Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — P.K. Chatterji, J. (Central Excise Act matter)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions arise from a raid conducted on 4-7-2001 at the premises of Harsingar Gutka Pvt. Ltd., a company manufacturing Harsingar Gutka Pan Masala. The petitioners include the company and associated proprietors: Smt. Anita Singh (Director), Sri Mahesh Singh (Managing Director), Smt. Anju Singh (proprietor of the distributing concern M/s. Anju Agencies), and Km. Rajni (proprietor of M/s. Gopal Grinding). During the raid it was alleged that Pan Masala was being sold without payment of excise duty. Three persons — Mukesh Bajpai, Rajneesh Tewari and Amit Srivastava — were arrested in connection with offences described under Sections 9/9AA and Section 13 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and were produced before the Magistrate in accordance with Section 19 of the Act.

The petitioners sought two principal forms of relief by writ petitions: (1) a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the complaint under Section 9AA/13/19 of the Central Excise Act, 1944; and (2) a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the opposite parties not to arrest the petitioners in connection with the same case. The record shows that, as of the hearing, no First Information Report (F.I.R.) or complaint had been lodged against the petitioners themselves, although the petitioners apprehended arrest.

A preliminary objection was raised by the Advocate General challenging maintainability on the ground that no F.I.R. or complaint had been lodged and petitioners only apprehended arrest; the court nevertheless proceeded to decide the petitions on their merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition for quashing the complaint (relief seeking certiorari under Section 9AA/13/19 of the Central Excise Act) is maintainable at the stage and on the facts presented.
  2. Whether the court should grant a mandamus directing the opposite parties not to arrest the petitioners (i.e., pre-emptive protection against apprehended arrest) when no F.I.R. or complaint has been lodged.
  3. What powers of arrest and investigation are vested in Central Excise officers under the Central Excise Act (specifically Sections 9A/9AA, 13, 19, 20, 21 and related provisions) in relation to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for non-cognizable offences.
  4. Whether Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) and Article 226 (writ jurisdiction) permit pre-violation relief restraining an impending arrest or deprivation of liberty by authorities acting under a special Act such as the Central Excise Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Under Section 9A of the Central Excise Act offences under Section 9 are to be treated as non-cognizable within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure; consequently, the Central Excise officers lack the investigative and arrest powers of a police officer for non-cognizable offences.
  • A combined reading of Sections 13, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act shows that persons cannot be remanded to custody for pending investigation and that Section 21 deals with inquiry rather than investigation.
  • There was, as of the hearing, no F.I.R. or complaint against the petitioners, yet the petitioners apprehended arrest because statements in applications for remand and other averments suggested involvement; this created a credible threat of arrest.
  • Relied on S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh for the proposition that courts may grant pre-violation protection of personal liberty under Article 226/Article 21.

Respondent / State's Arguments

  • The writ petitions amount in substance to applications for anticipatory bail; the petitions are not maintainable in the absence of an F.I.R. or complaint against the petitioners.
  • Relied on the decisions in Dukshiyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria and Enforcement Officer Ted v. Bheer Chand Tikajl Bora to oppose the relief sought and to support the position that the petitions should not be entertained as anticipatory bail applications.
  • The Central Excise Act (including Sections 13 and 21) grants certain powers to Central Excise officers; the respondents argued these powers permit inquiries and procedures under the Act, including requisitions for attendance and treating certain enquiries as judicial proceedings for specified purposes.
  • Characterized some of the departmental activity as an investigation/enquiry and pointed to provisions such as Section 214 and the proviso applying exemptions under Sections 132 and 133 Cr.P.C. to attendances requisitioned under that section.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990 SCC (Cri) 110) Articulated that a threatened violation of the right to life and personal liberty may be restrained before actual violation; courts can provide pre-violation protection under constitutional writ jurisdiction. The court relied on the principles in this decision to consider whether pre-emptive relief under Article 226/Article 21 is available when arrest or deprivation is threatened; the decision supported permitting pre-violation protection in appropriate cases.
Dukshiyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria (1998 SCC (Cri) 261; (1998) 1 SCC 52; AIR 1998 SC 696) Invoked by the State to oppose the petitions (as reflecting the court's approach to anticipatory bail/maintainability of such writs). The Advocate General relied on this authority to argue against entertaining the petitions as applications for anticipatory bail; the court noted the reliance but proceeded to decide the petitions on merits.
Enforcement Officer Ted, Bombay v. Bheer Chand Tikajl Bora (2000 ELT 7 : 1999 AIR SCW 4951) Relied upon by the State in opposing the relief sought (cited along with other authorities to contend petitions were not the proper vehicle for anticipatory relief). The court recorded that the State relied on this authority but nonetheless proceeded to examine statutory provisions and constitutional protections in reaching its conclusion.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (SCC references quoted in the opinion) Principle that inability of courts to issue directions where a fundamental right is threatened would render remedies under the Constitution ineffective; highlights the need for pre-violation remedies. The court referred to this principle (as relied upon in S.M.D. Pasha) to justify consideration of pre-violation relief under Article 226 and Article 21 when a right is threatened.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the record and the statutory provisions relied upon by the parties and proceeded stepwise.

