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  • Sec. 152 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
  • U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
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  • Sec. 152 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
  • U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Attar Singh v. Mahendra Singh & Jeet Singh (Bench of B. Dayal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two connected suits (No. 145 of 1954 and No. 333 of 1954) were filed by Attar Singh against Mahendra Singh and Jeet Singh and were heard together; Suit No. 145 was treated as the main suit. The plaintiff alleged that Jeet Singh (his adoptive father) executed a sale deed in favour of Mahendra Singh which was (a) without legal necessity, (b) without consideration, and (c) affected joint family property in which plaintiff, as adopted son, had an interest. Criminal proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. had resulted in attachment of the agricultural plots and their crop, and Suit No. 333 sought declaration that the attached crop belonged to the plaintiff and should be released in his favour.

The defendants denied adoption, asserted Jeet Singh had the right to sell, claimed legal necessity and valid consideration. The trial court held that the sale deed was executed from legal necessity and validated transfer of the house, the gher and half of the agricultural Bhumidhar land belonging to Jeet Singh, but held that half of the Bhumidhar share (the plaintiff’s share) could not be sold. It also found the transferee (Mahendra) had been given possession before the sale and therefore the crop belonged to him. On those findings the trial court partly decreed Suit No. 145 (only as to half the Bhumidhar share) and dismissed the rest, and dismissed Suit No. 333.

The plaintiff appealed (Appeals Nos. 165/1963 and 150/1963) and the defendants appealed the part setting aside the sale as to the plaintiff’s half (Appeal No. 180/1963). The lower appellate court framed three points: (1) whether Attar Singh was adopted (it found he was); (2) whether the whole sale deed could be set aside (it found no legal necessity and set aside the entire sale); and (3) whether possession of the plots had been given to Mahendra so that the disputed crop was sown by him (it found possession not transferred and decreed Suit No. 333). Against that decision, Mahendra filed two second appeals which were heard by the present bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Attar Singh was the adopted son of Jeet Singh (a fact question determined by the courts below).
  2. Whether the entire sale deed executed by Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh could be set aside — i.e., whether there was legal necessity or valid consideration justifying the sale.
  3. Whether the disputed agricultural plots had been delivered into the transferee's possession so that the crop for Rabi 1361-F was sown by the transferee and belonged to him.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The sale deed executed by Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh was without legal necessity and without consideration.
  • The property in question was joint family property and Attar Singh, as adopted son, had an interest in it; thus the sale was invalid as to the plaintiff's share.
  • The crop attached in criminal proceedings belonged to the plaintiff and should be released to him.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Jeet Singh had the right to sell the property; there was legal necessity for the sale.
  • There was valid consideration for the sale.
  • It was denied that Attar Singh was the adopted son of Jeet Singh (a factual denial raised in defence).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath, 1964 A.L.J. 197 F.B. That the notions of Hindu law or Mohammedan law should not be imported into the interpretation of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act when rights are created by the Act; the Act governs Bhumidhari rights irrespective of personal law. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that Bhumidhari rights created under the Act are governed by the Act's transferability and succession provisions and are not subject to co-parcenary or Hindu-law restrictions such as proof of legal necessity for transfer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by accepting certain concurrent findings of the lower courts and then examined the legal effect of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (the Act) on Bhumidhari rights:

  1. Adoption: The court held the finding that Attar Singh was the adopted son of Jeet Singh could not be challenged in the second appeal because no substantial question of law was raised; therefore adoption is treated as established for present purposes.
  2. Legal necessity and consideration: The court accepted the lower appellate court's finding that the sale deed was without legal necessity. It also accepted the lower court's factual conclusion that Rs. 3,200 of the consideration had been paid before the Sub-Registrar and therefore that part of consideration had passed; the remainder of the consideration was not accepted by the court below and that finding stood.
  3. Effect on joint family property and house/gher: Because there was no legal necessity for the sale, property that was joint family property could not be validly transferred by the transferor; accordingly, the lower appellate court's holding that the house and the gher were not transferable was accepted.
  4. Whether Bhumidhari rights were joint family property: The lower appellate court treated the Bhumidhari rights as joint family property because (a) after adoption Jeet Singh caused Attar Singh's name to be recorded in the tenancy, making Attar a co-tenant, and (b) on acquisition of Bhumidhari rights thereafter the rights were treated as joint. The present court disagreed with the inference that those facts converted the subsequently acquired Bhumidhari rights into joint family property governed by Hindu co-parcenary notions.
  5. Statutory analysis: The court examined the statutory scheme:
    • Section 152 of the Act provides that the interest of a Bhumidhar shall be transferable subject only to conditions in that chapter — implying a statutory right to transfer.
    • Other provisions such as Sections 161 (exchange), 169 (right to make a will subject to specific exceptions), and Sections 171–173 (special mode of succession), together with Section 175 (right by survivorship in limited circumstances), demonstrate that succession, testamentary disposition and modes of transfer under the Act are specially regulated and are inconsistent with treating Bhumidhari rights as co-parcenary joint-family interests governed by personal law.
  6. Interaction between personal law and the Act: The court emphasized that Bhumidhari rights are special rights created by the Act (referred to as Act I of 1951 in the judgment) and must be governed by the Act itself. Importing the notions of Hindu or Mohammedan law to restrict the statutory transfer rights would unduly curtail the rights expressly given by Section 152.
  7. Support from precedent: The court cited Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath to reinforce the principle that personal-law concepts should not be imported into interpretation of the Act when the Act creates and regulates new rights applicable to persons regardless of their personal law.
  8. Conclusion as to transferability of Bhumidhari rights: On that statutory and precedential basis, the court concluded that Jeet Singh could transfer his own interest in Bhumidhari property by a sale deed and that such transfer was not per se restricted by notions of legal necessity applicable to joint-family co-parcenary transfers under Hindu law.
  9. Application to the appeals: The court therefore limited the lower appellate court's setting aside of the sale: the sale deed was valid as to the half share that belonged to Jeet Singh (i.e., Jeet Singh's own share in the Bhumidhari property) but could not affect the half share that belonged to the plaintiff. Concerning the crops, the court accepted the lower appellate finding that Mahendra Singh had not been given possession and could not have sown the attached crops, and thus Mahendra was not entitled to those crops.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): Appeal No. 2105 of 1964 is partly allowed; Appeal No. 2104 of 1964 is dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The sale deed executed by Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh is held valid only to the extent of the half share in the Bhumidhari property that belonged to Jeet Singh himself; the plaintiff's half share is not affected by that valid transfer.
  • Mahendra Singh is not entitled to the attached crops for Rabi 1361-F because the lower appellate court's finding that Mahendra had no possession (and hence could not have sown the crop) was accepted; Suit No. 333 of 1954 remains decreed in the plaintiff's favour on that point.
  • Each party will bear their own costs in these appeals.

Broader legal implications: The court applied the statute (U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) and precedent to confirm that Bhumidhari rights are governed by the Act's special transfer and succession rules and are not to be treated as joint-family co-parcenary rights subject to Hindu-law limitations such as proof of legal necessity. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel or separate precedent beyond applying the statutory scheme and the cited authority to the facts.

