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Case Number

Writ Petition No. 398 of 1966

Attorney(S)

C.S. Tewari
B.R. Gupta

Judges

R.L Gulati
K.B Srivastava
Jagmohan Lal
Prem Prakash
S.K Kaul, JJ.

Acts

Act by Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U.P Act No. XXXVIII of 1958)
U.P Acts No. 1 of 1950 (U.P languages Bills Act) and 26 of 1951 (U.P Official languages Act)
U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred
U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gulati, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (the Act).

Factual summary (as stated in the opinion):

Smt. Dhanraj Kuer died leaving grove and agricultural plots which she had inherited from her husband. She had acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of the agricultural plots prior to her death.
During consolidation proceedings the Gaon Sabha, Jehwa, applied to the Consolidation Officer claiming that, as Smt. Dhanraj Kuer had died heirless, her entire holding vested in the Gram Samaj.
The original petitioners (Bhagwan Singh and Lalloo Singh) filed objections claiming the estate of the deceased widow on the basis of: (i) inheritance as husband's brother's sons' sons; (ii) a Will executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer on 12-10-1962 in favour of Bhagwan Singh; and (iii) a registered sale-deed dated 4-4-1963 executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer in respect of her entire holding in favour of the petitioners.
The Consolidation Officer rejected the petitioners' objection and upheld the Gaon Sabha's claim. The petitioners' appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was dismissed and a revision under Section 48 of the Act was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by an order dated 26-3-1966. The petitioners then filed the present writ petition under Article 226.
When the writ petition came up before Hari Swarup, J., a question arose whether the widow was competent to transfer her entire agricultural holding without prior permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as required by Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. The matter was referred to a Full Bench for decision on that question.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the prohibition in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act — which provides that "no tenureholder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained, shall transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area" — applies to the transfer of an agricultural holding as a whole, or applies only when a part of the holding is transferred.
Given an express conflict between the English and Hindi texts of the provision, which language-version should prevail (i.e., the question whether the English or the Hindi version should be treated as authoritative for interpreting Section 5(1)(c)(ii)), in light of Article 348 of the Constitution and related authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the law on the interpretation of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) had been settled by a series of decisions of this Court and should not be unsettled; taking a contrary view would cause confusion and unsettle transactions entered into on the faith of those decisions. In support of this contention the petitioners' counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in Raj Narain v. Sant Prasad (1973 2 SCC 35), which cautioned against disturbing an established view on interpretation of a local statute.

Respondents' Arguments and References

The learned counsel for the respondents referred to Articles 345, 346 and 347 of the Constitution (provisions concerning official languages of a State and recognition of other languages). The opinion records these references but states that those Articles have no bearing upon the specific question before the Full Bench (which concerns the authoritative text of a State enactment under Article 348).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Smt. Asharfunisa Begam v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, A.I.R. 1971 All. 87 (Full Bench)	Interpreted the expression "any part of his holding" as not including the entire holding (i.e., prohibition applies only to transfer of a part, not the whole).	Referred to as an earlier Full Bench decision supporting the view that transfer of the whole holding does not require permission; relied upon as part of settled position in this Court.
Munna Lal Shukla v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1966 A.W.R. 818	Held that the prohibition in clause (ii) of Section 5(1)(c) extended to transfer of a part of the holding and not to transfer of the whole holding.	Noted as the first decision taking this view; cited to support meaning of "any part" as "a part".
Ram Behari Shukla v. Munna Lal Shukla, 1968 A.L.J. 223	Affirmation on special appeal of the decision in Munna Lal Shukla.	Referenced as confirmation of the earlier single-judge decision.
Smt. Rajeshwari v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1970 R.D. 130 (Full Bench)	Full Bench agreed with prior Full Bench view (Smt. Asharfunisa Begam) that "any part" means "a part" and does not include the whole holding.	Cited to show continued unanimity of this Court's view on the interpretation issue.
Raj Narain v. Sant Prasad, 1973 2 SCC 35 (Supreme Court)	General principle that a High Court's long-settled view on interpretation of a local statute should not normally be disturbed so as to avoid upsetting transactions entered into on that basis.	Invoked by petitioners' counsel to argue against changing the established interpretation; the Full Bench acknowledged the force of the contention but found it unnecessary to rely on stare decisis because it considered the provision unambiguous.
Sagir Ahmad v. The Government of the State of U.P., A.I.R. 1954 All. 257 (Division Bench)	Held, with reference to Article 348, that an English notification must prevail over a Hindi notification where the constitutional text applies.	Applied to support the conclusion that where there is divergence between English and Hindi texts of a State Act, the English translation (authoritative text under Article 348) prevails.
Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (II), U.P., Allahabad, A.I.R. 1962 All. 240 (Full Bench)	After U.P. language enactments, both the Hindi version and English translation of a Bill or Act published in the Official Gazette are valid and authorised and both can be used; in case of divergence the English version prevails.	Relied upon to explain that although both texts may be valid for official use, English prevails when there is divergence—applied by the court to resolve conflict in favour of English text.
Medical Officer of Health, Municipal Corporation, Agra v. Gulzari, A.I.R. 1965 All. 170 (Single Judge)	Held that although Hindi was official language of U.P., in case of divergence between Hindi and English versions in the Official Gazette the English version reigned supreme.	Used to reinforce the conclusion that the English text must prevail over the Hindi version in case of conflict.
Bhikam Chand v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Raj. 142	Held that the English version supersedes local language version where there is divergence (Rajasthan High Court).	Noted as judicial support from another High Court for the principle that English prevails in case of conflict.
Govindram Ram Prasad v. Assessing Authority (Sales-tax), A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 16	Similar holding from Madhya Pradesh High Court that English version supersedes local language version where divergence exists.	Referred to as further judicial support for giving precedence to the English authoritative text.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench limited its consideration to the single, short question referred by the learned single Judge: whether the ban in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) applies to transfer of the whole holding or only to transfer of a part of the holding.

