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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges (a) the order dated 30-10-1984 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under the Stamp Act and (b) the order dated 30-11-1983 of the Additional District Collector (Finance and Revenue), Varanasi. The petitioner (a public limited company) agreed to purchase land, building and machinery of Central Jute Mills Ltd., Sahupuri, Varanasi, and presented a draft sale deed to the Collector under Section 31 of the Stamp Act on 6-2-1981 (registered as Case No. 49/80-81). The Collector adjudicated by an order dated 16-2-1981 determining stamp duty as Rs. 8,71,972.50. The petitioner deposited that amount on 2-3-1981 and obtained a treasury certificate under Section 10-A.

When the petitioner presented the deed (with the adjudication order/certificate) for registration, the Registrar impounded the document under Section 33 and referred it to the Additional Collector (F&R). The Additional Collector issued a notice; after hearing he held on 30-11-1983 that stamp duty of Rs. 76,94,727.50 was payable (a deficiency of Rs. 68,22,755) and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,77,245 (total demand Rs. 70,00,000). The petitioner obtained a revision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, which by order dated 30-10-1984 quashed the Collector's order but remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, observing that the Collector's earlier order was “mere a communication” and not an endorsement upon the deed.

No counter-affidavit was served on the petitioners until a late filing dated 29-5-2003, despite time having been granted twice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 16-2-1981 passed on the petitioner’s application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act constitutes an "endorsement" on the instrument within the meaning of Section 32(3) of the Stamp Act.
  2. Whether the Additional Collector (F&R)/respondent had jurisdiction under Section 33 to impound the document and to reopen the question of valuation and impose penalty after the earlier adjudication and deposit of duty.
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant relief to the petitioner in the circumstances narrated, in spite of procedural and substantive concerns regarding earlier adjudications and subsequent proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The adjudication by the Collector dated 16-2-1981 (and the deposit of the assessed duty) should be treated as an effective endorsement under Section 32(3) because the order was transcribed on the application to which the deed was annexed and the order itself refers to the annexed deed; this makes the order part of the deed.
  • The Registrar/Addl. Collector had no jurisdiction under Section 33 to re-open valuation after the Section 31 determination and deposit of duty; the impounding and penalty imposed were beyond jurisdiction.

Respondent's / Controlling Authority's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority observed that the Collector's order under Section 31 was “mere a communication” and was not an endorsement on the deed; therefore, the matter could be re-determined and the document could be impounded under Section 33.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohd. Amir Ahmad v. Dy. Commissioner, AIR 1956 All 453 (Full Bench) The scope of Sections 31, 32 and 33: when an instrument is presented under Section 31, the Collector gives an opinion; after giving his opinion the applicant may or may not pay the duty and the Collector cannot compel payment or levy penalty under those sections. The court relied on this Full Bench to explain that Section 31 is a substantive provision for adjudication of duty and Section 32 is procedural; the Full Bench supports the view that a Section 31 adjudication need not necessarily be treated as a bar to subsequent stages unless the procedural prerequisites of Section 32 are satisfied.
State of U.P v. Mohd. Amir Ahmad, (1971) SC 787 (Supreme Court) Confirmation of the Full Bench: words in Section 33 refer to production before officers for registration or evidence, and do not extend to the determination of the question of duty payable under Section 31; Section 31 is complete by itself and once adjudication is given the Collector becomes functus officio unless Section 32 consequences follow. The court quoted paras 5 and 6 to support the proposition that seeking an opinion under Section 31 and the subsequent endorsement under Section 32 are distinct stages, and that Section 33 applies at a later stage when additional steps (like endorsement or payment under Section 32) have been taken.
C.I.T. v. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 : AIR 2001 SC 3868 The general principle that a statutory power vested in an authority must be exercised in the manner provided by the statute. The court cited this authority for the proposition that statutory powers should be exercised as prescribed; it used this to frame the larger point that procedure must be followed but cannot be used to defeat substantive rights.
Syed Mohd. Bakar v. Abdul Habib Hasan Arab, (1998) 4 SCC 343 : AIR 1998 SC 1624 Procedural law is in aid of justice and subservient to substantive law; procedure cannot take away what substantive law gives. The court relied on this principle to hold that the procedural requirement of endorsing the order on the deed (Section 32) cannot be allowed to defeat the substantive adjudication effected under Section 31 when the order and annexures show the determination and deposit.
Chunni Lal Burman v. Board of Revenue, U.P., AIR 1951 All 851 When an instrument is presented for Collector’s opinion under Section 31, the Collector is not authorised to impound the document; if applicant pays deficiency and Section 32 conditions are fulfilled, the Collector is bound to endorse and cannot impound nor impose penalty under Section 33. The court invoked this case to reinforce that a Collector’s role under Section 31 is limited to determination and that impounding or penal action under Section 33 is not available where the statutory procedure envisaged for validation (Section 32) has been complied with or effectively satisfied by the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis grounded entirely in the statutory scheme and the authorities cited in the record:

  1. The court identified the primary statutory provision and the procedural counterpart: Section 31 (substantive adjudication of duty) and Section 32 (procedural endorsement mechanism), and quoted Section 32(3).
  2. It posed the principal question whether the Collector’s order dated 16-2-1981 amounted to an endorsement under Section 32(3). The record shows the petitioner filed under Section 31, the Collector adjudicated duty and the petitioner deposited the assessed amount; the only procedural lapse was that the Collector did not endorse the certificate directly on the deed but recorded the order on the application to which the deed was annexed.
  3. The court relied on the Full Bench decision in Mohd. Amir Ahmad and its affirmation by the Supreme Court (State of U.P v. Mohd. Amir Ahmad) to explain the relationship between Sections 31, 32 and 33: Section 31 is a complete scheme for determination of duty; Section 32 comes into play when the applicant wishes to proceed further and obtain an endorsement making the instrument receivable as duly stamped; Section 33 deals with a later stage such as impounding when Section 32 procedures have not been followed.
  4. Applying those authorities, the court concluded that the Collector’s order, though transcribed on the application and not on the deed itself, expressly referred to the "annexed deed" and was therefore part of the deed record. The court treated the transcription on the application (with the deed annexed) as effectively satisfying the procedural requirement, reasoning that the adjudication was substantive and must not be rendered ineffective by a mere procedural lapse of failing to write on the deed itself.
  5. The court emphasized the doctrine Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no man) to justify that a procedural lapse on the part of the Collector's office should not prejudice the litigant who complied with substantive requirements, and it noted the principle (from Syed Mohd. Bakar) that procedural law aids substantive justice and cannot defeat it.
  6. However, the court went on to scrutinize the content and quality of the 16-2-1981 adjudication: it observed that the first adjudication was cryptic and one-line, provided no reasons or basis for the market valuation (stated as Rs. 1,02,58,291), whereas the later adjudication (30-11-1983) disclosed detailed basis and a valuation of Rs. 7,23,97,434.06 leading to a much larger duty. The court found the very large difference striking and expressed suspicion—describing the first adjudication as possibly ipse dixit and highly doubtful, raising the possibility of collusion or connivance and potential defrauding of the State.
  7. Balancing the legal defect in process (which the court found could be cured by treating the application-notation as constituting the endorsement) against the broader facts suggesting potential dishonesty and large public interest implications (substantial loss to the exchequer), the court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in favour of the petitioner. The court noted that the petitioner had used the sum for commercial activities under an unconditional interim order for about 18 years.
  8. Consequently, although the court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the Collector’s adjudication could be treated as an effective determination/endorsement for Section 32 purposes, the court refused relief on discretionary grounds because of the surrounding circumstances and public interest concerns.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED. The interim order previously in favour of the petitioner is vacated. There is no order as to costs.

