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  • section 379 I.P.C
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Judgment Summary — M. Katju, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition (certiorari and mandamus) challenges the allotment/selection process for a petroleum retail outlet situated at Waheed Nagar, district Sant Ravidas Nagar. The petitioner seeks quashing of the entire selection process and a mandamus preventing respondents from interfering with the petitioner's running of the retail outlet and from issuing any letter of intent in favour of respondent No. 4 or other empanelled candidates.

Key factual assertions by the petitioner: officials of Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) allegedly induced the petitioner's father-in-law, Prakash Nath Misra, and his brothers to execute a lease deed dated 25.8.2000 of 1,401.50 sq. meters to the Corporation on the promise that the retail outlet at that site would be leased to the petitioner. The petitioner claims to have invested his savings, obtained permissions and a one-year work order (dated 29.12.2000), and applied to a Dealer Selection Board process advertised on 25.8.2000. The petitioner appeared before the Dealer Selection Board (interview letter dated 11.7.2001; interview on 31.7.2001) but was not selected; the petitioner alleges political influence and irregularities in the selection.

Respondents' position in summary: Indian Oil Corporation filed a counter-affidavit stating that a Field Investigation Report favoured respondent No. 4 and a letter of intent was issued on 9.8.2001; that the land does not belong to the petitioner; that the lease deed was valid and not procured by inducement; and that the petitioner had only a temporary (one-year COCO) contract. Respondent No. 4 denied improper influence, asserted that the petitioner's temporary contract created no proprietary right, and referred to alleged prior criminal charge details concerning the petitioner/family supplied by police.

The writ was heard by this Court, which considered the factual disputes, the nature of the petitioner's contractual relationship with IOC, the Dealer Selection Board's role, and relevant precedents. The petition was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the selection/allotment of the retail outlet by the Dealer Selection Board can be quashed on the grounds alleged by the petitioner (inducement, promise, political influence and irregularity).
  2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to preferential allotment or a mandamus to prevent issuance of a letter of intent to respondent No. 4, based on the lease deed executed by the petitioner's father-in-law and the one-year COCO work contract.
  3. Whether the High Court should interfere with the decision of a Dealer Selection Board where the petitioner participated in the selection process and did not challenge the selection at the time.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner alleges that IOC officials induced his father-in-law and brothers to lease land to IOC on the promise that the retail outlet established there would be leased to the petitioner.
  • The petitioner claims to have invested life savings, obtained necessary permissions, and been running the retail outlet under a work order dated 29.12.2000 (one-year contract).
  • The petitioner applied pursuant to an advertisement (25.8.2000) which, he says, provided preference to those who transfer/lease land or who were already running the outlet; he contends he met the conditions for preference but was not selected.
  • The petitioner alleges irregularities in the Dealer Selection Board process, lack of rational criteria for marking, and political influence favouring respondent No. 4 and other empanelled candidates.
  • He seeks quashing of the selection and directions preventing respondents from issuing any letter of intent to respondent No. 4 or disturbing his possession/operation.

Indian Oil Corporation (Respondent) — Counter-Affidavit

  • IOC states the Field Investigation Report favoured respondent No. 4 and that a letter of intent was issued on 9.8.2001.
  • IOC contends the land in question does not belong to the petitioner, and therefore he cannot claim preferential rights.
  • The lease deed execution is admitted as a normal 30-year transaction; allegations of inducement/promise by IOC officials are denied as wrong and irrelevant.
  • IOC says the petitioner had only a temporary one-year COCO job contract and that temporary grant does not create a right to regular allotment; selections were held per Government of India guidelines and the Dealer Selection Board prepared the panel correctly.
  • IOC alleges the petitioner stopped lifting petroleum supplies since July 2001 and issued a show-cause notice dated 1.8.2001.

