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  • For the Appellant: K. RAMACHANDRA RAO, P. RAMACHANDRA REDDIACHANDRA REDDI, P. SRINIVASA REDDY, Advocates.
Judges
  • Satyanarayana Raju, J.
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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: K. RAMACHANDRA RAO, P. RAMACHANDRA REDDIACHANDRA REDDI, P. SRINIVASA REDDY, Advocates.
Judges
  • Satyanarayana Raju, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition concerns whether the High Court may transfer to itself an application filed under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act that was pending before the House Rent Controller at Gudivada.

Chronology (as stated in the opinion):

  • 11 February 1953: The respondent (before the Rent Controller) filed B.A.P. No. 3 of 1953 under Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, seeking fixation of fair rent.
  • 24 March 1953: The petitioner filed his counter.
  • 27 October 1954: The respondent's counsel concluded arguments; on that day the respondent (the petitioner in the present petition) filed an application under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure before the House Rent Controller (that petition remained pending).
  • 29 October 1954: The present petition was filed in the High Court seeking withdrawal of B.A.P. No. 3 of 1953 from the Rent Controller's file to the High Court.

The petitioner attacked the maintainability of the Rent Controller petition, challenged Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act as violative of Article 19 and ultra vires, and asserted that upon the formation of Andhra State the Madras Act had ceased to operate there, depriving the Rent Controller of jurisdiction. The respondent disputed these contentions, alleged belatedness and mala fides, and noted earlier judicial determinations recognizing tenant status in C.M.A. Nos. 87 and 88 of 1953.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court has power under Article 227 of the Constitution (power of superintendence) to withdraw and transfer to itself a matter pending before a statutory tribunal or officer (the House Rent Controller) which is not, in the view of prior authority, a "court".
  2. Whether Article 228 (power to withdraw cases pending in courts subordinate to the High Court that involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution) applies when the matter is pending before a Rent Controller or similar tribunal that is not a "court".
  3. Ancillary issues raised by the petitioner as grounds for transfer: the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (including alleged violation of Article 19) and whether the Madras Act continued to be in force in the newly formed Andhra State (jurisdictional challenge to the Rent Controller).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petition before the Rent Controller is not maintainable because Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is unconstitutional (violates Article 19) and is not a reasonable restriction in the public interest; the section is ultra vires the legislative power.
  • On formation of Andhra State the Madras Act ceased to be in force there, so the Rent Controller lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
  • Consequently, the High Court should withdraw the proceedings in B.A.P. No. 3 of 1953 to its own file.
  • As an additional legal basis the petitioner contended that Article 227's power of superintendence implicitly includes the power to transfer matters pending before tribunals (even where Article 228 expressly deals with transfer from subordinate courts), relying on Hyderabad High Court decisions that interpreted "superintendence" broadly to encompass judicial powers, including transfer/revision.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent asserted he had been declared a tenant entitled to Rent Control Act benefits by earlier determinations (Subordinate Judge's Court and the High Court of Madras in C.M.A. Nos. 87 and 88 of 1953).
  • The application for withdrawal to the High Court was belated.
  • The constitutional questions now urged were not raised before the House Rent Controller and are foreign to the scope of the Rent Controller proceedings.
  • The respondent alleged the petition had been filed mala fide with the motive of delaying determination of fair rent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, 1954 S.C.J. 290 Established that a Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are not "courts". The court accepted that the House Rent Controller was not a court (a concession by petitioner’s counsel based on this decision), which meant Article 228's mandatory withdrawal power (applicable to subordinate "courts") did not directly apply.
Mohamed Abdul Raoof v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1951 Hyd. 50 (Full Bench) Held that Article 227 applied to the Court of the Special Tribunal and that the High Court's superintendence was wide enough to include principles akin to statutory transfer provisions (Section 494 Hyderabad CrPC), thereby empowering transfer. Referenced by the petitioner to support the contention that Article 227's superintendence includes power to transfer matters from tribunals; the court noted this authority but observed it did not consider the specific point later emphasized by this opinion.
Mohammed Baquar Hussain Qureshi v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1951 Hyd. 82 Held that "superintendence" in Article 227 is not confined to administrative control but includes judicial powers; tribunals (even those whose decisions are not subject to appeal) fall under High Court superintendence. Relied on by petitioner to argue Article 227 grants judicial powers including transfer; the court recorded this reliance but distinguished the present question, noting these decisions did not address whether Article 227 authorises withdrawal of matters pending before statutory tribunals to the High Court.
Re Tirupuliswamy Naidu Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ. (reported reference in the opinion) Held that jurisdiction under Article 227 is revisional and that no letters patent appeal lies from an order exercising such jurisdiction. The court cited this authority for the proposition that Article 227 is revisional in nature, but noted that the case did not consider whether Article 227 permitted transfer of matters under its superintendence.
Re Annamalai Mudaliar Ramaswami, J. (reported reference in the opinion) Held that agencies (whether courts or not) deciding disputed questions of right under state laws are subject to the High Court's administrative and judicial control, and that Article 227 confers revisional jurisdiction over such tribunals (e.g., Deputy Registrar under Co-operative Societies Act). The court acknowledged this view as supporting broad superintendence, including revisional powers over tribunals, but did not treat it as disposing of the specific issue whether Article 227 authorises withdrawal to the High Court of a case pending before a statutory tribunal when Article 228 deals with transfer from subordinate courts.
Re Pattisam (Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J.) (reported reference in the opinion) Considered scope and effect of Article 227 in relation to earlier statutory provisions (Charter Act 1861, Government of India Acts), but did not consider whether Article 227 empowers transfer of petitions pending on the file of a tribunal to the High Court. Noted by the court as an authority that examined Article 227's scope, but it did not resolve the specific transfer question central to the present petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds from textual analysis of Articles 227 and 228 and from prior decisions:

  1. Textual foundation:

    Article 228 expressly obliges the High Court to withdraw a case pending in a subordinate court when it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution; Article 227 confers superintendence over "all courts and tribunals" in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The Articles are juxtaposed, signalling distinct roles: Article 228 deals specifically with transfer from subordinate "courts" for constitutional questions; Article 227 establishes broad superintendence over courts and tribunals.

  2. Condition precedent for Article 228:

    A necessary condition for Article 228's operation is that the case be pending in a court subordinate to the High Court. The court emphasised this as a threshold matter.

  3. Application of precedent on the character of the forum:

    The petitioner's counsel conceded that, by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, the House Rent Controller is not a "court." Because Article 228 applies to cases pending in subordinate courts, the fact that the tribunal before which the matter stands is not a "court" undermines reliance on Article 228 as the basis for withdrawal.

  4. Petitioner's alternative reliance on Article 227:

    The petitioner argued that the High Court's power to transfer is implicit in the wide superintendence under Article 227 and relied on Hyderabad High Court decisions that construed "superintendence" as including judicial powers (including transfer/revision) over tribunals.

  5. Court's synthesis and limitation:

    The court reasoned that Article 227 and Article 228 serve different functions and that Article 227 cannot be read to subsume a power that Article 228 specifically assigns (transfer from subordinate courts) unless the Constitution so indicates. Article 228's specific focus on "courts" and its absence of any explicit reference to "tribunals" suggests the framers did not intend Article 228's mandatory-transfer mechanism to extend to tribunals. If the drafters had meant to include tribunals under Article 228 they could easily have done so by explicit wording. The court therefore found it difficult to accept that the superintendence in Article 227 comprehends a power to withdraw to the High Court a case pending before a statutory tribunal.

  6. Treatment of earlier authorities:

    The court reviewed the Hyderabad decisions and other authorities cited. It noted that those precedents interpreted "superintendence" broadly but that they did not address the specific constitutional question whether Article 227 permits withdrawal of matters pending before tribunals to the High Court in the manner sought. The court declined to follow those authorities as establishing the required power in the circumstances of this petition.

  7. Conclusion of analysis:

    On the combined basis that (a) Article 228 applies to subordinate "courts" and not to tribunals such as the Rent Controller (per Waryam Singh), and (b) Article 227's superintendence should not be read to supply the transfer power that Article 228 specifically confines to courts, the court concluded the application for withdrawal could not be granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The court's final disposition was that the application to withdraw the proceedings in B.A.P. No. 3 of 1953 from the file of the Rent Controller to the High Court is not maintainable and the petition is dismissed.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect: The petition seeking withdrawal of the Rent Controller proceedings to the High Court was refused; the Rent Controller proceedings remain on the Rent Controller's file.
  • Constitutional scope: The court emphasised a textual distinction between Articles 227 and 228 and declined to read Article 227 as authorising withdrawal of matters pending before statutory tribunals in the manner sought. The opinion therefore confines the mandatory-transfer mechanism of Article 228 to cases pending in subordinate "courts" (as that term is understood under the precedents cited).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion analyses and distinguishes earlier authorities relied upon by the petitioner but does not state that it establishes a newly enunciated, broader precedent beyond the disposition. The immediate, explicit consequence set forth in the opinion is the dismissal of the petition; broader doctrinal consequences are discussed only to explain why the specific transfer relief cannot be granted in this case.

