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Legal Opinion Summary — Jagdish Bhalla, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These two special appeals arise from an order dated 5 April 2002 made by a learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002. The single Judge directed the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P., Lucknow, to hold the election of the Managing Committee of Oudh Gymkhana Club on 20 May 2002, after due publication. The single Judge further directed that the election be held on the basis of the membership list that was valid on 21 March 1999 (the date of the last election) and that all resolutions of the Managing Committee passed after 21 March 1999 — by which membership of some members was cancelled and new members enrolled — be ignored.

In Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002 the appellants were respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in the writ petition. The appellants in Special Appeal No. 122 (MS) of 2002 were not parties to Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002; they contended that the impugned order curtailed their vested right of franchise because they were duly enrolled members who were not impleaded in the writ petition. Various preliminary objections were raised challenging the maintainability of the special appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a special appeal lies against the impugned order dated 5 April 2002 — i.e., whether the order is a "judgment" within the meaning of the relevant rules (Chapter VIII Rule 5 and Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of pending election proceedings or a direction to hold elections, the High Court should refrain from intervening (drawing on principles in election-related authorities such as Election Commission v. Ashok Kumar).
  3. Whether appellants who were not parties to the writ petition can maintain a special appeal if the impugned order adversely affects their franchise and other vital rights (issues of non-joinder and representative joinder).
  4. Whether alternative remedies (for example under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860) render the special appeal or writ petition non-maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments Advanced on Behalf of the Private Respondents and Oudh Gymkhana Club (Sri K.B. Sinha & Sri Anupam Mehrotra)

  • Preliminary objection to maintainability: contended that the impugned order is not a "judgment" and therefore a special appeal is not maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5.
  • Relied on Section 2(9) CPC definition of "judgment" (a statement of grounds for a decree or order) to assert that the impugned order is interlocutory and not final.
  • Argued that the impugned order is interim in nature and will merge into a final judgment; it does not terminate proceedings or have the trappings of a final order.
  • Submitted that no rights of appellants in Special Appeal No. 123 were curtailed because those appellants were never enrolled as members of the Club.
  • Argued that, since election proceedings had already commenced in pursuance of the impugned order, the Court should avoid stalling or interfering with the election process (relying on election jurisprudence including N.P. Ponnuswami, Mohinder Singh Gill, and Election Commission v. Ashok Kumar).
  • Further submission that appellants had alternative remedies under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and that appellants who were strangers to the writ petition cannot maintain this special appeal because they were not impleaded.

Arguments Advanced on Behalf of the Appellants (Sri S.K. Kalia, Sri Anil Tewari and others)

