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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, referred to the court the question of whether proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act were within time and legal. The assessee, Raghunath Prasad Tandon, an individual and karta of a Hindu undivided family (HUF), received salary from a firm in which he was a partner as karta. For the assessment year 1950-51, it was held that the salary was his individual income, not that of the HUF. For the subsequent assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53, the Income-tax Officer issued notices under section 22(2) only to the HUF, which filed returns showing income excluding the salary. The assessee filed separate returns as an individual showing the salary income. The Income-tax Officer assessed the HUF on the total income, including the salary, but did not assess the individual. Appeals by the HUF were allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who held the salary income was to be taxed in the hands of the assessee individually. Subsequently, notices under section 34 were issued to the assessee, who filed nil returns and contested the validity of the notices. The Income-tax Officer assessed the individual on the salary income, and these assessments were confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The question referred to this court concerns the legality and timeliness of these proceedings under section 34.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act were within the prescribed time limits and legally valid.
  2. Whether the notices issued under section 34(1)(b) were based on information that was new to the Income-tax Officer, thereby justifying reassessment.
  3. Whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to direct fresh assessment after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year.
  4. Whether the assessee, having submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction by not appealing, could now challenge the legality of the reassessment.

Arguments of the Parties

Department's Arguments

  • The notices issued on May 31, 1957, were not under section 34(1)(a) because the assessee had already filed returns.
  • The notices were issued under section 34(1)(b) based on information in the Income-tax Officer's possession that the income had escaped assessment, justifying reassessment within four years from the end of the assessment years.
  • The Income-tax Officer acquired new information after receiving the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated March 14, 1957, which directed assessment of the salary income in the hands of the assessee individually.
  • The second proviso to section 34(3) exempts such assessments from the four-year limitation if made in consequence of an order under section 31.
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to direct fresh assessment even after four years from the end of the assessment year.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The notices under section 34 were not legally issued as they were beyond the four-year period from the end of the assessment years.
  • The Income-tax Officer did not have new information justifying reassessment under section 34(1)(b).
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to direct assessment after the expiry of four years.
  • The assessee contended that the reassessment was time-barred and invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas [1959] 36 I.T.R 569 Validity of notice under section 34(1) when a return has been filed and not rejected. The court distinguished the instant case from this precedent, noting that unlike in Ranchhoddas Karsondas, the Income-tax Officer had effectively rejected the assessee's return by assessing the income under the HUF, thus justifying the notices under section 34(1)(b).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature and timing of the notices issued under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. It observed that notices could not be under section 34(1)(a) since the assessee had filed returns, a fact conceded by the department. The court then examined whether the notices were valid under section 34(1)(b), which allows reassessment if the Income-tax Officer, based on information in his possession, believes income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

The court emphasized the distinction between possession of knowledge of a claim and possession of information. The Income-tax Officer initially did not accept the assessee's claim that the salary income was his individual income and assessed it as HUF income. Therefore, the income had not escaped assessment but was assessed under the wrong person. The crucial new information arose only after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order under section 31, which directed the income be assessed as the assessee's individual income. This order constituted new information that justified the reassessment under section 34(1)(b).

The court further held that the four-year limitation for reassessment under section 34(3) did not apply in this case because of the proviso exempting assessments made in consequence of an order under section 31. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to direct fresh assessment even after the four-year period, and the assessee, having not appealed against this direction, was bound by it.

The court distinguished the cited precedent of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas, noting that in that case the return was pending and not rejected, whereas here the return was effectively rejected by assessing the income under the HUF.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act were within time and legally valid.

The court answered the referred question in the affirmative, confirming that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue notices and assess the assessee individually on the salary income despite the lapse of four years from the end of the assessment years, due to the direction under section 31. The assessee was bound by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction and could not now challenge the reassessment. This decision directly affects the parties by validating the reassessments but does not establish a new precedent beyond the application of the existing statutory provisions and their interpretation in this context.

    Raghunath Prasad Tandon v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P

    M.C Desai, C.J:— The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, has referred to this court the question: “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act were within time and legal”, in the following circumstances:

    The assessee at whose instance the question has been referred is Raghunath Prasad Tandon, an individual. He also is a karta of a Hindu undivided family. There is a firm known as Kishore Chand Shiv Charan Lal, in which he is a partner as karta. He is also paid a salary by the firm. For the assessment year 1950-51 there arose a question whether the salary received by him from the firm was his income as an individual or an income of the Hindu undivided family and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held by its order dated November 4, 1956, that it was his income as an individual and not of the Hindu undivided family. In this reference we are concerned with the next two assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53. For these two assessment years the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under section 22(2) to the Hindu undivided family and in response to them two returns were filed in each of the two years; no notice under section 22(2) was issued to Raghunath Prasad Tandon as an individual, and this was because previously the Income-tax Officer had been issuing a notice under section 22(2) only to the Hindu undivided family and not to the individual. For the assessment year 1951-52, one return was filed by the Hindu undivided family represented by Raghunath Prasad Tandon on August 16, 1951, and the other by himself as an individual on September 29, 1955. The former was filed under section 22(2) and the latter could be a return under section 22(3), because prior to that date no assessment order had been passed against the individual and no notice under section 22 had been issued against him. In the return filed by the individual the only income shown was of Rs. 12,000 received by him as salary from the firm and this amount was not included in the income of the Hindu undivided family in the return filed on its behalf. For the assessment year 1952-53 also two returns were filed, one on September 15, 1952, by the Hindu undivided family in response to the notice issued under section 22(2) and the other on January 24, 1956, by Raghunath Prasad Tandon as an individual under section 22(3). The individual showed in his return the income of Rs. 14,280 on account of the salary received by him from the firm and this amount was not included in the income in the other return filed on behalf of the Hindu undivided family. On September 30, 1955, the Income-tax Officer assessed the Hindu undivided family on the total of the incomes shown in the two returns filed for the assessment year 1951-52, treating the income shown in the return of the individual as the income of the Hindu undivided family. He did not assess the individual at all because he found that he had earned no income during the year. He passed similar orders in respect of the assessment year 1952-53, assessing the Hindu undivided family on the total of the incomes shown in the two returns and treating the income shown in the individual returns as the income of the Hindu undivided family. Before these assessment orders were passed, the individual had never been assessed to tax. There were two appeals from the two assessment orders by the Hindu undivided family and both were disposed of by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on March 14, 1957. By this date he had in his possession the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in respect of the assessment of 1950-51, to the effect that the salary received by the assessee was his income as an individual and was not the income of the Hindu undivided family. In accordance with the decision, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeals and assessed the Hindu undivided family on the income shown by it in its return, holding that the income from the salary was to be taxed only in the hands of the assessee as an individual. Thereupon, the Income-tax Officer issued notices under section 34 against the assessee as an individual on May 31, 1957. The assessee appeared before him and filed two returns for the two assessment years, each showing nil income, and contended that no notice could be issued against him under section 34. On September 9, 1957, the Income-tax Officer assessed him on the income of Rs. 12,000 for the assessment year 1951-52 and the income of Rs. 14,280 for the next assessment year. These assessments have been confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. At the assessee's instance the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the question, set out above, for answer by this court.

    2. The notice that was issued by the Income-tax Officer on May 31, 1957, was certainly not a notice issued under section 34(1)(a). As the assessee had filed returns in respect of the incomes on which he has now been assessed, the notices could not have been issued under that provision, and this was conceded by Sri Gopal Behari on behalf of the department.

    3. It was contended by Sri G.P Bhargava that the notices were not issued also under section 34(1)(b) because they were not based on any information which was not in the Income-tax Officer's possession previously. The provision is to the effect that “if…. notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income………… chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year,…he may in cases falling under…. clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee……. a notice……. and may proceed to assess…… such income…” The assessee had not been assessed for the two assessment years before the Income-tax Officer assessed him on September 9, 1957. He had undisputedly earned income in the two assessment years and was undisputedly assessable to tax. Therefore, when the Income-tax Officer proceeded to assess him as an individual on September 9, 1957, it was a case of his acting under section 34(1)(b), if it could be said that in consequence of information in his possession he had reason to believe that his income had escaped assessment for the two years. What gives him jurisdiction so to act is the possession of information about the income having escaped assessment. Possession of knowledge of a claim is not the same thing as possession of information. During the earlier assessment proceedings completed on September 30, 1955, the Income-tax Officer had in his possession the claim of the assessee that he had earned the income in the two years, but he did not believe the claim and thought that the income had been earned not by him but by the Hindu undivided family. He assessed the income but as in the hands of the Hindu undivided family. Consequently it was not then a case of income escaping assessment and there (could be no question of his being then in possession of information about its having escaped assessment. What is required under section 34(1)(b) is escape of a certain income from assessment and not escape of a certain person from being assessed. So long as an income has been assessed, no matter in whose hands, it cannot be said by the assessing officer himself that there is a case of escape of income. The return filed by the assessee showing the income as his income was only a claim or an allegation and not an information. Before an assessment order can be passed on a return, it must be accepted as correct. On September 30, 1955, the Income-tax Officer did not believe that the returns were correct and, therefore, he could not be said to have had information in his possession that the incomes were earned by the assessee. This information was acquired by him later when he received a copy of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated March 14, 1957. It was through this order that he learnt that the incomes were really of the assessee and that they had escaped assessment on account of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's having reduced the assessable income of the Hindu undivided family. The income escaped assessment in consequence of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and it was only after the order was passed that the Income-tax Officer could possibly have any information about the escape. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the Income-tax Officer had no information in his possession on September 9, 1957, which had not been in his possession on September 30, 1955. He had full jurisdiction to serve on the assessee at any time within four years of the end of the assessment years a notice and proceed to assess him. Four years from the end of the two assessment years ended on March 31, 1956, and March 31, 1957. The notices issued by the Income-tax Officer on him on May 31, 1957, were, therefore, after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment years. Section 34(3) requires that no order of assessment (barring certain orders of reassessment with which we are not concerned) can be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. Both the assessment orders passed on September 9, 1957, were admittedly passed more than four years after the end of the two assessment years. But the provisions in sub-section (1)(b) and sub-section (3) of section 34 are subject to the proviso that the provisions limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order of assessment may be made are not to apply to assessment made on the assessee in consequence of, or to give effect to, any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in his order under section 31 had given a definite direction that the salary received by the assessee from the firm was to be assessed as his income. When he had directed that it was to be assessed as his income, it meant that the Income-tax Officer was to proceed to assess it, as his income. The income, being assessable, had to be assessed in the hands of one person or another. Originally, it was assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family, but the consequence of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order under section 31 was that it escaped assessment. The subsequent assessment by the Income-tax Officer of the income as that of the assessee could be said to have been made in consequence of, and to give effect to, the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that it was the assessee's income. The second proviso to section 34(3) clearly-applied and neither the issue of the notices nor the making of the assessment order could be said to have been time-barred.