Appeal No. 2105 of 1964 partly allowed
Appeal No. 2104 of 1964 dismissed

    Mahendra Singh Defdt.- v. Attar Singh And Others Pllff.-Defdt-

    B. Dayal, J.:— These are two connected appeals both arising out of two suits filed by Attar Singh against Mahendra Singh and Jeet Singh referred to this bench by a learned single Judge. Both the suits Nos. 145 of 1954 and 333 of 1954 were heard together. The former suit No. 145 of 1954 was treated as the main suit. The allegation of the plaintiff was that the sale deed executed by his adoptive father Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh was without legal necessity, without consideration and was in respect of the joint family property in which he was also interested as the adopted son and the sale deed was, therefore, invalid. There were proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C and the agricultural plots and their crop had been attached in criminal proceedings. The second suit was, therefore, filed for a declaration that the attached property, namely, the crop belonged to the plaintiff and was liable to be released in favour of the plaintiff. The defence taken to both these suits was that Jeet Singh had a right to sell the property, that there was legal necessity and there was valid consideration for the sale. It was also denied that the plaintiff was an adopted son of Jeet Singh. The trial court after hearing both the suits, came to the conclusion that the sale deed was for legal necessity and consequently the house, the gher and half of the agricultural Bhumidhari land which belonged to Jeet Singh were validly transferred by the sale deed. But the court held that half of the Bhumidhari property could not be sold by Jeet Singh as it was the share of the plaintiff Attar Singh, and Jeet Singh had no right to sell it. The court also found that possession of the agricultural plots had been handed over to Mahendra Singh, the transferee even before the sale was executed and consequently the crop grown upon these plots belonged to the transferee and the plaintiff had no right to it. On these findings, the trial court decreed suit No. 145 of 1954 only to the extent of the half of the Bhumidhari property and dismissed the rest of the plaintiff's claim in that suit, and dismissed suit No. 333 of 1954. Against that decision the plaintiff filed two appeals, appeal No. 165 of 1963 against the decision in suit No. 145 of 1954 refusing to set aside the sale in respect of the house, the gher and half of the Bhumidhari property and appeal No. 150 of 1963 against the dismissal of his suit No. 333 of 1954. The defendants filed appeal No. 180 of 1963 against that part of the decision in suit No. 145 of 1954 by which the sale deed was set aside to the extent of half of the Bhumidhari property. The learned Civil Judge heard all the three appeals together and framed three points for its decision. The first was whether Attar Singh was the adopted son of Jeet Singh and on this he came to the conclusion that he was the adopted son. This was the concurrent finding by both the courts below and has not been challenged before us in Second Appeal. Nothing more need be said about that matter now.

    2. The second point considered by the lower appellate court was whether Attar Singh could get the whole sale deed executed by Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh set aside. On this point, the lower appellate court found that there was no legal necessity for the sale and that the Bhumidjiari property also was the joint family property and in the absence of legal necessity no part of it could be transferred by Jeet Singh. He, therefore, set aside the whole of the sale deed. The third point considered by the lower appellate court was whether the plots in suit, were given in the possession of Mahendra Singh, the transferee so that the crop in dispute for Rabi 1361-F, was sown by him. On this point the court found that possession had not been transferred to the transferee and the crop was therefore, not sown by him. On this ground suit No. 333 of 1954 was also decreed. Against the decision of the lower appellate court, two appeals have been filed by Mahendra Singh, the transferee in the two suits.

    3. After hearing learned counsel for both the sides, we have come to the conclusion as said above that the question of adoption cannot be challenged in Second Appeal because there is no question of law raised and it must be accepted that Attar Singh plaintiff was the adopted son of Jeet Singh transferor. The finding of the lower appellate court that the sale deed was without any legal necessity must also be accepted. The lower appellate court found that out of the consideration mentioned in the sale deed, a sum of Rs. 3,200/- which was paid before the Sub-Registrar, had certainly passed as consideration at the time of the sale deed. It did not accept the other part of the consideration having been paid and this part of the judgment also cannot be challenged in Second Appeal. The result of this finding is that there being no legal necessity for the sale, the property which was the joint family property at the time of the sale could not be validly transferred. The house property and the gher were therefore validly held to be not transferable by the lower appellate court. The question then arises whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that the Bhumidhari rights were also joint family property and could not be transferred without proof of legal necessity. The lower appellate court has observed as follows in order to hold that the Bhumidhari property was also the joint family property:

    “In this case admittedly the plots were in the tenancy of Jeet Singh. If he had simply made an adoption and did nothing else beyond that, probably it could be held that tenancy remained with Jeet Singh with no interest of Attar Singh in the same, but the circumstances of the case show that Jeet Singh treated the property as joint family property. These plots were in the tenancy of Prem Mahavidyadaya Zamindar and after the adoption in 1944 …. an application was moved by Jeet Singh to have the name of Attar Singh recorded over the plots. By an agreement between the zamindar and the parties, the name of Attar Singh was recorded, vide copy of compromise dated 31-8-1948 Ex. V and the order dated 3-9-1948 Ext. VI.”