Respondent No. 4 (Anil Kumar Upadhayay)

  • Respondent No. 4 argues that the petitioner's temporary permission to run a petrol pump could not confer any right to the regular allotment.
  • He points out the relevant agreement (Annexure 1) was for one year from 29.12.2000, terminable on one month's notice and subject to termination for breach.
  • Respondent No. 4 denies kinship or improper connection with the State Home Minister and calls the petitioner's allegations reckless.
  • He further notes that the petitioner has no lien or possession over the land/outlet and refers to alleged criminal charges against the petitioner/family (section 379 IPC mentioned in the counter-affidavit) as part of the factual matrix provided by the police station.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandra Prakash Tewari v. Shakuntla Shukla, 2002 6 SCC 127 Cited as authority for estoppel against challenging a selection after participation (the petitioner is estopped from challenging the selection having participated). The Court held that, in view of this decision, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the selection process after having participated and not raised objections at the relevant time.
G. Sarana v. Lucknow University, 1976 2 ALR 621 SC Cited among authorities supporting limited judicial interference with selection/administrative decisions. Relied on as part of a group of Supreme Court decisions indicating the Court should not sit in appeal over the Dealer Selection Board's decision.
Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 2248 Cited as authority limiting writ jurisdiction in matters involving assessments/selection where applicants have participated. Used to support refusal to interfere with the selection process conducted by the Dealer Selection Board.
Madan Lal v. State of J. & K, AIR 1995 SC 1088 (and AIR 1996 SC 1088 references in the text) Cited for the proposition that courts should not act as appellate forums over administrative selection decisions. Applied to reinforce the conclusion that this Court cannot rehear or substitute its view for that of the Dealer Selection Board.
Chancellor v. Bijayannanda Kar, AIR 1994 SC 579 Cited for the principle restraining judicial reappraisal of selection/appointment board decisions. Invoked as part of the jurisprudence preventing the Court from sitting in appeal over the Dealer Selection Board's decision.
Style v. Union Territory Chandigarh, 1999 7 SCC 89 Cited as authority on limited interference with administrative selection processes. Relied upon to support non-intervention in the Dealer Selection Board's selection.
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chakravarty, AIR 1999 SC 625 Cited in the context of judicial restraint and the limited scope of writ jurisdiction in selection matters. Used to support the Court's decision not to interfere with the Dealer Selection Board's choice.
Chairman J.K. State Board of Education v. Fiyoz Ahmad Malik, 2000 3 SCC 59 Cited for the same general principle of limited judicial interference in selection/administrative determinations. Relied on to justify dismissal of the petition and refusal to review the Board's decision.
Union of India v. Lt. General Rajayada Singh, 2000 6 SCC 698 Cited to support the proposition that courts should not substitute their own view for administrative selection decisions. Applied as part of the authorities preventing the Court from acting as an appellate authority over the Dealer Selection Board.
Prima Channel v. Union of India, 2000 10 SCC 606 Cited as one of the decisions delineating limits of judicial review in administrative selection matters. Relied on to reinforce the Court's refusal to disturb the selection by the Dealer Selection Board.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following lines (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Existence of Highly Disputed Questions of Fact: The Court observed that highly disputed factual questions (e.g., inducement by IOC officials, alleged political influence, ownership/possession claims) were present and such issues could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction without a fuller factual adjudication.
  2. Petitioner's Lack of Proprietary Right in Land: The Court accepted the respondents' position that the land in question belongs to the petitioner's father-in-law and brothers, not the petitioner; therefore the petitioner was not entitled to any automatic preference based on land ownership.
  3. Nature of Petitioner's Grant (COCO One-Year Contract): The Court emphasized that the petitioner had only a temporary COCO job contract for one year, which the Court considered distinct from a regular allotment; a temporary grant of this nature does not confer a right to a regular allotment.
  4. Participation and Failure to Challenge Immediately: The Court noted that the petitioner participated before the Dealer Selection Board and did not challenge the selection at the time; the petitioner's belated challenge after non-selection is barred by principle and authority (specifically citing Chandra Prakash Tewari for estoppel).
  5. Reliance on Supreme Court Authorities: The Court placed reliance on multiple Supreme Court decisions that, collectively, support the doctrine that courts should exercise restraint and should not sit as appellate bodies over selections made by constituted selection boards. The Court held that it could not overturn the Dealer Selection Board's decision absent grounds that would justify judicial interference.
  6. Disputed Allegations of Political Influence: Allegations of political influence and kinship between respondent No. 4 and the State Home Minister were described as disputed questions of fact denied by respondents and not appropriate for resolution on writ petitions.
  7. Other Relevant Facts: The Court noted IOC's claim of a favourable Field Investigation Report and issuance of a letter of intent in favour of respondent No. 4; it also noted the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner for cessation of lifting petroleum supplies.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. Petition Dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Court declined to quash the Dealer Selection Board's selection and did not grant the petitioner a mandamus preventing issuance of a letter of intent to respondent No. 4.
  • The petitioner retains no right by virtue of the temporary one-year COCO contract to claim regular allotment; the selection by the Dealer Selection Board stands subject to the respondents' administrative actions (including the letter of intent already issued).
  • The Court applied established Supreme Court precedents to refuse to substitute judicial judgment for the Dealer Selection Board's decision and to hold that the petitioner is estopped from belatedly challenging the selection after participating.
  • No new legal precedent was created by this judgment; the Court relied on existing Supreme Court authorities to dismiss the petition and to state the limits of writ review in such selection matters.
Order: Petition dismissed.