Textual and contextual interpretation:

The Court examined the wording of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 5(1)(c) (inserted by the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958). Clause (i) uses the phrase "holding or any part thereof" while clause (ii) uses the phrase "any part of his holding". The proviso to clause (i) also employs "holding or any part thereof".
Having regard to the juxtaposition of these expressions, the Court concluded that clause (ii)'s use of the expression "any part of his holding" is not synonymous with "holding or any part thereof" and, in context, was intended to mean "a part" (i.e., a part as distinguished from the whole) rather than every part including the whole. The Court noted that if clause (ii) had used the same expression as clause (i), a different conclusion might not have been necessary, but the differing terminology indicates a limited ban in clause (ii).
The Court acknowledged a minor grammatical imperfection (that "a part" might have been more apt than "any part") but held that where the legislative intention is clear, nothing turns on such a grammatical error.

Precedential and purposive considerations:

The Court observed that a line of precedents of this Court (including Munna Lal Shukla, Ram Behari Shukla, the Full Bench in Smt. Asharfunisa Begam, and Smt. Rajeshwari) had uniformly interpreted "any part" to mean "a part" and held the prohibition in clause (ii) extended to transfer of a part, not the whole, of a holding. The Court treated this body of authority as concluding the matter as far as this High Court is concerned.
Examining the object of the provisions, the Court explained that clause (i) aims to preserve land for agricultural purposes and therefore imposes a complete ban (on use for non-agricultural purposes) over the holding or any part thereof, whereas clause (ii) aims to prevent fragmentation of holdings and therefore reasonably applies only to transfers of parts of holdings. Transfer of the whole would not fragment holdings, only change ownership, and so did not require the same ban.

On conflict between English and Hindi texts:

The Court acknowledged a conflict between the Hindi and English versions: the Hindi version appeared to make the ban applicable to the holding as a whole as well as to parts thereof.
Relying on Article 348 of the Constitution and pertinent authorities, the Court held that the authoritative text of State Acts is the English translation (unless Parliament prescribes otherwise). The Court explained that although the State Legislature may enact in Hindi, Article 348 requires the authoritative text to be in English, and a translation published under the Governor's authority in the Official Gazette is the authoritative English text.
Following decided authorities (including Sagir Ahmad, Jaswant Sugar Mills Full Bench, Medical Officer of Health v. Gulzari, and other High Court decisions cited), the Court concluded that where there is a divergence between English and Hindi versions of a State enactment, the English text prevails.

Conclusion of analysis:

On textual, purposive and precedential grounds, and having resolved the language conflict in favour of the English authoritative text under Article 348, the Court held that the expression "any part of his holding" in clause (ii) of Section 5(1)(c) does not include the whole holding.
Therefore, it is not necessary to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for the transfer of a holding as a whole under clause (ii) of Section 5(1)(c).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Full Bench answered the referred question by holding that the prohibition in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not extend to the transfer of the holding as a whole; it applies only to the transfer of a part of the holding. Consequently, according to the authoritative English text of the Act, the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is not necessary for the transfer of the whole agricultural holding.

