1. This judgment will govern all similar petitions listed before us today.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. By means of this petition the petitioner has challenged the Constitutional validity of the first proviso to Section 56(1-A) of the Indian Stamp Act, which was inserted by the Indian Stamp (U.P Second Amendment) Act, 2001 (U.P Act No. 38 of 2001) copy of which is Annexure-II to the writ petition.
3. The facts of this case are that by a sale deed dated 1-8-2001 Annexure-2 to the writ petition one Deepak Kumar transferred the land in question to the petitioner. The Sub-Registrar, Karchhana, District Allahabad made a reference to the District Magistrate, Allahabad vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition stating that the Stamp duty on the document was Rs. 1,17,900/- but the petitioner had paid only Rs. 23,400/- hence the deficiency in the stamp duty was Rs. 94,500/-. The petitioner filed an objection dated 8-5-2002 before the respondent No. 2 vide Annexure-4 to the writ petition alleging that there was no deficiency. The respondent No. 2 however, by order dated 30-11 -2002 Annexure-7 held that there was deficiency of Rs. 94,500/- which should be recovered as land revenue. Against that order the petitioner filed a revision under Section 56(1) of the Stamp Act before the Commissioner, Allahabad with a Stay application. True copy of the Revision and the Stay application are Annexures-8 and 9 to the writ petition. However, the Commissioner, Allahabad by order dated 25-3-2003 admitted the Revision and held that if petitioner deposits ⅓rd of the amount in question then the Stay application will be considered. True copy of the said order dated 25-3-2003 is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. It is evident that the said order has been passed in view of the impugned first proviso to Section 56(1-A) of the Stamp Act.
4. Section 56(1-A) stated:—
“(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any person including the Government aggrieved by an order of the Collector under Chapter-IV, Chapter-V or under Clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 26 may, within sixty days from the date receipt of such order, prefer an appeal against such order to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard consider the case and pass such order thereon as he thinks just and proper and the order so passed shall be final:
Provided that no application for stay recovery of any disputed amount of stamp duty including interest thereon or penalty shall be entertained unless the applicant has furnished satisfactory proof of the payment of not less than one-third of such disputed amount:
Provided further that where the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority passes an order for the stay of recovery of any stamp duty, interest thereon or penalty or for the stay of the operation of any order appealed against and such order results in the stay of recovery of any stamp duty, interest thereon or penalty, such stay order shall not remain in force for more than thirty days unless the appellant furnishes adequate security to the satisfaction of the Collector concerned for the payment of the outstanding amount.”
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first proviso to the impugned Section 56(1-A) has created undue hardship and is an unreasonable restriction and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
6. In our opinion there is no merit in this petition.
7. It may be mentioned that as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Naveen Gun House v. Union of India, 2003 (2) AWC 894 : (2003 All LJ 1512) stamp duty is a tax and the power to levy stamp duty is in the concurrent list of the Constitution i.e Entry 44 of the List III of the VII Schedule. Hence the State Legislature has power to pass the impugned Act.
8. It is well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the Statute vide Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshav Chand, AIR 1950 SC 265 (vide para 20). If the language is plain and admits of only one meaning it has to be given effect to even if it leads to hardship or possible injustice vide D.D Joshi v. Union of India, (1983) 2 SCC 235 : AIR 1983 SC 420 : 1983 Lab IC 530.
9. In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 (685) it was observed by the Supreme Court that if there is any hardship it is for the Parliament to amend the law, but the Court cannot be called upon to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear the Court has to give effect to it, however inequitable or unjust the result may be. As is said, ‘dura lex sed lex’ which means ‘the law is hard but it is the law’. In our opinion even if the impugned amendment is causing hardship to some people it is not for this Court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpretated in its plain and literal sense as that is the first principle of interpretation. In our opinion the impugned amendment to the Stamp Act is clear and unambiguous. It clearly states that no stay of recovery of any disputed amount of stamp duty including interest or penalty can be entertained unless the appellant has deposited ⅓rd of the deposited amount.
10. In Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, Willes, J. observed “I utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable.” In Miller v. Salomans, 7 Ex 475, Polak, J. observed, “If the meaning of the language be plain and clear we have nothing to do but to obey it-to administer it as we find it, and to take a different course is to abandon the office of the Judge and to assume the province of legislation.” The same view has been taken by our Supreme Court in Suddappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2002 (1) SCC 142 : AIR 2001 SC 2951.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that we should read into the impugned Section 56(1-A) a provision empowering the appellate authority to waive or stay even the ⅓rd amount which has to be deposited, in certain circumstances when there is hardship etc. In our opinion a Court cannot supply a casus omissus. As held by the Supreme Court in Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001 (7) SCC 71 : (AIR 2001 SC 2699) the Court cannot correct a deficiency in the Statute. An interpretation which has the effect of adding certain words and clauses to an enactment should be avoided vide Fakhruddin v. State of U.P, 1976 ALR 274 (FB).