Implications and direct effects as set out in the opinion:

  • The petitioner’s challenge to the remand/order under the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the Additional District Collector did not result in the grant of discretionary relief under Article 226; the petition is dismissed and the interim protection is withdrawn.
  • The court found procedural compliance sufficient (the adjudication transcribed on the application annexed to the deed was treated as adequate endorsement for Section 32 purposes), but despite that legal view the court exercised its discretion against the petitioner because of concerns about the integrity of the first adjudication and significant public interest arising from alleged large-scale evasion of duty.
  • The court directed administrative remedial action: the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow is to issue directions to all Collectors exercising power under Section 31 to pass reasoned orders giving full particulars regarding market value and basis for calculation of stamp duty and to provide for reference/review/revision of orders under Section 31; a copy of this order is to be sent to the Secretary for necessary action forthwith.
  • As to precedent-setting: the opinion applies and follows existing precedents about the interplay of Sections 31, 32 and 33 and the relation of procedure to substantive rights; it does not purport to create a novel legal doctrine beyond those applications and the administrative directive to ensure reasoned orders under Section 31.

    Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad And Another

    1. Heard counsel for the parties. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 30-10-1984 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under the Stamps Act and order of Additional District Collector (Finance and Revenue), Varanasi, dated 30-11-1983 and for a direction to him for endorsing certificate on proposed sale deed certifying that full stamp duty has been paid by the petitioner.

    2. No counter-affidavit was filed by the State in spite of time being granted twice but a counter-affidavit filed on 29-5-2003 is on record, which was not served on the petitioners.

    3. The petitioner is a public limited company. It entered into an agreement of sale for purchasing the land, building and machinery of Central Jute Mills Ltd., Sahupuri, Varanasi. A draft sale deed was prepared and was presented to the Collector, Varanasi under Section 31 of the Stamp Act for giving his opinion on 6-2-1981 with regard to proper stamp duty, chargeable on the said deed. The petitioner paid requisite fee under Section 31 of the Act. This application was registered under the Stamp Act as Case No. 49/80-81. The Collector adjudicated and by order dated 16-2-1981 determined that stamp duty on the sale deed was chargeable as Rs. 8,71,972.50/-.

    4. The total order passed on the application filed by the petitioner itself is as under:—

    [Vernacular matter omitted— Ed.]

    5. In view of the aforesaid order of the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 8,71,972.50/- which was deposited in cash under Challan No. 28 dated 2-3-1981 in the Treasury of State Bank of India, Varanasi. The Chief Treasury Officer, Varanasi issued a certificate of depositing the amount under Section 10-A of the Stamp Act read with G.O No. 2864/10-500(17-C) 74-Lucknow dated 22-4-1975.

    6. The petitioner thereafter presented the said deed along with order dated 7-3-1981 and the certificate dated 7-3-1981 before the Registrar for Registration. The Registrar impounded the document under Section 33 of the Stamp Act and referred the matter to the Addl. Collector (F&R), Varanasi, i.e the same authority which passed order under Section 31 of the Act stating that the deed is not properly stamped and less stamp duty has been paid. The Addl. Collector (F&R), Varanasi issued a notice to the petitioner fixing 4-9-1981 as date of hearing. The petitioner filed objections before the Addl. Collector on 4-9-1981. This case was registered as Case No. 66 of 1981-1982.

    7. The Additional Collector (F&R) by his order dated 30-11-1983 held that the stamp duty liable to be paid comes to Rupees 76,94,727.50/- as against Rupees 8,71,972.50/- paid by the petitioner. Thus there was deficiency of Rs. 68,22,755. He also imposed penalty of Rs. 1,77,245/- on the petitioner. Thus total demand comes to Rs. 70,00,000/- (Seventy lakhs).

    8. The petitioner filed a Revision No. 9 (N) 1983-1984 before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, which was allowed by him vide order dated 30-10-1984. He quashed the order of the Collector but remanded the case back for fresh decision on merits in accordance with observations made by him. This writ petition has been filed against this order of remand in which it has been observed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority that the order of the Collector under Section 31 is “mere a communication” of the amount of duty chargeable and the order dated 16-2-1981 is not endorsement upon the deed hence there is no bar in redetermination of stamp duty/order of rehearing. He held that said order is not endorsement on the deed hence it is not final and the document can be impounded under Section 33 of the Act.

    9. Section 32(3) of the Stamp Act runs as under:—

    “Any instrument upon which an endorsement has been made under this Section shall be deemed to be duly stamped or not chargeable with duty, as the case may be, and if chargeable with duty, shall be receivable in evidence or otherwise and may be acted upon and registered as if it has been originally duly stamped.”

