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  • Sec. 209(b) of the Cr. P.C Unlike Section 344 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 209(b)
  • Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Sections 395/397, I.P.C Police Station
  • Section 209, Cr. P.C
  • Section 209(b)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 209(b) of the Cr. P.C Unlike Section 344 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 209(b)
  • Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Sections 395/397, I.P.C Police Station
  • Section 209, Cr. P.C
  • Section 209(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (H.N. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Rajendra Gosain, detained in District Jail, Banda since 11 August 1979, filed a petition under Article 226 seeking a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of his detention. He alleged contraventions of Article 22 of the Constitution and of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) and contended there was no valid court order authorising his continued custody.

The respondents stated that the petitioner was first lodged on 12 August 1979 on a remand warrant in Crime Case No. 323 of 1978 (S. 396 IPC) and subsequently remanded in connection with three other cases: Crime Case No. 67 of 1979 (Ss. 395/397 IPC, Police Station Raipura — leading to Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980), Crime Case No. 256 of 1978 (Ss. 395/397 IPC, Police Station Karvi), and Crime Case No. 42 of 1979 (Ss. 395/397 IPC, Police Station Mau). The petitioner's detention in relation to Crime Case No. 67 of 1979 was said to have been authorised by a warrant issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda on 10 September 1980 under S. 209(b) Cr. P.C and subsequently endorsed by the Sessions Court. The respondents produced original authorisation documents for the court's perusal.

The High Court framed the enquiry to determine whether the present detention was validly authorised in respect of any one of the three pending cases. The court observed that if detention was valid in any one case, it would not be open to it to issue a writ of habeas corpus for release.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's present detention is validly authorised in respect of any of the three criminal cases in which he is being held (particularly Crime Case No. 67 of 1979 / Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980).
  2. Whether, under S. 209(b) Cr. P.C., a Magistrate committing an accused to the Court of Session can validly authorise detention of the accused in jail "during and until the conclusion of the trial".
  3. What is the interplay between the specific provision S. 209 Cr. P.C. and the more general provision S. 309 Cr. P.C. (including the 15-day limit on remands under S. 309) when an accused is committed to Sessions?
  4. Whether procedural deficiencies alleged by the petitioner (absence of an order-sheet entry for 10 September 1980; wording of the custody warrant) vitiate the Magistrate's order of 10 September 1980.
  5. Whether a subsequent valid order of detention can prevent release even if prior detention was alleged to have been invalid.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that none of the three cases furnished a valid authority for his present detention; therefore he should be released.
  • Challenged the validity of the order dated 10 September 1980 on several grounds: there was no order-sheet entry for that date (suggesting he was not produced), the custody warrant did not explicitly state detention "during and until conclusion of the trial" and at best authorised custody only until 24 September 1980 (the first production date), and subsequent endorsements by officers other than the committing Magistrate could not validly authorise continued detention beyond that date.
  • Contended that after commitment to Sessions any remand beyond the commitment must be authorised by the Sessions Judge (relying on S. 309 Cr. P.C.), and absent such authorisation the detention was invalid.
  • Argued that if detention before 10 September 1980 was illegal, it could not be validated by the order of 10 September 1980, and therefore the petitioner should have been set at liberty on that date; invoked Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that the petitioner's detention was justified and authorised by appropriate criminal courts; originals of the warrants and authorisations were produced.
  • Specifically relied on the order dated 10 September 1980 under S. 209(b) Cr. P.C. by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, which, it was contended, validly authorised detention in judicial custody "during and until the conclusion of the trial".
  • Argued that the dates on the back of the warrant were for production before the Sessions Court and did not limit the authority to detain to the first date; thus if detention was valid under any one of the three cases, habeas corpus could not be granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court
Urooj Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973 Cr LJ 1458) Interpretation of old Cr. P.C. S. 344 about warrants and successive remands; whether a warrant form can validly cover successive remands. The court distinguished Urooj Abbas because that decision concerned S. 344 of the old Code; S. 209(b) Cr. P.C. (present case) contemplates a different mode (a single authorisation to detain during and until conclusion), so Urooj Abbas did not help the petitioner.
Basanta Chandra v. Emperor (AIR 1945 FC 18) Where a valid order directing detention is produced at any time before release, the court cannot direct release merely because earlier stages lacked valid cause. The court relied on this principle to hold that a later valid order (10 Sept. 1980) could prevent release even if earlier detention had been challenged.
Kunjan v. State (1980 Luck LJ 119) Held (by Division Bench) that S. 209(b) remands are subject to S. 309's 15‑day limitation; i.e., Magistrate's remand power under S. 209 limited by S. 309. The court rejected the relevance of Kunjan to the present facts, holding that Kunjan's ratio does not apply to a situation where, after commitment to Sessions, the Magistrate in the commitment order authorises detention "during and until conclusion" under S. 209(b).
Luxmi Brahmin v. State (1975 Luck LJ 364) Earlier Division Bench decision referenced in the Kunjan discussion (no separate rule recited in the opinion). The court noted Kunjan had doubted Luxmi Brahmin but found those discussions not determinative of the present S. 209 power exercised on commitment.
Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi (AIR 1953 SC 277) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). The court recorded that this and several other authorities were cited by petitioner but found that none addressed the specific scope of S. 209 when committing to Sessions; they did not run counter to the court's reasoning.
Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v. D.M., Azamgarh (AIR 1959 All 384) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner among others; court found it not directly relevant to the S. 209 issue.
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 740) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court concluded it did not bear on S. 209's scope for commitment remands.
In re Madhu Limaye ((1969) 1 SCC 292 : AIR 1969 SC 1014) Case(s) cited by petitioner (constitutional/procedural jurisprudence referenced broadly). Cited by petitioner; court observed these authorities did not address the specific question of S. 209 commitment remands.
A. Laxman Rao v. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram ((1970) 3 SCC 501 : AIR 1971 SC 186) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court stated it did not affect the S. 209 issue before it.
Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti ((1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Referred to by petitioner; court noted no direct bearing on S. 209 authority to detain on commitment.
Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M., Monghyr ((1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner among several; court held it did not contradict the court's interpretation of S. 209.
Gauri Shankar Jha v. State of Bihar ((1972) 1 SCC 564 : AIR 1972 SC 711) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court found no inconsistency between it and the present decision on S. 209.
Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa (AIR 1975 SC 1465) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court said it did not bear on the narrow question of S. 209's power on commitment.
Raghuvendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1976 Luck LJ 37) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court found it not directly relevant to the S. 209 issue.
Sayeed Ahmad v. State (1978 Cr LJ 541 (All)) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court recorded it as not addressing the scope of S. 209 on commitment remands.
Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597) Constitutional case on personal liberty cited by petitioner. Cited; court observed that although many constitutional and procedural cases were cited, none dealt specifically with whether S. 209 authorised detention "during and until conclusion" on commitment.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1360) and (1980) 1 SCC 108 (AIR 1979 SC 1377) Cases addressing speedy trial and liberty issues, cited by petitioner. Cited by petitioner; court noted these decisions did not consider the precise point about S. 209 commitment remands and therefore did not run counter to the court's conclusion.
Mantoo Majumdar v. State of Bihar ((1980) 2 SCC 406 : AIR 1980 SC 847) Case cited by petitioner (context not elaborated in the opinion). Cited by petitioner; court concluded it was not directly material to the S. 209 question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court adopted a sequential, text-focused analysis directed primarily at Crime Case No. 67 of 1979 (Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980). The main points of its reasoning were:

  1. Examination of documentary record: The Chief Judicial Magistrate's order dated 10 September 1980 committed the petitioner to the Court of Session for trial under Ss. 395/397 IPC and, in translation, expressly directed that the accused "shall remain in judicial custody during and until conclusion of the trial" and that he be sent to jail for that purpose. An authorisation slip / custody warrant prepared the same day instructed the Superintendent of District Jail, Banda to keep the accused in custody and to produce him on dates shown on the reverse.
  2. Production and order-sheet issue: The petitioner argued there was no order-sheet entry for 10 September 1980 and so he was not produced that day. The court noted the absence of a written order-sheet entry but pointed to signatures and margin notations on the earlier order-sheet (signature and date marks indicating 24 September 1980, with signatures/thumb impressions of the accused) and to contemporaneous proceedings in another case in which the petitioner was produced on 10 September 1980. The court concluded the petitioner had in fact been produced and the order was made in his presence despite a clerical failure to record the order-sheet entry.
  3. Interpretation of the custody warrant and its dates: The court analysed the two parts of the custody warrant — (a) an authorisation to keep the accused in custody and (b) a direction to produce him before court on specified dates. It held the back-of-warrant dates were for production only and were not intended as limiting the period of authorised detention. Reading the warrant in the light of the committing order, the first part must be read as authorising detention "during and until conclusion of the Sessions trial", even though the words of duration were not repeated in the warrant's first part.
  4. Statutory analysis — S. 209(b) Cr. P.C.: The court quoted and analysed S. 209 (post-amendment) and observed that it expressly empowers a Magistrate who commits an accused to Sessions to remand the accused "during and until the conclusion of the trial." The court concluded that when a Magistrate makes an order under S. 209 committing an accused, he can validly authorise detention for the whole of the sessions trial.
  5. Interplay between S. 209 and S. 309 Cr. P.C.: The petitioner argued S. 309 (which contains a proviso limiting remand by a Magistrate to fifteen days at a time) governed and therefore S. 209 could not authorise detention beyond fifteen days at a time. The court reasoned that S. 309 is a general provision while S. 209 is a special provision enabling commitment with an express power to remand "during and until conclusion." As a special provision, S. 209 governs in its domain and is not derogated by S. 309; the fifteen‑day proviso in S. 309 applies only to remands made under S. 309 itself. The court therefore rejected the contention that S. 309 curtailed the effect of a S. 209 commitment warrant.
  6. Treatment of authorities cited: The court considered the petitioner's reliance on Kunjan (which suggested S. 209 remands were subject to S. 309) and Urooj Abbas (on successive remands under the old S. 344). It distinguished Urooj Abbas on the basis that S. 209 differs from the old S. 344. Regarding Kunjan, the court held its ratio was not applicable to the second-stage S. 209 commitment situation before it. The court further observed that many constitutional and personal liberty cases cited by counsel did not directly address the precise statutory question of S. 209's scope on commitment.
  7. Subsequent valid order and effect on prior detention: Relying on Basanta Chandra, the court held that if at any time before the court directs release a valid order authorising detention is produced, the court cannot direct release merely because earlier detention was invalid. Thus, the valid S. 209 order of 10 September 1980 (found to be valid) precluded release on habeas corpus even if earlier stages were defective.
  8. Conclusion from analysis: The court concluded that the Magistrate's order of 10 September 1980 validly authorised detention in relation to Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980 and therefore the Superintendent was entitled to continue custody until conclusion of that trial or until the petitioner obtained bail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court held that the custody warrant and the committing order dated 10 September 1980 under S. 209(b) Cr. P.C validly authorised the petitioner's detention in District Jail, Banda, during and until the conclusion of Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980, and therefore a writ of habeas corpus directing release could not be issued.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner remains detained under the valid order relating to Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980 until that trial concludes or until he obtains bail; the High Court declined to examine the validity of detention in the other two cases because validity in this one case was sufficient to deny the writ.
  • On precedent and general law: The court interpreted S. 209 as a specific statutory authority permitting a Magistrate, on committing an accused to Sessions, to authorise detention "during and until conclusion of the trial," and held that S. 309 does not nullify that specific authority. The court distinguished prior authorities that dealt with other statutory provisions or different factual matrices and declined to treat them as controlling on this point.
  • No declaration that broader constitutional provisions (e.g., Article 21 or Article 22) are invalid or overridden: the petitioner did not challenge the vires of S. 209, and the court did not find a contravention of Article 21 on the facts once the S. 209 order was held valid.
  • On prospective practice: The court expressed the view that, for clarity and to avoid confusion, committing Magistrates should expressly state in the warrant that detention is authorised "during and until conclusion of the Sessions trial" when exercising S. 209 powers; this is advisory and directed at avoiding future ambiguity.
  • Precedential outcome: The opinion applies existing principles to the facts and interprets S. 209 in the specific factual context; the court did not record that it was creating a novel general rule beyond that statutory interpretation. If no broader implications were intended, the immediate consequence remains the denial of the writ and continued custody.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

