AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specially Sections 140, 143, 146, 147 and 149 and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
  • Section 95 of the old Act (Section 147 of the New Act) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act
  • SECTION 147 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • SECTION 96 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • 2 of Section 96 of the old Act (Section 149 of the new Act)
  • 49. Proviso-1 of Section (1) (b) of Section 147 of new Act
  • Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • Section 4A(3) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923,
  • Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen Compensation Act,
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • SECTION 167 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT 1988
  • Workmen's Compensation Act No. 153 of 1993
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923),
  • provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 47.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
  • 51. Sub-section (5) of Section 147
  • 7 of Section 149 of the new Act
  • Workmen's Compensation Act. 48.
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 149,
  • Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • Compensation Act, 1923.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specially Sections 140, 143, 146, 147 and 149 and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
  • Section 95 of the old Act (Section 147 of the New Act) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act
  • SECTION 147 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • SECTION 96 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • 2 of Section 96 of the old Act (Section 149 of the new Act)
  • 49. Proviso-1 of Section (1) (b) of Section 147 of new Act
  • Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • Section 4A(3) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923,
  • Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen Compensation Act,
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • SECTION 167 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT 1988
  • Workmen's Compensation Act No. 153 of 1993
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923),
  • provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 47.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
  • 51. Sub-section (5) of Section 147
  • 7 of Section 149 of the new Act
  • Workmen's Compensation Act. 48.
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 149,
  • Workmen's Compensation Act,
  • Compensation Act, 1923.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an award made by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner directing payment of compensation for the death of Babu Ram, who was the driver of truck No. U. P. 15-J-5061 owned by respondent No. 1 (Shri Krishna Jain). The truck was insured by the appellant, United India Insurance Company (respondent No. 2 in the original claim). The Commissioner awarded Rs. 1,79,560 (by the Tribunal) / Rs. 1,89,560 (as referenced in one part of the opinion) as compensation to the deceased's wife, Smt. Chandra Kali, and directed payment of interest (12% simple interest from the date of death in the Tribunal's order). The Tribunal also considered a possible penalty under Section 4A and directed notice to the employer.

The insurer filed the present appeal challenging (a) the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to saddle the insurer with liability, (b) certain factual findings (e.g., that death occurred in the course of employment and while the vehicle was in use), and (c) alleged breaches of the insurance policy terms (such as the driver allegedly allowing gratuitous passengers). The insurer did not deposit the awarded amount before filing the appeal. Two separate but concurring judicial opinions are recorded: one by V. N. Singh, J. (main judgment with full analysis) and an agreeing concurring note by S. P. Srivastava, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had jurisdiction to saddle the insurer with liability to pay compensation in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (particularly where Section 14 insolvency scenario was not alleged).
  2. Whether an insurer who has issued a policy under the Motor Vehicles Act is liable to pay compensation under an award made in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (i.e., whether the insurer "steps into the shoes" of the employer and becomes liable as judgment debtor for compensation and interest).
  3. Whether the insurer was obliged to deposit the awarded amount under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act before filing the appeal, and whether failure to do so renders the appeal incompetent.
  4. Whether factual findings by the Commissioner that the death occurred in the course of employment and that the offending motor vehicle was in use were vitiated in law.
  5. Whether the insurer could be relieved from liability because of an alleged breach of the terms of the insurance policy (specifically, the claim that the driver permitted three gratuitous passengers) or for failure of the owner to inform the insurer of the incident.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurer) — Principal Arguments

  • The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had no jurisdiction to saddle the insurer with liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly where the case did not fall under Section 14 (insolvency of employer) of that Act (paragraph 3).
  • The insurer contended there was a breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy: evidence (as relied on by insurer's written statement) purportedly showed the driver was using the vehicle to carry passengers for fare, and alternatively that gratuitous passengers were carried (paragraphs 13, 14, 15).
  • The appellant raised questions whether the driver was justified in allowing a total stranger to board the truck and whether the owner committed breach by not informing the company about the incident (points listed at paragraphs 30–33).
  • The appellant did not make the deposit of the award amount required under Section 30 before filing the appeal; an endorsement at the foot of the appeal stated that because the appeal was not filed by the employer deposit was not required (paragraphs 51–53).