    10. The first question raised is whether the order dated 16-2-1981 passed on the application is an endorsement on the deed, can be treated as endorsement under Section 32(3) of the Act.

    11. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Amir Ahmad v. Dy. Commissioner, reported in AIR 1956 All 453 considered scope of the Sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act, in which it was held that—

    “The procedure, in cases to which Sections 31 and 32 apply is that when an instrument is brought before the Collector, he proceeds to give his opinion. After the Collector has given his opinion it is left entirely to the applicant to pay the duty or not and the Collector cannot under either of these sections compel its realisation nor can levy any penalty though it may be that he can order the prosecution of the applicant.”

    12. The above case was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Appeal reported in 1971 SC 787 (sic), State of U.P v. Mohd. Amir Ahmad. Interpreting the Sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act in paras 5 and 6 of the judgment it held thus:—

    “The words ‘every person…………before whom any instrument…………is produced or comes in the performance of his functions’ in Section 33 refer: firstly, to production before judicial or other officers performing judicial functions as evidence of any fact to be proved and secondly, to other officers who have to perform any function in regard to those instruments when they come before them e.g registration. They do not extend to the determination of the question as to what the duty payable is. They do not cover the acts, which fall within the scope of Section 31, because that section is complete by itself and it ends by saying that the Collector shall determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable, if it is chargeable at all.

    “The scheme of the Act shows that where a person is simply seeking the opinion of the Collector as to the proper duty in regard to an instrument, he approaches him under Section 31. If it is not properly stamped and the person executing the document wants to proceed with effectuating the document or using it for the purpose of evidence, he is to make up the duty under Section 32 the Collector will then make an endorsement and the instrument will be treated as if it was duly stamped from the very beginning. But if he does not want to proceed any further than the seeking the determination of the duty payable; then, no consequence will follow, and an executed document is in the same position as an instrument which is unexecuted and unstamped and after the determination of the duty the Collector becomes functus officio and the provisions of Section 33 have no application. The provisions of that section are a subsequent stage when something more than mere assessing of the opinion of the Collector is to be done.”

    13. There is no dispute that an application under Section 31 of the Act was filed by the petitioner on which adjudication order was passed and in pursuance thereof the petitioner was directed to deposit the stamp duty, which was duly deposited. The only lacuna pointed out is that certificate was not endorsed upon the deed itself.

    14. The endorsement on the deed itself is only a procedural requirement. There is no denial that the Collector passed adjudication order though it is only one line order containing no reasons. Section 31 is substantive law and Section 32 is procedure. The order was transcribed on the application to which deed was annexed. The order itself says “on the annexed deed” the duty has been determined. Thus order was made part of deed, which was annexed and is as good as endorsement on the deed itself. It is an order of adjudication by which duty was adjudicated and was not communication. The order was transcribed on an application and was annexed to the deed. The adjudication will not become ineffective and will not make the order non-existent or make the order invalid if it is written on the application itself instead of proposed deed. Transcribing order is procedural as held by Full Bench (supra).

    15. Procedural lapse or irregularity does not affect the legality and validity of an order particularly when deed was made annexure to the order. The order dated 16-2-1981 is not communication as held by the Controlling Authority, respondent No. 1. Procedure is provided for advancing justice and is not a tool for doing injustice. The petitioner complied with all formalities of law and matter was adjudicated. He has no control on the office of Collector. The Collector had to make endorsement. The petitioner was not at fault if order is endorsed on the application and was not endorsed on the deed. It will amount to injustice if the order duly passed is not given legal effect on such technical ground. A litigant cannot be made to suffer for lapse of authority. I am of the opinion that order passed and noted on the application, which is annexed to deed is part of the deed and is sufficient compliance of Section 32 of the Act though the Collector was duty bound to make endorsement on the deed itself on which he made adjudication. For procedural lapse on the part of Court, litigant cannot be made to suffer in view of the doctrine Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit.

    16. Reliance has been placed in the case of C.I.T v. Ghaswala, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 : (AIR 2001 SC 3868), in which the Apex Court held:

    “It is a normal rule of Constitution that when a statute vests certain power on an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself.”