  1. Preliminary factual findings: The court observed that no F.I.R. or complaint had been lodged against the petitioners and the remand application that led to arrests was not directed against the petitioners themselves. Three persons arrested earlier were subsequently bailed out.
  2. Maintainability and character of reliefs: The court distinguished the two reliefs sought. It observed that the prayer to quash the complaint (relief No.1) was not maintainable at that stage. The petitioners' second prayer was not framed as a conventional anticipatory bail application but sought a direction not to arrest; the court considered this protective relief in the light of constitutional guarantees.
  3. Statutory construction — Sections 9A / 9AA: The court noted that Section 9A prescribes substantial penalties including imprisonment and fines and that Section 9AA/Section 9A treated the offence as non-cognizable within the meaning of the Cr.P.C. The court emphasised that the prosecution must prove that an accused "was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business" before proceeding against a person under Section 9A — i.e., that factual proof of being in charge is a pre-condition to proceed.
  4. Statutory construction — Sections 13, 19, 20, 21 and interaction with Cr.P.C.: The court analysed Section 13 (power of arrest by Central Excise officers) and noted Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) provisions quoted in the opinion. The court observed that Section 19 requires forwarding arrested persons to a Central Excise Officer empowered to send persons to a Magistrate or to the nearest police officer if no such Central Excise Officer is available. Section 20 sets out the duties of the officer in charge of the police station when a person is forwarded under Section 19.
  5. Distinction between "inquiry" and "investigation": The court relied on Cr.P.C. provisions (Sections 154 and 155) to observe that Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. contemplates investigation by police officers for cognizable offences and that investigation of non-cognizable offences requires Magistrate's order under Section 155(2). The court held that the inquiry powers of a Central Excise Officer under Section 21 (which permits certain powers analogous to those of an officer in charge of a police station when investigating a cognizable case) cannot be equated with the full investigative powers of police in a non-cognizable case; because the offence under Section 9A/9AA is non-cognizable, Central Excise Officers do not acquire the same investigative powers as police officers for such cases.
  6. Limits on excise authorities' power to file FIRs and take police-like action: The court concluded that Central Excise authorities cannot register an F.I.R. under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. for non-cognizable offences, cannot proceed under Sections 156 and 157 Cr.P.C., and the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on their report as a police report. The appropriate recourse for excise authorities is to file a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. so that the Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(a) Cr.P.C.
  7. Constitutional angle and pre-violation relief: The court referred to Article 21 and the discussion in S.M.D. Kiran Pasha and M.C. Mehta to reiterate that when a fundamental right (personal liberty) is threatened with imminent violation, the court may provide protective relief before actual violation occurs. The court applied that reasoning to consider the petitioners' apprehension of arrest.
  8. Practical conclusion from statutory and constitutional analysis: The court held that authorities under the Central Excise Act must act within the procedural bounds of Cr.P.C. and that they may enquire and determine a prima facie case and then file complaint before a Magistrate; arrests under the Act should be made only when there is a prima facie case and by due process of law. The court noted that the departmental application contained allegations potentially implicating petitioners, but that the Department had bailed out the initially arrested persons and the application for remand did not directly target the petitioners.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The court rendered a split result: it dismissed the petitioners' claim to quash the complaint (relief No.1) but granted limited protective relief regarding arrest (relief No.2). In the court's words the writ petitions are "partly allowed" and:

Core Ruling: The writ petitions are partly allowed. Relief (a) (quashing the complaint) is dismissed. Relief (b) (a direction that the opposite parties not arrest the petitioners) is granted in the sense that the opposite parties are directed to "act in accordance with law" as set out in the judgment. No orders as to costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The petition to quash the complaint (certiorari) was held not maintainable and is dismissed.
  • The opposite parties (respondents) are directed to follow the legal constraints discussed in the opinion (i.e., exercise arrest powers only as prescribed under Section 13 sub-clause (2) of the Excise Act, to respect the limits imposed by the non-cognizable nature of the offence and the Cr.P.C., and to proceed by complaint before a Magistrate where appropriate).
  • The petitions were therefore "partly allowed" and no costs were awarded.

Broader implications:
The opinion emphasises procedural limits on officers acting under a special Act (the Central Excise Act) and reiterates that such authorities cannot override Cr.P.C. provisions regarding arrest and investigation for non-cognizable offences: they must establish prima facie responsibility before proceeding, may file complaints before Magistrates, and must respect constitutional safeguards to personal liberty. The court did not purport to set aside or quash the departmental processes entirely but required that the respondents act within the statutory and constitutional framework described.

Disposition: Petitions partly allowed. No orders as to costs.

    Km. Rajni And Others v. Union Of India And Others

    P.K Chatterji, J.:— As common question of law and fact are involved in these petitions, hence they are being disposed of by a common judgment.

    2. By means of these petitions, the petitioners have prayed to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the complaint under Section 9AA/13/19 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and also prayed to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to arrest the petitioners in connection with the aforesaid case.

    3. The petitioners are running a Private Limited Company known as Harsingar Gutka Pvt. Ltd. and the company manufactures Harsingar Gutka Pan Masala. Petitioner No. 3 Smt. Anita Singh is the Director of the company, while her husband Sri Mahesh Singh is the Managing Director of the Company. Petitioner No. 2 Smt. Anju Singh is the sole proprietor of M/s. Anju Agencies, which is the distributing concern of the company. Petitioner No. 1 Km. Rajni is the proprietor of M/s. Gopal Grinding, which crushes the Supari and other material used in manufacturing Gutka by the company. A raid was conducted on 4-7-2001 at the company premises and it was found that the company was selling Pan Masala with-out paying Excise Duty. Three persons namely Mukesh Bajpai, Rajneesh Tewari and Amit Srivastava were arrested for offences punishable under Sections 9/9AA and under Section 13 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter to be referred as Act) and were produced before the Magistrate and in accordance with Section 19 of the Act.

    4. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Advocate General regarding the maintainability of the writ petition and submitted that till date no F.I.R has been lodged against the petitioners and no complaint has been lodged against them but the petitioners are apprehending their arrest. The learned counsel for the petition ers submitted that this objection could have been raised at the initial stage of the writ petition, therefore, we propose to dispose of these writ petitions on merit.

    5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that according to Section 9A of the Act, offences under Section 9 shall be deemed to be non-cognizable within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. He further submitted that a combined reading of Sections 13, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act shows that a person cannot be remanded to custody for pending investigation. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that Section 21 of the Act says about the inquiry and not about investigation.

    6. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that till date no F.I.R has been lodged against the petitioners nor any complaint has been lodged against them but the petitioners apprehend that they may be arrested in connection with the case in which three persons have already been arrested. In support of his contention, Sri Virendra Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on decision of S.M.D Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1990 SCC (Cri) 110.

    7. Sri S.C Misra, learned Advocate General has vehemently opposed the ground of threat of arrest of the petitioners and submitted that by means of this writ petition, the petitioners are trying to get anticipatory bail. He relied upon the decision rendered in Dukshiyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria reported in 1998 SCC (Cri) 261 : ((1998) 1 SCC 52 : AIR 1998 SC 696) and Enforcement Officer Ted, Bombay v. Bheer Chand Tikajl Bora reported in 2000 ELT 7 : (1999 AIR SCW 4951).

    8. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S.C Misra, learned Advocate General and gone through the record.