    Pramod Kumar Misra v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Others

    M. Katju, J.:— This writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari calling for the entire record in respect of allotment of retail outlet situated at Waheed Nagar, district Sant Ravidas Nagar and for quashing the entire selection process.

    2. The petitioner has also prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere in the running of the retail out let situated at Waheed Nagar, district Sant Ravidas Nagar by the petitioner. The petitioner further prayed that the respondents be directed not to issue any letter of intent in favour of respondent No. 4 or any of the other empanelled candidates.

    3. It is alleged by the petitioner that the Govt. of India had taken a policy decision by which it allowed parallel marketing in petroleum and its products and the market was opened up for Private enterepreneurs, and thus the monopoly which was being exercised by the four oil companies namely, Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, I.B.P and Hindustan Petroleum was ended. After opening up of the petroleum market in the country there was stiff competition with the aforesaid four government owned oil companies. It is alleged in para 4 of the writ petition that with a view to steal a march over the private entrepreneurs, the aforesaid four government owned oil Companies embarked upon a dubious but novel method of capturing the best commercial sites for installation of the retail outlets. In its exercise the officials of the Indian Oil Corporation were scouting for an appropriate land for setting up a retail out-let at the main crossing at Waheed Nagar in district Sant Ravidas Nagar on the main G.T Road running between Allahabad to Varanasi. The most suitable commercial sites at the aforesaid crossing belonged to the father in law of the petitioner with his brothers. The officials of the Corporation approached the father in law of the petitioner namely Prakash Nath Misra and tried to lure him into selling a portion of his land situated at Waheed Nagar crossing to the corporation and in the alternative to lease it out for a period of 30 years. The father in law of the petitioner refused to do so since the price offered was miserably law and also the monthly lease rent was only about Rs. 8,000/-. The petitioner, a gullible villager could barely make his two ends meet and had to support a large family including three daughters. The petitioner cannot read or understand the English language. It is alleged that the officials of the Corporation promised to lease out the retail outlet in exchange for the aforesaid land and induced the petitioner to some how talk to his father in law into leasing out an area of 1401.50 square meters of the land to the Corporation. The father in law of the petitioner knew the plight of the petitioner very well and thus to enable the petitioner to make a decent living agreed to lease out the aforesaid portion of the land to the Corporation even though the terms were highly unfair and arbitrary. A lease deed was executed on 25.8.2000 by Prakash Nath and his three brothers in favour of the Corporation on the promise and inducement that the retail outlet to be set up at the site would be leased out to the petitioner. The lease deed was drawn in the English language and executed on the aforesaid date i.e 25.8.2000 and a copy of the same was promised to be supplied to the petitioner but in vain. The petitioner invested his life's savings in development of the leased plot and worked extremely hard for obtaining necessary permission of the concerned authorities, and the retail outlet came up on the aforesaid site. The officials of the Corporation granted a work order on 29.12.2000 to the petitioner for a period of one year only. A true copy of work order dated 29.12.2000 is Annexure I. The petitioner was made to sign several documents which were in English. However, the copies of the same were never supplied to him. In para 19 of the petition it is alleged that to run the aforesaid outlet, the petitioner obtained loan from different sources including from State Bank of India Gyanpur branch in nature of cash credit facility to the tune of Rs. 8,00,000/- in order to effectively run the aforesaid retail outlet. A certificate to the aforesaid effect is Annexure 2. In the month of September 2000 the petitioner came to know that an advertisement had been issued in the daily newspaper Dainik Jagran published on 25.8.2000, whereby applications were invited for allotment of several out lets situated at different sites which were being run by or on behalf of the Corporation. The petitioner met the then Senior Divisional Manager of the Corporation at Allahabad and protested, but he informed the petitioner that this was a formality and pointed to him that the advertisement had clearly stated that preference would be given to those persons who are either willing to transfer the land or lease it out. It is alleged in para 21 that the then Senior Divisional Manager also informed the petitioner that since the petitioner has already allowed the Corporation to obtain the land on lease, he would be given preference, and further preference would be given to the petitioner since he is already running a retail outlet and no complaints were found. A true copy of advertisement 25.8.2000 is Annexure 3.

