Dilip Gupta, J.:— The present appeal has been filed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) by the State of U.P against the award of the Reference Court made under section 18 of the Act.

2. We have heard learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri S.N Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sharad Malviya for the claimants-respondents.

3. Briefly stated the facts are that the claimants were the recorded tenure-holders of plot No. 362 measuring 18 bighas 17 biswas situated in village Chandpur Salori, pargana Chail within the municipal limits of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. The notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 6.3.1987 proposing to acquire the land for the purposes of construction of a residential colony by the Allahabad Development Authority under the Govindpur Extension Scheme. This was followed by a declaration made under section 6 of the Act on 16.4.1987 The urgency provisions were resorted to and the possession of the land was taken on 16.3.1989 The Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 10.9.1989 The amount of compensation was, however, distributed in the ratio of 37% and 63% in between the claimants and the Estate of the Government.

4. The claimants did not accept the offer and filed a Reference Application under section 18 of the Act. The claimants contended that not only were they entitled to the entire amount of compensation under the award but that the market rate of the land and amount awarded towards other items should also be enhanced.

5. The Allahabad Development Authority was initially not impleaded in the Reference Application. It filed an application for being impleaded and the Reference Court, by its order dated 20.2.1991, allowed the application and granted time to the Allahabad Development Authority to file the written-statement. Written-statements were filed both by the State of U.P and the Allahabad Development Authority.

6. From the award of the Reference Court, it is clear that during the course of the arguments, the claimants gave up the claim for the enhancement on the basis of the market value of the land and other items and confined the claim to the distribution of the amount of compensation by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in the ratio of 37% and 63% in between the claimants and the Estate of the Government. The Reference Court by its award dated 11.4.1994 allowed the reference application holding that the claimants were entitled to the entire amount of compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. It was further ordered that interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of possession till the date of payment is actually made, shall also be paid to the claimants on the amount, which had not been paid.

7. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant took us through the award of the Reference Court and raised the same contentions, which had been urged before the Reference Court on behalf of the State and the Allahabad Development Authority.

8. The first contention sought to be raised was that the Reference Application under section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. According to the appellant, the application could have been filed only under section 30 of the Act. The provisions of sections 18 and 30 of the Act are reproduced below:

“18. Reference to Court.—(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made—

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”

“30. Dispute as to apportionment.—When the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.”

9. The Reference Court has clearly held that the application could have been filed only under section 18 of the Act. In our considered opinion also the application under section 18 of the Act was clearly maintainable.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar . 2003 3 SCC 128, has very elaborately considered the scope of sections 18 and 30 of the Act. Reference may be made to paragraph 25 of the judgment which is quoted below:

“25. Keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Dr. G.H Grant case and analyzing in depth the provisions of the Act, the difference between reference under section 18 and the one under section 30 can be summarized and set out as under:

By reference to locus:

Under section 18(1) a reference can be made by the Collector only upon an application in writing having been made by (i) any person interested, (ii) who has not accepted the award, (iii) making application in writing to the Collector requiring a reference by the Collector to the Court, (iv) for determination of any one of the four disputes (specified in the provision), and (v) stating the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. For reference under section 30 no application in writing is required. The prayer may be made orally or in writing or the reference may be made suo moto by the Collector without anyone having invited the attention of the Collector for making the reference.

By reference to the disputes referable:

Under section 18(1) there are four types of disputes which can be referred to the Civil Court for determination. They are disputes: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii) as to the amount of the compensation, (iii) as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable, or (iv) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under section 30 the only disputes which are referable are; (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable. A dispute as to the measurement of the land or as to the quantum of compensation or a dispute of a nature not falling within section 30, can neither be referred by the Collector under section 30 of the Act nor would the Civil Court acquire jurisdiction to enter into and determine the same.

By reference to the nature of power:

Under section 18 of the Act, the Collector does not have power to withhold the reference. Once a written application has been made satisfying the requirements of section 18, the Collector shall make a reference. The Collector has no discretion in the matter, whether the dispute has any merit or not is to be left for the determination of the Court. Under section 30 the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. The Collector has discretion in the matter. Looking to the nature of the dispute raised, the person who is raising the dispute, the delay in inviting the attention of the Court, and so on are such illustrative factors which may enter into the consideration of the Collector while exercising the discretion. If the Collector makes the reference it may be decided by the Court subject to its forming an opinion that the dispute was capable of reference and determination under section 30 of the Act. In case the Collector refuses to make a reference under section 30 of the Act, the person adversely affected by withholding of the reference or refusal to make the reference shall be at liberty to pursue such other remedy as may be available to him under the law such as filing a writ petition or a civil suit.

