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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old)
  • Sections 188, 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C
  • Section 188, I.P.C Section 188, I.P.C
  • Sections 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C
  • fact, Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old)
  • provisions of Section 188, I.P.C
  • Sections 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C,
  • Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C (old).
  • Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C (old).
  • Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C
  • Section 559 Cr. P.C (old)
  • Section 195(1), Cr. P.C
  • Section 195, Cr. P.C
  • Section 145, Cr. P.C
  • Section 144, Cr. P.C
  • Section 188, I.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old)
  • Sections 188, 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C
  • Section 188, I.P.C Section 188, I.P.C
  • Sections 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C
  • fact, Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old)
  • provisions of Section 188, I.P.C
  • Sections 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C,
  • Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C (old).
  • Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C (old).
  • Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C
  • Section 559 Cr. P.C (old)
  • Section 195(1), Cr. P.C
  • Section 195, Cr. P.C
  • Section 145, Cr. P.C
  • Section 144, Cr. P.C
  • Section 188, I.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.N. Bakshi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from Case No. 15/72 of 1967 under Section 145, Cr. P.C., originally decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur. According to the opinion, by an order dated April 11, 1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate declared Shrimati Ram Piari to be in possession of plot No. 338, village Balapur Rohi, P.S. Gopiganj, district Varanasi, and restrained Ram Lakhan from interfering with her possession. (The opinion also records an argument by counsel that the original order was dated April 11, 1963 and was passed by Sri R.C. Shukla.)

Ram Lakhan subsequently died. Six applicants before the High Court (two brothers and four nephews of Ram Lakhan) were substituted as his heirs and legal representatives in pending civil litigation. It is recorded in the opinion that these applicants obstructed Shrimati Ram Piari in exercising possessory rights over plot No. 338.

On March 10, 1972 a complaint was filed by Sri S. Nath, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur, alleging an offence under Section 188, I.P.C., for disobedience of the aforesaid order. The trial court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to three months' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Gyanpur, Varanasi dismissed the appeal on April 19, 1977 but converted the imprisonment sentence into a fine of Rs. 100 on each applicant. The applicants challenged those outcomes by filing the present revision application in the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. bars taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188, I.P.C., unless the complaint in writing is made personally by the public servant "concerned" who promulgated the order (or, in his non-availability, by a public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate).
  2. Whether an order passed under Section 145, Cr. P.C. — described in the opinion as an order "inter partes" and pronounced in open court — amounts to an order "promulgated by a public servant" within the meaning of Section 188, I.P.C., so that disobedience of such an order is punishable under Section 188, subject to the limits imposed by Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The applicants' counsel argued that the original Section 145 order was passed by Sri R.C. Shukla and that Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. bars the taking of cognizance of an offence under Sections 172–188, I.P.C. unless the complaint in writing is made by the public servant "concerned" (i.e., the officer who promulgated the order) or, if he is not available, by a public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.
  • Counsel contended that only the public servant who passed the Section 145 order (or his subordinate in the specific contingency of non-availability) was competent to file the complaint; a complaint filed by a successor magistrate who did not promulgate the order was, therefore, not maintainable under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.
  • In support of this contention, counsel relied on prior decisions (including Bachuram Kar v. The State; Saladi Chandra Rao v. Gollakoti Sambayya; and Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S. Jagannatha Chariar) that discussed the requirement of a complaint by the public servant concerned and the essential elements of Section 188, I.P.C.

