Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Second Appeal No. 202 (M/S) of 2002

Judges

Jagdish Bhalla
P.K Chatterji, JJ.

Acts

Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1978, Section 4 (w.r.e.f 27.2.1978).(2)
provisions of the Societies Registration Act and Rules
Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act.
Section 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act,
VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules
U.P Industrial Disputes Act

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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Judgment by Jagdish Bhalla & P.K. Chatterji, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

By an interim order dated 9.7.2002, the learned single Judge recorded certain findings and directed the Registrar to hold a fresh election of the Committee of Management within two months in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and the rules framed thereunder.

The appellants challenged that order by filing a special appeal. The appellants contended that the Registrar had no power under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and that the Registrar's order (dated 5.7.2002) was void ab initio because respondent No. 3 — who was a member and President of the Committee whose decision was impugned — was not competent to approach the Registrar. Respondent No. 3 objected to the maintainability of the special appeal, relying on several precedents. The writ petition in which the interim order was passed remained pending at the time of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Registrar has power under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, to call and preside over fresh elections in the circumstances described.
Whether the order passed by the Registrar is an administrative order or an order of a tribunal/quasi-judicial body (i.e., whether it attracts the trappings of a judicial/tribunal determination).
Whether respondent No. 3 (a member and President of the Committee) was competent to make representations to the Registrar and thereby invoke Section 25 procedures.
Whether the special appeal against the interim order dated 9.7.2002 is maintainable, particularly given that the order was interim and the underlying writ petition was pending.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Sri Anupam Mehrotra)

The Registrar's order dated 5.7.2002 is purely administrative and cannot be equated to an order of a tribunal.
The Registrar nullified elections already held on 1.7.2002 (pursuant to notification dated 20.6.2002) and bypassed Section 25(1) of the Act when purporting to act under Section 25(2).
Section 25 (and its Explanation) shows the "prescribed authority" is an officer or court authorized by the State Government; the prescribed authority decides disputes judicially and functions as an Election Tribunal to resolve election disputes under Section 25.
Relied on multiple earlier decisions to support the contention that the Registrar's order was administrative in character and thus the forum for challenge and the nature of the order required recognition that this appeal is maintainable. Specific cases relied upon by the appellant included Committee of Management v. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari; Abhay GGJS Kusmikhalan v. Assistant Registrar; Urwa Bazar Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar; Khapraha Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar; Committee of Management v. Assistant Registrar; Muslim Welfare Society v. Assistant Registrar; and Sri Ram Laxmi Narvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies.

Respondent No. 3's Arguments (as presented by Sri N.K. Seth)