By reference to limitation:

Under section 18 the written application requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court shall be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award or within six weeks of the notice from the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. There is no such limitation prescribed under section 30 of the Act. The Collector may at any time, not bound by the period of limitation, exercise his power to make the reference. The expression “the person present or represented” before the Collector at the time when he made his award would include within its meaning, a person who shall be deemed to be present or represented before the Collector at the time when the award is made. No one can extend the period of limitation by taking advantage of his own wrong. Though no limitation is provided for making a reference under section 30 of the Act, needless to say, where no period of limitation for exercise of any statutory power is prescribed, the power can nevertheless be exercised only within a reasonable period; what is a reasonable period in a given case shall depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

11. In the present case the claimant-respondents had filed an application under section 18 of the Act before the Collector, Allahabad which was registered as Reference No. 9 of 1990. Through, the said application the claimants desired that the market rate of the land should be enhanced to Rs. 500/- per sq. metres instead of Rs. 113.63 paise per sq. metres determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The claimant-respondents also demanded an amount for fruit bearing trees, walls, buildings, swimming pool, building and electricity iron poles. A further prayer was made that the distribution of the compensation by the Special Land Officer in the ratio of 37:63 is illegal and unwarranted in law. The claimant-respondents were persons interested. Their claim fell within the scope of section 18 of the Act since it related to the amount of compensation. The learned Standing Counsel has not been able to substantiate his contention that the application under section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the application filed by the claimant-respondents under section 18 of the Act was maintainable.

12. The next contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant was that in any view of the matter, the Reference Court was not justified in holding that the claimants were entitled to the entire amounts of compensation. Sri S.N Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, however, submitted that the claimant-respondent were entitled to the entire amount of compensation as held by the Reference Court and that the Special Land Acquisition Officer in his award has not given any reason at all for distributing the amount of compensation between the claimants and the Estate of the Government.

13. The claimants were admittedly recorded as grove-holders of the land situated within the urban limits of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. They cannot be termed as “tenants” under the provisions of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939 inasmuch as section 3(23) specifically provides that a “tenant” does not include amongst others a grove-holder. Under section 206(c) of the U.P Tenancy Act, the interest of a grove-holder is transferable by voluntary transfer or in execution of a decree of a Civil or Revenue Court or otherwise. A grove-holder subject to certain restriction is the absolute owner of the land and the trees standing thereon. Since the entire land was located within the Municipal Area of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, it fell in an urban area to which the provisions of the “U.P Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956” (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Zamindari Abolition Act’) apply. In view of the provisions of section 17 of the aforesaid Act, the claimants, who were the recorded grove-holders prior to the commencement of the Act, became bhumidhars. A bhumidhar has permanent heritable and transferable right in his holding. He has the right to use the land for any purpose whatsoever. In other words, a bhumidhar is the absolute owner of the land, which stood settled with him after the commencement of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Thus, in our considered opinion, the claimants were entitled to the entire amount of compensation and no infirmity can be attached to the order of the Reference Court.

14. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The power to acquire by the State the land owned by its subjects hails from the right of eminent domain vesting in the State which is essentially an attribute of sovereign power of the State. The State does not acquire its own land for it is futile to exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring rights in the land, which already vests in the State. The Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi (supra) has observed that it would be an absurdity to comprehend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in the State. In other words, the land owned by the State on which there are no private rights or encumbrances is beyond the purview of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

15. In Collector Of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others . AIR 1955 SC 298., the Supreme Court observed that if the Government has itself an interest in the land, it has only to acquire the other interests outstanding thereof so that it might be in a position to pass it on absolutely for public user.

16. In the instant case, the Government has not acquired only 37% of the interest. It has acquired the entire interest in the land. The Government was well aware that it had no interest in the land and that is why it proceeded to acquire all the interests in the land. Thus, also the claimants are entitled to the entire compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the distribution of compensation in the ratio of 37% and 63% between the claimants and the Estate of the Government by the Special Land Acquisition Officer cannot be sustained and the Reference Court was justified in awarding the entire compensation to the claimants.

17. There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed.