not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Proviso and refused to set aside the decree. The report sets out the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, but the actual judgment of Mr. Justice Ramesam was this:
“Following Assan Mohamed Sahib v. Rahiman Sahib (Full Bench)—(see also Tarapada Ghose v. Jagat Mohini Dasi), I hold that the Subordinate Judge is right. The petition is dismissed with costs.”
18. It is necessary to note this fact because in all the later decisions of the Madra High Court, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge was read as the judgment of the High Court.
19. In Chathiyelan Kanna Kurup v. Raman Nayar, the facts were these: An application was made on 7th April, 1941, for setting aside an ex parte decree, which was four days after the ex parte decree had been passed. The application was not accompanied by the deposit of the decree amount nor by the offer of any security. On 9th April, there was a further affidavit in which certain property was offered as security to the Court in connection with the application to set aside the ex parte decree. The Court ordered notice to the decree-holder and also ordered the property offered as security to be tested. The result of the test was that the property was found to be sufficient and a report to this effect was received early in July. On 21st July, the learned District Munsif rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that he had not complied with the provisions of section 17. King, J., has held that section 17 requires a previous application if the applicant is to be permitted to give security instead of depositing cash and admittedly no such previous application was filed. The learned Judge noticed two earlier decisions of the Madras High Court, one of Jackson, J., and the other of Happell, J., who construed the expression ‘furnish security’ as equivalent to ‘tender security While observing that there might be much to be said for that point of view, the learned Judge felt that he ought to follow the authority of Balakrishna Ayyar v. Pichamuthu Pillai, which directly dealt with section 17 rather than the other cases which dealt only with cognate provisions of law.
20. About a year later, the same question arose for consideration by a Division. Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Leach, C.J, and Shahabuddin, J.,. in Penchalu Setti v. Subbareddi. The learned Judges observed that they were in full agreement with the interpretation placed upon section 17 by Ramesam, J. During the course of the judgment they stated:—
“The respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in Balakrishna Aiyar v. Pichamuthu Pillai and Chathiyelan Kama Kurup v. Raman Nayar. In the former of these cases, Ramesam, J., held that the mere filing of a draft bond was not sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. He pointed out that the draft security bond was a mere piece of paper and it could not have the effect of a security bond duly executed and registered which alone could be enforced.”
21. As already noted, the observations attributed to Ramesam, J., were really those of the Subordinate Judge. That may not, however, affect the position.
22. A latter Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Marimuthu Goundar v. Ponnammal, however, showed preference for a more liberal construction of the Proviso. After referring to the earlier decisions, the learned Judges observed:—
“We consider that these decisions place too narrow a construction upon the security that is required under section 17, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act…. In my opinion the criterion is this Was the security which the party placed in the hands of the Court and which the Court ultimately accepted sufficient to enforce the obligation upon him? Judged by this test an unregistered security bond is, in my opinion, sufficient compliance with the law, provided that the delay in getting it registered is not due to any fault of the applicant himself.”
23. In taking this view, the learned Judges accepted with approval the reasoning in the decision of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Rajeswari v. Brahmanand . A.I.R 1933 Patna 279. where the terms of the Proviso received a liberal construction.
24. The question then is: Whether the filing in time of the draft bond, which was accepted by the Court after scrutiny after the period prescribed, would be a sufficient; compliance with the provisons of section 17? This would depend upon the meaning to be given to the words “give such security for the performance of the decree” occurring in the Proviso. Do these words mean that the security itself must be furnished, or would it be sufficient compliance if the tender of the security is made within the time prescribed?
25. The procedure ordinarily followed in Courts in this State with regard to the ‘famishing of security bonds may be referred to here. The applicant files a draft security bond. Notice is then given by the Court to the opposite party for filing his objections, if any. If no objections are filed, the Court requires the applicant to file the fair bond. But where the opposite party raises objections to the sufficiency of the security or otherwise, the Court deputes an Officer to test the security and after the report of that Officer is received, the opposite party files his objections. They are then enquired into by the Court and eventually the Court either rejects the security as being insufficient or accepts it as sufficient. In the former case, dearly there is nothing further to be done as the Court rejects the security bond. But where, after the objections are heard and decided, the Court accepts the security bond, the party is required to file the fair bond. All this necessarily takes time. Very often due to the exigencies of work in Court it may not be possible for the presiding officer to dispose of the application expeditiously within the time prescribed.
26. It is not difficult to envisage cases where, for no fault of the applicant, the eventual order pased by the Court accepting the security bond is beyond the prescribed period. Should the party be penalised for the delays occurring in the Court?
27. An unregistered security bond is sufficient compliance with the law, provided the delay in getting it registered is not due to any fault of the applicant himself. The test is whether the security which the party placed in the hands of the Court J. and which the Court ultimately accepted was sufficient to enforce the obligation upon him. Therefore, the filing in time of the draft bond, if accepted by the Court after scrutiny, would be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Proviso. As a result of the above discussion, we would answer the question referred to the Full Bench as follows: Where security is tendered within the time and proves, even though tested after the time, eventually to be sufficient, the applicant must be deemed to have complied with the requirements of the Proviso. The words “give such security” may be construed to mean “tender such security”.
28. This petition coming on for final hearing before the Division Bench after the Tull Bench expressed its opinion upon the question referred to it, the Court made the following
29. The Full Bench has answered the question in favour of the petitioner. The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. The lower Court is directed to set aside the ex parte decree and proceed with the trial of the suit.
30. Reference answered: Revision allowed.