Mukerji, J.:— This is an application for a review of judgment dated 17th of August 1961.
2. The review has been sought on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. The application for review has been made under Or. 47, R. 1, C.P.C and the prayer is in these words:—
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to review its judgment and decree dated 17-8-1961, and after recalling or setting aside the same, be pleased to order that proceeding in the above Second Appeal shall remain stayed in accordance with the provisions of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act.”
3. In order to appreciate the true import of the prayer it is necessary to notice a few facts.
4. Sometime in the year 1953 a suit for possession of six plots covering an area of 6 bighas 12 biswas, situated in village Asharfabad was filed in the court of the Munsif of Mirzapur. On the 13th of April 1955 the aforementioned suit was decreed for possession with costs against the second defendant to the suit. An appeal was preferred against the decision of the learned Munsif and that appeal was decided by the lower appellate court on the 28th of July 1956. The decision in the appeal was against the appellant with the result that the decision of the Munsif was confirmed. A second appear was filed in this court on the 23rd of August 1956. The second appeal came up Before a learned single judge on the 20th of April 61. The learned single judge referred the appeal to a Bench and it came up before us for decision on the 17th of August 1961. We decided the appeal in favour of the appellant and the result of our decision was that the plaintiffs' suit stood dismissed.
5. On the 29th of November 1961 the present application for review was made. The reason for the review was sought in the fact that there had been a notification made under the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, in respect of the area in which the plots in dispute lay. This notification was said to have been made on the 27th of June 1961; and said to have been published in the official Gazette of that date.
6. The effect of the publication of a notification under Sec. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act was as provided for by Sec. 5(b)(i) that all proceedings for correction of records and all suits for declaration of rights and interest over land or for possession of land or for partition, pending before any authority or court, whether in appeal or reference or revision, was to stand stayed. The suit which was to remain stayed under Sec. 5(b)(i) was ultimately to be decided in accordance with the decision given by the Consolidation courts.
7. From the narration of the facts above it would clearly appear that on the date on which this second appeal came up before this Bench there was a subsisting notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act and therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 5(b)(i), the second appeal could not be heard by us because under that section it stood stayed. The question that falls for determination is whether when the appeal was decided by us in ignorance of there having been a notification in respect of the property, under Sec. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, whether that decision of ours was liable to be set aside or recalled on a review application.
8. A review can be had under the provisions of Or. 47 on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due deligence, did not come within the knowledge of the party seeking the review and such evidence could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed or the order made or there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. There can be no doubt now that the expression “sufficient reason” which appeared in Or. 41, R. 1(1)(c) had to be ejus dem generis the other grounds and therefore the court had to see whether the reason suggested was analogous to the earlier reasons. The reason that is suggested in this case for the review is that this court decided the appeal when, properly there could be no appeal which could come up for decision. The question that has to be answered in this context is whether the fact that we were not aware of the notification was sufficient circumstance to rob our decision of all legal sanctity which it otherwise would have had if there were no such notification. The other matter that we have to consider is whether the ignorance of the notification at the time of the hearing of the appeal and its subsequent production by the party could be said to be in the nature of a discovery of a new important matter within the scope of those words in Or. 47, R. 1(1)(c) of the Code. There could be no difficulty in saying that the fact that there was a notification under Sec. 4 touching the lands in dispute in the second appeal, would be a new discovery of an important matter at the time this knowledge was for the first time gathered by the applicant but that was not enough for the applicants success in his review for he had for his success further to show that this discovery could not be within His knowledge even after the exercise of due deligence. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the applicant could not have known of the notification at the time when the appeal came up for hearing before us if he had been really diligent. Therefore, the applicant could not take advantage of the circumstance that he had not known of the notification at the time when the appeal was heard by us and that his subsequent knowledge should be treated as falling in the category of discovery of new and important material. The notification not having been on the record nor there being any other fact or circumstance on the record which could indicate that there was a notification under Sec. 4, in respect of the area in which the property in dispute was situated it could not also be said that when we decided the second appeal we committed a mistake or an error which was apparent on the face of the record. If we had decided the appeal in ignorance of the notification on the record or something on the record which could indicate that there was a notification, then obviously it could have been said that there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. From what we have said above it appears to us that the power of review conferred on the court under Or. 47 did not confer power, that type of power which would be needed to review this decision.
9. The question that next falls for consideration is whether our inability to review our decision under Or. 47, C.P.C makes us completely impotent to set right a wrong—particularly when the wrong was committed in ignorance of a notification of which the court could have taken notice on its mere production before it.
10. It has never been disputed, seriously, that a court has inherent jurisdiction, a jurisdiction which has been preserved to the court by Sec. 151, C.P.C to undo a wrong. Even though this power of undoing a wrong could not be exercised for correcting such errors as could legitimately and properly be corrected by a court of appeal or a court of revision. Broadly speaking the errors which a court could appropriately correct under its inherent powers had to be something very different from mere errors of law or fact. It had to be an error which would often partake of the nature of a jurisdictional error. The error that has been committed in the instant case is that this court decided the case at a time when the case should not have been available for decision. The second appeal in which the decision was given was, under a statutory provision to remain stayed and no court therefore could decide a matter when it remained stayed. It was contended that since the decision that we gave could not be treated as a nullity therefore there could be no question of our recalling that decision. If may be pointed out that even if the decision was not a nullity, for we do not determine the question whether the decision was a nullity or not, the fact remains that we should not and possibly could not have decided the appeal and we would not have decided it if we knew of the notification.
11. If we were not to give effect to the legal consequence which followed on the making of the notification under Sec. 4 then we would be flouting, so to speak, the intention of the legislature, for the legislature by making the notification intended that the dispute which we determined was to be determined by another hierarchy of the courts, namely the consolidation courts. The intention of the legislature was beyond doubt clear and therefore it was but fit and proper that this court should, when it has seen the position clearly, give effect to the clear intention of the legislature particularly when the matter relates in a sense to jurisdiction.
12. There is yet another circumstance to which we wish to refer to for that in our judgment should also play a part in determining the fate of the review application and this circumstance lay in the fact that our decision in the second appeal, which was ill ignorance of the notification made under Sec. 4 may not be strictly binding on the consolidation courts, and it may be open to those courts to ignore our decision and come to a contrary decision. Courts are very chary to have their decisions flouted and consequently a court would, if it can, save a situation where its decision could be ignored, particularly, by a court of inferior jurisdiction.
13. For the reasons given above we allow this application for review and recall our decision dated the 17th of August 1961 and declare that Second Appeal No. 1396 of 1956 shall remain stayed in terms of Sec. 5(b)(i) of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. The parties will bear their own costs of this application.
Application allowed.