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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sub-section (1) of Section 21 of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act)
  • Section 3 of 1947 U.P Rent Control Act
  • Rule 18 of the Rules
  • Rule 18(1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (1) of Section 21 of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act)
  • Section 3 of 1947 U.P Rent Control Act
  • Rule 18 of the Rules
  • Rule 18(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged two orders: an order of the prescribed authority dated 10.8.1982 releasing the disputed shop in favour of landlord-respondent No. 1, and the order of the appellate authority dated 27.3.1998 which dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Respondent No. 1 purchased the premises bearing house Nos. 2127 and 2128 from the erstwhile owner Smt. Champa Devi on 12.2.1996. The first floor (three rooms) bears No. 2128 and the ground floor (two inter-connected rooms) is No. 2127. Mohan Lal had been tenant of both portions; after his death in 1962 the tenancy was inherited by his widow Nanhi Devi and, after her death, the petitioner occupied the premises as the adopted son of Mohan Lal.

On 25.8.1981 respondent No. 1 applied for release of the ground floor portion No. 2127, alleging that the western wall had fallen and that the accommodation was dilapidated and required demolition and reconstruction; he also stated that he required the accommodation to run a Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink shop. The petitioner contested the application denying dilapidation and denying that respondent No. 1 required the accommodation for business. The prescribed authority found the accommodation dilapidated, capable owner (respondent No. 1) was in a position to reconstruct, and that respondent No. 1's need to carry on the specified business was bona fide and that rejecting the application would cause respondent greater hardship. The petitioner appealed; the appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 27.3.1998. The petitioner instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 challenging those findings and orders. The court heard counsel for both sides (Sri K.M. Dayal for the petitioner and Sri K.S. Singh for respondent No. 1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed accommodation is a residential building or a non-residential (shop) accommodation for purposes of clause (ii) of the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and, consequently, whether an application under Section 21(1)(a) for release for business occupation is barred.
  2. Whether earlier judicial findings (notably the District Judge's order dated 1.2.1973) that the accommodation was not being used for commercial purposes operate as res judicata or otherwise bar consideration of the application under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Act.
  3. Whether the accommodation was in a dilapidated condition requiring demolition and reconstruction.
  4. Whether respondent No. 1's need to occupy the shop for carrying on business (Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink shop) was bona fide.
  5. Whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act and whether such notice was in fact served.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The disputed accommodation is residential and therefore clause (ii) of the third proviso to s.21(1) of the Act prohibits entertaining an application for occupation for business purposes; the authorities erred in treating it as non-residential.
  • The earlier finding in proceedings initiated by Smt. Champa Devi (District Judge's decision dated 1.2.1973) that the accommodation was not being used for commercial purposes operates as res judicata and prevents application of Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Act.
  • The disputed accommodation is not in a dilapidated condition; expert and Commissioner reports allegedly show it was not dilapidated and the appellate authority ignored or did not take into account the Commissioner's report.
  • Respondent No. 1's need is not bona fide since he allegedly purchased another building (with his wife and brothers) where business is carried on; thus he need not be granted release.
  • Respondent No. 1 (referred to at one place as respondent No. 3 in the opinion) purchased the premises on 12.12.1976 and was not entitled to file an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) unless the petitioner was served with the notice as required by the first proviso to Section 21; the petitioner contends such notice was not served.

Respondent No. 1's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The disputed ground-floor accommodation (No. 2127) was dilapidated (western wall fallen) and required demolition and reconstruction, making release appropriate to enable reconstruction.
  • Respondent No. 1 bona fide required the accommodation to run a Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink shop and would suffer greater hardship if application were refused.
  • Evidence, including engineer reports and subsequently the Commissioner’s reports and the Nagar Palika engineer's report, supported the finding of dilapidation.
  • The requisite notice under the first proviso to Section 21 was served upon the petitioner and recorded by the appellate authority as received on 12.10.1979.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amal Chand Dutt v. II Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1988 14 ALR 794 SC Interpreting Rule 18(1): Rule 18(1) does not prohibit filing of an application within six months; the Rule is directory and not mandatory; it regulates the authority's dealing with repeat applications without sufficient interval. The court relied on the principle that Rule 18(1) is directory in assessing whether the earlier proceedings barred the later application; the decision was applied to conclude Rule 18 does not operate as an absolute bar preventing the authorities from entertaining the release application.
Kailash Nath Bajpai v. Chandra Shekhar Singh Principle that if a tenant changes the user of the building from non-residential to residential, sub-clause (ii) of the third proviso (bar on entertaining an application for business occupation in a residential building) will not be attracted. The court used this principle to hold that subsequent residential use by a tenant does not alter the original non-residential nature of the building; hence the sub-clause (ii) was not attracted on the facts (earlier finding that the house was let out as a shop).
Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aligarh Law that a building need not be in imminent danger of collapse to be regarded as dilapidated and requiring reconstruction. The court relied on this authority to uphold the conclusion that the accommodation was dilapidated and required reconstruction despite the absence of a showing that it was in immediate danger of falling down.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the findings made at different stages and the documentary and expert evidence relied upon by the authorities:

  1. The court reviewed the District Judge's earlier order dated 1.2.1973 (Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1972) which recorded that "the house been let out to the defendant and this includes the shop" but also observed "This shop is not being used as shop by the defendant but as a Baithak." The court interpreted that order as indicating the house was let as a shop even if at the time of that order it was being used as a Baithak; a subsequent change in user by the tenant does not change the intrinsic nature of the building.
  2. Applying the principle in Kailash Nath Bajpai, the court accepted that mere subsequent residential user does not convert the nature of the building from non-residential to residential for the purposes of the proviso; on the facts the prescribed authority and the appellate authority had found that Mohan Lal originally used the disputed accommodation as a shop, and that finding was affirmed.
  3. On the question of Rule 18 and the earlier proceedings, the court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Amal Chand Dutt: Rule 18(1) only prescribes a prohibition of a directory nature and does not operate as an absolute bar to entertaining an application. The court noted that Rule 18 does not prevent filing an application within the statutory intervals and is concerned with avoiding successive applications without sufficient interval.
  4. Regarding dilapidation, the court examined the technical reports — reports by Om Saran Jauhari (for the petitioner), B.B. Singh (retired Junior Engineer) (for the landlord), affidavits, the Commissioner’s report and additional report (annexures 12 and 13), and the Nagar Palika engineer's report dated 7.11.1981. The appellate authority and the prescribed authority had considered these reports. The court found no substance in the petitioner's contention that the Commissioner's report was not taken into account. Applying the principle in Ramesh Chandra, the court held that the law does not require imminent danger of falling to treat a building as dilapidated, and concluded there was no legal infirmity in the authorities' finding of dilapidation requiring reconstruction.
  5. Concerning the bona fides of the landlord's need, the court noted that the appellate authority had examined allegations about other properties and found respondent No. 1 had no share or connection with the businesses there. On the material before the authorities, respondent No. 1’s need to have the shop for carrying on Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink business was found bona fide; the court did not find it necessary to re-evaluate the detailed evidence which the authorities had considered.
  6. On service of notice under the first proviso to Section 21, the appellate authority had recorded that notice was served and received by the petitioner on 12.10.1979. The court treated that as a factual finding and declined to interfere with it under Article 226.

Overall, the court focused on whether findings of fact by the prescribed authority and appellate authority (nature of user, dilapidation, and bona fide need) were vitiated by any legal error; finding none, it upheld the authorities' conclusions.

Holding and Implications

Writ petition dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The orders of the prescribed authority dated 10.8.1982 (releasing the disputed shop in favour of respondent No. 1) and the appellate authority dated 27.3.1998 (dismissing the petitioner's appeal) are upheld and remain effective.
  • The direct consequence for the parties is that respondent No. 1 is entitled to the release of the ground-floor portion No. 2127 for the purposes found by the authorities (demolition/reconstruction and carrying on the specified business) and the petitioner's challenge fails. The court did not indicate that it was establishing any novel legal principle beyond application of the cited authorities.

    Harish Chandra Gupta v. Swatantra Kumar Jain And Others

    Sudhir Narain, J.:— The petitioner aggrieved against the order passed by the prescribed authority dated 10.8.1982 releasing the disputed shop in favour of landlord-respondent No. 1 and the order of the appellate authority dated 27.3.1998, has filed this writ petition:

    2. Respondent No. 1 purchased premises in question bearing house Nos. 2127 and 2128 from the erstwhile owner Smt. Champa Devi on 12.2.1996 The first floor portion consisting of three rooms has been numbered as 2128 and the ground floor portion consisting of two inter-connected rooms has been numbered as 2127. Mohan Lal was the tenant of both the portions namely 2127 and 2128. After his death in the year 1962 it was inherited by his widow Nanhi Devi. After the death of Nanhi Devi the petitioner occupied the premises as adopted son of Mohan Lal. Respondent No. 1 filed application against the petitioner on 25.8.1981 for release of the ground floor portion No. 2127 on the allegation that western wall of the disputed accommodation had fallen down. The accommodation is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. He further sought release on the ground that he requires this accommodation for running Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink shop. The petitioner contested the application denying that the disputed accommodation was in dilapidated condition or respondent No. 1 required it for carrying on any business. The prescribed authority recorded a finding that the disputed accommodation was in dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. Respondent No. 1 was in capacity to reconstruct the shop in question. It was further found that the need of respondent No. 1 to carry on business of Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink was bona fide. In case his application is rejected he will suffer a greater hardship. The petitioner filed an appeal against this order and the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal on 27.3.1998

    3. I have heard Sri K.M Dayal, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri K.S Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 1.

    4. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the disputed accommodation is residential one and therefore it cannot be released for commercial purposes as clause (ii) of third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act) prohibits entertainment of application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act in the case of any residential building, for occupation for business purposes. The prescribed authority recorded a finding that the disputed accommodation was let out for the purpose of carrying on business by Mohan Lal and it was not a residential accommodation. This finding has been affirmed by the appellate authority. The petitioner has challenged those findings in this writ petition.