    9. It is apparent from the record that neither there is any complaint nor there is any F.I.R instituted by the Excise authorities against the petitioners and further the application by which the remand was sought was not against the petitioners. So far the question of the order is concerned how so ever illegal that may be cannot be adjudicated upon at the present and for this reason the argument by the State Advocate General is maintainable who has relied upon the ruling of Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred above (supra). The prayer in these petitions is not that of anticipatory bail but to issue a direction to the opposite parties not to arrest the petitioners as relief No. 2 so far relief No. 1 is concerned it is not maintainable. It is also apparent from the record that Mukesh, Rajneesh and Amit have been insinuated in the said application that Mukesh Bajpai has given some statement that Pan Masala is despatched from the factory and Bijak is prepared by M/s. Anju Agency, 105, Gora Bagh, Lucknow and the same is also distributed by them and some manipulation is there. Therefore, it is apparent that so far as Mukesh Bajpai is concerned, the department has bailed him out also and all the three persons who were arrested have also been bailed out. A plain reading of the complaint also makes an allegation against Sri Mahesh Singh Patel that he had also knowledge of the said Bijaks along with Kailash Nath Singh Patel.

    10. Sri Virendra Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that he has full apprehension that Mahesh Singh Patel one of the petitioners may also be arrested without any knowledge as it has been done by the respondents in the other cases.

    11. It will be relevant to discuss that offence under Section 9-A of the Act which prescribes, the levy of Rs. 1,00,000/- as fine with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to seven years under Section 9A of the said Central Excise Act, the offence is said to be non-cognizable within the meaning of Code and under Section 9AA. The petitioner who at the time of offence committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as he shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The position of Mahesh Singh as made in the application dated 4-7-2001 for demanding a remand has to be interpreted by the officer in the light of Section 9 AA, before they proceed against Mukesh Singh. Because the allegation in the said application in para 7 against Mukesh Singh is that he is the Manager of Har Shingar Gutka and he is also Managing Director. But from the plain reading of Section 9A, the prosecution has to prove before making the offence that he was in charge and was responsible for the conduct of business of the company and unless that evidence comes, the prosecution cannot proceed with the case against him.

    12. The other point argued by the learned counsel for Union of India and other is with regard to powers to be exercised under Section 13 of the Act. The power of arrest is provided under Section 13 sub-clause (1) which says,

    “Any Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the Central Government in this behalf may arrest any person whom he has reasons to believe to be liable to punishment under this Act.”

    13. Sub-Clause (2) of Section 13 provides—

    “Any person accused or reasonably suspected of committing an offence under this Act or any rules made thereunder, who on demand of any officer duly empowered by the Central Government in this behalf refuses to give his name and residence, or who gives a name or residence which such officer has reasons to believe to be false may be arrested by such officer in order that his name and residence may be ascertained.”.

    14. If this argument is accepted even then it does not authorize the period of such detention under this provision. The learned counsel for the State has also attracted our attention to Section 20 of this Act wherein it is prescribed that,

    “Officer in charge of a police station to whom any person is forwarded under Section 19 shall either admit him to bail to appear before the Magistrate having jurisdiction, or in default of bail forward him in custody to such Magistrate.”

    15. Therefore it is quite clear according to Section 19 of the Act that every person arrested under this Act shall be forwarded without delay to the nearest Central Excise Officer empowered to send person so arrested to Magistrate, or, if there is no such Central Excise Officer within a reasonable distance, to the officer in charge of the nearest police station. Therefore, we observe that the powers and duties of the officer under this Act is not parallel to the power of Station House Officer of the police Station. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the information to the police and their powers to investigate. This does not contemplate the power of investigation to any other officer other than mentioned therein sub-clause (1) of section 154 Cr. P.C deals with the investigation of the cognizable offence which is not attracted in the present case under Excise Act which has been made non-cognizable. Sub-clause (1) of Section 155 Cr. P.C deals with the information regarding non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases and under subclause (2) of the said section wherein it has been provided that the investigation can be made only with the order of the Magistrate having power to try such cases or to commit such cases and under sub-clause (3) it has been provided any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable learned Counsel for the State has tried to draw our attention towards the provision of Section 21 of the Excise Act which says, inquiry how to be made by Central Excise Officer against persons forwarded to them under Section 19 and under subclause (2) of the section it is further provided that, for this purpose the Central Excise Officer may exercise the same powers and shall be subject to the same provisions as the officer in charge of a police station may exercise and is subject to under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. when investigating a cognizable case. Hence the case being not cognizable case the Central Excise Officer have no powers to that of Officer Incharge of a Police Station and under Section 22 of the said Act, sub-clause (b) provides vexatiously and unnecessarily detains, searches or arrest any person shall for every such offence be punishable with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. Hence the duty has been imposed on the Central Excise Officer to be within the law of Cr. P.C as well.

