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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Ravi Kiran Jain
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • B.D Agrawal, J.
Acts
  • 19(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act
  • Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Holdings Act
  • U.P (Amendment) Act, 1973, (U.P Act VIII of 1973)
  • Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred
  • Act. Unlike S. 9(2) of the other Act Sec. 6
  • Land Holdings Amendment Act, 1972
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Ravi Kiran Jain
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • B.D Agrawal, J.
Acts
  • 19(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act
  • Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Holdings Act
  • U.P (Amendment) Act, 1973, (U.P Act VIII of 1973)
  • Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred
  • Act. Unlike S. 9(2) of the other Act Sec. 6
  • Land Holdings Amendment Act, 1972
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two connected writ petitions under Article 226 directed against an order dated 9 November 1982 of the District Judge, Dehra Dun, in proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Act).

Facts (as stated in the opinion): - Lieutenant Colonel D. Sanyal (the objector) was the owner of premises No. 26-B, Mohini Road, Dehra Dun, comprising three dwelling units; total area 7,395 square meters; covered area 554 square meters. - On commencement of the Act, the objector filed a statement under Section 6(1) asserting no surplus vacant land. - On 23 March 1977 the objector executed a will bequeathing the property to his three grandsons; the objector died on 21 April 1977. The legatees subsequently filed statements under Section 15 of the Act. - The competent authority held that the assessment of surplus vacant land must be made with reference to the date of commencement of the Act (17 February 1976) and not a later date; and, applying Section 4(9), found excess vacant land to be 3,841 square meters (competent authority finding). - An appeal under Section 33 was filed in the District Judge's court. The District Judge affirmed the reference-date principle but recalculated the excess under Section 4(9) as 1,841 square meters. - Brigadier M.C. Sanyal (one legatee and executor) filed Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1983; the State filed another petition (Writ Petition No. 1583 of 1983) challenging the appellate court's computation under Section 4(9). Both petitions were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the determination of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit must be made with reference to the commencement of the Act (17 February 1976) or may be made with reference to a later date (for example, date of death of the original owner or the date when determination is made).
  2. Whether the shares/bequests to the legatees under the will executed on 23 March 1977 can be taken into account in computing the extent of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit.
  3. How Section 4(9) of the Act is to be applied in computing the covered area, appurtenant land and additional land for each dwelling unit (i.e., the correct computation of excess vacant land under the Act, as informed by the Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Brigadier M.C. Sanyal / counsel Sri Ravi Kiran Jain)

  • The objector retained title until his death on 21 April 1977, and therefore the determination of excess vacant land in relation to the legatees should be with reference to a date later than 17 February 1976 (for example, the date of death or the date of decision), not the commencement date of the Act.
  • Section 3 of the Act is subject to other provisions of the Act; the petitioner relied on provisions (including an analogy drawn from R. 19(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act) to argue that post-commencement events (such as the will and death) should affect computation.

State's Position (as represented in the proceedings)

  • The State's position, accepted by the competent authority and the District Judge on the reference-date point, is that the general rule of Section 3 applies and the determination of excess vacant land must be made with reference to the commencement of the Act (17 February 1976).
  • The State also contended (and the Court accepted) that the correct application of Section 4(9), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson, results in the excess vacant land being 3,841 square meters; the respondent's counsel conceded that if the petitioner's primary point failed, the excess would be 3,841 square meters.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Horam Singh v. District Judge, (1978 All WC 758 : 1979 All LJ 85) Interpretation of a provision (R.19(2)) under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act — specifically the effect of a tenure-holder's death before publication of a general notice under that Act's Section 9(2). The Court examined this Division Bench decision and concluded that rather than supporting the petitioner's contention, the Horam Singh decision aligns more with the State's position. However, the court distinguished the schemes — observing the procedures under the two Acts are not identical — and therefore did not treat Horam Singh as directly controlling in favour of the petitioner.
State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson, (1983) 4 SCC 110 : AIR 1983 SC 1303 (decided 8 Sept. 1983) Interpretation of Section 4(9) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act — in particular, treatment of covered area plus appurtenant/additional land in calculating exclusion for dwelling units (and related computation rules). The Court held that the District Judge erred in computation and that, following the Supreme Court's interpretation in L.J. Johnson, the correct method requires counting the covered area plus 1,000 square meters for each of the three dwelling units (including appurtenant/additional land), leading to a covered-plus-appurtenant total of 3,554 sq. m. and thus excess vacant land of 3,841 sq. m., as found by the competent authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, each tied to particular statutory provisions and factual circumstances expressly set out in the opinion:

  1. Reference Date under Section 3:

    The court began from the language of Section 3 which, subject to "except as otherwise provided in this Act", declares that from the commencement of the Act (17 February 1976) no one shall hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The court examined the other provisions of the Act to see if any permitted a departure from the commencement-date reference.

