1. Two tubewell operators filed an application under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act through the present petitioner contending that respondent-employers illegally made deductions from their wages for the period between 11 October 1988 and 31 July 1989 and prayed for refund of the said amount together with compensation. The application was allowed by order, dated 21 December 1989, directing refund of deductions and compensation. After the recovery was in progress under S. 15(3) of the said Act and recovery warrants had been issued, respondents 2 and 3 preferred an appeal under S. 17 of the said Act on 21 March 1990. As there was delay of about two months, an application under S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act supported by an affidavit was filed. Employees filed objection to the application for condonation of delay. Respondent 5 by his order, dated 12 July 1990, allowed the said application upon condoning the delay and the appeal was admitted. Challenging the said order, this writ petition was filed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner on behalf of the employees contended that in respect of such an appeal under S. 17 of the said Act, the provision of S. 5 of the Limitation Act is not available. Law has been referred to on behalf of the petitioner, workmen as decided in the case of Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Siddaramaiah [JT 1993 (1) SC 328]; Union of India v. Aftab Hussain [1966 A.L.J 806]; and Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Seventh Additional District Judge, Faizabad [1997 (4) L.L.N 731]. Reference was also made to the cases of Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narayan Misra [(1974) 2 SCC 133 : A.I.R 1974 S.C 480], Mukri Gopalan v. C.P Aboobacker [JT 1995 (5) SC 296]; and Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubachand Beghel [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1099].
3. It has been contended that law has been decided in the case of Anwari Basavaraj Patil (vide supra), wherein question of applicability of provisions of Limitation Act in respect of a proceeding under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, was being considered. It has been held therein that the period for notice under proviso to Sub-sec. (1) of S. 97 of the said Act does not permit condonation of delay under the Limitation Act. Considering the provisions of the said Act as also the effect of S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act and also the law as explained in the case of H.N Yadav (vide supra), it has been held that if on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Special Act, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded then the benefits conferred by the Limitation Act cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Special Act.
4. It has been further contended that the specific provision for condonation of delay has been made in the second proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of S. 15 of the said Act although no such provision is there in S. 17 and, therefore, the aforesaid interpretation of law becomes applicable.
5. On behalf of the respondent-employers, it has been contended that the authority acted under S. 15 of the said Act is persona designata and, therefore, the specific provision empowering condonation of delay had to be made whereas the Authority under S. 17 is a regular Court having all its incidental power and, therefore, S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be interpreted in the aforesaid manner as contended by the petitioner-employees.
6. Reliance has been placed on the law decided in the cases referred to above as also on the cases of Lata Kamat v. Vilas . [(1989) 2 SCC 613 : A.I.R 1989 S.C 1477] and State of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das [(1996) 5 SCC 342 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 2437].
7. In the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (vide supra), law in this connection was settled considering the Limitation Act as it then stood as also the question came for consideration therein. The said law was again considered in the case of H.N Yadav (vide supra), and it was laid down there that if the scheme of special law and the nature of the remedy provided therein amount to a complete code in itself, then the provisions of the Limitation Act must be held to be necessarily excluded.
8. In the case of Mukri Gopalan (vide supra), the two-Judges Bench while considering a law of the State of Kerala interpreted S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (vide supra), was followed. The change indicated by a three Judges Bench in H.N Yadav case (vide supra), and followed in the case of Anwari Basavaraj Patil (vide supra), was not taken note of. Therefore, in view of the above circumstances, the law decided in the case of H.N Yadav (vide supra), by a larger Bench remains binding. The aforesaid case of Lata Kamat (vide supra) and State of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das (vide supra), also did not consider the change in interpretation of law as settled in the case of H.N Yadav (vide supra), and, therefore, is not having a binding effect.
9. In view of the aforesaid law as decided in the case of H.N Yadav (vide supra), and followed in the case of Anwari Basavaraj Patil (vide supra), only thing to be considered is as to whether the present case, the provisions of Payment of Wages Act on examination make it clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded so far as appeal under provision of the said Act is concerned.
10. A comparison of the language used in S. 15 and S. 17 of the said Act clearly indicates that for the purpose of proceeding under S. 15, the power has been provided categorically for entertaining an application even after the period prescribed for filing such application. But, in the case of an appeal under S. 17 of the said Act, such provision for condonation of delay has been omitted. Such specific omission on the part of the Legislature has to be interpreted as withholding the power of condonation of delay from the appellate authority. The provision of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 17 also indicates finality of the order passed under S. 15(2) same as provided in S. 17(1), i.e, an appeal filed within thirty days.
11. The contention of the respondents that specific provision for condonation of delay has been provided as the Authority under S. 15 of the said Act is persona designate and the same was not required in case of Appellate Authority being a civil Court, does not appear to be acceptable. In the present case, in the absence of any indication that for deciding the appeal under S. 17 of the said Act, powers of civil Court are available, the said contention of the respondent-employers cannot be accepted.
12. Moreover, in cases of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board [1997 (4) L.L.N 731] (vide supra) and Union of India v. Aftab Hussain [1966 A.L.J 806] (vide supra), position in respect of appeal under S. 17 of the said Act had been considered holding finally that the Tribunal being not a Court within the meaning of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, such power of condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act is not available.
13. In view of the aforesaid findings, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order, dated 12 July 1990, is hereby quashed. There will be no order as to costs.