Claimant / Respondent

  • The claimant (Smt. Chandra Kali) alleged Babu Ram was the driver employed by respondent No. 1 and earned Rs. 3,000 per month; he was killed on 31.5.1999 (died 1.6.1999) while returning from Hathras, and the vehicle was insured by respondent No. 2 (paragraphs 18–26).
  • The claim sought Rs. 3,00,000 with 24% annual interest; the Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,79,560 (ordered insurer to pay this amount within 30 days and 12% simple interest from date of death) (paragraphs 23, 25–28).
  • The claimant's pleadings did not allege that the driver had taken on board three gratuitous passengers (paragraph 14).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Minu B. Mehta & Anr. v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1248 Clarified that an insurance policy must insure the person against any liability incurred in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to third-party property arising out of use of the vehicle; when liability is caused the insurer pays as if a judgment debtor. The court relied on this decision to explain the scope of insurer's liability under the Motor Vehicles Act and to state that insurer's liability is co-extensive with insured's liability and that insurer may be required to pay as judgment debtor (paragraphs 4, 6).
Sir Chunni Lal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 Set out tests to determine whether a substantial question of law is involved (five illustrative criteria listed by the Supreme Court). The court applied these criteria to assess whether the question of insurer liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act constituted a substantial question of law permitting an appeal (paragraphs 31–35).
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangawwa and Ors., 1997 (75) FLR 439 Discussed insurer's obligations and was relied on concerning the requirement that the insurer (stepping into the shoes of employer) must deposit compensation before filing an appeal; also held insurer must cover liability under Section 147 (old Section 95) and pay interest where applicable. The court held that, based on this decision (and related Division Bench authority), the appeal was not maintainable because the insurer had not deposited the awarded amount under Section 30 (paragraphs 41, 54, 57).
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kashimasab, ILR 1993 Kar 1991 Authority relied upon for the proposition that insurer steps into the shoes of the employer/owner and must deposit the compensation before filing appeal. The decision was cited (via Gangawwa) to support the conclusion that the insurer should have deposited the awarded amount and failure to do so rendered the appeal not maintainable (paragraph 56 and surrounding discussion).
Northern India Insurance Co., Branch Indore v. Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Indore & Ors., 1973 ACJ 428 Held that an insurance company is a proper party to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act and that provisions of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act (old Act) apply to such proceedings; insurer can raise only the statutory defences and may be made a party after notice. The court relied on this decision to conclude that the insurer is a proper party, may be obliged to satisfy judgment as judgment debtor, and is limited to statutory defences (paragraph 53).
Mst. Kamala Devi v. Navin Kumar & Anr., AIR 1973 Raj 79 Held Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are applicable to claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act where the accident arises out of use of a motor vehicle in a public place and the employee is covered by required limits. The court invoked this precedent to support the applicability of Motor Vehicles Act provisions to Workmen's Compensation claims arising from motor accidents (paragraph 55).
Khirod Nayak v. Commissioner for Workmen Compensation, 1991 Lab IC 2155 (Orissa High Court) Held that Section 4A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act speaking about the employer is not sufficient to exonerate the insurer; insurer has duty to satisfy judgment against the insured under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The court cited this decision to reinforce that insurer cannot be exonerated merely because certain provisions name the employer and that insurer has duty to satisfy judgments (paragraph 57).
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Hasmat Khatoon & Ors., 1989 (58) FLR 879 (Delhi High Court) Held that the liability of the insurance company can be limited either by statute or by the contract of insurance. The court relied on this authority to note that insurer's liability may be contractually or statutorily limited, but, within the statutory/contractual scope, insurer remains liable for compensatory obligations (paragraph 58).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The two judicial opinions are consistent and complementary. The court's reasoning can be summarized in the following steps, drawing strictly from the text:

  1. Nature of insurer's liability: The court analysed the relationship between the Motor Vehicles Act and the insurance contract. It emphasized that while third-party rights under the Motor Vehicles Act are statutory, the insurance contract between insurer and insured is contractual and of indemnity in nature. The insurer's liability is co-extensive with the insured's liability and is to be determined by the terms of the policy and the statutory provisions (paragraph 4).
  2. Statutory backing: The court relied on the non-obstante and indemnity provisions (Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act and its provisos and sub-sections, as cited in the opinion) which make an insurer liable to indemnify within policy-covered liabilities (paragraphs 4, 49–52, 66–69).
  3. Dependency on insured's liability: The court stressed that the insurer cannot be held liable if the insured is exonerated; insurer's liability depends upon liability of the insured and covers liabilities arising out of use of the motor vehicle (paragraph 5).
  4. Scope of liabilities covered: The court distinguished between compensation, interest (compensatory), and penalty under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It held that the insurer's obligation (in this context) covers normal compensation and interest (as compensatory) but does not extend to penalties under the Workmen's Compensation Act (paragraphs 8–9).
  5. Jurisdiction to saddle insurer: Taking a composite reading of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act (including Sections 140, 143, 146, 147, 149 as invoked in the opinion), the court held that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to saddle the insurer with the liability to pay compensation in a workmen's compensation proceeding. The court observed that jurisdictional source may be traced in another enactment where permissible and thus the contention that Commissioner had no jurisdiction was rejected (paragraph 10).
  6. Deposit requirement and appeal maintainability: The court noted that the appellant-insurer had not deposited the awarded amount as contemplated by Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Citing precedent (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangawwa and the Division Bench authority in Kashimasab), the court held that because the insurer "steps into the shoes" of the employer/owner for payment purposes, the insurer must make the deposit before filing the appeal; failure to do so rendered the appeal incompetent / not maintainable (paragraphs 11, 51–57).
  7. Evaluation of factual findings: The court reviewed the Commissioner’s findings that the death occurred in the course of employment and while the vehicle was in use, and found these findings were based on evidence and not shown to be vitiated in law; no substantial question of law was demonstrated that would require overturning those findings (paragraph 12).
  8. Alleged breach of policy: The insurer's contention that the driver carried three gratuitous passengers (and that this amounted to breach of policy) was examined. The court noted the claimants had not pleaded gratuitous passengers and that the insurer's written statement alleging carrying passengers for fare was unsupported by any evidence. Accordingly, the plea of breach of the policy was not established and did not warrant disturbing the award (paragraphs 13–16).
  9. Application of precedents and statutory provisions: The court systematically applied the tests for substantial question of law (Sir Chunni Lal), and relied on other authorities (Northern India Insurance, Mst. Kamala Devi, Khirod Nayak, Oriental Insurance, United India v. Gangawwa) to conclude that an insurer is a proper party, is under prescribed statutory obligations, and is ordinarily liable to satisfy awards for compensation and interest as a judgment debtor, subject to policy and statutory limits (paragraphs 31, 53–61).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED. Both the opinion of V. N. Singh, J. (main judgment) and the concurring words of S. P. Srivastava, J. agree that the insurer's appeal must fail (paragraphs 1, 16, 62).

Direct consequences for the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's award that the insurer pay the compensation and interest stands; the insurer is liable to satisfy the award as judgment debtor for the normal compensation and interest (paragraphs 10, 11, 61, 62).
  • The insurer's contention of policy breach (gratuitous passengers / carrying passengers for fare) was not established by evidence, and the award cannot be disturbed on that ground (paragraphs 14–16).
  • The appeal was held not maintainable because the insurer failed to deposit the awarded amount as contemplated under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (paragraphs 11, 51–57). This procedural defect contributed to dismissal of the appeal.
  • Costs: "Parties shall bear their own costs." (paragraph 63).