  2. Examination of Other Provisions (Sections 19–22, 20, 21, 22):

    The court reviewed Sections 19 (categories excluded), 20 (power to grant exemptions), 21 (use-for-weaker-sections declaration), and 22 (retention after destruction by vis major) and found none applied to the petitioner’s case. The petitioner did not claim exemption or reliance on any of these special provisions, so none provided a basis for using a date other than the commencement date.

  3. Section 5(1) and Transfers between the Appointed Day and Commencement:

    The court considered Section 5(1), which treats transfers made between the appointed day and commencement as relevant to computation. Far from supporting the petitioner's position, Section 5(1) indicates that transfers after the appointed day cannot be used to escape inclusion in the ceiling calculation; the provision thus lends support to the State’s position that the relevant reference point is the commencement of the Act.

  4. Section 15(1) (Acquisition After Commencement) — Inapplicability:

    The court explained Section 15(1) applies when a person who already held vacant land on the commencement acquires additional vacant land thereafter (by inheritance, bequest, purchase, etc.) and that such post-commencement acquisition triggers filing duties and procedures under Section 15. In the present case, the legatees had not held land on the commencement date — their sole claim arose from the bequest of 23 March 1977 — so Section 15(1) does not apply.

  5. Effect of Death of the Objector Before Completion of Administrative Steps:

    The court noted that although the objector died before the draft statement was issued under Section 8(3), the objector had nonetheless been within the purview of the Act from its commencement. Title remained with the objector until death, but the determination of what constituted excess vacant land was governed by the Act and could be completed posthumously with legatees representing the deceased's estate. The fact that determination occurred after his death did not vitiate the applicability of the Act or require a later reference date.

  6. Comparison with UP Ceiling Act jurisprudence (Horam Singh):

    The court considered counsel's reliance on R.19(2) and Horam Singh (interpreting the UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act) and explained that although Horam Singh dealt with post-death application of an Act where a general notice under Section 9(2) had not been published before death, the scheme of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act differs materially. In the present Act, Section 6(1) operates from the commencement without the need for a general notice, and Rule 3 prescribes 212 days; thus the objector was brought within the Act's operation from its commencement, making Horam Singh inapposite to the petitioner's advantage.

  7. Application of Section 4(9) and Reliance on State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson:

    The court found the appellate authority had erred in its computation under Section 4(9). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson (1983), the court accepted the principle that for each dwelling unit one must count the covered area plus 1,000 square meters (including appurtenant/additional land where applicable) in computing exclusion under Section 4(9). Applying that interpretation to the admitted facts (three dwelling units; covered area 554 sq. m.), the computation of covered-plus-appurtenant amounted to 3,554 sq. m. Against a ceiling of 2,000 sq. m. in that agglomeration, the resulting vacant land in excess is 3,841 sq. m., as found by the competent authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1983 (Brigadier M.C. Sanyal v. District Judge, Dehra Dun) and allowed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1583 of 1983 (State of U.P. v. Brigadier M.C. Sanyal).

Direct Consequences and Directions:

  • The appellate authority was directed to redetermine the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in accordance with law and the observations contained in the opinion (in particular taking into account the Supreme Court's interpretation in State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson for applying Section 4(9)).
  • Costs were awarded on parties.
  • An oral application for a certificate under Article 134A read with Article 133(1) of the Constitution (sought by counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1073) was refused on the ground that the case did not involve a substantial question of law of general importance requiring Supreme Court decision.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing statutory rules and the Supreme Court's L.J. Johnson interpretation of Section 4(9) to the facts; the judgment does not announce any novel legal principle beyond the application and distinction of established provisions and precedent, and does not purport to set a new precedent in itself.

Show full summary ...

    M.C. Sanyal v. District Judge

    1. These connected petitions under Art. 226 of the constitution are directed against an order passed by the District Judge, Dehra Dun, dated Nov. 9, 1982, in proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

    2. One Lieutenant Colonel D. Sanyal was owner of the premises No. 26-B, Mohini Road, Dehra Dun, comprising of three dwelling units and having the total area of 7395 square meters. The covered area is 554 square meters. Upon the commencement of the Act, D. Sanyal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Objector’) put in statement under S. 6(1) asserting that there was no surplus vacant land held by him. On March 23, 1977, he executed a will whereby he bequeathed the property to his three grandsons. The objector died on April 21, 1977. The legatees filed statements thereafter under S. 15 of the Act. The competent authority was of the view that the shares of these legatees under the will could not be taken into account inasmuch as the determination of the extent of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit was to be made in reference to the date of the commencement of the Act and not with reference to the period subsequent thereto. He also was of the view that regard been had to the S. 4(9) the land to be treated as vacant over and above the ceiling limit is 3841 square meters. Against this decision of the competent authority dated Nov. 17, 1980, there was appeal filed under S. 33 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge. The District Judge affirmed the finding of the competent authority to the effect that the determination of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has to be in reference to the date of the enforcement of the Act and not in reference to the date of the death of the objector. As regards the application of S. 4(9) of the Act, however, the decision taken was that the vacant land over and above the ceiling limit is 1841 square meters only. Brigadier M.C Sanyal one of the legatees, under the will dated March 23, 1977, and also the executor has preferred the writ petition 1073 of 1983. The other petition has been filed by the State, which assails the view taken by the appellate authority in regard to the application of S. 4(9) of the Act. Both these petitions were heard together.

    3. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner in writ petition No. 1073 of 1983, argued that the objector, to whom the building in question belonged, died before this could vest in the State under S. 10(3) of the Act. The title was retained by the objector till his death, which took place on April 21, 1977. According to him, the determination of the vacant land in relation to the legatees be with reference to the date on which the decision is arrived at and not as on Feb. 17, 1976. It was further submitted that S. 3 is subject to what is otherwise provided in the Act. Reference was also, in this connection, made by the learned counsel to R. 19(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act.

    4. In my opinion none of these contentions is possessed of merit.

    5. In this State to which the Act applies in the first instance, the appointed day is Jan. 28, 1976, vide Sec. 2(a)(i) this being the day when the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976, was introduced in the Parliament. The date of the commencement of the Act is Feb. 17, 1976, vide S. 1(3). Sec. 3 reads as under:—

    “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1.”

    6. The general provision contained in Sec. 3 is that a person is not entitled to hold on and from the commencement of this Act, that is, Feb. 17, 1976, vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. This general rule is accompanied with a qualifying clause in the shape of the words “Except as otherwise provided in this Act”. It may, therefore, be scrutinised as to what are such other provisions in contemplation herein. Section 19 lays down certain provisions and is to the effect that Chapter III (Ceiling on Vacant Land) comprising of Ss. 3 to 24 does not apply to certain vacant land. The instant case is not claimed to be covered under any of the categories enumerated in this section. Provision is made in S. 20 for the power of the State Government to grant exemption and permit a person to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. It is not said that there is any exemption granted by the State Government to the petitioner. In S. 21 we find it provided that in certain cases excess vacant land is not to be treated as excess. Those are cases where the person holding any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit makes declaration in the prescribed form before the competent authority that such land is to be utilised for the construction of dwelling unit for the accommodation of the weaker sections of the society in accordance with the approved scheme. Nothing of the sort is averred in the present (case?), there is neither any such declaration nor any intention suggested to build for the weaker sections. Section 22 permits retention of vacant land under certain circumstances where the building is destroyed or demolished solely due to the vis major and this also is not attracted to the present (case?). Sri Jain, the learned counsel, does not cover the case under any of these provisions nor is there any other thing referred to by him which may be said to lay down any departure from the general provision contained in S. 3 suggesting that the extent of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit may be in reference to any date other than the commencement of the Act.

    7. Learned counsel points to S. 5(1) in this connection. The provision made therein is to i the effect that where any person, who had held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at any time during Jan. 23, 1976 (the appointed day) and Feb. 17, 1976 (the commencement of the Act) has transferred such land or part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, the extent of such land so transferred shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person and the excess vacant land in relation to such person shall be I selected, so far as possible out of the vacant land held by him after such transfer. Instead of supporting the petitioner's contention, the provision lends assistance to what the State contends in this case. According to this provision the transfer made before the commencement of the Act, but after the appointed day, is not allowed to escape in the calculation made of the extent of the vacant land. To the transferee in such a case there is in the nature of a concession inasmuch as the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit may be carved out of other such vacant land but with this rider that in case vacant land found in excess is not satisfied by this mode, the area covered shall also be rendered liable to be taken over. This cannot be taken to suggest by any means that the determination of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit can be with reference to any period other than the commencement of the Act. Section 15 is also referred to by the learned counsel. Sub-Section (1) thereof reads as under:—

    “If, on or after the commencement of this Act, any person acquires by inheritance, settlement or bequest from any other person or by sale in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of an award or order of any other authority or by purchase or otherwise, any vacant land the extent of which together with the extent of the vacant land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling limit, then, he shall, within three months of the date of such acquisition, file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all the vacant lands held by him and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain.”

    8. Section 15 is in reference to a case where a person already held vacant land on the commencement of the Act and he acquires by inheritance, bequest, or sale in execution of decree or order of a civil court or an award or order of any authority or by purchase or otherwise some other vacant land subsequent to the commencement of the Act. In that event the determination of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit held by such a person is to be made in accordance with the procedure laid herein. The underlying requisite to invoke S. 15(1) is that thereby vacant land in excess of; the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act and there is addition over the same by virtue of some subsequent event as narrated therein. The instant, on the contrary, is a case where admittedly none of the legatees of the objector held any land of their own on the commencement of the Act. The case set up on the petitioner's side, has throughout been that the only property, which the legatees own, is that which was bequeathed on March 23, 1977, in their favour by the objector. It follows clearly, therefore, that S. 15(1) is inapplicable.

    9. It is true that the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit does not vest in the State till the stage of the notification under S. 10(3) arrives. Under the scheme of the Act, every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act is required under S. 6 read with R. 3 to file a statement before the competent authority within a period of 212 days from the commencement of the Act. Such a statement had been filed by the objector contending, however, that there was no excess vacant land held by him. Draft statement, accompanied with notice, is issued by the competent authority under S. 8(3); the objections are required to be decided by him under sub-s. (4). The final statement is drawn thereafter under S. 9 and the notice thereof is given to the objector. Section 10(1) envisages that after the service of the final statement competent authority shall notify the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that such vacant land is to be acquired by the State Government. In case any other person has claim with respect of such land, he may put in the same and the objection has to be decided by the competent authority. The competent authority thereafter, issues notification under S. 10(3) declaring the excess vacant land referred to in the notification under sub-s. (1) to vest in the State with effect from such date as is specified in the declaration. The land is then deemed to have been acquired by the State Government upon the publication of such notification. The objector in this case died before the draft statement was issued under S. 8(3), meaning thereby that he retained title to the land till his death. This retention of title by him was, however, ever since, the enforcement of the Act subject to determination of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The fact that this determination could not take place during his life time is of little consequence. This could be made under the law with the legatees representing the estate subsequent to the death of the objector. They have stepped into the shoes of the deceased, the determination is not adversely affected due to the fact that the individual, who held the land on the commencement of the Act, no longer services.

