1. This is an appeal arising out of a suit filed by Shital Prasad, the plaintiff, for recovery of arrears of rent and for ejectment of the defendant Shri Krishan. During the pendency of the suit, Shital Prasad sold the house to Babu Lal Jain. An application was filed for the impleadment of Babu Lal Jain.
2. An objection was raised to the maintainability of the suit on behalf of the defendant on the ground that as the plaintiff had sold the property to Babu Lal Jain on 14-1-1969, he was not entitled to get the decree. The objection was overruled on the ground that by the transfer of the house Shital Prasad, the plaintiff, did not lose interest in the property. The suit was decreed for the recovery of arrears of rent, but was dismissed for the relief of ejectment. Shital Prasad filed an appeal. His appeal was accepted, and the decree for ejectment was also granted in his favour. Aggrieved, Sri Krishan, the defendant, filed the present Second Appeal. After filing the appeal, an application was filed on behalf of the defendant Sri Krishan for impleadment of Babu Lal Jain. On 23-11-1971, the application was rejected on the ground that the impleadment of Babu Lal Jain was not necessary. This Court held that the defendant Shri Krishan shall have the benefit of the decision as against the transferee as well.
3. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant Sri Krishan died on 12-11-1972 and an application for substitution of his heirs was made on 9-1-1973. Meanwhile, Shital Prasad also died on 25-5-1974. On 28-7-1975, an application was filed on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Sri Krishan for impleadment of the heirs of the deceased Shital Prasad. In para 6 of the affidavit, the assertion made was that the applicants learnt about the death of Shital Prasad on 13-7-1975. The applicants claimed that they were out of touch with the family of the deceased Shital Prasad and had no knowledge about the death of Shital Prasad. Two counter-affidavits were filed an behalf of the heirs of the deceased Shital Prasad disputing that the applicants (heirs of the deceased Sri Krishan) had no knowledge of the death of Shital Prasad. It was asserted in the counter-affidavit that the Yatindra Mohan Sharma, one of the heirs of the deceased Sri Krishan, attended the 13th day ceremony on 7-6-1974. In the rejoinder, the reply given was evasive.
4. The first thing that is required to be considered is about the delay in moving the application for impleadment of the heirs of Shital Prasad. This application was, admittedly, barred by time, having not been filed within 90 days of the death. After having perused the affidavits filed by the parties and hearing their counsel, I find that the applicants took a false case that they had no knowledge about the death of Shital Prasad From the counter-affidavit of the heirs of the deceased Shital Prasad, it is established that Yatindra Mohan Sharma attended the Tervi ceremony (last rites), and that he had knowledge of death of the deceased Shital Prasad. The rejoinder affidavit does not give any satisfactory reply to the counter. To me, the affidavit filed on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Shital Prasad appears to be more reliable. The applicants had taken a false case of the lack of knowledge about the death of Shital Prasad, to cover up the delay as the applicants knew about the death and gave an incorrect explanation for the delay in filing the substitution application, the application is liable to be rejected. That being so, the delay in filing the application is not liable to be condoned.
5. Counsel for the applicants, thereafter, fell back upon the argument that since the applicants did not know about the requirement of filing the substitution application, the delay should be condoned. The argument is fallacious inasmuch as on the death of Sri Krishan these very applicants had filed a substitution application within 90 days. The argument therefore, of the learned counsel for the applicants is not convincing.
6. Counsel for the applicants, however, urged that as Shital Prasad had transferred the property, the omission to bring his personal heirs on record would not result in the abatement of the appeal. For this purpose, it would be necessary to state that Babu Lal Jain, the transferee, had died even before the death of Shital Prasad. The applicants did not file any application for impleadment of the heirs of the deceased Babu Lal Jain, before 30-10-1978. Babu Lal Jain, according to the admission of the applicants themselves, died on 23-7-1973. Even if it be assumed that Babu Lal Jain was the legal representative of the deceased Shital Prasad, the application for impleadment of the heirs of Babu Lal having been filed much after the period of limitation prescribed, the same is liable to be rejected. The applicants gave no explanation for having not filed the application within time.
7. It may, however, be pointed out that on the death of Shital Prasad, the applicants should have impleaded his personal heirs on record. The expression ‘legal representative’ has been defined in Section 2(11) of the CPC as follows:
“‘legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.”
8. A reading of the above definition would show that a person can be said to be a legal representative who represents the estate of a deceased, Babu Lal Jain did not represent the estate of the deceased Shital Prasad inasmuch as the right, which Babu Lal Jain had, did not accrue on the death of Shital Prasad, but on a transfer made to him by the latter in his lifetime. Therefore, he could not come in as a man entitled to have his name substituted in consequence of the death of the original plaintiff. Babu Lal Jain could not be a legal representative of the deceased Shital Prasad during the lifetime of the latter. Hence, it was incumbent on the heirs of the appellant to have filed the substitution application within time.
9. Reliance was next placed on O. 22, R. 10 of the CPC for the argument that as interest had devolved on Babu Lal Jain, the provisions of R. 4 of O. 22 did not apply. The submission made is not tenable. Order 22, R. 10 applies to cases of an assignee, creation or devolution of any interest, whereas R. 4 deals with the requirement of substitution on the death of one of the defendants or the sole defendant. The present was a case covered squarely by R. 4 of O. 22, R. 10 of O. 22 did not apply to a case like the present. When there is death of a party to a suit, the party is required to file an application for substitution of the heirs under R. 3 or R. 4 of O. 22 of the CPC as the case may be. Rule 10 is meant for a different purpose.
10. Sri D. Sanyal, counsel for the applicants, next placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao (AIR 1956 SC 593). This case, does not support his argument. In this case, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court held that the effect of S. 52 was not to wipe out a sale pendente lite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. This controversy does not arise for decision in the present case. To me, it appears that the aforesaid case relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants instead of supporting his contention, goes against him.
11. The inescapable result is that the applications filed by the applicants for impleadment of the heirs of the deceased Shital Prasad as well Babu Lal Jain are liable to be rejected.
12. Consequently, the application for substitution filed by the applicants on 28-7-1978 for bringing on record the heirs of Shital Prasad as well as the application for substituting the heirs of Babu Lal Jain are rejected. As a result thereof, the Second Appeal has abated and is dismissed as such.
13. There shall be no order as to costs. The application for bringing on record the heirs of the deceased appellant Sri Krishan is, however, allowed.
14. Appeal dismissed.