State's Arguments

  • The State relied on a decision reported as In re Subramanian Chettiar (dealing with Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C. (old)) to argue that a successor may file a complaint. That decision was cited to support the proposition that the magistrate presiding at the time of complaint should be regarded as competent to complain even if the order complained of was made by a predecessor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachuram Kar v. The State Where the public servant concerned is not available by reason of transfer, resignation or death, a complaint may be made by some other public servant to whom he is subordinate (case involved Section 144, Cr. P.C.). The Court acknowledged the principle that a subordinate public servant may act when the public servant concerned is unavailable, and treated it as supporting the reading of Section 195(1)(a) that allows complaint by the public servant concerned or, in his non-availability, by a subordinate.
Saladi Chandra Rao v. Gollakoti Sambayya Considered a Section 145 order disobeyed; discussed limits on proceeding under Section 188 and whether accused could be tried for other offences (e.g., Section 447) arising out of the same facts. The Court used the decision to illustrate judicial thinking on the scope of prosecutions following disobedience of Section 145 orders and to show constraints on charging accused under offenses whose ingredients differ from Section 188.
Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S. Jagannatha Chariar Detailed the ingredients of Section 188, I.P.C., and emphasized that a complaint in writing of the public servant or of another public servant to whom he is subordinate is required; stated that the most essential requirement is the personal complaint of the public servant concerned. The Court relied on this exposition to support the conclusion that prosecution under Section 188 cannot be instituted without the personal complaint of the public servant concerned (or, in contingencies, a subordinate).
In re Subramanian Chettiar Dealt with Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C. (old), observing that a complaint under a specified provision should be made by the Magistrate presiding at the time of the complaint, not his predecessor-in-office. The State cited this decision. The Court distinguished it on the ground that Section 195(1)(c) (old) used different phraseology (e.g., "such court") and that successor-in-office principles applicable under Section 559 (old) and Section 195(1)(c) (old) do not carry over to Section 195(1)(a) (old) because Section 195(1)(a) refers to the "public servant concerned". The Court therefore found the decision distinguishable and not controlling for Section 195(1)(a).
State v. Gugla Held that an order under Section 145, Cr. P.C., pronounced in open court is to be deemed duly "promulgated" as regards the parties to the litigation; "promulgate" includes making an order known by open declaration. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that a Section 145 order pronounced in open court is "promulgated" to the parties and, therefore, disobedience of such an order is punishable under Section 188, I.P.C., subject to the limitations of Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) the interpretive question whether Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. prevents cognizance unless the complaint is made by the public servant "concerned" or his subordinate; and (B) whether an order under Section 145, Cr. P.C. is a "promulgated" order within the meaning of Section 188, I.P.C.

(A) Interpretation of Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.

The Court reviewed prior decisions cited by the applicants (including Bachuram Kar and Chinnamuthu Ambalam) which emphasize that a prosecution under Section 188 requires a written complaint by the public servant who promulgated the order or, where that officer is not available, by a public servant to whom he is subordinate. From those authorities the Court inferred that the bar in Section 195(1)(a) deprives the criminal court of power to take cognizance of the offence unless the prescribed complaint requirement is satisfied.

The Court then considered the State's reliance on In re Subramanian Chettiar. That decision concerned Section 195(1)(c) (old) and an earlier statutory scheme. The High Court distinguished that authority on textual grounds: Section 195(1)(c) (old) referred to "such court" and is linked with Section 559 (old) (which permits successor exercise of powers), whereas Section 195(1)(a) uses the expression "public servant concerned". The Court concluded that the phraseology of subsection (a) must be given effect and that, unlike the successor-in-office situation contemplated under subsection (c), a successor public servant cannot be treated as the "public servant concerned" for the purposes of subsection (a). The Court therefore held that the power to file the complaint in the circumstances contemplated by Section 195(1)(a) must be exercised personally by the public servant who is concerned, or alternatively by a public servant to whom he is subordinate when the public servant concerned is not available. On that basis the Court found the complaint filed by a successor magistrate (i.e., not the public servant who promulgated the section 145 order) to be not maintainable in law.

(B) Whether a Section 145 order is "promulgated" for purposes of Section 188, I.P.C.

The Court examined the meaning of "promulgation" (referencing a dictionary definition quoted in the opinion) and acknowledged that an order under Section 145 is inter partes and intended to prevent breach of the peace between disputing parties. However, the Court held that an order pronounced in open court must be deemed to have been duly promulgated as regards the parties to the case. The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in State v. Gugla for the proposition that promulgation need not follow any single prescribed mode; pronouncement in open court can constitute promulgation to the parties. Consequently, a disobedience of a Section 145 order pronounced in open court would be punishable under Section 188, I.P.C., subject to the restrictions of Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.