Broader precedent implications: The opinion applies and reaffirms existing statutory interpretations and case law concerning the interplay between the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act (including the principle that insurers may be liable as judgment debtors for compensation and interest). The text does not assert that a new legal principle or novel precedent is laid down beyond the application of cited authorities.

    United India Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Smt. Chandra Kali And Another

    JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J.

    1. I have had the opportunity to go through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Hon'ble V. N. Singh, J. and I agree that this appeal is liable to be dismissed. However, I would like to add few words.

    2. The insurer--appellant feels aggrieved by the award given in the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, of an amount of Rs. 1,89,560 as compensation to the wife of the deceased Babu Ram who met his untimely death during the course of his employment as a driver of motor vehicle (truck) bearing registration No. U. P. 15-J-5061 owned by respondent No. 1 which truck was being driven by the deceased. The aforesaid motor vehicle was insured and the certificate of insurance as contemplated under the provisions contained in Chapter No. XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, had been issued by the present appellant.

    3. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had no jurisdiction to saddle the insurer-appellant with any liability to pay the amount of compensation as no such jurisdiction is vested in him under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, specially when the present one was not a case envisaged under Section 14 of the said Act where the employer had become an insolvent.

    4. It may be noticed that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, while the liability of the insurer as against third parties is statutory and the right of the third parties flows from the statute and is not contractual, yet so far as the insurer and the insured are concerned, the insurance is a personal contract of indemnity. The liability of the insurer is co-extensive with the liability incurred by the owner of the vehicle, the insured. If the insurer and the insured have entered into a mutual agreement, the remedy of the insurer, if any, may lie against the insured on the basis of their mutual agreement. The insurer, however, can always issue certificate of insurance policy covering risks which may not be covered by the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act but once the motor vehicle is insured, to cover all risks, thus, being comprehensively insured, the liability of the insurer has to be determined taking into consideration the terms and conditions subject to which the insurance policy has been issued so far as the contractual obligations are concerned. The provisions contained in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act contain a non-obstante clause which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of the person or those classes of persons. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Minu B. Mehta and Anr. v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1248. had clarified that policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. While explaining the words "against any liability which may be incurred by him", the Hon'ble Supreme Court had indicated that what was intended to be covered by the policy of insurance is the risk of a person who has incurred liability for the death or bodily injury or damage to the property of a third parly.

    5. However, it should not be lost sight of that the insurer cannot be held liable where the insured himself stands exonerated of any such liability. In other words, the liability of the insurer depends upon the liability of the insured. The expression "liability" is meant to cover any liability arising out of the use of the motor vehicle.

    6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Minu B. Mehta (supra) had also indicated that when a liability is caused against any person insured by the policy then the insurer is required to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree as if it were a judgment debtor.

    7. Under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the primary liability of paying compensation is fastened on the employer and if the insurer is liable to indemnify the employer for the latter's liability to pay compensation, there exists no cogent reason to exonerate the insurer. Once the insurance company had agreed to indemnify the insured against his legal liability, it is clear that the insurance company steps into the shoes of the employer and has to discharge liability cast on the insured.

    8. The composite reading of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act makes it clear that in all the motor accident cases it is the statutory duty of the insurance company to satisfy the award as the judgment debtor and it will not make any difference whether the award passed is under Workmen's Compensation Act or under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, it cannot be ignored that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, against liabilities arising from the risk covered by the insurance policy, while the liability for penalty arises from violation of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is obvious that the liability in the context of Workmen's Compensation Act, so far as the insurer is concerned, means only normal compensation. It does not include penalty. So far as the interest part is concerned, since it is compensatory in nature and is not a penalty, the liability towards payment of interest. If any, cast on the insured has to be discharged by the insurer. The Workmen's Compensation Act has used expressions "compensation" "interest" and "penalty" conveying different concepts. The amount of compensation or award of interest.

    which is also compensatory in nature, cannot be taken to include within its ambit the penalty.

