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Case Number

Referred Trial No. 66 of 1954 and Criminal Appeals Nos. 422, 423 and 424 of 1954

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: C. Srinivasa Rao, K. Srinivas Murthy, Advocates

Judges

Subba Rao, C.J
Bhimasankaram, J.

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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Subba Rao, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The three accused were originally convicted by the Court of Session, Cuddappah Division, under Section 302 read with Section 34 and under Section 392 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced to death. The victim was Yedoti Subbamma, who was murdered on 11-2-1954 near the vanka lying to the west of Kumarapalle village. The prosecution's case alleged that quarrels between the deceased and her sister-in-law Sitamma, and at Sitamma's instigation, the three accused (allegedly hired assassins) waylaid and brutally murdered the deceased. The prosecution described a sequence of events in which accused 3 pelted a stone, accused 1 and accused 2 used bill-hooks (M.O.6 and M.O.7) to cut the deceased, after which accused 2 allegedly cut off the deceased's feet and the accused removed and divided the deceased's silver anklets and leg-chains.

On appeal, Mr. Srinivasamurthi argued that the conviction and sentence could not be sustained on the material placed before the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reviewed the evidence, including witness statements, confessions, physical exhibits, expert (serologist) reports, and identification procedures, and ultimately set aside the convictions and sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the conviction and death sentences could be sustained on the material before the appellate court (i.e., whether the prosecution had proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
Whether statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code made after detention in police custody and after delay could be acted upon, and how such statements should be treated.
Whether a confession (Exhibit P-8) which was subsequently retracted and where there was evidence of police coercion should be treated as voluntary and sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration.
Whether identification or identification-related records prepared or supervised by police (including a Panchayatnama identifying jewellery) are admissible under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Whether physical evidence (bill-hooks, shirts, etc.) discovered at places shown by accused and examined by a serologist, which did not yield blood traces, sufficiently connects the accused to the crime.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Queen Empress v. Jadub Das, 27 Cal 295	Criticism of the practice of obtaining statements under Section 164 in circumstances where the witness is practically in police custody; such statements raise suspicion as not being voluntary.	The court quoted the case to illustrate judicial concern about Section 164 statements taken while a witness is effectively in police custody; but ultimately the court preferred a later formulation (see Paramanand) and did not rely on this case as determinative in the present facts.
Emperor v. Manu Chik, AIR 1938 Pat 290	Recognition that statements under Section 164 often raise suspicion that they were not voluntarily made.	The court cited the judgment as reflecting caution about Section 164 statements but indicated preference for the modified approach in Paramanand (see next row).
Paramanand v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Nag 340	If a witness's statement was previously recorded under Section 164, this leads to an inference that police feared the witness might change; however, if the witness sticks to the statement and there are supporting circumstances, the statement may be acted upon but must be received with caution.	The court stated a preference for the Paramanand formulation as the correct approach to Section 164 statements and applied it to conclude that the Section 164 statements in the present case were not reliable given inconsistencies, the circumstances of custody, and lack of independent support.
Ramkishan v. Bombay State, AIR 1955 SC 104	Interpretation of Section 162 CrPC: statements made to police in the course of investigation (including identification acts directed or supervised by police) are inadmissible; the mental act of identification given in court by the identifier is an exception, but physical acts/statements to police are covered by the ban.	The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis to hold that the identification test and Panchayatnama supervised and attested by police were inadmissible under Section 162 and therefore could not be used to connect the discovered jewellery to the deceased.
Decision of the Judicial Committee (unnamed in this opinion)	Only that part of an accused's statement which leads to a discovery is admissible as a discovery statement; other parts of the confession remain inadmissible.	The court applied the principle to hold that only the portion of the accused 3's statement that led to the discovery of M.O.1 and M.O.2 would be admissible; but even then admissible evidence to connect those articles to the deceased was lacking.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a sequential assessment of the central evidentiary materials relied upon by the prosecution and considered applicable legal principles and precedents when assessing admissibility and weight:

Motive: The court examined evidence (P.W.1 the father, P.W.8 the husband, references to quarrels, and a confessional statement by accused 1 alleging Sitamma's instigation). It concluded that the evidence did not satisfactorily establish that Sitamma hired the accused to kill the deceased. The court noted insinuation but found no definite evidence to sustain a finding that Sitamma was party to the murder.
Eye-witness evidence (P.W.10 and P.W.11): The court treated these witnesses as central to the prosecution case but found both unreliable.
- P.W.10: The court found his account inherently improbable (because, if the accused planned the murder, it was unlikely they would bring a neutral witness to the scene and create an eyewitness). The court noted inconsistency between what P.W.10 told the police shortly after the incident (he did not report going with the accused or drinking arrack) and his later Section 164 statement given 1½ months later after five days in police custody. The court expressed suspicion about statements taken after keeping witnesses in police custody and noted the witness's impoverished circumstances and the likelihood that he might have been an accomplice rather than a disinterested witness. On these grounds the court declined to act upon his evidence.
- P.W.11: The court noted she observed events from about 50 yards and had not frequented the locality except on that occasion; she too did not report seeing the incident to the police initially and was taken to the police station and kept for several days before making a Section 164 statement. The court considered her a witness "improvised for the occasion" and declined to act upon her testimony.
Confessional statement of accused 1 (Exhibit P-8): The confession was retracted by accused 1 before the committing magistrate with an allegation of police coercion (beating, threats, and forcible administration of arrack). The court applied the rule of prudence that a retracted confession should not form the sole basis for conviction unless substantially corroborated by independent evidence. The court examined contemporaneous statements of accused 2 and 3 who alleged police ill-treatment and coercion as well. The Sub-Magistrate himself expressed doubts as to voluntariness and gave accused 1 time for reflection. On the facts, the court concluded the confession was not voluntary and could not be relied upon.
Physical evidence and expert report: Bill-hooks (M.O.6 and M.O.7) and shirts (M.O.8 and M.O.9) were recovered at places shown by accused. The serologist's report disclosed no blood marks on the shirts and there was no evidence directly connecting the bill-hooks found to the instruments used in the killing. An attempted proof (P.W.13) that M.O.7 was pledged by accused 2 after the offence was undermined by the witness's correction that the pledge occurred prior to the murder. The court therefore found the physical items did not provide reliable independent corroboration linking the accused to the crime.
Identification of jewellery (M.O.1 and M.O.2) and Section 162: Accused 3's statement led to discovery of silver anklets and leg-chains. The court applied the principle (from the Judicial Committee) that only the part of the statement leading to the discovery is admissible. More importantly, the court examined the Panchayatnama (Ex. P-25) prepared when P.W.1 and P.W.2 identified the jewellery. Because the identification procedure was conducted and supervised by police and attested by police, the court applied the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 162 (Ramkishan v. Bombay State) to hold that the identification evidence given or recorded in police-supervised proceedings was inadmissible. Consequently, the identification did not provide admissible corroboration.
Overall inferential conclusion: Having rejected or treated with suspicion the key pieces of testimonial and corroborative evidence (P.Ws.10 and 11, the retracted confession, the supposed linkage of bill-hooks, and the police-supervised identification), the court concluded that the prosecution had not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Applying these findings, the court set aside the convictions and sentences.

Holding and Implications

Convictions and sentences set aside.

Direct effect: The appellate court quashed the convictions and death sentences imposed by the Sessions Judge and ordered that the accused be set at liberty.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasised caution in treating statements made under Section 164 of the CrPC when those statements were made after delay and while witnesses were effectively in police custody, endorsing the Paramanand approach that such statements must be received with caution and supported by independent evidence. It also applied the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 162 CrPC (Ramkishan) to exclude police-directed or supervised identification procedures and attendant records (such as a Panchayatnama) from admissible evidence. The decision therefore reinforces existing principles concerning the admissibility and weight of confessions, Section 164 statements, and police-conducted identification procedures; the opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying and preferring the cited precedents.

Reported judge signature/initials in the opinion: K.S.B.

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Gopisetti Chinna Venkata Subbaiah, In Re

Subba Rao, C.J:— The three accused were convicted by the Court of Session, Cuddappah Division, under S. 302 read with S. 34, Penal Code and also under S. 392 read with S. 34, Penal Code and sentenced to death.