Bringing these strands together, the Court concluded that although a Section 145 order can be "promulgated" so as to attract Section 188 if disobeyed, the prosecution under Section 188 cannot be lawfully instituted unless the written complaint is filed by the public servant concerned (or, if he is unavailable, by a public servant to whom he is subordinate). Because the complaint in the present matter was filed by a successor magistrate who had not personally promulgated the Section 145 order and was not shown to be a public servant to whom the original public servant was subordinate, the complaint was held to be not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision application was allowed. The High Court set aside the conviction and sentence that had been imposed on the applicants for the offence under Section 188, I.P.C.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The applicants' conviction and sentence for disobedience under Section 188, I.P.C. were quashed and set aside by the High Court.
  • Scope of reasoning: The Court affirmed two points: (a) an order under Section 145, Cr. P.C., pronounced in open court, is to be treated as "promulgated" for the parties and thus may give rise to liability under Section 188, I.P.C.; and (b) prosecutions under Section 188, I.P.C. (or other offences within Sections 172–188) are barred from being taken cognizance of except upon a written complaint by the public servant "concerned" who promulgated the order or, if he is unavailable, by a public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate, in accordance with Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C.
  • No broader pronouncement of new law was stated by the Court beyond applying and distinguishing prior authorities; the decision's immediate consequence is the quashing of the convictions in this case.

This summary is strictly limited to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add factual or legal material beyond that text.

    Mata Bhikh v. State

    P.N Bakshi, J.:— Case No. 15/72 of 1967 under Section 145, Cr. P.C Between Doodhnath and Ram Lakhan, was decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur on merits. Doodhnath represented the interest of Shrimaiti Ram Piari. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur by his order dated April 11, 1968 declared Shrimati Ram Piari to be in possession over plot No. 338 situate in village Balapur Rohi, P.S Gopiganj, district Varanasi and restrained Ram Lakhan from interfering with her possession. Ram Lakhan hag died. Out of the six applicants before this Court, two are his brothers and four are his nephews.

    2. It appears that civil litigation is also pending between the parties in which the applicants have been substituted as the heirs and legal representatives of Ram Lakhan. It further, appears that these applicants have obstructed Shrimati Ram Piari in exercising possessory rights over plot No. 338 with the result that a complaint was filed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur for taking action against the applicants for an offence under Section 188, I.P.C on the basis of a complaint made by Doodhnath on March 10, 1972. The trial court came to the conclusion that the offence had been established and awarded a sentence of three months R.I to the applicants. Aggrieved thereby an appeal was filed before the Sessions Judge, Gyanpur, Varanasi which has been dismissed on April 19, 1977, with the modification that the sentence of imprisonment has been converted into one of fine of Rs. 100/- on each of the applicants. Hence this revision. I have heard Sri Anand Swarup Srivastava learned counsel for the applicants and Sri Prem Prakash, A.G.A at considerable length and have also perused the impugned orders. The applicants' counsel has argued that the original order dated April 11, 1963 was passed by Sri R.C Shukla, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur and the instant complaint under Section 188, I.P.C has been filed by Sri S. Nath, Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Gyanpur, Varanasi. Learned counsel for the applicants has contended that Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C, bars taking of the cognizance of this complaint. Section 195(1), Cr. P.C reads as follows:

    “No Court shall take cognizance—

    (a) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, or except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.”

    3. Learned counsel has argued that Sri R.C Shukla had initially decided the case under Section 145, Cr. P.C on April 11, 1968. He alone was the public servant concerned competent to file a complaint. If, for some reason or the other, he was not available then, in the alternative the complaint could also have been filed by a public servant to whom Sri Shukla was subordinate.