Objected to the maintainability of the special appeal, relying on several decisions (including Fakirelal v. State of U.P; Pratapur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner; Smt. Rama Devi v. Smt. Madhuri Verma; Sita Ram Lal v. District Inspector of Schools) to argue the appeal was not maintainable.
Placing reliance on Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, he argued that where an authority has to determine objections and act judicially (after considering pleadings, affording opportunity to lead evidence and passing a reasoned order), the order should be treated as an order of a Tribunal; however, he failed to satisfy the Court that the Registrar performs such functions while exercising powers under Section 25(2) of the Act.
Argued that under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, a decision of a single Judge (which is final for practical purposes in many contexts) should not be subject to further appeal when the body whose order was challenged had acted as a tribunal; and that the interim order dated 9.7.2002 was not a judgment but an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Fakirelal v. State of U.P.	The opinion cites this case in support of the contention that the special appeal is not maintainable (specific principle from the case is not detailed in the provided text).	The Court treated this and similar citations as decisions relating to different authorities (tribunal/quasi-judicial bodies) and found them not applicable to the Registrar under Section 25 in the present context.
Pratapur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner	Cited for non-maintainability of the special appeal (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	The Court observed such decisions relate to other authorities (e.g., Labour Commissioner) that function as tribunals; hence they do not apply to the Registrar under Section 25 here.
Smt. Rama Devi v. Smt. Madhuri Verma	Cited for non-maintainability (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Court treated it among decisions concerning other tribunal/quasi-judicial authorities, and therefore not applicable to the Registrar's situation under Section 25 as presented in this case.
Sita Ram Lal v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 24	Cited for non-maintainability (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Included in the group of authorities the Court held to relate to other tribunal/quasi-judicial bodies; the Court found these not directly applicable to the Registrar under Section 25.
Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, 1993 (1) AWC 916	Held that an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should be treated as an order of the Tribunal where the officer determines objections under applicable rules and acts judicially after considering pleadings, affording evidence, and passing a reasoned order.	The Court noted that counsel failed to satisfy that the Registrar performs such tribunal-like functions under Section 25(2); therefore, the Sudarshan Singh Bedi principle was not applicable to the Registrar in this case.
Committee of Management v. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, 1987 UPLBEC 989	Cited by the appellant to support the contention that the Registrar's order is administrative (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	The Court acknowledged that the appellant relied on this and similar cases to argue the Registrar's order was administrative; the Court found force in the appellant's arguments regarding maintainability.
Abhay GGJS Kusmikhalan v. Assistant Registrar, 1990 UPLBEC 480	Cited by the appellant regarding the administrative character of the Registrar's order (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	The Court noted this case among those relied upon by the appellant to support the administrative-nature argument.
Urwa Bazar Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1988 (2) AWC 1148 : 1988 UPLBEC 515	Cited by the appellant regarding administrative nature of Registrar's orders (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Noted by the Court as one of the authorities relied upon by the appellant; the Court found merit in the appellant's contentions on maintainability.
Khapraha Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) AWC 332 : 1993 UPLBEC 890	Cited by the appellant for the proposition that the Registrar's order is administrative (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Recognised by the Court as part of appellant's reliance; the Court accepted the force of the appellant's maintainability arguments.
Committee of Management v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) UPLBEC 690	Cited by the appellant on the administrative character of Registrar's orders (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Included among the authorities the appellant relied upon; Court treated them as supporting the appellant's position.
Muslim Welfare Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1991 (2) AWC 1311 : 1991 UPLBEC 1046	Cited by the appellant for administrative characterization of Registrar's order (specific principle not detailed in the provided text).	Cited by the Court as part of the appellant's authorities to support the contention that Registrar's order was administrative in nature.
Sri Ram Laxmi Narvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies, 2000 (3) AWC 1955 : (2000) 3 UPLBEC 2063	Stated principle: the Registrar may take a workable administrative decision to recognize a newly constituted Committee so that functioning is not hampered, but where a bona fide dispute as to election is raised the Registrar should refrain and make a reference under Section 25.	The Court relied upon and quoted this decision in support of the view that the Registrar has administrative functions but should refer bona fide disputes under Section 25; the appellant invoked this decision to argue the character of the Registrar's functions.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786	Supreme Court observation: not every interlocutory order is a judgment; only those that decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights, causing serious injustice, will be treated as judgments.	The Court relied on this principle when considering whether the interim order dated 9.7.2002 was appealable; it formed part of the analysis as to whether the single Judge's order had the trappings of a final order.
Sandeep Agarawal v. Adarsh Chaddha, Special Appeal No. 122 (M/S) of 2002	Principle applied: an interlocutory order that disposes of a vital issue and affects vital and valuable rights, having the trappings of a final order, is maintainable by special appeal.	The Court relied on this case to support the conclusion that when an interlocutory order has the trappings of finality and affects vital rights it is appealable; the Court applied this standard in holding the special appeal maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal analysis grounded on the wording of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, its Explanation, and the authorities cited by the parties.

The Court noted Section 25 provides for resolution of disputes regarding election or continuance in office of office-bearers by a "prescribed authority" and sets out specific grounds on which election may be set aside. The Explanation defines "prescribed authority" as an officer or Court authorised by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
The Court observed that the State Government has authorized the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as a prescribed authority within the respective jurisdiction. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate is characterized as an executive Magistrate whose functions are administrative/executive, although he also functions as a Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Court concluded that the prescribed authority under Section 25 is empowered to decide disputes judicially and in exercise of the State's inherent judicial powers. The jurisdiction of this Tribunal can be invoked either by a reference from the Registrar or by at least one-fourth of the members of the general body of the society (Section 25(1)). The Court noted that members in general were intentionally excluded from invoking the jurisdiction singly, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and frivolous litigation.
The Court emphasized that the prescribed authority generally passes an order after hearing parties and giving them an opportunity to adduce evidence — reflecting that the function is judicial in character.
The Court analyzed the precedents relied upon by respondent No. 3 (which involved other authorities such as Panchayat Raj prescribed authorities, Additional/Deputy Labour Commissioners under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and District Inspectors under the Intermediate Education Act) and concluded those decisions relate to authorities that function as tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies. Consequently, such decisions (as relied upon by respondent No. 3) were found not to be directly applicable to the Registrar under Section 25 in the present case.
The Court accepted the appellant's contention that the order passed by the Registrar was administrative in nature, and it found force in those arguments regarding maintainability of the special appeal.
Addressing the interlocutory-versus-final character of the single Judge's order, the Court applied the principles from Shah Babulal Khimji and Sandeep Agarawal: not every interlocutory order is a judgment; but where an interlocutory order decides a vital issue and affects vital and valuable rights and has the trappings of a final order, it is appealable. On the facts, the Court concluded the single Judge's interim order had the trappings of a final order.
On this basis, the Court held that the special appeal was maintainable.

Holding and Implications

SPECIAL APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE.

Direct effect on the parties:

The Court held that the impugned interim order dated 9.7.2002 passed by the learned single Judge possesses the trappings of a final order for the purposes of appeal.
Accordingly, the special appeal filed by the appellants against that order is maintainable.