    9. In the present case, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has cast a liability on the insurer to pay the compensation and interest only.

    10. Taking into consideration the various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specially Sections 140, 143, 146, 147 and 149 and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and specially the over-riding effect of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is apparent that the impugned award of compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, saddling the insurer with the liability to pay the compensation cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. It is not always necessary that the provision vesting the jurisdiction should be there in the same enactment as it is permissible to trace the source of authority in some other enactment. The contention urged in this regard is devoid of merit and is not at all acceptable.

    11. It may further be noticed that the appellant has not taken any step to deposit the required amount as contemplated under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The insurer-appellant, as has already been indicated hereinabove, steps into the shoes of the employer or the owner of the vehicle and in that view of the matter, for maintaining the appeal, it is bound to comply with the requirements envisaged under the aforesaid provisions. The failure in this regard rendered the appeal incompetent and liable to be dismissed.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings recorded by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner holding that the death was caused while the deceased was working in the course of employment and while the offending motor vehicle was in use and was being driven by him. This finding is based on evidence and material brought on the record. The appellant could not demonstrate that the said finding is in any manner vitiated in law and any substantial question of law is involved which may require a decision by this Court.

    13. It has also been urged that there was a breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy as from the evidence of the claimant's witnesses, it had come to light that the driver had allowed three gratuitous passengers to travel in the truck.

    14. The claimants had not come up with any such case in the pleadings indicating that the driver had taken on board three gratuitous passengers. In the written statement, however, the insurer had taken the stand that the driver of the motor vehicle was using the offending motor vehicle for carrying passengers on payment of fare. However, no evidence worth the name was led in support of such a plea. The plea in regard to breach of the terms of the policy as taken in the written statement could not be established by any evidence.

    15. The impugned award is not liable to be disturbed on this ground as claimed.

    16. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.

    V.N. Singh, J.

    17. The present appeal has been filed by the insurance company for setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal and for dismissing the claim of the claimant-respondent against the appellant-insurance company.

    18. The brief facts of the case is that the claim under Workmen's Compensation Act No. 153 of 1993 was filed against Shri Krishna Jain by Smt. Chandra Kali w/o late Babu Ram and United India Insurance Company.

    19. Allegation of Smt. Chandra Kail was that her husband late Sri Babu Ram was driver of respondent No. 1 Sri Krishna Jain since one year before the accident by the Truck No. U. P. 15-J/5061 and he used to get salary of Rs. 3,000 per month.

    20. On 31.5.1999, while her husband late Babu Ram was coming from Hathras by the truck and reached to Hapur road near Hazi park, three unknown persons killed her husband Babu Ram at 2.30 p.m. Babu Ram was admitted in the Lajpat Rai Nursing Home, Meerut, by the conductor who died on 1.6.1999 at 7.30 a.m.

    21. Report was lodged by the conductor Sandeep in the Police Station Kharkhanda district, Meerut. Age of her husband Babu Ram was 40 years at the time of the incident.

    22. It was also alleged that the vehicle was insured and insurance was valid from 5.12.1998 till 4.12.1999. Its cover note is 009274. hence respondent No. 2 is also liable for compensation.

    23. Smt. Chandra Kali claimed Rs. 3 lacs along with 24% annual interest. As the respondent No. 1 was absent, hence the case proceeded ex parte against him.

    24. After hearing parties, learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner held that late Babu Ram, husband of the claimant was an employee of the respondent No. 1 and he died on 1.6.1999 due to injury received on 31.5.1999 during the employment of the respondent No. 1.

    It was also held that the alleged truck which was being driven by the husband of the claimant was insured by the respondent No. 2. It was also held that the age of late Babu Ram, husband of the claimant was 38 years at the time of the accident. It was also held that the pay of late Babu Ram at the incident was Rs. 3,000 per month.