12. A Taxing Statute cannot be struck down merely on the ground that the imposition is heavy vide Jagannath v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 148. There are several taxing Statutes, which may be harsh, but they cannot be held to be unconstitutional for that reason. Thus, when a Sales Tax law is made under which the dealer cannot pass on the incidence of the tax to the purchaser, this will not make the law unconstitutional vide S. Dodar v. State of Kerala, (1974) 4 SCC 422 : AIR 1974 SC 2272 and (Paras 12 to 14) and Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 : AIR 1983 SC 1019. A Stamp Act, as already observed above, is a taxing statute, and as regards a taxing statute it is well settled that equity has no place in it. As observed by Rowlatt, J. in his classic statement in Cape Brady Syndicate v. IRC, (1921) 1 KB 64. “There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in nothing is to be implied”, and this view has been approved by our Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. The Ajax Products Limited, AIR 1965 SC 1358 and Banarsi Debi v. I.T.O, AIR 1964 SC 1742.
13. The Supreme Court in CIT v. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216 observed that equity is out of place in tax laws. In CIT v. Madhav Prasad Jatia, 1976 (4) SCC 92 : (AIR 1977 SC 420) the Supreme Court held that there could be no consideration of equity if the language of the provision was plain and clear. In CIT v. Shahzada Nand, AIR 1966 SC 1342 the Supreme Court observed that while interpretating a taxing statute one cannot go by the notion as to what is just and expedient.
14. We are of the opinion that no doubt the impugned first proviso to Section 56(1-A) is a harsh provision but it is not for this Court to cure this defect vide Smt. Tarun Lata Sham v. CIT, 108 ITR 345 (SC) : ((1977) 3 SCC 305 : AIR 1977 SC 1802), as it would then be taking on the role of the legislature. If there is a casus omissus the defect can only be remedied by legislation, vide S.P Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149 (Paras 251 to 257). The Supreme Court held in these cases that where there was a lacuna in the Act that could not be filled up by the Court, but only by the legislature.
15. In Gujrat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, 1999 (4) SCC 468 : (AIR 1999 SC 1818) it was held by the Supreme Court that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute, and it is for the legislature to decide whether the right should be given conditionally or unconditionally. In this decision the appellant had challenged the constitutional validity of Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, which required the deposit of the impugned tax as a pre-condition for entertaining the appeal. The proviso to that provision permitted waiver of only 25% of the tax imposed. In other words, 75% of the tax had to be deposited before the appeal could be entertained. The Supreme Court held that the provision did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. No doubt in State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, 2001 (10) SCC 740 it was held that if gross injustice is done the High Court under Article 226 can interfere. However, as observed in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation, 1993 (1) SCC 22 : (AIR 1992 SC 2279) (vide para 45), the resort to Articles 226 and 227 in such cases should be discouraged. As held in Titaghar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603 : (1983 Tax LR 2905) in tax matters ordinarily there should not be any short-circuiting of the alternative statutory remedy of appeal/revision.
17. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents in writ petition No. 608 of 2003, Smt. Kanchan Jaiswal v. State of U.P, and we are treating that as the counter-affidavit in this case and in the other similar writ petitions listed before us, so far as the legal aspect is concerned.
18. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the object of the impugned enactment was to prevent evasion of stamp duty. It had been experienced that there was very slow realization of stamp duty and as such the new provision was added. We find nothing unconstitutional in this. Tax laws are often amended to prevent evasion of tax.
19. Moreover, it may be pointed out that the impugned amendment has not deleted Section 56(1) which stated that the power of the Collector is subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Hence if in a rare and exceptional case the Collector has imposed exorbitant stamp duty arbitrarily the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, on an application, can modify the same. However, this should be done only in rare and exceptional cases, otherwise the provision for appeal under Section 56(1-A) will become redundant.
20. Since the language of the impugned first proviso to S. 56(1-A) is plain and unambiguous we cannot interpret it otherwise. We find no unconstitutionality in the impugned enactment. Obviously it was made so that Government dues may be recovered quickly. As held by the Supreme Court in Asst. Collector, Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., 1985 (1) SCC 260 : (AIR 1985 SC 330) the Government requires Revenue for various purposes and it cannot run on Bank guarantees.
21. Thus there is no Constitutional infirmity in the impugned provision. The petition is therefore dismissed. Other similar petitions listed before us today are also dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal under Section 56(1-A), or under Section 56(1) in rare and exceptional cases.
22. Petition dismissed.