    16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that from the averments made in the application of the Excise Inspector, there is eminent threat of the arrest of the petitioner. At this stage, the mention of Article 21 of the Constitution of India becomes relevant which reads as under:

    “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.

    17. Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India provides appointments of the Judges of the subordinate Courts and their powers therefore, the Judges of the subordinate Courts and not other than them can exercise any power restraining or taking away the liberty of a citizen and the special Act that is the Excise Act and all other similar Acts provides a provision for filing a complaint or F.I.R to the appropriate authority. The power of arrest has been enunciated in the Special Act that is Central Excise Act which has also been subjected to the power of arrest as enunciated above under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    18. In the matter of S.M.D Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra) their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court have observed:—

    “Conferring the right to life and liberty imposes a corresponding duty on the rest of the society, including the State to observe that right, that is to say, not to act or do anything which would amount to infringement of that right, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other words, conferring the right on a citizen involves the compulsion on the rest of the society, including the State, not to infringe that right.”

    19. The question before their Lordships was at what stage the right can be enforced? Does a citizen have to wait till the right is infringed? Can the obligation or compulsion on the part of the State to observe the right be made effective only after the right is violated or in other words can there be enforcement of a right to life and personal liberty before it is actually infringed? When a right is yet to be violated, but is threatened with violation can the citizen move the Court for protection of right? The protection of the right is to be distinguished from its restoration or remedy after violation. When right to personal liberty is guaranteed and the rest of the society, including the State is compelled obligated not to violative that right, and if, someone has threatened to violate it or its violation is imminent and the person whose right is so threatened or its violation so imminent resorts to Article 226 of the Constitution could not the Court protect observance of his right by restraining those who threatened to violate it until the Court examines the legality of the action? Resort to Article 226 after the right to personal liberty is already violated is different from the pre-violation. Post violation resort to Article 226 is for remedy against violative and for restoration of the right, while pre-violation protection is by compelling observance of the obligation or compulsion under law not to infringe the right by all those who are so obligated or compelled.

    20. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that there are averments in the application for taking other accused injudicial custody against the petitioner Mahesh Singh Patel that he had knowledge of manufacturing Gutka and manipulation of data of the computer and bungling without paying the tax and distributing the Gutka from their factory, but strange enough in spite of filing of the complaint before the Magistrate under Section 200, Cr. P.C they initiated an application for getting them in judicial custody of some of the accused named in the application. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that this averment in their application has arisen sufficient doubt in the mind of the petitioners that without going through the process as enumerated in the Section 13 of the Excise Act, they may get the petitioners arrested. The learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention towards Section 214 of the Act which gives power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents in inquiries under this Act and it has been provided in the said proviso that exemption under Sections 132 and 133 Code of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable to requisitions for attendance under this section.

    21. The learned counsel for State has further argued that this is an investigation but we failed to understand the argument because Section 14 itself mentions that it is in the nature of enquiry and moreover as dealt above no other person than the police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure has power to investigate under the Act and no other person under the Excise Act can act as police officer. The further argument of the learned counsel for the State that under proviso every such enquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the word used shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding, cannot be extended beyond the meaning which can be gathered from the context of Section 14 of the Act and therefore, the enquiry conducted by the Central Excise Officer under Section 14 cannot be termed as investigation trial and thus they do not have the powers which in charge officer of police station or person deputed by Cburt for the investigation has. That an officer in charge of the police station can only register an F.I.R otherwise it will be interference in law. The result is that they cannot register on information as F.I.R under Section 154(1), Cr. P.C or they cannot proceed either under Section 154 as officer in charge of the police station for a non-cognizable offence. Consequently they are also not entitled for the powers under 156 and 157, Cr. P.C and therefore the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on their report as a police report. The only course open for them is to file complaint under Section 200 Code of Criminal Procedure so that the Magistrate can take cognizance under Section 190(a) Code of Criminal Procedure.