    Rajendra Gosain v. Superintendent, District Jail

    H.N Seth, J.:— By this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, petitioner Rajendra Gosain who is being detained in the District Jail, Banda ever since 11th Aug., 1979, challenges the validity of his detention and prays for a writ of habeas corpus. According to him, his detention has been rendered invalid inasmuch as the persons responsible for the same have contravened the provisions of. Art. 22 of the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also claims that as at present there is no valid order from any competent Court authorising the Superintendent of District Jail, Banda to keep him in custody, he is entitled to be set at liberty forthwith.

    2. The case of the respondents, on the other hand is that to begin with the petitioner was lodged in the District Jail Banda on 12th Aug., 1979 in pursuance of a warrant of remand in criminal case No. 323 of 1978 under S. 396, I.P.C Subsequently petitioner's detention was also authorised under remand warrants issued by criminal Courts in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979 under S. 395/397, I.P.C Police Station Raipura, Crime case No. 256 of 1978 under Ss. 395/397, I.P.C Police Station Karvi, and crime case No. 42 of 1979 under Sections 395/397, I.P.C Police Station Mau. Although the petitioner has been discharged in crime case No. 323 of 1978, lie continues to be under detention in connection with remaining three cases. According to the respondents, the petitioner has been, in connection with crime case No. 42 of 1979 committed to Court of Session on 23rd May, 1980 (S.T No. 162 of 1980) and his detention during the pendency of the Sessions trial is authorised under a warrant under S. 290(b), Cr. P.C Issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda on 23rd May, 1980. It has also been authorised by subsequent endorsement made by the Sessions Court on the back of the warrant. Likewise the petitioner has been committed to Court of Session in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979 on 10th Sept., 1980 (S.T No. 366 of 1980) and his detention during the pendency of the trial has been authorised by the Chief Judicial Magistrate by means of a warrant under S. 209(b) Cr. P.C issued at the time of making of the order for petitioner's commitment. So far crime case No. 256 of 1978 is concerned, the proceedings for petitioner's commitment are going on and he is being duly remanded to jail custody and is being detained in that, connection under remand orders made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda from time to time. The Superintendent of the District Jail, Banda has also produced the originals of the authority on the basis of which the petitioner is being detained by him in connection with the three cases for our perusal.

    3. Sri D.S Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, who argued the case before us with great tenacity tried to make out that in none of the three cases, in connection with which the petitioner is at present being confined in the District Jail, Banda, is there a valid authority enabling the Jail authorities to detain the petitioner. He thus claimed that the petitioner is entitled to be released forthwith. Sri Malviya, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents, refuted the submission made by Sri Misra and contended that present detention of the petitioner in connection with the three cases is fully justified under the authority of criminal Courts, validly exercised. He further contended that if it is found that there exists a valid authority to detain the petitioner in the District Jail. Banda even in one of the three cases, it will not be possible for this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and to direct his release.

    4. We agree with the submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate that if the petitioner is, at present being validly detained in connection with any of the three cases in which he is involved, it will not be possible for this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and to direct his being released from custody. We have, therefore, to examine the facts and circumstances of each of the three cases in connection with which the petitioner is being, at present detained in District Jail, Banda one after the other, and to find whether his present detention has been validly authorised in any one of them. If it is found that petitioner's present detention is justified in any of the three cases, it will not be necessary for us to go into and scrutinize the facts and circumstances of remaining cases at this stage.