T.A.B
Show full summary ...

    Muragani Ramalingam Petitioner (2Nd ) v. Kondapalli Guramurthy Reddy (Petitioner).

    1. This petition raises an important question as to the power of the High Court under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India to transfer an application filed under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act from the file of the Rent Controller to the High Court.

    2. The 2nd Respondent before the Rent Controller is the petitioner in this petition. The respondent in the present petition filed B.A.P No. 3 of 1953 on the file of the Rent Controller, Gudivada, under Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1949 on the 11th of February, 1953 for the fixation of fair rent. On the 24th of March 1953, the petitioner herein filed his counter. The petition was enquired into. The respondent's counsel concluded his arguments on the 27th of October 1954. On that day the respondent (Petitioner herein) filed an application under Order 27-A of the Code of Civil Procedure before the House Rent Controller. That petition is pending, On the 29th October 1954, the present petition has been filed in this Court.

    3. It is alleged by the petitioner that the respondent's petition is not maintainable, that Section 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1949 violates the fundamental rights of every citizen guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution; that the said section places restrictions that are not reasonable and are not justified in public interest; that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and in particular Section 4 of the said Act, is ultra vires the powers of the legislature. It is further submitted that on the formation of the Andhra State the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has ceased to be in force in the Andhra State and the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to proceed with a petition under Section 4. It is therefore prayed that the High Court may withdraw the proceedings in B.A.P No. 3 of 1953 on the file of the Rent Controller, Gadivada, to the file of the High Court.

    4. The respondent filed a counter wherein it is alleged that he has been declared to be a tenant entitled to the benefits of the Rent Control Act not merely by the Subordinate Judge's Court but also by the High Court of Madras in C.M.A No. 87 and C.M.A No. 88 of 1953; that the application for withdrawal of the proceedings is belated; that the questions touching the constitutional validity of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have not been raised so far before the House Rent Controller; that such questions are foreign to the scope of these proceedings; and that this petition has been filed malafide with the motive of putting off the determination of the fair rent.

    5. The relevant Articles of the Constitution of India may be extracted:—

    “227(1). Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

    (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may:—

    (a) call for returns from such courts;

    (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and

    (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

    (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the Sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein;

    Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.

    (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

    228. If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw the case and may:—

    (a) either dispose of the case itself, or

    (b) determine the said question of law and return the case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn together with a copy of its judgment on such question, and the said court shall on receipt thereof proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment.”

    6. Article 228 makes it obligatory on the High Court to withdraw from the subordinate courts all cases which involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The object of the Article is to make the High Court the sole interpreter of the Constitution in the State and to deny to the Subordinate courts a right to interpret the Constitution. One of the essential conditions for the application of Article 228 is that a case must be pending in a court subordinate to the High Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has conceded before me that the House Rent Controller is not a Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath 1954 S.C.J 290. wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are not courts. But he contended that the power of transfer is implicit in the power of superintendence given to the High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. He relied upon two decisions of the Hyderabad High Court, Mohamed Abdul Raoof v. State of Hyderabad A.I.R 1951 Hyd. 50 F.B. and Mohamed Baquar Hussain Qureshi v. The State of Hyderabad A.I.R 1951 Hyd. 82.. In Mohamed Abdul Raoof v. State of Hyderabad the High Court had to deal with applications for transfer by the accused, who were being prosecuted with ten others in the Court of the Special Tribunal No. IV, Hyderabad, for offences of criminal conspiracy prmoting class hatred, robbery, dacoity, etc. The applications were filed under Section 494 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code corresponding to Section 526 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code. But some of the applicants had also invoked the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in support of their applications for transfer. The Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held that Article 227 of the Constitution is applicable to the Court of the Special Tribunal and the powers of superintendence conferred on the High Court are sufficiently wide to include the principles laid down in Section 494 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code and to empower them to deal with the transfer applications. In that view, they held that it was unnecessary to give any finding as to the applicability of Section 494 or of Article 226 of the Constitution.