The opinion does not set out any sweeping new legal precedent beyond its application of Section 25, the Explanation thereto, and established principles on interlocutory orders and appealability; its practical consequence is the recognition that the single Judge's order in this matter is appealable as a special appeal.

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Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society And Another v. Registrar, Firms, Societies And Chits, U.P, Lucknow And Others

Jagdish Bhalla & P.K Chatterji, JJ.:— By an interim order dated 9.7.2002, learned single Judge while recording certain findings directed the Registrar to hold the fresh election of Committee of Management within two months from that date in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Societies Registration Act and Rules framed thereunder.

2. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellants have preferred this special appeal inter alia on the ground that the Registrar has no power under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as the Act] but the learned single Judge has passed the impugned order upholding the order of the Registrar for the reason that the case appeared to be of strange type, who without recording any finding declared the order of the Registrar to be perfectly legal and justified. Learned single Judge, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, has committed an error in not adverting to the submission that the order of the Registrar is void ab initio for the reason that respondent No. 3 was not at all competent to approach the Registrar on account of the fact that respondent No. 3 himself was not only the member but President of the Committee who has taken the decision, which respondent No. 3 had sought to challenge and thus the action of the Registrar taking cognizance on the representations of respondent No. 3 was not proper and legally justified. Sri N.K Seth, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 raised objection to the maintainability of the special appeal and placing reliance on the decisions in Fakirelal v. State of U.P, 1999 (2) AWC 926 : 1999 (17) LCD 606, Pratapur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2001 (19) LCD 247, Smt. Rama Devi v. Smt. Madhuri Verma, 1998 (16) LCD 115 and Sita Ram Lal v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 24, learned counsel for the respondent contended that in view of the principles laid down in the above cases, this special appeal is not maintainable.

3. Sri Seth in support of his contention that the special appeal is not maintainable in the present case further relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, 1993 (1) AWC 916. In this case, their Lordships held that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall be treated as an order of the Tribunal as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to determine the objections as provided under Rule 8(2) of the rules. The provisions of determination casts duty upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to act judicially after considering the pleadings of the parties and after affording them opportunity to lead evidence and further to pass a reasoned order. Learned counsel, however, failed to satisfy that the Registrar also performs such functions while passing order in exercise of powers under Section 25(2) of the Act. In these circumstances, the case relied upon by him is not applicable in this case.

4. According to learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules is based on a logic that the prescribed authority or the revisional authority which acts as Tribunal or Court having already appreciated the matter from judicial angle and in order to get finality, the decision of the single Judge should be taken as final and no appeal should further be maintainable. Elaborating further, he submitted that while deciding whether the appeal is maintainable or not, what is to be seen is whether the order which is subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution had been given by a body or authority which had been constituted by the State and had been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and to determine them on merits, fairly and objectively.

5. Sri Anupam Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the Registrar is purely an administrative order and this order cannot be termed to be an order of a body or authority having the status of a Tribunal. Relying upon the decisions in Committee of Management v. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, 1987 UPLBEC 989, Abhay GGJS Kusmikhalan v. Assistant Registrar, 1990 UPLBEC 480, Urwa Bazar Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1988 (2) AWC 1148 : 1988 UPLBEC 515, Khapraha Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) AWC 332 : 1993 UPLBEC 890, Committee of Management v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) UPLBEC 690 and Muslim Welfare Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1991 (2) AWC 1311 : 1991 UPLBEC 1046 learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order dated 5.7.2002, passed by the Registrar is purely an administrative order by which it has been directed that election will be held by the Registrar. Further, by this order, the Registrar has nullified elections that have already held on 1.7.2002 in pursuance of notification dated 20.6.2002 and giving complete go-bye to Section 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act, has passed the impugned order allegedly under Section 25(2) of the Act on the representation of the Respondent No. 3.

6. Sri Mehrotra also invited our attention to Section 25 of the Act which relates to disputes regarding election of office bearers and provides that the prescribed authority may hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearer of such society. Prescribed authority is competent to set aside the election of an office-bearer on the grounds detailed in the section itself. He further submitted that the expression “prescribed authority” has been defined in the Explanation attached to Section 25 which means that an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette. Section 25 is reproduced herein under:

“25. Dispute regarding election of office-bearers.—(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:

Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied:

(a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or

(b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected; or

(c) that the result of the election insofar it concerns such office-bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.

Explanation I.—A person shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person:

(i) induces, or attempts to induce, by fraud, intentional misrepresentation, coercion or threat or injury, any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or any person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election.

(ii) with a view to inducing any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or to inducing any person to stand or not stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election, offers or gives any money or valuable consideration, or any place or employment, or holds out any promise of individual advantage or profit to any person;

(iii) abets (within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code) the doing of any of the acts specified in clauses (i) and (ii);

(iv) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure;

(v) canvasses on grounds of casts, community, sect or religion;

(vi) commits such other practice as the State Government may prescribe to be a corrupt practice.