Direct implications for the parties:

The court directed that the writ petition be placed before a learned Single Judge for disposal in light of the answer given by the Full Bench.

Broader implications:

The Court treated the issue as already concluded by prior decisions of this High Court and, by resolving the language conflict in favour of the English authoritative text under Article 348, affirmed the established interpretation rather than creating a new departure in the law. The opinion notes the settled line of authority and indicates that the decision aligns with that settled view.

Note: This summary is confined to and based exclusively upon the material contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what appears in the opinion text.

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Ram Rati v. Gram Samaj

Gulati, J.:— This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. One Smt. Dhanraj Kuer died leaving some grove and agricultural plots which she had inherited from her husband. She had acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of the agricultural plots before her death. During the consolidation proceedings the Gaon Sabha, Jehwa, moved an application before the Consolidation Officer claiming that as Smt. Dhanraj Kuer had died heirless, her entire holding vested in the Gram Samaj. The original petitioners. Bhagwan Singh and Lalloo Singh filed objection laying claim to the estate of the deceased widow on the basis of:—

(i) inheritance being her husband's brother's sons' sons:

(ii) Will executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer on 12-10-1962 in favour of Bhagwan Singh.

(iii) Registered sale-deed dated 4-4-1963, executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer in respect of her entire holding including groves in favour of the petitioners.

3. The petitioner's objection was rejected and the claim of the Gaon Sabha was upheld. The appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and their revision under Sec. 48 of the Act was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 26-3-1966. The petitioner then moved the present writ petition. When the writ petition came up for hearing before Hari Swarup, J., he noticed that one of the questions that arose in the case was as to whether the widow was competent to transfer the whole of her agricultural holding without the prior permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as required by Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.

4. Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act enacts that no tenureholder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained, shall transfer by way of sale gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area. A Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Asharfunisa Begam v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, camp at Hardoi A.I.R 1971 Alld. 87. has taken the view that the Expression “any part of his holding” did not include the entire holding so that the ban applied only where a part of the holding was transferred and not when the holding was transferred as a whole. The learned Judge noticed the Hindi version of Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act which reads:

“NA CHAKBANDI KSHETTRA ME SAMMILIT APNI JOT ATHVVA USKE KISI BHAG KO VIKRAYA, DAN ATHWA BINIMAY DWARA HASTANTARIT KAREGA.”

5. According to the Hindi version, the ban would apply as much to the transfer of a part of the holding as to the whole. In his opinion the words in the English Version were not clear and it was possible, to interpret them in accordance with the Hindi version of the enactment. He accordingly referred the matter to a Full Bench and that is how this petition has come up before us.

6. To begin with, we might state that although the learned Judge has not indicated as to whether the entire case has to be decided by the Full Bench or only the question relating to the interpretation of Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, yet having regard to the fact and the circumstances of file case the intention of the learned Judge was to refer only the limited question relating to the interpretation of Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) and not the whole case, because even if the petitioners fail on this ground their alternative pleas will have to be examined. We shall accordingly restrict ourselves to the short question as to whether the ban incorporated in Sec. 5(1)(c)(ii) applies to the transfer of an agricultural holding as a whole or applies only when a part of the holding is transferred.

7. Clause (c) of Sec. 5(1) was added in the Act by Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U.P Act No. XXXVIII of 1958) and reads as under:—

“(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenureholder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation, previously obtained shall—

(i) use holdings or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandary including pisciculture and poultry farming; or

(ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area;

8. Provided that a tenureholder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in use prior to the date specified in the notification issued under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4.”