    25. The learned Tribunal held that the claimant is entitled for a sum of Rs. 1,79,560. It was also held that as the truck was insured by the respondent No. 2, hence the respondent No. 2 is liable to pay the compensation to the claimant. The Tribunal directed the insurance company to pay the compensation of Rs. 1,79,560 within 30 days. The respondent No. 2 was also directed to pay 12% simple interest from the date of the death of Babu Ram till the date of payment. It was also held that under Section 4A of the Act, a notice be issued to the respondent No. 1 why 50% of trie compensation amount be not imposed on him as penalty.

    26. Aggrieved by the said order dated 18,5.2002, appeal has been filed by the appellant.

    The points raised by the appellant are as under :

    (1) Whether the driver of the truck, in the course of his employment, was justified in allowing the total stranger to board the truck?

    (2) Whether by not informing the company about the incident at all by the owner of the truck, the owner has committed breach of legal provisions as well as insurance contract?

    (3) Whether the Tribunal is entitled to pass an award against the insurance company?

    27. According to the proviso of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is clear that, appeal shall lie only, if the substantial question of law is involved.

    28. The question raised by the appellant as to whether the driver of the truck was justified in allowing the total stranger to board the truck in the course of his employment, is question of fact and not question of law.

    29. The next question raised by the appellant is whether by not informing the company about the incident, at all by owner of the truck, the owner has committed a breach of legal provisions as well as insurance contract. This is also question of fact and not the question of law.

    30. The next question raised by the appellant is whether the Workmen Compensation Commissioner is entitled to pass an award against the insurance company.

    Now it is to be seen, whether this is the substantial question of law or not?

    31. In the case of Sir Chunni Lal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Com. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that following test should, by a large or not one of them, be satisfied to find whether a substantial question of law is involved :

    (i) Whether directly or indirectly it affects substantial right of the parties, or

    (ii) question is of general public importance, or

    (iii) whether it is an open question in the sense that the issue is not settled by pronouncement of the Supreme Court or Privy Council or Federal Court, or

    (iv) the issue is not free from difficulty, or

    (v) that it calls for a discussion for an alternative views.

    32. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it affects the substantial right of parties, as such substantial question of law is involved.

    33. In this connection, attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant towards Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') Section 3 of the Act lays down as follows :

    "If a personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter :

    Provided that the employer shall not be so liable : ................."

    34. Argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, according to Section 3 of the Act, employer is liable for the compensation if the injury caused to the workman by incident arising out of or in the course of his employment. There is no reference that the insurance company shall be liable.

    35. Considering Section 3 of the Act, it is debatable, whether the insurance company is liable or not in place of the employer even if the insurance company has insured the vehicle. It is a substantial question of law hence, the appeal can be filed under Section 3 of the Act on this point.

    36. The next question for determination is, whether the appeal is maintainable because the appellant has not deposited the awarded amount before filing the appeal.

    37. In this connection, it is admitted by the appellant and an endorsement has been made by the appellant at the foot of the appeal, that since the appeal is not being filed by the employer, the deposit of the awarded amount is not required to be made as stated under Section 30 of the Act.

    38. Attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant towards IIIrd proviso of Section 30 which lays down ; Provided further that no appeal by an employer under Clause-A will lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.

    39. Now the point for determination is whether the insurance company who has filed the appeal is liable to deposit the amount or not?

    40. The learned counsel for the appellant has not cited any law on this point.

    41. In this connection, the decision in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gangawwa and Ors., 1997 (75) FLR 439. is relevant in which, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of United Indian Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kashimasab, ILR 1993 Kar 1991,

    "that as the insurer steps into the shoes of the employer or owner of the vehicle, insurer must deposit the compensation before filing the appeal."

    42. In view of the above mentioned decision, the appeal is not maintainable.

    43. The next point for determination in this case is. whether the Tribunal is entitled to pass an award against the insurance company.

    44. The learned counsel has not cited any ruling on this point also.

    From the perusal of the evidence, it is clear that late Babu Ram was driver, who died during the course of employment.