  • Contended that the impugned order deprives rights of valid members who were enrolled after 21 March 1999 and who claim a right to vote; the order was passed without giving those members an opportunity to put forward their version.
  • Argued that the procedure for holding elections is governed by the Club's bye-laws and that aggrieved members have remedies under the Societies Registration Act — but that the impugned order had the effect of curtailing their rights.
  • Relied upon decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court (including State of U.P. v. Km. Renu Tiwari; Ramayan Rao v. Rama Shankar Prasad; Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania; Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P.) to submit that an interlocutory order which affects vital and valuable rights may be treated as a "judgment" and is therefore appealable.
  • Submitted that the single Judge's order effectively decided and disposed of a vital issue (who are the members entitled to vote) and therefore had the trappings of a final order.
  • Claimed that the writ petition had defects of non-joinder of necessary parties (persons vitally affected), invoking the principle that a High Court should not decide a writ under Article 226 without necessary affected persons before it (relying on Prabodh Verma principles).
  • Pointed out that there were multiple identical and connected petitions and that objections about maintainability arising from the status of certain petitioners (for example, persons whose membership had allegedly been cancelled) were rejected by the single Judge without a speaking order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 Principle that courts should avoid stalling or interrupting election proceedings; caution in intervening in election-related matters. Cited by respondents' counsel to argue against court intervention in the election process; the Court considered but distinguished this line of authority because the elections in this case were being held under a court order rather than statutory election proceedings.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 85 Authority on restraint and caution in judicial intervention in election matters. Relied on by respondents' counsel to support the submission that the Court should not stall the election; the Court noted this principle but found it inapplicable in the specific factual setting of a court-ordered election that affected members' rights.
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216 : AIR 2000 SC 2979 Paragraph 32(5): The Court must be circumspect and act with caution while entertaining election disputes during pendency of election proceedings; avoid being used to stall elections; act only on a clear and strong case supported by particulars and material. Invoked by respondents to resist interference; the Court acknowledged the cautionary principle but distinguished the case because the contested order created the election process by judicial direction and affected the rights of members.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 Definition/approach to when an interlocutory order may be treated as a "judgment" — orders deciding controversies that affect valuable rights may be regarded as judgments within letters patent. Relied upon by appellants and followed by this Court to hold that orders which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights may amount to a "judgment" and thus render an appeal maintainable.
State of U.P. v. Km. Renu Tiwari, (1993) 2 UPLBEC 1325 Authority (following Delhi Full Bench in Begum Aftab Zamani) for the proposition that if an order gives a party what it could obtain only after final adjudication, it may be treated as a "judgment". Invoked by appellants to support the contention that the impugned interim order had the trappings of a final order and therefore was appealable; Court treated this principle as relevant in assessing maintainability.
Ramayan Rao v. Rama Shankar Prasad, (1993) 3 UPLBEC 1995 Held that an order deciding a matter of moment and affecting vital rights amounts to a judgment which makes an appeal maintainable; reliance on Shah Babulal Khimji. Relied upon by appellants; the Court treated it as supporting the proposition that an interim order affecting vital rights can be appealable.
Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167 Principle that a High Court should not decide a writ under Article 226 without the persons who would be vitally affected being before it as respondents (or at least some of them in a representative capacity); non-joinder can render a petition liable to dismissal. Invoked by appellants to contend that necessary parties (those whose franchise was affected) were not before the single Judge; Court accepted the principle as relevant when considering whether the single Judge should have decided the matter without joinder of affected persons.
Begum Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chandra Khanna (Delhi Full Bench) — cited via Renu Tiwari Authority on when an adjudication which confers substantive relief amounts to a "judgment" even if proceedings remain pending. Referred to by this Court (through Renu Tiwari) to support the view that an interlocutory order that gives what could be provided only after final adjudication may be treated as a judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the rival submissions and the authorities invoked. The principal strands of the Court's reasoning, stated in the opinion, are as follows:

  1. The contention that the special appeals were not maintainable because the election process had commenced (and that authorities advising caution in interfering in elections should therefore apply) was considered. The Court observed that the precedents relied upon are based on the bar created by Article 329(b) of the Constitution (which pertains to elections under statutory law). In the instant case, the elections were not held under any statutory electoral process but were being conducted pursuant to the single Judge's order. Because the order itself had initiated the election process and had the effect of taking away rights of duly enrolled members, the protective principle in election cases did not provide the respondents an automatic shield from challenge.
  2. The Court analysed whether the impugned order was a mere interlocutory order or one possessing the "trappings of a final order" (i.e., a "judgment" for the purposes of enabling a special appeal). The Court noted that the impugned order directed the Registrar to hold elections on the basis of the list valid on 21 March 1999 and to ignore subsequent resolutions without specifying those resolutions. By directing elections on that basis and excluding subsequent membership changes, the order effectively decided the critical question of who would be entitled to vote — a decision that affects the substantive rights of members. Accordingly, the Court found that the impugned order had the characteristics of a final order for present purposes.
  3. The Court also considered the position under the Societies Registration Act. It observed that it is the duty of the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits to conduct elections under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and that the Registrar must examine the membership and determine who are duly enrolled members (to "choose grains from the chaff"). The single Judge's restriction would amount to deciding the matter (i.e., deciding who are entitled members) without affording an opportunity to those whose rights would be adversely affected.
  4. Balancing these considerations, and having regard to the authorities about when an interlocutory order may be treated as a judgment (Shah Babulal Khimji and related authorities), the Court concluded that the special appeals were maintainable.
  5. On the appropriate relief, the Court set aside the impugned order insofar as it imposed the restriction of holding the election on the basis of the list valid on 21 March 1999, and directed the Registrar to prepare the final voter list of duly enrolled members expeditiously and to fix a timetable for holding the election at the earliest; the elections were to be held subject to the ultimate decision in the writ petition. The Court additionally directed consolidation/expeditious disposal of identical and connected writ petitions and invited the single Judge to consider allegations of misappropriation of funds and possible remedial measures.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The special appeals are maintainable, and the Court set aside the order dated 5 April 2002 insofar as it restricted the holding of elections to the membership list valid on 21 March 1999.