    4. Sri G.P Bhargava argued in the alternative that even if the case was governed by the second proviso to section 34(3), the assessment order for 1951-52 at least was time-barred. This argument was based upon the fact that by March 14, 1957, the date of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order under section 31, more than four years had passed since the end of the assessment year. The contention was that after the expiry of the four years from the end of the assessment year the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to give any direction for assessment or reassessment of the income earned in the relevant accounting year. We do not find this contention supported by any statutory provision or authority. Section 31(3), which states what orders can be passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner, does not contain any limitation on his power mentioned in clause (b) to direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. He is not required by any provision to dispose of an appeal within four years of the end of the assessment year. His power to direct a fresh assessment is general, capable of being exercised in every appeal. Since he may dispose of an appeal after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, it follows that he had the power to give the direction even if four years had expired. The second proviso to section 34(3) does not contain anything to suggest that the order under section 31 must have been passed within four years of the end of the assessment year. The proviso is general and applies whenever an assessment is to be made in consequence of, or to give effect to, any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31 regardless of whether it was passed before or after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. It is not within the province of the court to read in the proviso a qualification that the order must have been made within four years.

    5. We further find that the assessee submitted himself to the direction contained in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order that the income in question should be assessed as his income by not appealing from it. He cannot challenge the legality of the direction now. If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to give the direction because four years had elapsed since the end of the assessment year, he should have challenged the direction by means of an appeal.

    6. If it be conceded that the direction was not illegal, the Income-tax Officer was bound to comply with it regardless of any question of limitation. The second proviso to section 34 was enacted with the express object to meeting such cases as the instant one. Any direction legally given by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner must be complied with or given effect to, regardless of any question of time.

    7. We, therefore, see no substance even in the alternative argument in respect of the assessment year 1951-52.

    8. We were referred to Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas [1959] 36 I.T.R 569, but the facts there were quite different. There the Income-tax Officer, in spite of a return having been filed before him in response to his general notice, issued a notice against him under section 34(1). He had not rejected the return but had simply ignored it and the Supreme Court held that the notice could not be issued under section 34(1)(a) because the return had already been filed, or under section 34(1)(b) because while the return was pending it could not be said that the income had escaped assessment. In the instant case the Income-tax Officer had virtually rejected the return of the assessee and it was not pending when he issued the notices under section 34(1). So long as a return is pending before the Income-tax Officer he may not say that any income mentioned in it has escaped assessment, but virtual rejection of a return may amount to escape of the income mentioned in it from assessment. The return of the assessee cannot be said to have been pending merely because the Income-tax Officer did not pass a specific order rejecting it. When he assessed all the incomes mentioned in it as the income of the Hindu undivided family and did not assess the assessee at all on it, it meant that he had rejected the return and not kept it pending. He must be deemed to have found, as required by section 23(3), that the assessee's total income was nil.

    9. Accordingly we answer the question in the affirmative and direct that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 66(5). We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax the costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 200.

    10. Question answered in the affirmative.

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    Raghunath Prasad Tandon v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P
    (Jul 27, 1962)