    7. In Mohammed Baquar Hussain Qureshi v. The State of Hyderabad a Bench of the Hyderabad High Court was dealing with an application for transfer of a case before the Special Judge' at Warrangal, constituted under the Special Judges' Regulation. On behalf of the State of Hyderabad, an objection was raised that the High Court had no jurisdiction to transfer cases triable by the Special Judges to another Court. Mohammed Ahmed Ansari and Srinivasa Chari, JJ. took the view that the Word “superintendence” used in Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be confined to mere matters of administrative control but confers judicial powers also on the High Court. The learned Judges pointed out that the mention of the word “Tribunal” in the said Articles goes to show that the Constituent Assembly intended to confer on the High Courts, powers of superintendence not only over Tribunals or Courts as are subject to its appellate jurisdiction but also on those whose decisions are not subject to appeal before the High Courts.

    8. They said:

    “If we were to place a narrow interpretation on the word “superintendence” as covering matters of administration only, it would follow that the High Court will have administrative control over these tribunals but not judicial, and that appears to us to be hardly the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of opinion that the word “superintendence” used in Article 227 of the Indian Constitution is wide enough to cover matters of judicial nature also, and if this High Court thinks proper to exercise its power of revision or transfer that can be done not withstanding the restrictive provisions contained in the laws passed by the State, for the jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution Act cannot be controlled by State legislation.”

    9. In re Tirupuliswamy Naidu Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ. held that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is a revisional jurisdiction and hence no letters patent appeal is competent from an order passed by a Judge of the High Court in exercise of such a jurisdiction. The question as to whether the High Court has power to direct a transfer under Article 227 did not fall for consideration in this decision.

    10. In re. Annamalai Mudaliar Ramaswami, J., held that all agencies whether Courts of not, performing the duty of deciding disputed questions of right between parties on behalf of and under the sanction of the State and in accordance with State-made laws are placed under the administrative and judicial control of the High Court and that the High Court has got revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 by way of superintendence over the judicial work of a duly constituted tribunal, like the Deputy Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act. He further held that the word “superintendence” includes power to guide and to direct subordinate Courts and Tribunals to carry out orders of the High Court.

    11. In re. Pattisam, Rajamannar, C.J, and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., had to consider the scope and effect of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judges considered the provisions of Section 15 of the Charter Act of 1861 and Sec. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in relation to Article 227 of the Constitution. But in these two decisions there was no need for the learned Judges of the Madras High Court to consider as to whether the High Court has power under Article 227 to transfer a petition which is pending on the file of a Tribunal to the High Court.

    12. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is almost a reproduction of Section 15 of the Charter Act of 1861. Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided for superintendence of the High Court over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Section 225 provides for transfer of certain cases for trial to the High Court. That section ran thus:

    “225.(1) If on an application made in accordance with the provisions of this Section a High Court is satisfied that a case pending in an inferior Court, being a case which the High Court has power to transfer to itself for trial, involves or is likely to involve the question of the validity of any Dominion or Provincial Act, it shall exercise that power.”

    13. Article 227 of the Constitution corresponds to section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, with certain changes and Article 228 of the Constitution corresponds to Section 225 of the Government of India Act 1935 with certain changes. Order XXVII-A of the Civil Procedure Code, which has been inserted by Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act XXIII of 1942 (as subsequently adopted and amended) provides for notice to the Advocate-General wherein any suit it appears to the Court that any such question as is referred to in clause 1 of Article 132 read with Article 147 of the Constitution is involved. Rule 2 of Order 27A also provides that the court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the Central Government or a State Government shall be added as a defendant in any suit involving any such question as is referred to in clause 1 of Article 132 read with Article 147 of the Constitution.

    14. Articles 227 and 228 occur in juxtaposition indicating thereby that they are not intended to serve the same purpose. Article 228 of the Constitution expressly confers power on the High Court to transfer a case pending in a court subordinate to it which involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, while Article 227 provides that every High Court will have power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Article 227 cannot comprehend a power which is specifically embodied in Art. 228. When an application for transfer is made, it must come only under Article 228 and_that Article makes no mention of tribunals though tribunals are specifically referred to in Article 227. If the framers of the Constitution intended to confer upon the High Court a power to transfer a matter pending before a tribunal involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution nothing could have been more easy than to add the words “or tribunal” in Art. 228. In the two decisions of the Hyderabad High Court referred to above, this point has not been considered. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227, it is no doubt true, is both judicial and administrative. But I find it difficult to hold that it comprehends a power to withdraw to the file of the High Court a case pending before a Statutory tribunal.

    15. In the above view I do not think this application can be granted. It is, therefore, dismissed.

    T.A.B

    16. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Muragani Ramalingam Petitioner (2Nd ) v. Kondapalli Guramurthy Reddy (Petitioner).
    (Dec 16, 1954)