Directions / Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P., is directed to prepare a final voter list of duly enrolled members expeditiously and to fix a time schedule for holding the election at the earliest.
  • The elections are to be conducted subject to the final decision in the writ petition.
  • All identical and connected writ petitions are to be disposed of together expeditiously by the learned single Judge.
  • The learned single Judge, while hearing the writ petitions, may examine allegations of misappropriation of funds by office-bearers or members of the Club and consider appropriate remedial directions if necessary.

Broader implications:

This opinion focuses on the particular facts and the remedial directions in the case: it decides the immediate dispute between the parties by setting aside the single Judge's restrictive direction and by directing the Registrar to determine the voter list and proceed with elections. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying existing authorities on when interlocutory orders may be treated as judgments; the direct practical effect is restricted to the parties and the management of the Club's election process.

Disposition

Both appeals were disposed of finally in accordance with the directions recorded above.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters and statements contained in the provided opinion text and does not add external facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Sandeep Agarwal And Others v. Adarsh Chadha And Others

    Jagdish Bhalla, J.:— On 17th May, 2002, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we issued certain directions and held that the special appeal is maintainable, reasons of which to be recorded later on.

    2. Now we record the reasons, which are as under:

    “These two appeals arise out of the order dated 5th April, 2002, passed by learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 whereby directions have been issued to the Registrar, Firm. Societies and Chits, U.P, Lucknow, to hold the election of the Managing Committee on 20.5.2002, after due publication. The learned single Judge has further directed the Registrar to hold the election on the basis of the list which was valid on 21.3.1999, when the last election of the Managing Committee was held and to ignore all the resolutions of the Managing Committee which were passed subsequent to 21.3.1999 by which membership of some of the members was cancelled and the new members were enrolled.”

    3. Appellants in Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002 were respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 whereas the appellants of special appeal No. 122 (MS) of 2002 were not party to Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 but have preferred this Appeal on the ground that the impugned order dated 5.4.2002, curtails their vested right of franchise as they are duly enrolled members of the Gymkhana Club and deliberately they were not impleaded as party in Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 so as to suppress the material and correct facts and to mislead the Court. Sri K.B Sinha, senior advocate and Sri Anupam Mehrotra, counsel for the private respondents and Oudh Gymkhana Club respectively have raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of these appeals on the ground that the impugned order is not a judgment and, therefore, special appeal is not entertainable in view of the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5. Chapter VIII Rule 5 reads as under:

    “An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate Jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award of a Tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.)”

    4. According to learned counsel, from the perusal of above provision, it is amply clear that no special appeal lies against the order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless there is adjudication of dispute of rival parties and it must put an end to that dispute.

    5. Sri K.B Sinha, Senior Advocate while questioning the maintainability of the special appeal invited our attention to Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure where word “judgment” has been defined. Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

    “Judgment” means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order.”

    6. Placing reliance on this definition, it has been submitted by him that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be treated to be a judgment as defined in the Code and unless it fulfils the requirement of Section 2(9), it will remain as an interlocutory order and further it does not being about the termination of the proceeding in which the adjudication is made. It has been further contended by him that the impugned order dated 5.4.2002 is only an interim arrangement and not the final judgment and the interim order will ultimately merge into final judgment and thus it cannot be said to be an order having trappings of the final order. Moreover, no rights of the appellants of Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002 have been curtailed by the impugned order as the appellants of Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002 have never been enrolled as members of the Oudh Gymkhana Club.