    22. Their Lordships dealing with the case of S.M.D Pasha v. Government of A.P (supra) relied on M.C Mehta v. Union of India SCC 407-408 para 7, in which it has been held that, if the Court were powerless to issue any direction, order or writ in cases ‘where a fundamental right has already been violated, Article 32 would be robbed of all its efficacy, because then the situation would be that if a fundamental right is threatened to be violated, the Court can injunct such violation but if the violator is quick enough to take action infringing the fundamental right, he would escape from the net of Article 32. On this point paras 19 and 20 of the S.M.D Pasha v. Government of A.P become relevant and the same are reproduced herein below:

    19. “Analytical positive concept of right has been differently analysed. Hohfed writing on fundamental legal concepts as applied in judicial reasoning analyses four ideas. One of those is that a right may be a claim right P has a right to do X, it means to indicate that Q or every one else has a duty to let P to do X. The existence of such a duty gives P some sort of claim against Q. Claim-rights may be either in personam or in rem. A claim-right in personam co-relates to a duty of a person, while claim-rights in rem correlates to duties in principle incumbent on every one. A right enjoyed by one thus co rrelates to a duty on the part of others.”

    20. “In Hans Kelsen's analysis it is usual to oppose the concept of right to the concept of obligation and to cede priority of rank to the former as we speak of rights and duties. The behaviour of one individual that corresponds to the obligated behaviour of the other is usually designated as a content of a right as an object of a claim that corresponds to the obligation. “The behaviour of the one individual that corresponds to the obligated behaviour of the other particularly the claiming of the obligated behaviour, is designated as exercising a right”. In case of an obligation to tolerate something, the behaviour of the one corresponding to the obligation of the other is spoken of as enjoyment of the right. According to Kelsen the right or a claim of an individual is merely the obligation of the other individual or individual. When we speak of a right as a legally protected interest. In the words of Kelsen, it refers to a right as the “reflex of a legal obligation”. Right is often understood as a will power conferred by law. A right in the sense is present if the conditions of the sanction that constitutes a legal obligation includes a motion, normally of the individual in relation to whom the obligation exists, the motion is aimed at the execution of the sanction and has the form of a legal action brought before the law applying organ. Then this organ may apply the general norm to effectuate the right, which is the reflex of the legal obligation by executing the sanction. The right which is the reflex of the legal obligation is equipped with the legal power of the entitled individual to bring about by a legal action the execution of a sanction as a reaction against the nonfulfillment of the obligation whose reflex is his right, or as it is sometimes called, the enforcement of the fulfillment of this obligation. To make use of this legal power of motion is exercise of the right. In this sense each right of an individual contains a claim to the behaviour of another individual — namely to that behaviour to which the second individual is obligated toward the first, the behaviour that constitutes the content of the legal obligation identical with the reflex right. If an individual, towards which another individual is obligated to a certain behaviour, does not have the legal power to bring about by a legal action the execution of a sanction as a reaction against the nonfulfillment of the obligation, then the act by which he demands fulfillment of the obligation has no specific legal effect; the act is legally irrelevant, except for not being legally prohibited. Therefore, a claim as legally effective act exists only when a law exists, which means that an individual has the legal power. The subject of a right may be not only one individual but two or several individuals, including the State.”

    23. From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the authorities working under a Special Act such as Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot over ride the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as regards the arrest or filing of the complaint. For the convenience of the Court, they may enquire into the facts and determine the prima facie case against the accused, may file complaint before the Magistrate and it will be for the Magistrate to issue the process after looking into the gravity of the complaint. Secondly the arrest of a person under this Act has to be made only when there is a prima facie case against him and that too by the due process of law.

    24. Coming to the conclusion from the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the authorities have no power under the Excise Act to arrest anybody except in the cases as prescribed under Section 13 of the said Act, as enumerated in sub-clause (2) of Section 13 of the said Act. On completion of the enquiry they have also power to file a complaint and pray before the Court for action in accordance with law.

    25. Therefore, we held that the petitioners are not entitled for the relief (a) claimed in their petition and the writ petition is dismissed on that count. So far as the relief (b) of the petition is concerned, the opposite parties are directed to act in accordance with law as observed above.

    26. The writ petitions are accordingly partly allowed as held above. No orders as to costs.

    27. Petitions partly allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Km. Rajni And Others v. Union Of India And Others
    (Dec 2, 2002)