    5. We will, first of all, proceed to consider the facts and circumstances in which the petitioner is at present being detained in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979 under Ss. 395/397, I.P.C Police Station Raipura, giving rise to Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980. A perusal of the record shows that on 10th September, 1980 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda committed the petitioner to Court of Session to stand his trial for offences under Ss. 395/397, I.P.C by making an order which translated into English reads thus:—

    “Accused Rajendra Gosain, Shiv Bali and Jagat Pal have been put up before this Court by Police Station Raipura in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979 under Ss. 395/397, I.P.C As aforesaid offences are triable by Court of Session, the case is committed to Sessions and it is directed that the accused should be present in the Court of Sessions Judge on 24th Sept. 1980.

    6. Accused Shiv Bali has been granted bail by the Court and it is directed that he should continue to remain on the same bail. Accused Rajendra Gosain and Jagat Pal are in jail. It is accordingly directed that they shall remain in judicial custody during and until conclusion of the trial and they are being sent to the jail for that purpose. All necessary copies of police papers have been handed over to the accused. Necessary records and calendar should, in accordance with the rules, be submitted to be Court of Session and the Public Prosecutor be informed accordingly.”

    7. On the same day the Chief Judicial Magistrate prepared an authorisation slip requiring the Jailor, District Jail, Banda to keep the petitioner in his custody, and to produce him before the Court on the dates mentioned on its reverse. Translated into English, the authorisation slip reads thus:—

    “Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda Superintendent, District Jail, Banda, you should keep accused Rajendra Gosain, son of Nathoo, resident of Gosainpur, Police Station Rajapur, District Banda, who is required in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979 under Ss. 395/397, I.P.C Police Station Raipura, confined in your jail and you are also directed to produce the accused before the Court on the dates mentioned at the back of the warrant.”

    8. At the back of the warrant we find mention of following dates under the signatures of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and Presiding Officers of Sessions Court:—

    1. 10-9-80, 24-9-80 Sd/- Chief Judicial Magistrate 24-9-80, 3-10-80 Sd/- Presiding Officer of Sessions Court. 3-10-80, 10-10-80 Sd/- -Do- 10-10-80, 17-12-80 Sd/- -Do-

    9. We may mention here that Annexure I to the counter affidavit sworn by Sri M.L Singh appears to indicate that all the dates mentioned at the back of the warrant have been put under signatures of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, but the original produced before us indicates that it is only the first set of dates, namely, 10-9-80, 24-9-80, that appears under the signatures of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the remaining dates, namely, 24-9-80, 3-10-80, 3-10-80, 10-10-80 and 10-10-80, 17-12-80 appear under the signatures of the Presiding Officers of the Sessions Court.

    10. Learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to S. 209 of the Cr. P.C relevant portion of which as it stands after amendment made by U.P Act No. XVI of 1976, reads thus:—

    “209. When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall—

    (a) as soon as may be after complying with the provisions of S. 207, commit the case to the Court of Session.

    (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until commitment of the case under clause (a) and thereafter during and until the conclusion of the trial:

    (c) to (d) …… …… …… …… ……”

    11. He contended that under this section a power has been given to the Magistrate to, while committing the accused to stand his trial, authorise his detention in jail custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. In such a case, even though all further proceedings are to take place before the Court of Session and no proceedings are to take place before the Magistrate, the detention of the accused in jail custody can be authorized, by the Magistrate who commits the accused to Sessions. In the instant case the Magistrate has, while passing the order dated 10th of Sept., 1980, mentioned above, clearly directed that the petitioner should be kept in judicial custody in District Jail Banda during and until conclusion of the trial. The order authorising petitioner's detention in this case, therefore, is perfectly in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 209, Cr. P.C and it authorizes the Superintendent, District Jail, Banda to keep the petitioner in his custody during and till the conclusion of the Sessions Trial. The dates mentioned at the back of the warrant are the dates on which the accused was being directed to be produced by the Superintendent of the Jail before the Sessions Court and they have nothing to do with the authority of the Superintendent to keep the petitioner in his custody. Such dates could, after the first date mentioned at the back of the warrant, be indicated only by the Sessions Court and they were so indicated by it.

    12. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the authorisation relied upon by the learned Additional Government Advocate is neither valid nor can it be said to be in accordance with the provisions of S. 209 of the Cr. P.C He also contended that after an accused has been committed to the Court of Session, he can be remanded to jail custody only under the authority of the Sessions Judge and in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C As, such an authority is lacking in this case, the detention of the petitioner is invalid.

    13. In order to substantiate his submissions, the learned counsel invited our attention to the orders-sheet of the case maintained in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The last order-sheet is of the date 28th Aug., 1980, which reads thus:—

    “Case put up today. Accused Rajendra Gosain appeared before the Court under custody. Shiv Bali's application for permission to appear through counsel accepted. Jagatpal who is in jail in connection with another case has not been summoned.

    Ordered that the case be put up for orders on 10th Sept., 1980. Jagatpal and Rajendra Gosain be summoned from the jail on the same day; after supplying the copies the accused be committed.”