    7. Raising the next question regarding maintainability of the appeal. Sri K.B Sinha. Sr. Advocate submitted that the election process, in pursuance of the impugned order dated 5.4.2002 of the learned single Judge, has already started and, therefore, also this special appeal is not maintainable. While giving reference of N.P Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer. Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. New Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 85, the learned counsel relying upon paragraph 32(5) of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216 : AIR 2000 SC 2979 submitted that the Court must avoid stalling of the election proceedings and shall not act except on a clear and strong case for its intervening having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and by necessary material. Paragraph 32(5) of Election Commission of India's case (supra) reads as under:

    “The Court must be very circumspect and act with caution while entertaining any election dispute though not hit by the bar of Article 329(b) but brought to it during the pendency of election proceedings. The Court must guard against any attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the election proceedings. Care has to be taken to see that there is no attempt to utilize the Court's indulgence by filing a petition outwardly innocuous but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. Needless to say that in the very nature of the things the Court would act with reluctance and shall not act except on a clear and strong case for its intervention having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and precision and supporting the same by necessary material.”

    8. Mr. Anupam Mehrotra counsel for Oudh Gymkhana Club while adopting the arguments made by Sri K.B Sinha, Senior Advocate with regard to maintainability of the special appeal added that the special appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to the appellants under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Moreover, the appellants were not even parties to the writ petition nor the appellants have made any application for impleadment in the writ petition and as such this special appeal by a stranger is not maintainable.

    9. Replying to the question regarding maintainability of the Special Appeal No. 122 (MS) of 2002, Sri S.K Kalia, senior advocate submitted that the impugned order deprives the rights of the valid Members of the Oudh Gymkhana Club duly enrolled after 21st March, 1999 and submitted that the procedure for holding election is provided under bye-laws and, if any member is aggrieved, he has a right to approach the authority concerned under the provisions of Societies Registration Act. Moreover, the impugned order has been passed without they being asked to put their version before the Court.

    10. Sri S.K Kalia relying upon the decision of this Court in State of U.P v. Km. Renu Tiwari, (1993) 2 UPLBEC 1325 and Ramayan Rao v. Rama Shankar Prasad, (1993) 3 UPLBEC 1995, contended that the order under appeal amounts to disposal of a vital issue and in fact is affecting vital and valuable right of the appellants. It is further submitted that the learned single Judge while disposing application for interim relief has granted reliefs, which are final in nature and beyond the scope of the learned single Judge and is not permissible. Interim reliefs granted by the learned single Judge have the trappings of final order and have curtailed the rights of members who were enrolled after 21.5.1999 In Kumari Renu Tiwari's case (supra), this Court following the Full Bench decision of Delhi High Court in Begum Aftab Zamani v. Shri Lal Chandra Khanna observed as under:

    “……..it would appear that in order to be a “judgment”, an adjudication need not finally put an end to the proceedings in which it has been made. The said proceeding may remain pending but if the order gives to the party what it could get only after final adjudication on the disputed questions, it would amount to “Judgment.”

    11. In Ramayan Rao's case (supra), this Court relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, observed as under:

    “…….The order under appeal also decides a matter of moment and affects vital and valuable right of the Vice-President to officiate as President of the Nagar Palika. Accordingly by application of this judgment also, the present appeal is maintainable.”

    12. Elaborating further, Sri Kalia submitted that the interim order is to be tested vis-a-vis with the right of others and in the event, it is found that right of other is affected inspite of the fact he was not party to the writ petition, the special appeal in that situation is maintainable in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167.

    13. In this case, their Lordships while pointing out the defect in the writ petition filed by the Sangh of non-joinder of necessary parties-not even in a representative capacity considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents, held as under:

    “A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if the petitioners refused to so join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary parties.”

    14. Sri Anil Tewari, learned counsel appearing in Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002 adopted the arguments advanced by Sri S.K Kalia with regard to maintainability of the special appeal and relying upon the definition of ‘judgment’ given by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, submitted that the impugned order dated 5.4.2001, has the effects of trapping the final order and, therefore, it is appealable. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Shah Babulats case (supra) as under:

    “Thus, the only point which emerges from this decision is that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties. It must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.”