    4. Upon this fact, the lower appellate court has considered that because the plaintiff Attar Singh was made a co-tenant with Jeet Singh in the tenancy plots and therefore, when the Bhumidhari rights were acquired subsequently by depositing ten times the annual rental and on passing, of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, these Bhumidhari rights, so acquired must be held to be joint family property. In the first place these facts above are insufficient to lead to that conclusion. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the Bhumidhari rights are special rights created by Act I of 1951 and these new rights are solely to be governed by the provisions of the Act. The notions of Hindu Law or Mohammedan Law which would be applicable to other property not governed by any special law cannot be imported into the rights created by this Act.

    5. By Sec. 152 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, rights of a Bhumidhar are transferable and this power of transfer is only subject to the provisions of this Act. The section is as follows:

    “152. The interest of a Bhumidhar shall be transferable subject to the conditions hereinafter contained in this chapter.”

    6. Thus the rights of a Bhumidhar can be transferred and no restrictions are imposed upon those rights to transfer beyond those mentioned in the chapter of the Act. If the property is treated to be joint family property governed by the notions of Hindu Law, then a Bhumidhar will not be able to transfer his interest unless he proves legal necessity and will not be able to make a gift of his property. This would curtail the right given by Sec. 152. Moreover, under Sec. 161 of the Act, a Bhumidhar can make an exchange of his Bhumidhari rights with other rights. Under Sec, 169 of the Act, a Bhumidhar can make a will of his holding or any part thereof except as provided by sub-Sec. (2), which curtails the right to make a will only in the case of a Bhumidhar who has got those rights by inheritance as a widow, widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, mother, daughter, father's mother, son's daughter, sister, or half-sister being the daughter of the same father as the deceased. Thus except these female heirs mentioned in sub-Sec. (2) every other Bhumidhar has a right to bequeath his interest by will. Secs. 171 to 173 then lay down a special mode of succession which is wholly inconsistent with the rights of a co-parcener in the property. Sec. 175 provides for the right by survivorship only in respect of co-widows and co-tenure-holders, who the without any heir under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that under the Act the principles of co-parcenary property are not applicable to Bhumidhari rights. This view is supported by the observations of this Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath 1964 A.L.J 197 F.B.. The question in that case was whether a female Bhumidhar who either acquired rights by inheriting tenancy rights before the passing of the Act and then became a Bhumidhar or inherited the Bhumidhari property after the passing of the Act, could, make a transfer of the property which would enure to the benefit of the transferee even after the death of transferor and it was held that the notions of Hindu law or Mohammedan law should not be imported into the interpretation of the Act as it is equally applicable to persons governed by any personal law. If a Mohammedan or a Christian's widow could absolutely transfer the property inherited by her, there was no reason to hold that a Hindu widow could not do so. On the same principles, since Sec. 152 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act clearly gives a right to a Bhumidhar to transfer his interest, there is no reason to hold that in this case Jeet Singh could not transfer his interest in the Bhumidhari property in favour of Mahendra Singh by means of a sale deed, unrestricted by any consideration of legal necessity etc.

    7. In the result, we partly allow appeal No. 2105 of 1964 arising out of suit No. 145 of 1954 and hold that the sale deed executed by Jeet Singh in favour of Mahendra Singh is valid only to the extent of half share in the Bhumidhari property held by Jeet Singh, and dismiss appeal No. 2104 of 1964 in view of the findings of the lower appellate court that Mahendra Singh had no possession over the plots of land and he could not have sown the crops which were attached by the criminal court and is, therefore, not entitled to those crops. Parties will bear their own costs in these appeals.

    Appeal No. 2105 of 1964 partly allowed
    Appeal No. 2104 of 1964 dismissed.

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    Mahendra Singh Defdt.- v. Attar Singh And Others Pllff.-Defdt-
    (Nov 26, 1965)