    10. Learned counsel laid emphasis upon R. 19(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act and made a reference to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1978 All WC 758 : (1979 All LJ 85) (Horam Singh v. District Judge). A careful perusal of this decision shows that instead of supporting the petitioner's contention it is more in accord with what the State submits herein. Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Holdings Act declares that on and from June 8, 1973, no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him. Section 9(2) contains the provision relevant to give effect to this declaration. It says that after June 8, 1973, when the U.P (Amendment) Act, 1973, (U.P Act VIII of 1973) came into force the prescribed authority shall by general notice call upon every tenure-holder holding land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him on the enforcement of that Act to submit to him within thirty days of publication of such notice a statement as required under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 9. It will thus be noticed that in view of Sec. 9(2) a person could not fall within the purview of that Act until the prescribed authority had by general notice called upon tenure-holders holding land in excess of the veiling area to submit the prescribed statement. The decision taken by the Division Bench was that in case the tenure-holder concerned died before the issue of general notice by the prescribed authority under Sec. 9(2) he could not be said to be brought within the purview of the Act and since this was the position under the Act, R. 19(2) as then in force providing that where a tenure-holder died before the publication of the general notice under Sec. 9 such publication shall be deemed to apply to his legal representatives et cetera and the prescribed authority may proceed to determine the ceiling area applicable to the deceased person as if the legal representatives et cetera were the tenure-holders could not be sustained. The provision in this rule, it was found in consequence, did not have its base in the Act itself. Where, however, the death of the tenure-holder takes place subsequent to the publication of the general notice under Sec. 9(2), it would be immaterial and the land held by him in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on June 8, 1973, would be immaterial and the land held by him in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on June 8, 1973, would come within the purview of the Act. The Division Bench accordingly observed (at P. 90-91 of All LJ):—

    “Position of a tenure-holder who held land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him on the date when U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Amendment Act, 1972 came into force and who died after the general notice under Sec. 9(2) of the Act had been issued, is, however, slightly different. In his case as soon as the general notice under Sec. 9(2) of the Act was issued, the land held by him in excess of ceiling area applicable to him as on 8-6-1973 came within the purview of the Act and, notwithstanding any subsequent event, the surplus land held by him on 8-6-1973 was to be acquired by the State. Once a tenure-holder has been called upon to submit a statement of his holding and he failed to submit the same for any reason whatsoever, the provisions contained in Sections 10 to 12 of the Act which deal with procedure for declaration of surplus land for its acquisition became applicable.”

    11. Under the Act, however, the scheme in this behalf is not identical with that contemplated under S. 9(2) referred to above. In accordance with Sec. 3 the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is in reference to the commencement of the Act. S. 6(1) requires every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act to file a statement before the competent authority within such period as may be prescribed. The period prescribed under R. 3 is 212 days from the commencement of the Act. Unlike S. 9(2) of the other Act Sec. 6 does not require a general notice to issue by the competent authority in order that a person may be brought within the purview thereof. It may not, therefore, be said that, the Act had not become applicable to the objection before his death, which took place on April 21, 1977. The objector was brought within its purview as soon as the Act commenced. The well settled principle of interpretation applied also in relation to this Act is that the language of beneficial statute must be construed so as to avoid the mischief and advance its object.

    12. Taking up the other writ petition filed by the State, the error in the computation of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit made by the learned District Judge is manifest. The appellate authority did not have the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P v. L.J Johnson, (1983) 4 SCC 110 : AIR 1983 SC 1303 (decided on 8th Sept. 1983). The admitted facts are that the total area of land held by the objector on the commencement of the Act was 7395 square meters. This comprises of three dwelling units. In the light of the interpretation of S. 4(9) by the Supreme Court in L.J Johnson case (supra) this covered area plus 1000 square meters in respect of each of the three dwelling units if the land appurtenant and the additional land for the more convenient enjoyment thereof has also to be taken into account in computing the extent of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The ceiling limit in this agglomeration is 2000 square meters. The total of the covered area plus the appurtenant and additional land comes to 3554 square meters. The vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit would thus be 3841 square meters as found by the competent authority and the learned counsel for the respondent in this writ petition also concedes that in case his point of objection raised in the other writ petition is not accepted the extent of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit shall be 3841 square meters.

    13. Having regard to the discussion made in the above, the Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1983 (Brigadior M.C Sanyal v. District Judge, Dehra Dun) fails and is dismissed. The Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1583 of 1983 (State of U.P v. Brigadior M.C Sanyal) is allowed. The appellate authority is directed to redetermine the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. Costs on parties.

    14. Immediately after the pronouncement of this judgment, oral application was made by Sri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1983 (Brigadier M.C Sanyal v. District Judge, Dehra Dun) for the grant of certificate under Art. 134A read with Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.

    15. In my opinion the case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance requiring decision of the Supreme Court. The certificate asked for is refused.

    16. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    M.C. Sanyal v. District Judge
    (Nov 14, 1984)