    4. In support of this contention learned counsel for the applicants has cited some decisions, namely Bachuram Kar v. The State 1.. This was a case under Section 144, Cr. P.C in which Justice Mookerjee observed as follows:—

    “In a case where the public servant concerned …… is not available by reason of transfer or resignation or death, then a complaint might be made by some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.”

    5. While dealing with the facts of the case it appears that an ex parte order of injunction prohibiting the entry on the land in dispute under Section 144 of the Code had been made by a first class Magistrate, while he was functioning as a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. This order is alleged to have been violated and disobeyed. The complaint was made by the first class Magistrate for an offence under Section 188, I.P.C It was held by that Court that the complaint was a valid complaint, although on the date he made the complaint he was not functioning as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gyanpur.

    6. It was further argued before that Court that if Section 195, Cr. P.C be taken to refer to the public servant personally then it might create difficulties when the officer concerned is transferred and is not available due to death or resignation. That argument was repelled on the ground that the Legislature has already foreseen such a contingency and, therefore, it has provided that the complaint can also be filed by another public servant to whom the public servant concerned is subordinate.

    7. The next case cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is reported in Saladi Chandra Rao v. Gollakoti Sambayya 2.. In this case an order had been passed under Section 145, Cr. P.C which was disobeyed by the accused persons. A complaint was filed against the accused for the commission of the offence under Sections 188, 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C The Magistrate dropped the proceedings under Section 188, I.P.C but proceeded to try the accused for offences under Sections 447, 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C The learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was of the view that the accused could not be tried even for the offence under Section 447 (Criminal trespass) which involved a disobedience of the order of the Court passed under Section 145, Cr. P.C He was of the view that the trial could proceed only under Sections 506, 323 and 379, I.P.C, which were distinct offences and the ingredients of which were not the same as of an offence under Section 188, I.P.C

    8. The third case cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is the decision of the Mad. High Court reported in Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S. Jagannatha Chariar 3.. In this case Justice Ramaswami dealt in detail with the ingredients of Section 188, I.P.C in the following terms:

    “1. That there must be an order promulgated by a public servant.

    2. That the public servant must have been lawfully empowered to promulgate such order.

    3. That the person having knowledge of such order and directed by such order (a) to abstain from a certain act, or (b) to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, has disobeyed such direction.

    4. That such disobedience causes or tends to cause (i) obstruction, annoyance, or injury or risk of it, to any person lawfully employed, or (ii) danger to human life, health or safety, or (iii) a not or affray……

    A complaint in writing of the public servant or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate is required. A prosecution under this section should not be launched unless all the elements necessary for a conviction are present. A complaint for an alleged disobedience of the order under Section 144, Cr. P.C must show that the disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or a riot……

    “Out of all these requirements the most essential is that no prosecution can be instituted under this section without the personal complaint of the public servant concerned.”

    9. From a reading of the aforesaid decisions the inference appears to be inevitable that the bar of Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C would deprive the court of its power to take cognizance of an offence, unless the complaint in writing is made personally by the public servant or in the case of his non-availability by some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.

    10. Counsel for the State has brought to my notice an earlier decision of Ramaswami, J. reported In re. Subramanian Chettiar 4.. In that case the court was dealing with the provisions of Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old) and observed that:

    “……A complaint under Section 476 of the Code should be made by the Magistrate who is presiding in the Court at the time of the complaint, and not his predecessor-in-office, before whom the offence specified in Section 195 was committed.”

    11. In my opinion the facts of this case cited by the State Counsel are distinguishable. The expression ‘public servant concerned’ must be given its due import in Section 195(1)(a) Cr. P.C (old). There was no such expression used in Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C (old). As a matter of fact, Section 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C (old) speaks of a complaint in writing of ‘such court’, and under Section 559 Cr. P.C (old) the powers and duties of a Judge or a Magistrate may be exercised by his successor-in-office. Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C (old) does not use the expression ‘court concerned’, whereas Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C (old) speaks of the ‘public servant concerned’. To my mind, there was a clear distinction between phraseology of these two sub-sections to which due importance must be attached. Thus under Section 195(1)(c), Cr. P.C (old) ‘a successor Judge’ may exercise the powers contemplated therein, but under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C (old) a successor public servant cannot exercise those powers. The power to file a complaint in the circumstances mentioned above, must be exercised by the public servant concerned personally. In the event of his non-availability due to transfer, resignation, death or any other cause, the law provides an alternative by authorising a senior public servant, to whom the public servant concerned may be subordinate, to exercise jurisdiction under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C (old). In my opinion the instant complaint which has been filed by a successor Magistrate is not maintainable in law.