9. It may atonce be noticed that clause (ii) is, flanked by clause (i) and the proviso at the end of clause (ii). Clause (i) and the proviso deal with the ban on non-agricultural use of a holding while clause (ii) imposes a ban on the transfer of a holding. In clause (i) the expression used is “holding or any part thereof”. The same expression is used in the proviso, which, in fact, is a proviso to clause (i) so that the ban on the user of agricultural holding for non-agricultural purposes extends, to the holding, as a whole as also to a part thereof. But when we come to clause (ii) the expression used is “any part of his holding”. Obviously, the ban contemplated under, clause (i) is not co-extensive with the ban contained in clause (ii), otherwise there is no reason why the expression “holding or any part thereof” should not have been used in clause (ii) also. The expression “holding or any part thereof” is not synonymous with the expression “any part of the holding,” if regard is had to the juxtaposition of clause (ii). If clause (ii) had stood alone it could be possible to interpret the expression “any part of the holding” as meaning every part of the holding. But having regard to the terminology employed in the preceding clause and the succeeding proviso, no other meaning can be assigned to it except; that it means ‘a part’ as distinguished from ‘the whole’. It is true that grammatically, the expression “a part” would have been more apt than the expression “any part”. But when the intention of the Legisnatcre is clear, nothing will turn upon this grammatical error. According to the dictionary meaning also ‘any’ is some times used for the adjective ‘a’. It is not necessary, however, to dwell upon this point any further because the questions has been the subject matter of previous decisions of this Court which have unanimously interpreted the expression “any part” to mean “a part”. The first decision is of G.D Sahgal, J. in Munna Lal Shukla v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1966 A.W.R 818.. His Lordship held that the prohibition in clause (ii) of Sec. 5(1)(c) extended to the transfer of a part of the holding and not to the whole holding so that the whole holding could be transferred by a tenureholder without the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). This decision has been affirmed on special appeal by Oak, C.J and U.S Sri vastava, J. In Ram Behari Shukla v. Munna Lal Shukla 1968 A.L.J 223.. The question was again considered by another Full Bench of which two of us were members in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum when the view taken in the earlier cases was affirmed. There is yet another decision of a Full Bench of this Court consisting of S.N Dwivedi, G.S Lal and R.B Alisra, JJ. in Smt. Rajeshwari v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1970 R.D 130.. The Full Bench agreed with the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum. Thus so far this Court is concerned, the matter stands concluded.

10. If one has regard to the object underlying, the provisions in question, it becomes quite clear as to why the ban in clauses (i) and (ii) is not coextensive. The object underlying clacse (i) is to preserve the and for agricultural purposes and that is why a complete ban has been placed on the use of the land for non-agricultural purposes. A ban on a part of the land only would not have served the purpose. Under clause (ii) the ban was intended to prevent the fragmentation of holdings and as such, it was placed only on a transfer of a part of the holding. There could be no objection to the transfer of the holding as a whole because it would not involve fragmentation but would involve only a change in ownership. The scheme underlying the act was to consolidate agricultural holdings and to prevent their further fragmentation and also to preserve the land for agricultural purposes. It was not the intention to restrict the right of an owner to deal with his property by way of sale, exchange or transfer except to the extent that was necessary to carry out the objects of the Act. That is why a ban of a limited nature has been placed on transfers while a complete ban has been placed on the user of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. Having regard all this circumstances, it is not possible to take a different view.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the law having been settled by a series of decisions of this Court it should not be unsettled by taking a different view as it would lead to a lot of confusion and give rise to a spate of litigation. For, this he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Narain v. Sant Prasad 1973 2 SCC 35 where it has been observed:

“……to take a contrary view from the law laid down would have the effect of unsettling the law established for a number of years. In the matter of interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element of an uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be invoked in such a situation.”

12. There is a lot of force in this contention also but it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine of share decisis, because we are of the firm view that there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language in which this provision is couched and having regard to all the facts and the circumstances of the case it is not possible to interpret it differently.

13. It is no doubt true that the Hindi version is in conflict with the English version. The Hindi version expressly says that the ban shall apply to the holding as a whole as also to a part thereof. The question arises as to whether in such a situation we should give preference to the English version or to the Hindi version. For this purpose we have to turn to Art. 348 of the Constitution. It is necessary to reproduce that Article. It enacts:—

“348(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part, until parliament by law otherwise provides—

(a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court.

(b) the authoritative texts—

(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,

(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor…of a State, and

(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, shall be in the English language.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of clause (1), the Governor……of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purposes of the State, in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seal in that State;

Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such High Court.

(3) Notwithstanding anything, in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), Where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor…… of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in this official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this Article.”