    5. It is contended that Smt. Champa Devi, the erstwhile owner of the property, had filed an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer seeking permission to file suit for eviction against Smt. Nanhi Devi and the petitioner on the ground that it was bona fide required for her son to carry on business. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Smt. Champa Devi filed revision against that order before the Commissioner. During the pendency of revision U.P Act No. XIII of 1972 came into force. The revision was transferred to the District Judge and was converted in appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on 1.2.1973 and it was held that the disputed accommodation was not being used for commercial purposes. It is contended that the said finding operates as res judicata and Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Act will not be applicable.

    6. In Amal Chand Dutt v. II Additional District Judge, Allahabad . 1988 14 ALR 794 SC., the Supreme Court held that Rule 18(1) does not prohibit or bar filing of the application for release of any building on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) within a period of six months from the date on which a final order was passed in the previous application made under Section 3 of 1947 U.P Rent Control Act or within a period of six months from the commencement of the Act of 1972. The Rule only sets out a rule of prohibition to be followed by the prescribed authority for dealing with an application for release on the same ground without a sufficient interval of time between filing of the two applications. The prohibition, under Rule 18(1) is only of a directory nature and not mandatory nature.

    7. The contention is that the application may be maintainable after the period of one year as provided in Rule 18 but if any finding is recorded in respect of the nature of the building such finding is binding upon the prescribed authority in subsequent proceedings.

    8. A perusal of the order of the appellate authority dated 1.2.1973 indicates that the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1972 recorded the following finding:—

    “The house been let out to the defendant and this includes the shop.

    9. This shop is not being used as shop by the defendant but as a Baithak.”

    10. This finding itself indicates that the house was let out to the tenant as a shop but at the time the order was passed it was being used as Baithak. The subsequent user by the tenant for residential purpose did not change the nature of the building. In Kailash Nath Bajpai v. Chandra Shekhar Singh, it was found that if the tenant changes the user of the building from non-residential to residential, sub-clause (ii) of third proviso shall not be attracted. The prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority again considered this matter and found that Mohan Lal was using the disputed accommodation as a shop. He was residing on the first floor and the disputed accommodation was used as a shop. He died in 1962. The petitioner was adopted as his son and as the petitioner was employed as clerk in Collectorate he did not use the accommodation as a shop. It is not denied that Mohan Lal was a business man. He had executed a Will in favour of the petitioner and in that Will he bequeathed all his properties to him. The petitioner, in this writ petition, has not denied that Mohan Lal has not executed any Will in his favour. On the findings recorded by the District Judge in the earlier proceedings in appeal as well as the prescribed authority and the appellate authority in the present proceedings, it has been found that the disputed accommodation was let out for non-residential purpose and in view of such finding the bar contained in sub-clause (ii) of third proviso of Section 21 of the Act is not attracted.

    11. The petitioner has further assailed the finding on the question of nature of building. The version of the respondent No. 3 was that the disputed accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. The western wall has fallen down. The petitioner submitted the report of Om Saran Jauhari and the landlord filed the report of B.B Singh, retried Junior Engineer. Those reports were accompanied by their affidavits. These reports were duly considered by the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority. During the pendency of the appeal the Court appointed a Commissioner and the Commissioner submitted a report and further an additional report. Those reports have been annexed as Annexures 12 and 13 to the writ petition. Besides there was a report of the Engineer of Nagar Palika dated 7.11.1981 The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the report of the Commissioner has not been taken into account by the appellate authority. A perusal of these reports do not substantiate the contention of the petitioner that the accommodation in dispute is not in a dilapidated condition. In Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aligarh,2 the Court emphasised that the law does no require that a building should be in the imminent danger of falling down to be treated as dilapidated one requiring reconstruction. I do not find any legal infirmity in the finding recorded by the authorities below that the disputed accommodation was in dilapidated condition.

    12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further assailed the finding that the need of the landlord is not bona fide. It is urged that he has purchased another building in the name of his wife along with his brothers and they are carrying on business in that building. The appellate authority has considered in detail about the other properties in which the petitioner had suggested that respondent No. 1 is carrying on the business. It was found that respondent No. 1 has no share in such building or the business being carried on there. His need to have a shop of Soda Water, Lemon and Cold Drink was found bona fide. It is not necessary to consider again the details about the evidence considered by those authorities. The petitioner is employed as clerk and he himself never stated that he is carrying on business or requires it for carrying on business. He is residing on the first floor portion which consists of three rooms. He has alleged himself that he is using the disputed accommodation as Bithak. He can do so on the first floor portion of the house, particularly when the landlord-respondent No. 1 requires it for carrying on business. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No. 3 has purchased the disputed premises by a registered sale deed from the erstwhile owner Champa Devi on 12.12.1976 He was not entitled to file application for release of the disputed premises under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act unless the petitioner was served with a notice as contemplated under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act. The appellate authority has recorded a finding that such notice was served upon the petitioner and it was duly received by him on 12.10.1979 It is a finding of fact and does not require any interference under Article 226.

    13. In view of the above there is no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.

    14. Petition Dismissed.

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    Harish Chandra Gupta v. Swatantra Kumar Jain And Others
    (Apr 2, 1999)