    14. Learned counsel contended that the fact that the Magistrate did not write any order-sheet on 10th Sept., 1980 shows that neither the petitioner was produced before the Court nor did any proceeding in the case take place on that date. An order under S. 209, Cr. P.C for committing the accused to Court of Session and remanding him to jail custody during and until conclusion of the trial could validly be made only if the accused had either appeared or had been brought before the Court. The order made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 10th Sept., 1980 committing the accused to jail custody, therefore, was invalid.

    15. It is true that the order-sheet for the date 10th Sept., 1980, has not been written and that there has been a lapse on the part of the Reader of Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court in this regard. However, the question that still remain?s to be considered is as to whether or not the order dated 10th Sept., 1980, committing the petitioner to Sessions and authorising his detention during and until conclusion of the trial, was made after producing him before the court on that date.

    16. It is significant to note that there is no averment in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner that he was not produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate before the order dated 10th Sept., 1980 committing him to Court of Session and remanding him to jail custody was made. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even though no such averment has been made in the affidavit filed on his behalf, the fact that no order-sheet was written on 10th September, 1980 and the statement appearing in Court's order of that date to the effect that “as accused Rajendra Gosain and Jagat Pal are in jail, they are remanded to jail custody during and until conclusion of the trial,” clearly indicates that the said order was made without summoning the petitioner from jail. We, however, find that below the order-sheet of 28th Aug., 1980 there is, on the left-hand-side margin of the order-sheet, a mention of the date ‘24th Sept., 1980’ and below it are found the signatures of accused Sheo Bali and the petitioner. Practice prevailing in subordinate Courts of this State is that where on a particular date proceedings are adjourned to a subsequent date, the date to which the case is adjourned is mentioned in the margin and signatures or thumb impressions of parties are obtained thereunder in token of receiving information of the date. The order-sheet is then written by the Reader who obtains the signatures of the Presiding Officer.

    17. It thus appears that signatures of Shiv Bali and Rajendra Gosain, in token of receiving information about the next date fixed in the case being 24th Sept., 1980 were obtained when the Chief Judicial Magistrate made the order on 10th Sept., 1980 committing the petitioner to Sessions and fixing 24th Sept., 1980 as the date for his production in that Court. This circumstance, in our opinion, clearly shows that the order dated 10th September, 1980 was made in presence of the petitioner. In this connection it may also be mentiond that apart from proceedings in crime case No. 67 of 1979, there were proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with crime case No. 256 of 1978 as well. Order-sheet relating to crime case No. 256 of 1978 clearly shows that the petitioner had been produced before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with that case on 10th Sept., 1980 and as necessary copies had not been received, that case was adjourned to 24th Sept., 1980. Once the accused was brought and produced before the Court in connection with crime case No. 256 of 1978, there is no reason to think that he was not produced before the Court in connection with crime case No. 67 of 1979. We are accordingly of opinion that notwithstanding the fact that the office of the Chief Judicial Magistrate has been negligent in not writing the order-sheet of the date 10th Sept., 1980 in the file of crime case, No. 67 of 1979, the order dated 10th Sept., 1980 committing the petitioner to Court of Session and also remanding him to jail custody cannot be said to vitiated for the reason that the order was made without the petitioner being produced before the Court on that date.

    18. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner next contended that even if it was possible for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to make an order on 10th Sept., 1980 directing not only that the petitioner be committed to Court of Session but that he should also be detained in jail custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, the Magistrate concerned did not in fact authorise petitioner's detention in jail during and until the conclusion of the trial. The interim custody warrant issued by him on 10th of September, 1980 merely mentions that the petitioner was being remanded to jail custody and that he should be produced before the Court on the dates mentioned on the reverse of the document. The custody warrant did not state that the petitioner shall be kept in jail custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. By the warrant the Chief Judicial Magistrate could, at best, be said to have authorised detention of the petitioner in jail custody up to 24th Sept., 1980 (the date on which he directed the accused to be produced before the Court). Thereafter the other dates on the back of the warrant were put under the signatures of an officer other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate who had remanded the petitioner to jail custody on 10th Sept., 1980. The authorisation, to detain the petitioner in jail custody after 24th Sept., 1980 thus was not under the authority of the Magistrate who committed the petitioner to Court of Session and petitioner's detention cannot be justified under the authority of an order made under S. 209, Cr. P.C

    19. A perusal of the record indicates that on 10th Sept., 1980 the Chief Judicial Magistrate had, while committing the petitioner to Sessions, as provided by S. 209, Cr. P.C specifically directed that the petitioner, who was already in jail custody, should be kept in custody during and until conclusion of the sessions trial. It was in pursuance of this order that the interim custody warrant authorising the Superintendent, District Jail, Banda to keep the petitioner in custody was prepared on 10th Sept., 1980. The custody warrant is in two parts. First part of the warrant requires the Superintendent, District Jail, Banda to keep the petitioner in his custody; the second part of the order requires him to produce the detenu before the Court on the dates mentioned on the back of that document. Reading the custody warrant in the light of the order 10th Sept., 1980, leaves no manner of doubt that in the first part of the custody warrant, the Chief Judicial Magistrate authorised petitioner's detention in the District Jail, Banda, during and until conclusion of the sessions trial even though he did not mention therein the period for which the petitioner was to be kept in jail custody. The dates indicated on the reverse of the warrant were not intended to convey the period during which the petitioner was to be kept in custody. They had been mentioned with a view to enable the Superintendent of the District Jail to produce the detenu before the Court on those dates. In these circumstances, it is difficult to read the clause in the warrant authorising petitioner's detention in jail custody with reference to various dates mentioned on the reverse of the document.

    20. A perusal of S. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that in a case where the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate and the Magistrate feels that the offence is exclusively triable by Court of Session, he has to, unless the accused has been directed to be released on bail, remand him to custody during and until conclusion of the trial. He has no option in the matter. In the circumstances where a Magistrate commits an accused to Court of Session and directs his being remanded to custody during and until conclusion of the trial, the warrant remanding him to jail custody, without specifying the period for which the accused is to be kept in custody, has necessarily to be read as an authority for detaining the accused during and until conclusion of the sessions trial.

    21. We are, however, of opinion that it would have been much better if the Magistrate had, in the first part of the warrant, specified that petitioner's detention was being authorised for the period during and until conclusion of the Sessions trial, but as stated earlier, non-mention of this fact does not mean that petitioner's detention had been authorised for any other period. There was, in our opinion, absolutely no scope for the detaining authority as well, to interpret the warrant otherwise. However, we hope that in order to avoid all confusion the Magistrates should, while committing an accused to sessions and authorising his detention in jail custody under S. 209 of the Cr. P.C mention in the warrant itself that the detention of the accused is, subject to the provision relating to bail, being authorised for the period during and until conclusion of the sessions trial.

    22. In the result, we are of the opinion that the warrant dated 10th Sept. 1980 authorising petitioner's detention during and until conclusion of the trial did not stand vitiated merely because there was no mention in the warrant, that the authority to keep the petitioner in detention was to enure only during and until conclusion of the sessions trial.

    23. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Urooj Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973 Cr LJ 1458). In that case an accused person was remanded to jail custody in exercise of powers under S. 344 of the old Cr. P.C The warrant for detention stated that the jailor was required to receive the accused in his custody and to produce him before the Court as required on the reverse of the warrant. On the reverse of the warrant dates, in tabular form, were mentioned and initialled by the Magistrate.

    24. In view of the provisions in S. 344(1A) this Court held that under this section ordinarily there has to be a warrant or written authorisation to the jailor to receive the accused in custody on each date when the accused and remanded and that in appropriate cases it is also possible to use a single form for successive remands if it is appropriately worded so as to indicate that the accused was being remanded to custody on successive dates. The learned Judges, after considering the wordings of the warrant and the manner in which the dates had been mentioned on its reverse, came to the conclusion that the warrant did not indicate that the detenu had been, by means of a warrant, remanded to jail custody on certain dates rendering his detention invalid. We, however, find that in the case before us the petitioner has been, while being committed to sessions, remanded to custody under Sec. 209(b) of the Cr. P.C Unlike Section 344 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 209(b) does not contemplote successive authorization for the jailor to receive the accused on each day when the accused appears before the court. As already indicated, Section 209(b) contemplates one older being made by the Magistrate authorising the jailor to keep the accused in custody during and until conclusion of the sessions trial. We have already mentioned the reasons for holding that the warrant issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this case contains such authorization. We are, therefore, of opinion that the decision in Urooj Abbas's case does not help the petitioner.

    25. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner then invited our attention to the provisions of S. 309 Cr. P.C relevant portion of which reads thus:—

    “(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once taken, the same shall be continued from day to day until the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.

    (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:

    Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time:

    Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing:

    Provided also ………………

    Explanations 1 & 2 ……………”

    26. He contended that after the Sessions Court took cognizance of the offence, on petitioner being committed to it, the case fell within the ambit of S. 309, Cr. P.C and any remand or authorisation for the petitioner being kept in jail custody had to be issued by the Sessions Judge himself and the provisions contained in S. 209, Cr. P.C could not be available for that purpose. Admittedly in this case there is no such authorisation by the Sessions Judge. Merely because the Sessions Judge mentioned certain dates at the back of the authorisation issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and initialled it, it did not constitute an authority by the Sessions Judge for detaining the petitioner in jail custody. As in this case there is no order by the Sessions Judge authorising petitioner's detention in jail custody, the present detention of the petitioner cannot be said to be valid.

    27. We are unable to accept this submission. S. 309, Cr. P.C is a general provision contained in the Code enabling all courts taking cognizance of an offence or commencing the trial if they find it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial, remand an accused who is already in custody. S. 209, Cr. P.C however, is a special provision which enables a Magistrate to while committing an accused to Sessions, authorise his detention during and until conclusion of the trial. It is true that generally speaking under S. 309, Cr. P.C the court taking cognizance of an offence or trying an accused finds it necessary or advisable to adjourn or postpone the commencement of an inquiry or trial, is enabled to remand an accused who is already in custody till the date on which the case is to be taken up next and the detention of the accused beyond the period mentioned in the custody warrant has to be reauthorised after expiry of that date. But, Section 209, Cr. P.C enables the Magistrate committing an accused to Sessions to pass an order in respect of the proceedings that are to take place before a court other than himself and also for the period during and until conclusion of the trial irrespective of the dates on which the accused is to be produced before the court trying the accused. Inasmuch as S. 209, Cr. P.C is a special provision dealing with special type of cases it will continue to govern the cases coming under it notwithstanding that such cases may in terms be dealt with under S. 309, Cr. P.C as well. In cases falling under S. 209, Cr. P.C it is the Magistrate committing the accused to sessions who has been empowered to validly authorise the Superintendent, of the District Jail, to keep him in his custody during and until conclusion of the sessions trial, even though it is the Sessions Court, which may be seized of the case. In such cases the authority to detain the accused flows not from an order made by the Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings are to take place but from the order made by the Magistrate under S. 209 of the Cr. P.C In our opinion nothing contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C derogates from the authority conferred by S. 209 of the Cr. P.C on the court which commits an accused to Sessions to direct his being detained during and until conclusion of the Sessions trial. Once the detention of an accused during and until conclusion of the trial has been duly authorized it would not be necessary for the Sessions Judge to, every time he adjourns or postpones the trial, confer on any one such authority for detention of the accused.