2. One Yedoti Subbamma, daughter of Kandula Nagayya of Kandulavaripalle village was brutally murdered on 11-2-1954, near the vanka lying to west of Kumarapalle village. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Subbamma was the only daughter of Kandula Nagayya, that there were disputes between the deceased and her brother Pedayya and his wife Sitamma and that, at the instigation of Sitamma, the three accused, who were hired assassins, waylaid the deceased near the vanka and killed her. According to the prosecution, the murder was committed in the following way. The three accused having been pre-informed of the movements of the deceased, took arrack and awaited the deceased near the aforesaid vanka. When the deceased came that way, accused 3 pelted a stone of the size of a big orange at the deceased. The deceased fell down shouting “Amma, I am dead”. Accused 1 cut on the neck of the deceased with the bill-hook M.O 6. Accused 2 was having a bigger bill-hook M.O 7 in his hands. Accused 1 snatched it from accused 2 and cut the deceased again on her neck with the bill-hook M.O 7. Then accused 1 gave M.O 7 to accused 2, who cut off the two feet of the deceased, removed the silver anklets and leg-chains worn by the deceased and gave them to accused 1. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case and convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid.

3. Mr. Srinivasamurthi, in an able argument, satisfied us that the conviction and sentence cannot be sustained on the material placed before us.

4. First as regards the motive, there is the evidence of P.W 1 the father of the deceased. He has two sons Subbayya and Peddayya and one daughter the deceased. The two sons became divided from him about two years prior to the occurrence. Peddayya, his second son, married one Sitamma without his knowledge. He purchased 700 acres of waste land in Narayanarajupadu village-and brought the deceased, her husband and their children to his house and they were residing in his house. He also gifted 1½ acres of land to the deceased under Ex. P-1 the gift deed. On account of this, there were quarrels between the deceased and Sitamma, and Sitamma filed a criminal complaint against the first son for assault. This witness does not in terms say that the murder was at the instigation of Sitamma, though his evidence insinuates that must have been the reason. P.W 8, the husband of the deceased, says in his evidence that there were quarrels between the deceased and Sitamma. But, in cross-examination, he dilutes it by saying that he mostly heard about the quarrels, and that he saw them quarrelling only twice or thrice. P.W 9 is a cousin of Sitamma.

5. On the evening of the day previous to the day of occurrence, he went to Sitamma's house to collect money due to one Mylapalli Venkatareddi on a pronote. At that time, according to him, accused 2 came to Sitamma's threshold & called her & went to the threshold. He would add that they both talked something in low tones, and when Sitamma was about to go inside, accused 2 asked her “whera is the balance” and that Sitamma said that she would pay. Accused 2 then went away.

6. In the confessional statement made by accused 1 before the Sub-Magistrate, he stated that Sitamma asked him to kill the deceased, that Sitamma and her husband Peddayya stated that they would give him half a kunta of land and Rs. 100/- each if he killed her and that they paid him Rs. 70/-. This confession was subsequently retracted. We are not prepared to act upon this confession and we shall give our reasons for doing so at a later stage in the appropriate place. On this evidence, it is not possible to hold that the three accused were hired by Sitamma to do away with the deceased. Without more definite evidence, it is not possible to hold that the quarrels between the sisters-in-law or the preferential treatment given to the daughter by her father would have been a sufficient motive for a young lady like Sitamma to be a party to the murder of her sister-in-law. Anyhow, there is no sufficient evidence on record to sustain such a finding.

7. But, if the evidence is clear as regards the murder, the fact that the motive has not been established would not be of much relevance. The main evidence in this case consists of that of two alleged eye-witnesses P.Ws 10 and 11. As P.W 10 is the most important witness in the case, we shall discuss his evidence in some detail. He lives in the village of Kumarapalle to which accused 1 belongs. He has no property and ekes out his livelihood by doing cooly work. He knows all the three accused and also the deceased and P.Ws 1, 2 and 7. His version of the events may be stated thus. On the day of occurrence he had stomach-ache, and indeed, he had it since two days prior to it. The three accused came to him just before sunrise and told him that, if he drank arrack, he would be relieved of the pain. They took him into the vanka by the side of P.W 1's village and gave him a dose of arrack to drink. The three accused also drank arrack fully at that time.