    15. Their Lordships further observed in paragraph 116 of the report as under:

    “Thus, in other words, every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be Judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment, (e.s)

    16. After considering the materials on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the contention of Sri K.B Sinha that the Court has no power to interfere as the election process has started we are of the opinion that it does not give any protection to the respondent as the law relied upon by him is based upon the bar created by Article 329(b) of the Constitution. In the instant case, the election process has not started under any law but by the order under appeal which has taken away the rights of the duly enrolled members and have deposited membership fee and are utilizing facilities of the Club since long.

    17. Taking into accounts the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has the trappings of the final order because the Registrar, Firm, Societies and Chits, U.P, Lucknow, has been directed to hold election on the basis of the list valid on 21.3.1999 when the last election of the Managing Committee was held and also directed to ignore all the resolutions passed subsequent to 21st March, 1999, without being specific about the same.

    18. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in saying that special appeals are maintainable.

    19. No doubt, learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the election of the Committee of Management shall be held at the earliest and the only dispute between the parties is that the appellants want that the election be held on the basis of present membership whereas the respondents are keen that the election be held on the basis of list which was in existence at the time of last election.

    20. Sri S.K Kalia, while reiterating his arguments in this behalf, further submitted that the impugned order has curtailed the rights of franchise of the appellants without they being at any fault and being members, they are using the club facilities and are participating in the activities of the Club. Further, no reason has been assigned for debarring them from their right of franchise. Even if, there is any dispute between the President and the Secretary or between the office bearers of the Committee of Management, then also right to cast vote cannot be taken away. He added that the appellants are interested in election but at the same time, they do not want to give up their right of franchise being duly enrolled members of the Club.

    21. Sri Anil Tewari appearing for the appellants of Special Appeal No. 123 (MS) of 2002, while reiterating the above arguments submitted that there are number of other identical and connected writ petitions along with Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 and by the order under appeal, preliminary objection raised regarding maintainability of the Writ Petition No. 1009 (MS) of 2002 being prosecuted by a person, whose membership has already been cancelled and at present is not even a member of the Club, has been rejected without any reason. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned single Judge had indicated in the order under appeal that after going through the record, it appears that there is a dispute between the President and the Secretary and they are having strange relations after the election of 1999 and had rejected the contention raised about the maintainability of the writ petition without deciding the objection by a speaking order. Objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is independent to the dispute between the President and the Secretary and in any circumstance, this cannot be the reason for rejecting the objection.

    22. Sri K.B Sinha, Senior Advocate and Sri Anupam Mehrotra appearing for the private respondents and the Club respectively have drawn our attention to the various happenings of the club Including certain expulsions, litigations between the President and Secretary and not holding of election after March, 1999 and further submitted that the President is having a different Bank Account and huge amount of money has been misappropriated. On the contrary, the appellant Adarsh Chadha, who was elected in the year 1999 and was allegedly expelled by the President and others, has levelled similar charges.

    23. At least one thing is clear, if the version of the parties is taken to be true that money has been misappropriated, it is a matter of great concern and cannot be ignored.

    24. Having examined the materials on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by the Courts, we are of the opinion, that it is the duty of Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P Vikas Bhawan, Lucknow, to conduct the elections under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, smoothly of the Managing Committee of the Club and it is his job to choose grains from the chaff and then come to the conclusion as to who are duly enrolled members. The restriction imposed by the learned single Judge will amount to deciding the matter without affording opportunity to those whose rights are going to be adversely affected.

    25. We, therefore, set aside the order dated 5.4.2002, so far as it imposes restriction of holding election on the basis of the list which was valid on 21.3.1999, with a direction to the Registrar, Firm, Societies and Chits to prepare the final voter list of the duly enrolled members expeditiously and fix a time schedule for holding of election at the earliest. The said elections would be subject to the decision of the writ petition.

    26. We further provide that all the identical and connected writ petitions be disposed of together expeditiously by the learned single Judge.

    27. Before parting, we would like to observe that while hearing the writ petitions, the learned single Judge may also look into the allegation whether any money has been misappropriated by the office bearers or members of the Club and, if it is so what remedial measures or directions can be issued in this regard. With the above observations and directions, both the appeals are disposed of finally.

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    Sandeep Agarwal And Others v. Adarsh Chadha And Others
    (May 24, 2002)