    4. The petitioner after obtaining the application form applied for the outlet on 3.10.2000 In para 28 of the petition it is alleged that in mid July, the petitioner received an interview letter dated 11.7.2001 asking him to appear before the Dealer Selection Board at Allahabad on 31.7.2001 A true copy of interview letter dated 11.7.2001 is Annexure 5. The petitioner appeared before the Board and was interviewed. He informed members of the Board that he leased out the land for the retail outlet and is operating the same to the satisfaction of the officials of the Corporation and asked the members that he should be given preference in view of the conditions laid down in the advertisement. It is alleged that the petitioner had no other choice but to appear before the Board inspite of the open secret that very senior political leaders were trying their best to have their nominees selected for the retail outlet. This fact is also evident from a news item dated 30.7.2001 A true copy of the news item is Annexure 6. In para 31 of the petition it is alleged that the worst fears of the petitioner proved to be true when on 31.7.2001 the result of the selection was displayed on the notice board of the Dealer Selection Board at Allahabad and Anil Kumar Upadhayay respondent No. 4 was shown at serial No. 1 while Manoj Kumar Pandey and Smt. Dipti Misra were shown at serial Nos. 2 and 3. It is alleged in para 32 that Anil Kumar Upadhayay is the first cousin of the State Home Minster and both belong to the same village. Manoj Kumar Pandey is allegedly the son of Gorakh Nath Pandey, sitting MLA of the ruling party from Gyanpur Assembly constituency. Smt. Dipti Misra is alleged to be directly related to the Assembly Speaker. In para 35 of the writ petition it is alleged that the State Home Minister Sri Rang Nath Misra in a convoy of seven vehicles had gone to the petitioner's retail outlet at Waheed Nagar and advised the petitioner to stop the working of the retail outlet since it has now been allotted to his relevent and he also directed the Station House Officer of Police Station Gopiganj to ensure the same. The retail out let lies closed and a could be of policemen have been stationed at the outlet to ensure that it does not start operation. In para 36 of the petition it is alleged that the petitioner was eligible in all respects and if the preference had been given to the petitioner as advertised in the newspaper, there was no occasion for his non-selection. In para 37 of the petition it is alleged that no rational and fair method has been followed by the Dealer Selection Board Allahabad and no criteria had been evolved by it as to how marks would be allotted to compare the comparative merit of the candidates. In paras 40 and 41 of the petition reference has been made to some writ petitions in which also there were grievances of irregularities. Aggrieved this writ petition has been filed.

    5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Indian Oil Corporation. In para 6 of the same it is stated that in respect of the dealership in question the Field Investigation Report has already been successfully completed in favour of the respondent No. 4 and thereafter a letter of intent has also been issued on 9.8.2001 by the Corporation. A true copy of the letter of intent is Annexure CA2. In para 10 it is stated that the land in question does not belong to the petitioner and hence he cannot have any preferential claim for the grant of the outlet in question. In para 11 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that there was a mutually agreed contract containing mutual terms and conditions between the parties concerned for the sale and purchase of the land in question belonging to the father in law of the petitioner and others, and the lease deed in question was a normal and valid deed like other similar lease deeds of 30 years. The execution of the lease deed is admitted but the allegations regarding inducement or the promise made by the officials of the Corporation are said to be wrong and are denied. The plot in question did not belong to the petitioner. Moreover the allegations are wholly irrelevant. The other allegations against the officials of the Corporation have also been denied and it is denied that any promise was given by the official. In fact selection has been done by the Dealer Selection Board which is created by the Government of India, and the officials of the Corporation cannot grant any retail outlet. In para 13 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that a temporary contract was given to the petitioner for a period of one year. It is denied that the then Senior Divisional Manager promised the petitioner for any alleged extension or any alleged further lease/allotment order and no Senior Divisional Manager can give this kind of assurance to any person. The job contract is a part of the record, and the petitioner is bound by the terms and conditions of the same. The petitioner has duly/signed the relevant papers and documents and he is deemed to know the contents thereof. The relevant paper and copies were duly given to the petitioner.

