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  • Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act
  • Central Act No. 15 of 1999 (the repealing Act for short).
  • Section 5(2) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act;
  • Regulation) Act, 1976 (the principal Act for short)
  • Section 33 or 34 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 11 to 14 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(1) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(2) of the principal Act.
  • Section 10(3) of the principal Act
  • Section 10(5) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(6) of the principal Act.
  • Section 8(4) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 1(3)1
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act
  • Central Act No. 15 of 1999 (the repealing Act for short).
  • Section 5(2) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act;
  • Regulation) Act, 1976 (the principal Act for short)
  • Section 33 or 34 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 11 to 14 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(1) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(2) of the principal Act.
  • Section 10(3) of the principal Act
  • Section 10(5) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 10(6) of the principal Act.
  • Section 8(4) of the Principal Act.
  • Section 1(3)1
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Yatindra Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the "Principal Act") was repealed by Ordinance No. 5 of 1999 and subsequently replaced by Central Act No. 15 of 1999 (the "Repealing Act"). The central procedural question before the court was the effect of that repeal on multiple writ petitions arising out of orders passed under the Principal Act. Two specific questions were posed explicitly in the opinion: (i) whether the writ petitions abate in view of Section 4 of the Repealing Act, and (ii) whether the writ petitions should be decided on their merits.

The Repealing Act was brought into force in the State of Uttar Pradesh on 18.3.1999, as shown by a Government Order dated 31.3.1999 indicating the requisite resolution was passed on 18.3.1999. The Principal Act therefore ceased to be in force in Uttar Pradesh from that date. The writ petitions before the Court arose from various orders under the Principal Act (draft statements, objections, appellate and revision orders, permission-to-sell refusals, remands, condonation-of-delay orders, and interim orders), and the Court grouped the petitions into four categories (serial Nos. 1–5; 6–16; 17–18; 19–21) for resolution of their fate post-repeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petitions abate by reason of Section 4 of the Repealing Act.
  2. Whether the writ petitions should be decided on merits despite the repeal of the Principal Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.B. Singh v. Board of Revenue (referred in the opinion as the U.B. Singh case) Establishes the distinction between proceedings under Article 226 (writ petitions) and continuation of the original suit/proceeding; holds that a writ petition is not a continuation of the underlying proceeding and that writ petitions (and special appeals arising from them) do not abate under a statutory notification that otherwise abates other proceedings (in that case, under Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act). The Court applied the same reasoning to conclude that writ petitions and special appeals arising from orders under the Principal Act are not abated by Section 4 of the Repealing Act. The U.B. Singh principle supported the conclusion that writ petitions are distinct remedies and therefore not within the category of proceedings that automatically abate on repeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages corresponding to the two main questions posed.

1. Do the writ petitions abate?

  • The Repealing Act (Central Act No. 15 of 1999) was held to be in force in Uttar Pradesh from 18.3.1999; the Principal Act was thus no longer in force.
  • Section 4 of the Repealing Act provides that proceedings (except for certain specified sections) relating to orders under the Principal Act pending at the time of enforcement will abate. The writ petitions before the Court arise out of orders under the Principal Act and are not covered by the enumerated exception in Section 4.
  • Relying on the reasoning in the U.B. Singh case, the Court emphasized the legal distinction between proceedings under Article 226 (writ petitions) and continuation of the original suit/proceeding: a writ petition is not a mere continuation and the orders passed in the original proceeding do not merge in the order passed in the writ petition. Because of this distinction, writ petitions and the special appeals arising from them do not abate under statutory provisions that abate ordinary proceedings.
  • Applying that principle, the Court concluded that writ petitions and special appeals arising from orders under the Principal Act do not abate by reason of Section 4 of the Repealing Act.

2. Should the writ petitions be decided on merits after repeal?

  • The Court examined the scheme of the Principal Act to determine what practical consequences the repeal had upon ongoing proceedings: under the Principal Act, a draft statement (Sections 6–10) could culminate in a declaration under Section 10(3) vesting excess vacant land absolutely in the State, and thereafter possession could be taken (Sections 10(5)–10(6)).
  • The Repealing Act's Sections 2–4 were analyzed: while the Principal Act is repealed, the Repealing Act preserves the effect of a Section 10(3) declaration where possession has been taken by the State or an authorized person; but where no declaration has been published, the State can no longer complete the vesting or take possession because the Principal Act is no longer in force.
  • The Court noted Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, which permits restoration (divesting) of land that was deemed vested under Section 10(3) but where possession had not been taken, upon refund of any amount paid by the State.
  • Based on this statutory interaction, the Court concluded it was unnecessary to decide many of the writ petitions on merits because the repeal rendered the practical relief (vesting/possession by State) impossible in the absence of an already-published Section 10(3) declaration and actual possession.
  • The Court cautioned, however, that some petitions fall within saved categories (the proviso to Section 4 preserves proceedings relating to Sections 11–14 of the Principal Act) or involve situations where possession has been taken — such matters may require determination on merits because the legality of any possession already taken must be assessed.

Application to the Specific Groups of Writ Petitions

  • Group I (serial Nos. 1–5): Petitions against appellate/competent authority orders decided in favor of the persons concerned; no Section 10(3) declaration was published and no vesting/possession followed. These petitions are now infructuous and were dismissed without deciding merits.
  • Group II (serial Nos. 6–16): Petitions concerned with permission to sell (Section 27) refused because proceedings to determine excess vacant land were pending; appeals had been allowed in some cases. No Section 10(3) declaration was shown to have been published and the State can no longer pursue vesting/possession. These petitions were likewise dismissed as infructuous without deciding merits.
  • Group III (serial Nos. 17–18): Petitions where initial orders favored the person and the State’s revision remanded the matter; proceedings still pending before the competent authority and no Section 10(3) declaration published. The Court disposed of these petitions without deciding merits, observing that the State may not proceed further to take possession.
  • Group IV (serial Nos. 19–21): Mixed procedural posture (orders against petitioners, appeals dismissed, one matter involving recall of condonation order). No record showed Section 10(3) declaration or possession. The Court disposed of these with an observation that the State cannot take possession; if a declaration under Section 10(3) had been published unbeknownst to parties, petitioners would remain entitled to proceed for restoration/divesting under Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that writ petitions and special appeals arising from orders under the Principal Act do not abate by reason of Section 4 of the Repealing Act, but in many cases it is unnecessary to decide those petitions on their merits in view of the repeal.

Implications (direct effects described in the opinion):

  • The writ petitions listed at serial Nos. 1 to 16 were dismissed as infructuous because no Section 10(3) declaration had been published and the State could not proceed to vest or take possession of the land after repeal.
  • The remaining writ petitions were disposed of with the observation that the State Government is not entitled to take possession of land pursuant to any order under the Principal Act now that the Act is repealed. Where a declaration under Section 10(3) had already been published and possession had been taken, the legality of such acts would have to be examined and the affected petition(s) may require adjudication on merits; where a declaration had been published but possession not taken, petitioners may seek restoration/divesting under Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act upon refund of amounts paid by the State.
  • The Court emphasized that certain proceedings saved by the proviso to Section 4 (notably proceedings relating to Sections 11–14 of the Principal Act) and cases where possession has already been taken may still require full merits adjudication.
  • The opinion confines itself to the direct consequences for the petitions before the Court and does not purport to lay down any broader new legal precedent beyond applying established principles (as in U.B. Singh) to the interaction between repeal and pending writ proceedings.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is contained in that text.

    State Of U.P And Another v. M/S. Doon Udyog Pvt. Ltd. And Others

    Yatindra Singh, J.:— The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the principal Act for short) has been repealed by the Ordinance No. 5 of 1999, later replaced by the Central Act No. 15 of 1999 (the repealing Act for short). What is the effect of the repeal on the writ petitions arising out of the order passed under the Principal Act.

    (i) Do these writ petitions abate, in view of Section 4 of the repealing Act?

    (ii) Should these Writ Petitions be decided on merits?

    Ist QUESTION: WRIT PETITIONS ABATEMENT?

    The Principal Act Not in Force

    2. The repealing Act, in view of Section 1(3)1 applies to a State from the date the resolution in this behalf is passed under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. The Standing Counsel has brought to my notice a Government Order dated 31.3.1999, which states that the requisite resolution has been passed on 18.3.1999 Thus the Repealing Act has come into force in the State of Uttar Pradesh on 18.3.1999 The Principal Act is no longer in force.

    Writ Petition—Is not Continuation

    3. The Section 4 of the repealing Act2 provides that all proceedings (except under few sections) relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending at the time of enforcement of the repealing Act will abate. These writ petitions arise out of order passed under the Principal Act. They are not covered by the exception. Should they be abated on this ground?

    4. (A) decision in writ petition is not a decision about the merits of the parties in issue in the proceedings giving rise to it…… (A) Proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not continuation of the suit or proceeding giving rise to it and there exists a clear distinction between an appeal or revision and a writ petition…… (The) orders passed in the original suit or proceeding do not merge in the orders passed in such petition. Since a special appeal, directed against an order passed in a writ petition, is merely a rehearing of the petition, it has……the characteristics of a petition under Article 225 of the Constitution.’ (U.B Singh v. Board of Revenue) (the U.B Singh case)). This was the reason that the full bench in the U.B Singh case held, Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act has no impact on the writ petitions or special appeals arising out of them. And the writ petitions and special appeals do not abate in view of notification under Section 5(2) of the U.P Consolidation of Holding Act; though all other proceedings do.

    5. I see no reason why these observations will not apply in the present case. Neither the writ petitions nor the special appeals arising out of them abate under Section 4 of the repealing Act.

    2nd QUESTION: WRIT PETITION—DECISION ON MERITS

    The Scheme of the Principal Act

    6. All persons holding vacant land in excess were required to file statement under Section 6 of the Principal Act. The competent authority could also require such persons to file statements. Thereafter a draft statement was prepared under Section 8 of the principal Act and was served on the persons concerned under Section 8(3) of the Act, requiring them to file their objections. These objections were decided under Section 8(4) of the Principal Act. This order was subject to an appeal or a revision under Section 33 or 34 of the Principal Act. The competent authority was to make necessary amendment in the draft, determining vacant land, and prepare the final draft under Section 9 of the Principal. Act. This draft was published under Section 10(1) of the Principal Act. Any other person (not served with the notice could file his objection under Section 10(2) of the principal Act. After decision on objection, if any, under Section 10(2) of the principal Act, the competent authority was required to publish a declaration under Section 10(3) of the principal Act vesting the excess vacant land in the State. The excess vacant land vested absolutely (without any encumbrances) in the State Government from that date.

    7. The possession of the excess vacant land could be surrendered by the person concerned. On his failing to do so, the competent authority was required to serve a notice on the person in possession to hand over possession of the excess vacant land under Section 10(5) of the Principal Act. And on his failure to do so, the competent authority could take forcible possession under Section 10(6) of the principal Act. This possession is relevant under the repealing Act. Let's consider the implication of the repealing Act.

    Effect of the Repealing Act

    8. Sections 2 to 4 of the repealing Act lay down its effect. The principal Act stands repealed under Section 2 of the repealing Act but it does not effect the vesting of land in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the principal Act where possession is taken over by the State Government or by any authorised person. In case the land has not vested in the State Government, as the required declaration has not been published under Section 10(3) of the principal Act, then nothing can be done. Now neither the declaration can be published under Section 10(3) of the principal Act, nor the excess vacant land can be vested in the State Government. These proceeding except for a few, even if they are pending, are to abate, Section 3(2) of the repealing Act further provides that even where any land is deemed to have vested under Section 10(3) of the principal Act but possession has not been taken, the land may be restored (divested) after the amount paid by the State Government is refunded. Let's see its effect on the four groups of the writ petitions.

    Ist GROUP

    9. The first group of five writ petitions (serial No. 1 to 5) are against the orders of the appellate court and the competent authority in proceedings for declaration of excess vacant land. The appellate Court or both the Courts below have decided against the State. The subject matter in these proceedings has been held in favour of the ‘persons’ concerned. Obviously, for the land in dispute in the first group of the writ petitions, no declaration has been published under Section 10(3) of the principal Act. There is no question of vesting the land in the State or taking over possession over the same. Even if these writ petitions are allowed, the State Government can neither take steps to vest the land under Section 10(3) of the principal Act nor take possession of the land. It is unnecessary to decide these writ petitions on merit. They have become infructuous and are dismissed.

    IInd GROUP

    10. The second group of next 11 writ petitions (at serial No. 6 to 16) are not against the order passed by any authority declaring any excess vacant land. In these writ petitions, the person concerned had filed an application for permission to sell the land under Section 27 of the Principal Act. This application was dismissed on the ground that proceedings for determining excess vacant land are pending and notification under Section 10(1) is yet to be published. The persons concerned had filed appeals under Section 33 of the Act, which were allowed. These writ petitions are against the order granting permission to sell the land. In the 10 writ petitions (at serial No. 6 to 15) no interim orders were granted by this Court, but in the 11th writ petition namely at serial No. 16 an interim order was granted by this Court staying the operation of the appellate order. But this is immaterial.

    11. In these writ petitions, no land has been declared as excess vacant land. The permission to transfer was refused as notification under Section 10(1) of the Act was not published. There is no question of publication of declaration under Section 10(3) of the Act. There is also neither anything on the record, nor the standing counsel could point out if declaration under Section 10(3) of the principal Act has been published. The State Government in view of the repealing Act can neither take proceeding to vest the land, nor take possession. It is also unnecessary to decide these writ petitions on merits. They have become infructuous and are dismissed.

    IIIrd GROUP

    12. The third group of two writ petitions (at serial No. 17 and 18) unlike the earlier ones, are by the persons concerned. In these two writ petitions the orders were passed by the competent authority in favour of the person concerned. Thereafter the State Government in revision under Section 34 of the Principal Act remanded the case back to the competent authority for re-decision. There is an interim order in these two writ petitions. The competent authority is yet to determine the excess vacant land. The cases are still pending before the competent authority. There is no question of publication of declaration of vesting of any land in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the principal Act. Even if these two writ petitions are dismissed, neither any proceedings can be taken to vest the land, nor possession can be taken. In view of this, it would be appropriate to dispose of these two writ petitions (without deciding them on merit) with an observation that the State Government will not be entitled to further proceed in the case or take possession.

    IVth GROUP

    13. The fourth group of three writ petitions (at serial No. 19 to 21) are like the 3rd group by persons concerned. In the first two writ petitions of the IVth Group (at Serial No. 19 to 20) orders were passed by the competent authority against them and thereafter their appeals were also dismissed under Section 33 of the principal Act. They have filed the writ petitions against these orders. In the third petition of the 4th group (at serial No. 21) the competent authority passed an order against the person concerned, thereafter he filed an appeal, which was barred by time. He filed an application for condonation of delay which was allowed. Thereafter the State Government filed an application to recall the order condoning the delay. This application was allowed and the order condoning the delay was set aside. The writ petition at serial No. 21 is against the order recalling the order condoning the delay. There is nothing on the record of the case to show that declaration under Section 10(3) of the principal Act has been published or possession has been taken. As a matter of fact, this Court had already granted an interim order in favour of the petitioners. Here also, even if these three writ petitions are dismissed, the State Government can neither take proceedings to vest the land nor the possession can be taken. It is unnecessary to decide those writ petitions on merits. But it is possible that declaration might have been published and parties may not be aware. It would be appropriate to dispose of these three writ petitions with the observation that State Government will not be able to take possession of the excess land from the person concerned and in case the declaration under Section 10(3) of the principal Act has been published, then the petitioners would be at liberty to take proceedings for restoration or divesting the same as indicated in Section 3(2) of the repealing Act.

    A CAVEAT

    14. I have held—

    (1) the writ petitions and the special appeals do not abate due to Section 4 of the repealing Act.

    (2) It is unnecessary to decide these writ petitions on merits in view of the repealing Act.

    (3) Does it mean that all writ petitions against the order passed under the principal Act are to be decided without entering into the merits of the petition? I dons't think so. The proviso to Section 4 of the repealing Act saves certain proceedings—

    namely those relating to Section 11 to 14 of the Principal Act. The writ petition against these proceedings, if any, may have to be decided on merits. So is the case where the State Government or duly authorised person has taken possession.

    15. The repeal of the principal Act does not effect those cases where possession has been taken. But the State Government or duly authorised person could not take possession, unless the orders in the proceedings were legal. Their legality will have to be seen. The writ petitions in the cases, where possession has been taken, may have to be decided on merits.

    CONCLUSION

    16. In view of the repealing Act the writ petitions do not abate, but it is not necessary to decide these writ petitions on merits. The writ petitions at serial. Nos. 1 to 16 are dismissed as infructuous. The rest of the writ petitions are disposed of with the observation that now the State Government is not entitled to take possession over the land in pursuance of any order passed under the principal Act and in case the declaration under Section 10(3) of the principal Act has been published, the persons concerned would be at liberty to take proceedings for restoration or divesting the land in accordance with law.

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    State Of U.P And Another v. M/S. Doon Udyog Pvt. Ltd. And Others
    (Sep 1, 1999)