    28. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the provisions contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C make the legislative intent absolutely clear that a Magistrate is not to remand an accused to custody for a period more than fifteen days at a time, and that this intention will be completely frustrated and the salutary provision contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C would be rendered nugatory in case it is held that even when the case becomes pending before a Sessions Judge the Magistrate can direct detention of the accused for a period exceeding fifteen days at a time.

    29. In support of this submission learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kunjan v. State (1980 Luck LJ 119) wherein, after doubting the correctness of an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Luxmi Brahmin v. State (1975 Luck LJ 364) it was observed that under S. 209(b) of the Cr. P.C Magistrate's authority to remand an accused to custody till he commits the case, has to be exercised subject to the restrictions on his power contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C which disables a Magistrate from remanding a person to custody for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time. The Division Bench took this view as in its opinion the proceedings under S. 209 of the Code are proceedings for enquiry, within the meaning of S. 309 of the Cr. P.C and the Magistrate is bound to follow the general procedure under that section.

    30. In our opinion the ratio of Kunjan's case cited by the petitioner has no bearing on the facts of the present case. Provisions contained in S. 209(b) already noticed in the earlier part of this judgment clearly indicate that the power to remand the accused to custody under cl. (b) can be exercised at two different stages:—

    “(1) When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the court of Session, but the Magistrate is not in a position to, after complying with the provisions of S. 207 of the Code, commit the accused to Court of Session. He can, in such cases, remand the accused to custody until commitment of the case, and thereafter.

    (2) When, after complying with the provisions of S. 207 of the Cr. P.C the Magistrate makes an order committing the accused to court of Session. In such a case he is authorised to remand the accused to custody during and until conclusion of the trial.”

    31. Whereas, at the first of the aforementioned two stages, it may be possible to say that some enquiry, governed by the provisions contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C continues to be pending before a Magistrate and as such the power of a Magistrate to remand the accused to custody under Section 209 of the Cr. P.C until commitment of the case, continues to be governed by the restrictions contained in Section 309 of the Cr. P.C (it is not necessary for us to subscribe our assent to the aforesaid proposition), it can, in a case after it reaches the second stage and the Magistrate makes an order committing the accused to Sessions, by no stretch of imagination, be said that any enquiry or trial continues to be pending before a Magistrate, to which the provisions contained in Section 309 can be made applicable. We are accordingly of opinion that whatever may be the position regarding inter play of S. 309 of the Code on the provisions contained in S. 209 thereof, in connection with the power of Magistrate to remand an accused to custody till the commitment of the case, it is not at all relevant for determining the scope of the power of a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody while committing him to Sessions. We are, therefore, of opinion that the observations made by this Court in Kunjan's case (1980 Luck LJ 119) do not help the petitioner's submission.

    32. Moreover, it is in our opinion open to the Competent Legislature to confer on any authority the power to detain a person in different circumstances and that the power may also extend to enable such authority to, in different circumstances, authorise detention of a person for different periods. What S. 309 of the Cr. P.C lays down is that in a case where the Magistrate trying a case or holding an inquiry considers it necessary or expedient to postpone or adjourn the hearing or commencement of any inquiry or trial by him, he can, if the accused is already in custody, remand him to custody for a period not exceeding fifteen days at a time. The proviso specifically says that the restriction that the remand shall not be made for more than fifteen days at a time shall apply only to such cases where it is so made under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This restriction would not apply to a case where the Magistrate remands and authorises detention of an accused in jail custody under a provision other than S. 309 of the Cr. P.C Apart from the fact that S. 209 of the Cr. P.C in so many words states that the Magistrate is entitled to authorise detention of a person in judicial custody during and until conclusion of a Session trial, Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure very clearly indicates that the restriction on the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused to custody for a period not exceeding fifteen days would not be applicable to remands made under any other section.