    45. In this connection, Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is material, which lays down as follows :

    "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both."

    46. In view of Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, claimant may file the claim either under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

    47. Claimant, wife of late Babu Ram has filed the claim under Workmen's Compensation Act.

    48. In this connection, Section 95 of the old Act (Section 147 of the New Act) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is material.

    49. Proviso-1 of Section (1) (b) of Section 147 of new Act is material which lays down that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of his employment and the employment of a person injured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, out of and in the course of his employment other than the liability arising in respect of death of or bodily injury to any such employee.

    50. It means that policy is required in respect of a death or bodily injury to such employee to cover the liability arising out of and in the course of his employment.

    51. Sub-section (5) of Section 147 lays down as follows ;

    "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons."

    52. Proviso of para 2 of Section 96 of the old Act (Section 149 of the new Act) lays down as follows :

    "No sum shall be payable by an insurer under Sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given, the insurer had notice through the Court or. as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal ; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely ;"

    Para 7 of Section 149 of the new Act lays down as follows :

    (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in Sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in Sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in Sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be.

    In this case insurer is a party.

    53. In this connection, a decision of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Northern India Insurance Company, Branch Indore v. Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Indore and Ors., 1973 ACJ 428, is material, in which, it has been held that insurance company is a proper party to the proceedings and the provisions of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act (old Act) are applicable to the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923. The insurance company would take up only such defences as were laid down in section 96 of the old act. It could be made a party in such proceeding after notice. Although appropriate liability is that of the employer, yet insurance company is also liable to discharge the claim as it was a judgment debtor.

    54. In this connection, the decision in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gangwa and Ors. (supra), is also material, in which, it has been held that, it is not disputed that Section 147(1) of the Act of 1988 (Section 95 of 1939 Act) makes obligatory for the insurer to cover the liability under the Workmen Compensation Act in respect of death of or bodily injury of an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. The liability of the insurer under this provision is, no doubt, with regard to the available compensation under the provisions of the Act. It has also been held that as the insurer who virtuaily steps into the shoes of the employer for the purpose of paying the compensation to the workman himself also be liable to pay the interest.

    55. In this connection, decision in Mst. Kamala Devi v. Navin Kumar and Anr., AIR 1973 Raj 79. is also material in which it has been held that,

    Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, are applicable to claim under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, provided the accident arises out of the using of motor vehicles in public place and the employee concerned is covered by the limits laid down under Section 95(2) of the Act.

    56. It has also been held that the insurer has right to take only the statutory defences as provided under Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, unless by the terms of policy, the right to defend the action in the name of assured has been reserved.

    57. In this connection, a Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Khirod Nayak v. Commissioner for Workmen Compensation, 1991 Lab IC 2155, in which it has been held that Section 4A(3) of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, has spoken about the employer, it is, therefore, not enough to exonerate the insurer. Even as per Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the Judgment against the person insured.

    58. In this connection, a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Hasmat Khatoon and Ors. 1989 (58) FLR 879, is material, in which, it has been held by the Delhi High Court that,

    "the liability of the insurance company can be limited either by the statute or by the contract of the insurance."

    59. Considering the scheme and scope of the relevant provisions of two enactments, i.e., Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen Compensation Act, it is evident that it is the normal compensation payable in the case of death or bodily injury to an employee.

    60. In view of the divergent setting of the provisions under the said enactment, the word liability occurring in Section 95 in the context of Workmen Compensation Act is to be understood only as normal compensation ................................

    and the liability of the insurance company is only to pay the compensation.

    61. In view of Sub-section (1) of Section 149, insurer has to pay the compensation as Judgment debtor in respect of the liability together with amount payable in respect of the costs and in respect of interest by virtue of any enactment.

    62. In view of the decisions mentioned above and in view of the observations made earlier, the appeal is dismissed.

    63. Parties shall bear their own costs.

    Compensation Act, 1923.
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    United India Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Smt. Chandra Kali And Another
    (Aug 19, 2002)