    6. In para 17 it is stated that the petitioner was only having a job contract for one year on COCO basis and the increase in the sale of petroleum products depends upon a variety of factors. The COCO basis has been explained in para 9 of the counter-affidavit. In para 22 it is stated that wrong allegations are being made without any factual basis. The selections are held in accordance with the detailed guidelines given by the Government of India. It is, however, admitted that the petitioner had appeared before the Dealer Selection Board. The alleged press report is highly irrelevant. The Dealer Selection Board had rightly prepared the panel. In para 25 it is stated that the petitioner himself has stopped lifting the supply of petroleum products since July, 2001 and a show cause notice was issued to him dated 1.8.2001 A true copy of show cause notice is Annexure-CA3.

    7. A counter-affidavit has also been filed by the respondent No. 4 Anil Kumar Upadhayay. In para 5 it is stated that merely because the petitioner has been permitted to run the petrol pump, that too temporarily, no right can be said to flow in his favour. It is absolutely clear from condition number A of Annexure 1 to the writ petition that the aforesaid agreement is only for one year with effect from 29.12.2000 It was terminable on one month's notice and in case of breach of contract it would be automatically terminated. In para 11 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the petitioner was challened in a case under section 379 I.P.C in Police Station Dumri Gridih in Crime Case No. 54 of 1995. His brother Ashok Kumar too was involved in the aforesaid crime. The fact that the family members of the petitioner are hardened criminals is said to be fortified from the particulars supplied by the Police Station Gopiganj. In para 15 the respondent No. 4 denied that he has any connection with Sri Rang Nath Misra State Home Minister. It is denied that the respondent No. 4 is first cousin of Rang Nath Misra and these are reckless allegations. It is stated in para 17 that since the petitioner is not possessed of any lien over the land in question and he is not in possession of the leased outlet, therefore, there is no question of granting preference to the petitioner.

    8. A large number of other affidavits have also been filed and we have perused the same. In our opinion highly disputed questions of fact are involved in these case which cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction. Moreover we are in agreement with the respondent that the petitioner is not entitled to any preference, as he did not own any land. The land in question belongs to the father in law of the petitioner and not the petitioner. Moreover the petitioner was only given a job contract on COCO basis only for one year. In our opinion this temporary grant cannot confer any right on the petitioner. The petitioner appeared before the Dealer Selection Board but was not selected. Hence he cannot complain now. The petitioner never challenged the selection process by the Board at the time of selection and it only after his non-selection that he has chosen to challenge it. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash Tewari v. Shakuntla Shukla . 2002 6 SCC 127., the petitioner is estopped from doing so.

    9. The allotment given to the petitioner was on COCO basis for one year and is entirely distinct from regular allotment. Regular allotment has to be done through the agency of the Dealer Selection Board. The petitioner appeared in the interview but was not selected. Hence there is no merit in the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner.

    10. The petitioner alleged that the respondent No. 4 is related to Sri Rang Nath Misra, the State Home Minister. Sri Rang Nath Misra has not been arrayed as a respondent and the respondent No. 4 has denied any connection with him. Hence these are disputed question of fact which cannot possibly in decided in writ jurisdiction. The allegations in paras 26 and 27 of the writ petition that the Dealer Selection Board at Allahabad has been superseded/disbanded by the Central Government, had been denied by the respondents. It is alleged that the Central Government had merely stayed the interview of the Dealer Selection Board-1. The impugned selection was made by Dealer Selection Board—II. The petitioner had participated in the selection process and he cannot subsequently turn around and call it bad, in view of several decisions of the Supreme Court e.g, G. Sarana v. Lucknow University . 1976 2 ALR 621 SC., Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab . AIR 1991 SC 2248. and Madan Lal v. State of J.&K. . AIR 1995 SC 1088.

    11. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision by the Dealer Selection Board vide Madan Lal v. State of J.&K. . AIR 1996 SC 1088.; Chancellor v. Bijayannanda Kar . AIR 1994 SC 579,., Style v. Union Territory Chandigarh . 1999 7 SCC 89., Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K Chakri . AIR 1999 SC 625., Chairman J.K State Board of Education v. Fiyoz Ahmad Malik . 2000 3 SCC 59., Union of India v. Lt. General Rajayada Singh . 2000 6 SCC 698. and Prima Channeal v. Union of India . 2000 10 SCC 606..

    12. For the reasons given this petition has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.

    Petition Dismissed.

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    Pramod Kumar Misra v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Others
    (Sep 5, 2002)