    33. In these circumstances, the ambit of the power of a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, without specifying the exact period which may exceed fifteen days, is not at all affected by anything contained in S. 309 of the Cr. P.C In the result, we are not satisfied that the interim custody warrant dated 10th Sept., 1980 authorising petitioner's detention in jail custody stands affected by anything contained in or action taken under S. 309 of the Cr. P.C

    34. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner then contended that for various other reasons petitioner's initial detention and his detention up to 10th Sept., 1980 was invalid and that he was accordingly entitled to be a free man on 10th Sept., 1980. His illegal detention on 10th Sept., 1980 cannot be legalised by anything done on 10th Sept., 1980. Accordingly, despite orders made on 10th September, 1980 which may otherwise be valid, the petitioner continues to be entitled to be released from custody. We are unable to accept this submission. Without going into the question as to whether the detention of the petitioner prior to 10th Sept., 1930 was valid or not, a valid order authorising petitioner's detention in District Jail at Banda has been made on 10th Sept., 1980. This order does not purport to, nor has it the effect of, validating any prior invalid detention. It merely authorises petitioner's future detention irrespective of whether or not he was in valid detention earlier. The circumstances in which an order under S. 209 of the Cr. P.C remanding the accused to custody is to be made by the committing court (which under the law is, unless the accused has been admitted to bail, bound to remand him to custody until the conclusion of the trial) have nothing to do with the question as to whether or not the accused was, prior to the date of commitment, in legal custody.

    35. Such power to commit and remand the accused to custody can be exercised if the accused has either appeared or has been brought before the court. As held by Federal Court in the case of Basanta Chandra v. Emperor, (AIR 1945 FC 18) : (46 Cri LJ 559) in such cases if at any time, before the court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the court can direct release of the petitioner.

    36. In the result, we find that as the Chief Judicial Magistrate has, by his order dated 10th Sept., 1980, validly authorised the Superintendent, District Jail, Banda, to detain the petitioner during the trial arising out of crime case No. 67 of 1979 (S.T No. 366 of 1980), the Superintendent, District Jail, Banda, became entitled to keep the petitioner in his custody either till Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980 is concluded or till such time as the petitioner succeeds in obtaining his release on bail. It is not disputed that S.T No. 366 of 1980 is still pending and that there is no order from any competent court directing the petitioner to be released on bail in that case. Accordingly, so long as Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980 is not concluded, it will not be possible for this Court to issue a write of habeas corpus directing petitioner's release irrespective of the fact whether his detention in connection with other two cases is legal or not. In these circumstances, we refrain from going into the question about the validity of petitioner's detention in connection with other two cases notwithstanding that learned counsel for the petitioner had strenuously argued before us that his detention in connection with those cases was also vitiated.

    37. Before parting with this case, we may add that learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also challenged the action of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in remanding the petitioner in jail custody without setting him at liberty on 10th Sept., 1980 (as he claims petitioner's detention till that date was illegal) on the ground that action of the respondents has resulted in contravention of Art. 21 of the Constitution. He, therefore, insisted that we should record a finding on the question as to whether or not petitioner's detention up-till 10th Sept., 1980 was legal and, if we find that it was not legal, to direct his release forthwith. As pointed above, petitioner's detention is perfectly in accordance with provisions contained in S. 209 of the Cr. P.C The petitioner has in this petition not questioned the vires of the section. In the circumstances we fail to understand as to how the action of the respondents has resulted in contravention of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

    38. During the course of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner did not develop any argument to show to us as to how Art. 22 of the Constitution is attracted at the stage where the Magistrate while committing an accused, who had either appeared or who had been brought before him, to Sessions, proceeds to remand him to custody during and until conclusion of the trial.

    39. We may also mention that during the course of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner covered a very wide field and besides the cases already mentioned he also cited before the cases of—

    1. Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi (AIR 1953 SC 277) : (1953 Cri LJ 1113).

    2. Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v. D.M, Azamgarh (AIR 1959 All 384) : (1959 Cri LJ 685).

    3. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 740) : (1906 Cri LJ 608).

    4. In re: Madhu Limaye ((1969) 1 SCC 292 : AIR 1969 SC 1014) : (1969 Cri LJ 1440).

    5. A. Laxman Rao v. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram ((1970) 3 SCC 501 : AIR 1971 SC 186) : (1971 Cri LJ 253).

    6. Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti ((1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481) : (1971 Cri LJ 1715).

    7. Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M, Monghyr ((1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486) : (1971 Cri LJ 1720).

    8. Gauri Shankar Jha v. State of Bihar ((1972) 1 SCC 564 : AIR 1972 SC 711) : (1972 Cri LJ 505).

    9. Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa (AIR 1975 SC 1465) : (1975 Cri LJ 1212).

    10. Raghuvendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1976 Luck LJ 37).

    11. Sayeed Ahmad v. State (1978 Cr LJ 541) (All).

    12. Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597).

    13. Fussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1360) : (1979 Cri LJ 1036).

    14. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar ((1980) 1 SCC 108 : AIR 1979 SC 1377) : (1979 Cri LJ 1052).

    15. Mantoo Majumdar v. State of Bihar ((1980) 2 SCC 406 : AIR 1980 SC 847) : (1980 Cri LJ 546).

    40. In none of these cases the question regarding the scope of the power of a Magistrate to, while committing an accused to Sessions, remand him to custody during and until conclusion of the trial has been considered and there is nothing in the ratio of any of these cases which runs counter to the line of reasoning adopted by us for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had been validly remanded to custody in connection with Sessions Trial No. 366 of 1980 In the result, we find no merit in any of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The petition fails and is dismissed.

    41. Petition dismissed.

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    Rajendra Gosain v. Superintendent, District Jail
    (Feb 13, 1981)