Explanation II.—A promise of individual advantage or profit to a person includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself, or of any one in whom he is interested.

Explanation III.—The State Government may prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts or disputes in respect of such elections and make provisions in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insufficient provision exists in this Act or in the rules of society. Inserted by Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1978, Section 4 (w.r.e.f 27.2.1978).

(2) Where by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of a society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of that society, he may call a meeting of the general body of such society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by an officer authorised by him in this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications.

(3) Where a meeting is called by the Registrar under sub-section (2), no other meeting shall be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or by any person claiming to be an office-bearer of the society.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression “prescribed authority” means an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette.”

7. Relying upon the meaning of “prescribed authority” as defined in the Explanation attached to Section 25 of the Act and the decision of this Court in the case of Sri Ram Laxmi Narain Marvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies, 2000 (3) AWC 1955 : (2000) 3 UPLBEC 2063, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act decides the dispute judicially and in exercise of the inherent judicial powers of the State. By substituting Section 25 in the Act in present form, Legislature has constituted an Election Tribunal for resolving the election disputes of societies registered under the Act. In these circumstances, the order passed by the Registrar under Section 25(2) of the Act cannot be termed to be an order passed by the Tribunal and does not possess the trappings of the Court.

8. We find force in the arguments advanced by Sri Anupam Mehrotra regarding maintainability of the special appeal.

9. Section 25 of the Act was amended by the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act. A perusal of the objects and reasons of the section makes the legislative intent clear that it was to provide a forum for deciding the dispute in respect of election or continuance in office of office-bearers of a society. This section provides grounds on which the election of office-bearers can be set aside by the prescribed authority. Explanation to Section 25 further provides that for the purpose of this section, the expression “prescribed authority” means an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette. The State Government by notification has authorized the Sub-Divisional Magistrate a prescribed authority within their respective jurisdiction. Sub-Divisional Magistrate is an executive Magistrate and his functions relate to matters, which are administrative or executive in nature and acts as an administrative, or executive officer under various laws. He functions as Court as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus he is an executive officer as well as a Court.

10. Prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act is empowered to decide the dispute Judicially and in exercise of the inherent judicial powers of the State. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked either under a reference made by Registrar or by ¼ members of general body of society, as provided under Section 25(1) of the Act. A member of the society has been intentionally excluded to Invoke the jurisdiction of Tribunal with the intention to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and frivolous litigation. Prescribed authority passes the order after hearing parties and giving them opportunity to adduce evidence.

11. In Sri Ram Laxmi Narain Marvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies (supra), the Court held as under:

“………..The law as it stands is that the Registrar has to take a workable administrative decision to recognize the newly constituted Committee of Management or its office-bearers so that smooth functioning of the society is not hampered. This determination is, of course, subject to the ultimate decision by the civil court. Nevertheless, if a bona fide dispute or doubt with regard to the election of the rival Committee of Management of the office-bearers is raised, in that event the Registrar would keep his hands off and relieve himself by performing statutory duty of making a reference under Section 25 of the Act.”

12. In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the decisions relied upon by Sri N.K Seth referred to above, in fact relate to different authorities such as prescribed authority under the Panchayat Raj Act, Additional/Deputy Labour Commissioner under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and the District Inspector of Schools under the Intermediate Education Act, function as a Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. If a person being aggrieved by the order passed by the above authorities prefers a writ petition, then that writ petition is cognizable by learned single Judge and the pronouncement made therein is not amenable to special appeal. We further find that the order under challenge is an administrative order passed by the Registrar and thereafter the order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petition has the trappings of the final order.

13. Sri N.K Seth next contended that under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII the special appeal is not maintainable as it has been filed against the interim order as would be evident from the order dated 9.7.2002 and the writ petition is still pending. According to him, the order dated 9.7.2002 passed by the learned single Judge is not a judgment and, therefore, the special appeal is not entertainable. It will remain as an interlocutory order and further it does not bring about the termination of the proceeding in which the adjudication has been made.

14. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, the Supreme Court observed that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be Judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned.

15. In Sandeep Agarawal v. Adarsh Chaddha, Special Appeal No. 122 (M/S) of 2002, this Court after considering the principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court held that if the interlocutory order amounts to disposal of a vital issue and in fact is affecting vital and valuable rights having trappings of the final orders, in that case, the special appeal is maintainable.

16. On the facts and circumstances of the case, as already indicated above, we find force in the arguments advanced by Sri Mehrotra that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has the trappings of the final order and as such this special appeal is maintainable. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has the trappings of the final order. Accordingly, special appeal is maintainable.

Navyug Radiance Seni... v. Registrar, Firms, So...