    12. Another aspect of the matter may be considered. It is argued that an order under Section 145, Cr. P.C is one which concerns the parties to such litigation and not the public at large. Therefore such an order cannot be said to be duly promulgated under Section 188, I.P.C Section 188, I.P.C runs as follows:

    “Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take Certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management disobeys such direction ……… shall……be punished with simple imprisonment………”

    13. This section contemplates promulgation of an order by a public servant.

    14. In New International Dictionary, Vol. III, page 1816 ‘promulgate’ means to make known by open declaration; proclaim; to make known or public the terms of a proposed law; to make public as having the force of law, and to announce officially. ‘Promulgation’ means open declaration; public and official announcement.

    15. It is true that an order under Section 145 Cr. P.C is an order inter parties. It concerns the parties to the dispute qua immovable property and is intended to prevent an apprehension of the breach of peace. It is binding upon the parties to the dispute. But such an order pronounced in open court must be deemed to be duly promulgated so far as the parties to the case are concerned. Promulgation can be made in various ways. It may be effected by a notification in the Gazette, or by publication in the news papers, or by beat of drum or by pronouncement of an order in open court. The object of such a promulgation is that the public in general be informed of the order and they may act in accordance therewith. It has been held by a Division Bench of our Court reported in State v. Gugla 5..

    “As regards the question whether the order of the Criminal Court under Section 145 was covered by the provisions of Section 188, I.P.C I am of opinion that qua the parties to the litigation in the Criminal Court, the order having been passed in their presence, the order must be deemed to have been duly ‘promulgated’ so far as they are concerned. The word ‘promulgate’ means ‘to make known by public declaration, to publish, to disseminate or to proclaim’. In essence the word connotes two ideas, (1) making known of an order, and (2) the means by which the order is made known must be by something done openly and in public. Private information will not be ‘promulgation’. But the law does not prescribe any particular mode in which an order is made known openly and publication in Gazette; it may be by reading out an order openly in public. Any order announced in open Court will be deemed to have been promulgated, but as the Court from is a place where the ligigants are expected to go and the public at large is not expected to be present though they have a right to go there if they so wish, the open declaration of the order in Court will be deemed to be a notice not to the public at large but to the parties of the case in which the order is passed. An order duly pronounced in open Court must be deemed to be duly promulgated so far as the parties to the case are concerned.”

    16. Therefore, disobedience of an order passed under Section 145, Cr. P.C would be clearly punishable under Section 188, I.P.C Subject of course to the other restrictions laid down under Section 195(a) Cr. P.C

    17. There may be other instances under the Code of Criminal Procedure where promulgation may be necessary, Section 144, Cr. P.C may be cited as an example. Under that preventive section when danger is apprehended and the Magistrate considers that immediate steps are necessary, he makes an order in writing and that order is made public by beat of drum or otherwise. The order is directed to the public generally restraining them from frequenting or visiting a particular place.

    18. It is passed in order to prevent disturbance of public tranquility or a riot, or an affray and the public at large has, therefore, to be informed to prevent such a contingency arising therefrom. Therefore, an order passed under Section 144, Cr. P.C if disobeyed by the public at large would also be punishable under Section 188, I.P.C

    19. For the reasons given above, this revision application is hereby allowed. The conviction and sentence passed on the applicants for the offence under Section 188, I.P.C is set aside.

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    Comments

    Mata Bhikh v. State
    (Aug 3, 1979)