    17. The submission that the Collector is duty bound to endorse the order on the deed and order passed on the application under Section 31 is not legal and valid and cannot be accepted. As discussed above there is sufficient compliance of the abovementioned procedure in this case. The substantive provision is Section 31(1) of the Act. Section 32 is procedure. The Apex Court in the case of Syed Mohd. Bakar v. Abdul Habib Hasan Arab, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 343 : (AIR 1998 SC 1624), observed thus (at Page 1627 of AIR):—

    “A procedural law is always in aid of justice, not in contradiction or to defeat the very object which is sought to be achieved. A procedural law is always subservient to the substantive law. Nothing can be given by a procedural law which is not sought to be given by a substantive law and nothing can be taken away by the procedural law what is given by the substantive law.”

    18. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chunni Lal Burman v. Board of Revenue, U.P, reported in AIR 1951 All 851 held thus:—

    “Sections 31 and 32, Stamp Act, make it clear that when an instrument is presented to the Collector for his opinion as to the duty chargeable upon it, he is not authorised to impound the document if he comes to the conclusion that the instrument is not sufficiently stamped. It would appear that it is his duty to determine the stamp duty payable upon the instrument. If the applicant pays the deficiency, if any, and if the conditions mentioned in Section 32 are fulfilled, the Collector is then bound to make an endorsement on the document that it is sufficiently stamped. He cannot impound the document and cannot impose a penalty as he is bound to do so under Section 33 read with subsequent sections.”

    19. It is submitted that respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to reopen the question of valuation of the property under Section 33 of the Act and the order imposing penalty is also without jurisdiction. The contention of the petitioner has force and the impugned orders do not stand to legal scrutiny as the impugned orders appear to be beyond the scope of Section 33 of the Stamp Act, but these orders have been challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is a discretionary remedy. The order dated 16-2-1981 quoted above is cryptic and one line order. It does not contain any reason nor disclose any basis for determining the value of the property sought to be sold. No material is disclosed in the order for determining the market value as Rs. 1,02,58,291.00 on which stamp duty of only Rs. 8,71,972.50 Paise was determined by the then Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue). As against that in reference Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), an officer of the same rank, calculated on 30-11-1983 the value of the property as Rs. 7,23,97,434.06 Paise. He supported the opinion/report of property valuer and found that stamp of Rs. 76,94,727.50 Paise was liable to be paid. The procedure laid down under Section 32 was not fully complied with. Full market value with complete details and basis have been disclosed in the report dated 30-11-1983. The difference in market value and stamp duty payable thereon is very substantial. The facts speak for themselves. To me the first adjudication of 16-2-1981 does not appear to be an honest discharge of duty. The value of the property could not appreciate so to bring above appreciation in value of stamp duty alone to more than Rs. 76,94,727.50 in 2½ years. It is mere ipse dixit of the Additional District Magistrate and highly doubtful in view of opinion dated 30-11-1983. Ulterior motives in the above background cannot be ruled out. It is defrauding the State with the aid of law in connivance with officers. The difference of more than Rs. 68,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty Eight Lakhs) in stamp duty alone cannot be overlooked. It is evasion of duty by connivance of officers. It will cause substantial loss to the public exchequer and is against public interest.

    20. The market value of property and stamp duty payable thereon as found out by the impugned order has not been challenged before me. The petitioner has been using this amount in its commercial activities under unconditional interim order dated 17-1-1985, i.e, for 18 years. Considering the circumstances stated above in the present case, I am not inclined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. The interim order is vacated. No order as to costs.

    21. Before parting it appears to me that the order under Section 31 of the Stamp Act has been passed without any reason or basis of valuation of the property. The Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of U.P, Lucknow is directed to issue direction to all the Collectors exercising power under Section 31 of the Stamp Act to pass reasoned orders giving full particulars regarding market value of the property and basis of calculation of stamp duty. Provision should also be made for reference, review/revision of the orders passed under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. A copy of this order be sent to the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow for necessary action forthwith.

    22. Order accordingly.

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    Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad And Another
    (Oct 10, 2003)