8. A short while afterwards, the deceased came that way and accused 3 pelted a stone of the size of a big orange at the deceased. The deceased was hit and she fell down shouting “Amma, I am dead”. He went near her and lifted her up. The accused abused him and threatened him. Then, accused 1 cut the deceased on her neck with M.O 6. Accused 2 was having another big bill-hook M.O 7. Accused 1 snatched it from accused 2 and cut the deceased again on her neck with M.O 7. Then accused 1 gave M.O 7 to accused 2, who cut off the two feet of the deceased, removed the silver anklets and leg-chains and gave them to accused 1. Then, the three accused left the place threatening him, that they would cut him if he told about the incident to anybody. If his version is believed, it would certainly establish the prosecution case. But it is a very curious and extra-ordinary version. Would the three accused who planned the murder of the deceased, have come to the house of P.W 10 and taken him to the scene of offence and thereby created an eye-witness to the offence? It is impossible to believe such a story. If really he went along with them, it is more likely that he was an accomplice. In such an event, the prosecution, instead of following the straight course of taking him as an approver, would have put him forward as a disinterested witness. But it is not the prosecution case that he was an accomplice.

9. P.W 10 admits that when the police questioned him at first, he did not tell them that he saw the incident. He explains it by stating that he did not tell them as he was threatened by the accused. The offence was committed on 11-2-1954. The Circle Inspector examined him on 22-2-1954, i.e, more than ten days after the occurrence. P.W 21, the Circle Inspector, says that P.W 10 told him that he was related to P.W 1, that he went and saw a woman who was dead and that he did not tell him that he went with the accused to the rastha to drink arrack. If he was an eye-witness unconnected with the crime, there is no acceptable reason why ten days after the incident he had not given the true facts to the Circle Inspector. Whatever fear he might have had soon after the incident, the time lag was sufficient to enable him to give the true version. But on 18-3-1954, he made a statement under Section 164 of the Cr PC, before the Sub-Magistrate. This statement was made 1½ months after the incident. For the first time therein, he gave the present version. He admits in his evidence that he was kept in the police station for five days and that he was not allowed to go out. Such statements taken after keeping witnesses in police custody for a number of days are always looked upon by Courts with suspicion.

10. Princep and Hill JJ, in — ‘Queen Empress v. Jadub Das’, 27 Cal 295 (A) deprecated the practice of taking statements under similar circumstances as follows: at p. 299:

“We think it was never intended that S. 164 should be applied to such a purpose. It was not intended to enable the police to obtain an incriminating statement by some person, and as it were to put a seal on that statement by sending in that person to a Magistrate, practically under custody, to be examined before the judicial inquiry or trial, and therefore compromised in his evidence when judicial proceedings are regularly taken.”

11. This view was accepted and followed by Chatterji J, in — ‘Emperor v. Manu Chik’, AIR 1938 Pat 290 (B), At p. 295 the learned Judge observed: “It was pointed out by Princep J, in the well-known case in ‘Queen Empress v. Jadub Das (A)’ that a statement of a witness obtained under this section always raises a suspicion that it has not been voluntarily made.”

12. The Nagpur High Court dealt with such statements in — ‘Paramanand v. Emperor’, AIR 1940 Nag 340 (C) and stated the law at p. 346 in a slightly modified form. They observed:

“We are of the opinion that if a statement of a witness is previously recorded under Section 164 of the Cr PC, it leads to an inference that there was a time when the police thought the witness may change, but if the witness sticks to the statement made by him throughout, the mere fact that his statement was previously recorded under S. 164 will not be sufficient to discard it. The Court, however, ought to receive it with caution, and if there are other circumstances on record which lend support to the truth of the evidence of such witness, it can be acted upon.”

13. We would prefer to accept the aforesaid observations of the learned Judges as laying down the correct law in preference to the observations in ‘Queen Empress v. Jadub Das (A)’ and ‘Emperor v. Manu Chik (B)’. In the present case, the version of P.W 10 that the three accused before committing a planned murder came to his house and took him to the scene of offence for giving him a dose of arrack to cure him of his stomach-ache is inherently improbable. At the earliest stage, he gave to the police a different story. He came out with the present version only after 1½ months and after he was in custody of the police for five days. Though his evidence is consistent with his being a participant in the crime, it is not the case of the prosecution. He is also a man of impecunious circumstances. We are not, therefore, prepared to act upon his evidence.

14. The evidence of P.W 11 is not better. She is a woman aged 60. Her evidence is that, in the early hours of the morning of the day of occurrence, she went towards the vanka for gathering broomstick material and that, having heard the cry “Amma”, she went towards that direction and found accused 1 with a bill-hook in his hands accused 2 with a knife. She also saw accused 3 and P.W 10 there. She describes the incident in so far as accused 1 and 2 took part in it in the same manner as stated by P.W 10. Her cross-examination disclosed that she saw the incident from about SO yards. She never came to that locality except on the one occasion when the murder was committed. No other woman engaged in the same avocation came along with her. She says that she knew accused 1 who belongs to Kumarapalle though she admits that all the people of Kumarapalle are strangers to her. She admits that she works now and then under P.W 1. She also admits that she never informed anyone about the murder till she was examined by the police ten days later, that she was taken to the police station and that she was kept there for two or three days when P.W 10 was also there. About her evidence, the learned Judge himself says in his judgment as follows:

“Of course, there appears to be some doubt whether P.W 11 would have been able to identify the accused or whether she would have known the accused at all prior to the occurrence.”

15. The Circle Inspector, who examined P.W 11 on 23-2-1954, says as P.W 21 that P.W 11 did not tell him that she saw the occurrence or that she saw accused 3 or P.W 10 at the scene of offence or that accused 2 was armed and that she told him that she heard about the murder in the noon from Gumpa Subbaiah. After keeping her for some days in the police station, a statement was taken from her under Section 164 of the Cr PC, on 18-3-1954. Exhibit P. 11 is the statement. For the reasons already mentioned by us in connection with the evidence of P.W 10 we must, in the circumstances of the case, look upon that statement with suspicion. The suspicion is not dispelled but is enhanced by the evidence of P.W 11 in Court. She appears to us as a witness improvised for the occasion. For the reasons already given, we cannot act upon the evidence of P.Ws 10 and 11.

16. The next piece of evidence relied upon for the prosecution is the confession made by accused 1 on 18-3-1954. Exhibit P-8 is the said confession. In that confession, accused 1 states that Sitamma told him that Subbamma was to be killed that Sitamma and Peddayya said that they would give half a gunta of land and Rs. 100/- if he committed the murder of Subbamma and that they paid him Rs. 70/- and asked him to go to their house in the evening. He further adds that, after day-break at 5 O'Clock Peddayya came and told him that the deceased would be coming into the wet lands and asked him to be on the way, that he had brought a bottle of arrack and had drunk and that, when Subbamma came there, he cut her. Before the Committing Magistrate, he retracted from this confession and stated:

“For 15 days the police gave me arrack confusingly and beat me. From this place I was taken to Royachoti. As I was threatened that if I did not state as they instructed my bones would drop. I gave the statement. It is true”.

17. It is, therefore, a retracted confession. It exculpates the other two accused and is, therefore, inconsistent with the prosecution version. It is suggested that suggestion was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge that accused 1 must have made the confession revealing the true facts in so far as he was concerned and exculpating the other two accused in an attempt to take over the entire responsibility and at least to save the other two.

18. It is well-settled that, as a rule of prudence, a retracted confession should not be the basis of a conviction unless it is substantially corroborated by independent evidence. In this case, we are not even satisfied that the confession is voluntary. The three accused made their statements on 18-3-1954. Exhibits D-1 and D-2 are statements of accused 2 and 3 taken at 4-15 P.M and 4-30 P.M respectively. It may be mentioned that the statement of accused 1 was taken at 4 P.M Accused 2 stated that the police beat him for 11 days in station and that they troubled him. He said he did not know any thing. Accused 3 stated in his statement that the police questioned him five or six times and forced him to make a confession. He also said that he did not know anything. So too accused 1 answered to the question put by the Sub-Magistrate “Did the police force you to give the confessional statement” that the police troubled him. Instead of accepting his answer, the Magistrate pursued the question and accused 1 said that nobody troubled him to confess. The Sub-Magistrate himself felt a doubt whether he was making a voluntary statement and, therefore, he gave him 24 hours time for reflection and ordered him to be kept in a separate cell under the care of the Sub-Jail warder. On 19-3-1954, he admitted that he committed the murder. On the facts disclosed in the case, we have no hesitation to hold that the confession was I not voluntary.

19. Reliance is placed upon the discovery of M.Os 6 and 7, bill-hooks and M.Os 8 and 9 shirts, at the place shown by the accused. When these shirts along with M.Os 6 and 7 were sent to the serologist for examination, he sent a report that no blood marks were traced on them. But there is no evidence to connect the bill-hooks found with the bill-hooks alleged to have been used for committing the murder. An attempt was made in, regard to M.O 7 by examining P.W 13 to prove that M.O 7 was pledged with her by accused 2 after the offence, P.W 13 in her evidence, stated in chief-examination that five or ten days after P.W 13 heard about the murder of the deceased, accused 2 came to her house and pledged the billhook with her. But she immediately corrected herself and stated that accused 2 came and pledged the bill-hook six days prior to the murder. It is, therefore, not proper to rely upon this evidence to show that he pledged the bill-hook after the murder. Anyhow, the mere possession of the bill-hook cannot be relied upon as a circumstantial evidence to support the case that those bill-hooks must have been used for committing the murder as the billhooks do not contain any blood-stains.

20. Lastly, it is stated that M.O 1, the silver Kadiyalu and M.O 2 the silver leg-chains worn by the deceased were buried in the vanka where the murder was committed and that, pursuant to Ex. P-23, a statement made by accused 3, the said items were discovered. In view of the decision of the Judicial Committee only that portion of the statement which led to the discovery of M.Os 1 and 2 would be admissible.

21. If so, it is necessary that there should be other admissible evidence to connect M.Os 1 and 2 with that worn by the deceased. Ex. P-25 dated 9-3-1954 is the Panchayatnama prepared at the time said M.Os were identified by P.W 1 and his wife P.W 2. Ex. P-25 was signed by three Panchayatdars and also attested by the police. The document discloses that the identification was conducted in the presence of the prominent persons who signed therein near the police station. P.W 22, the Sub-Inspector says, in his evidence, that he sent for P.Ws 1 and 2, held the identification in respect of M.Os 1 and 2 and that both of them identified the jewels as those worn by the deceased. It is, therefore, clear from the evidence that the Sub-Inspector held the identification test, sent for P.Ws 1 and 2, and, after the identification, got the Panchayatnama written and attested the same. The question is whether the identification of the jewels contained in Ex. P-25 is admissible in evidence under Section 162 of the Cr PC. Section 162(i) of the Cr PC, reads:

“No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made”. In a recent judgment in Criminal Appeals 4, 28 and 23 of 1954 reported in — ‘Ramkishan v. Bombay State’, (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 (D) the Supreme Court laid down the law on the interpretation of the said section at p. 114 as follows:

“The distinction therefore which has been made by the Calcutta and the Allahabad High Courts between the mental act of identification and the communication thereof by the identifier to another person is quite logical and such communications are tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and come within the ban of S. 162. The physical fact of identification has thus no separate existence apart from the statement involved in the very process of identification and in so far as a Police Officer seeks to prove the fact of such identification such evidence of his would attract the operation of S. 162 and would be inadmissible in evidence, the only exception being the evidence sought to be given by the identifier himself in regard to his mental act of identification which he would be entitled to give by way of corroboration of his identification of the accused at the trial.”

22. When it was argued before the learned Judges that an identification involving a statement must i.e deemed to have been made to the panch witnesses and not to the police officers, they observed:

“The whole of the identification parades were thus directed and supervised by the Police Officers and the panch witnesses took a minor part in the same and were there only for purposes of guaranteeing that the requirements of the law in regard to the holding of the identification parades were satisfied. We feel very great reluctance in holding under these circumstances that the statements, if any, involved in the process of identification were statements made by the identifiers to the panch witnesses and not to the Police Officers as otherwise it will be easy for the Police Officers to circumvent the provisions of S. 162 by formally asking the panch witnesses to be present and contending that the statements, if any, made by the identifiers were to the panch witnesses and not to themselves.”

23. In the present case, also, the identification test was conducted and supervised by the Police. The Panchayatnama was also attested by them. We must, therefore, hold, following the Supreme Court decision, that the evidence of identification is inadmissible under Section 162 of the Cr PC. In the circumstances we are constrained to hold on the evidence that the prosecution has not brought home the guilt to the accused. We regret the result but, in the circumstances, it is inevitable. The convictions and sentences are set aside and the accused are set at liberty.

K.S.B

24. Convictions and sentences set aside.

Gopisetti Chinna Venkata Subbaiah, In Re

Legal Opinion Summary — Subba Rao, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Gopisetti Chinna Venkata Subbaiah, In Re

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