14. Under this Article two things have been provided; Firstly, all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court have to be in the English, language except when under clause (2) the Governor of a State with the previous consent of the President, authorises the use of the Hindi language or any other local language in proceedings in the High Court of that State. We are not concerned with that question in this case. Secondly, the authoritative text of all Bills and Acts of the Parliament and of the State Legislatures has to be in the English language. However, the State Legislatures are authorised to prescribe any language other than the English language for this purpose, but, in such an event, clause (3) provides that a translation in the English language of any Bill introduced in or Act passed by a State Legislature in a language other than the English language has to be published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the official Gazette of that State and such translation shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of such a Bill and Act. Whenever a question arises as to what is the authoritative Text of a particular Act or an Ordinance etc. of a State Legislature, one has to turn to its Engl in translation, if it was enacted in a language other than the English language. The authoritative text of any Bill, Act or Ordinance of a State Legislature cannot be in a language other than the English language unless the Parliament by law otherwise provides. Thus, the power to declare that the authoritative text of any Ordinance, Act etc. of a State Legislature shall be in a language other than the English language has been vested exclusively in the Parliament. The Parliament has not made any such provision so far. The official language of the State of Uttar Pradesh is Hindi, so that the Legislature of this State can pass Ordinance, Acts, etc. in the Hindi language. Thus even though the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act was passed by the State Legislature in Hindi, yet its translation in the English language shall be regarded its authoritative text and shall prevail over its Hindi version.

15. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to Arts. 345, 346 and 347 of the Constitution Art. 345 makes a provision for official language of a State and provides that the State Legislature may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or the Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes Art. 346 makes a provision about the official language for communication between one State and another or between a State and the Union. In Art. 347 a provision has been made that on a demand being made the President may direct that a language other than the English language shall be officially recognised in a State or any part thereof for such purposes as may be specified. These Articles have no hearing upon the question before us. We are not concerned with the official language of a State but are concerned with the question of the language in which the Bills and Acts have to be passed by a State Legislature and that subject has been specifically dealt with in Art. 348, which provides that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part of the Constitution, all Acts, etc. shall be in the English language. It is thus clear that the provisions contained in Art. 345, 346 and 347 are subject to the provisions contained in Art. 348.

16. The other argument is that in clause (3) of Art. 348 the use of the words “notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1)” suggests that this clause will over ride clause (1). This interpretation is not correct. It only means that a State Legislature may prescribe any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in or Acts passed by the State Legislature and that clause (1)(b) shall not create an impediment in its way. As we have already indicated above, when a Bill is introduced or an Act is passed in a language other than the English language by a State Legislature, an authoritative translation thereof in the English language has to be provided and that translation shall for the purposes of clause (1)(b) be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof. Indeed, it will be beyond the competence of a State Legislature to provide that the authoritative text of its Acts and Ordinances etc. shall be in a language other than the English language, because such a power vests only in the Parliament. Thus, when there is a conflict between the English version of a statute of a State Legislature and its Version in a local language, the version in English language will prevail over the version in the local language. A Division Bench of this Court in Sagir Ahmad v. The Government of the State of U.P A.I.R 1954 Alld. 257. while referring to Art. 348 of the Constitution has at page 278 in paragraph 83 observed:—

“In view of this provision of the Constitution the notification appearing in. English must prevail over the notification appearing in Hindi”.

17. A Full Bench of this Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (II), U.P, Allahabad A.I.R 1962 Alld. 240. has held that in U.P after the passing of the U.P Acts No. 1 of 1950 (U.P languages Bills Act) and 26 of 1951 (U.P Official languages Act) the State Legislature has prescribed Hindi as the language for the official use in the State and both, the Hindi version as also the English translation of a Bill or Act etc. published in the official Gazette are valid and authorised and both of them can be looked into and put to official use. There is no competion between the two. It is only in case of divergence between the two versions that the English version reign supreme and supersede the Hindi one.

18. Following this Full Bench decision a learned Single Judge in Medical Officer of Health, Municipal Corporation, Agra v. Gulzari A.I.R 1965 Alld. 170. has held that although Hindi was the official language of the State of U.P, in case of divergence between the Hindi and the English versions of the official gazette the English version reigned supreme and superseded the Hindi version. The same view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Bhikam Chand v. State A.I.R 1966 Raj. 142. and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Govindram Ram Prasad v. Assessing Authority (Sales-tax) A.I.R 1958 M.P 16..

19. This being the position we are clearly of the opinion that in the present case it is the English text which shall prevail over the Hindi version and according to the English text the expression “any holding” occurring in clause (ii) of Sec. 5(1)(c) of the Act does not include the “whole holding” so that it is not necessary to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for the transfer of the holding as a whole.

20. With this answer, we direct the writ petition to be placed before, a learned Single Judge for disposal.

21. Question answered.

Ram Rati v. Gram Samaj

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gulati, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Respondents' Arguments and References

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ram Rati v. Gram Samaj

Comments