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  • provisions of R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
  • Rule 19 of the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules.
  • Provinces Public Health Service Rules of which Rules 18
  • with.5. Rule 20
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
  • Rule 19 of the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules.
  • Provinces Public Health Service Rules of which Rules 18
  • with.5. Rule 20
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent obtained an M.B., B.S. degree from King Edward Medical College, Lahore, in 1939 and migrated to India from Pakistan in 1947. He applied for and was appointed to the Public Health Service of the State. Initially he was appointed temporarily for six months in Dehra Dun on 20 June 1949. By an order dated 24 June 1950 he was appointed as Medical Officer on two years' probation from 20 June 1949. On 16 October 1950 the Director of Medical and Health Services informed him that the post was permanent and pensionable and that he would be confirmed if his work was satisfactory. The probationary period expired on 19 June 1951. No formal confirmation order was issued, but the respondent continued in State service and was posted as Malaria Survey Officer at Saharanpur from 2 September 1952 until some date in August 1954, when he was discharged from Government service.

During probation (April 1950) the respondent had been found fit by a State Medical Board. The respondent suffered from a stammer; on 3 July 1954 a subsequent State Medical Board considered him "completely and permanently incapacitated for further service on any account in consequence of impediment of speech and to have lost all earning capacity." Pursuant to that report, the State Government issued an order dated 5 August 1954 directing that the respondent be invalided out of Government service and discharged with effect from the date of relief.

The appellant (State) protested administratively but did not succeed. The respondent filed a petition in the Court challenging the validity of the discharge order. The Single Judge (Mehrotra, J.) held that though the respondent had not been formally confirmed he was in permanent employment of the State and could not be discharged except in accordance with the provisions of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as then in force. Because that procedure had not been followed, Mehrotra, J. quashed the discharge order and directed reinstatement. The State Government appealed; this opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What was the legal nature of the respondent's engagement with the State at the time of discharge — i.e., whether he remained on probation, was temporarily engaged, or had become a permanent employee despite lack of formal confirmation?
  2. Whether the Government could validly terminate the respondent's employment on grounds of incapacity (as found by the Medical Board) without affording him an opportunity to show cause against dismissal, and whether Article 311 of the Constitution applied.
  3. Whether the State's action in dispensing with the respondent's services amounted to punishment attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution, given the circumstances (specifically the claim that the disability pre-existed appointment).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., L.R. 10 C.P. 125 at 145 Illustration of the contractual principle that a service contract may come to an end by reason of a supervening incapacity of the employee, supplying an implied term that the employer need not await recovery when incapacity frustrates the engagement. The court relied on the case to state the general principle that supervening incapacity can end an employment contract; however, it distinguished the present facts because the respondent's defect (stammer) pre-existed appointment and therefore could have been dealt with during probation.
Poussard v. Spiers and Pond, 1 Q.B.D. 410 Recognition of the same general principle concerning incapacity and contractual obligations affecting engagements of service. The court cited it as a later authority recognizing the principle in Jackson and used it to contextualize the rule, while noting the factual difference in the present case (pre-existing defect).
Storey v. Fulham Steel Works Company, 24 T.L.R. 89 Another authority recognizing the principle that service may terminate by reason of incapacity affecting performance. Used as a supporting precedent for the principle, but the court held the present case distinguishable on the ground that the incapacity existed at the time of employment.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 A.I.R. S.C. 36 Definition of "punishment" for purposes of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The court held that the respondent's discharge amounted to a punishment as defined in this case and therefore Article 311(2) was attracted, requiring compliance with its protections (opportunity to show cause, etc.).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps grounded in the text of the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules and constitutional protections:

  1. Interpretation of the Service Rules:
    • The court examined Rules 18 (probationary pay and counting of temporary/officiating service towards probation), 19 (Government may dispense with probationer during or at end of probation; may extend probation up to one year) and 20 (conditions for confirmation) of the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules.
    • The court concluded that a recruit directly appointed (like the respondent) is appointed to a permanent post on probation, ordinarily for two years, extensible up to one further year in special cases; there is no provision for probation to exceed three years.
    • If the Government does not exercise its power under Rule 19 to dispense with the services during or at the end of probation but retains the member, the court was inclined to treat that retention as tantamount to confirmation, though the court stated that it was not essential to resolve that point definitively for the decision before it.
  2. The legal effect of incapacity:
    • The court acknowledged established authorities (Jackson, Poussard, Storey) that a contract of service may terminate by reason of supervening incapacity which frustrates the engagement in a business sense.
    • However, the court found that the respondent's stammer was not a supervening incapacity; it was a pre-existing defect known at the time of appointment and, if relevant to efficiency, could have justified dismissal during the probationary period.
    • Because the respondent possessed the defect at the time of engagement and continued in service for some years without formal dismissal during probation, the court found no legal principle to justify removal after five years of service for that pre-existing defect.
  3. Application of constitutional protection (Article 311):
    • The court held that the respondent's removal under these circumstances involved the forfeiture of rights and amounted to a punishment as defined in Parshotam Lal Dhingra; accordingly, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was attracted.
    • Because the respondent was not afforded an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action, the discharge could not be upheld.
  4. Concurring reasoning (Dayal, J.):
    • Dayal, J. agreed with the conclusion, emphasizing that the State did not purport to dispense with the respondent's services under Rule 19 during probation but invalided him on medical grounds following the Medical Board's report.
    • Dayal, J. stressed the factual circumstances that made it reasonable for the respondent to be given an opportunity to challenge the Medical Board's findings: the respondent had been previously certified fit in 1950, one member of the second Board viewed the defect as minor, and the stammer reportedly did not impede certain aspects of his field duties as Malaria Survey Officer.
    • He observed that the compulsory invaliding of a Government servant on grounds of ill health effectively operates as a dismissal on the ground of unfitness, and so must fall within Article 311's protective ambit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED (with costs).

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The result of dismissing the appeal restores the effect of the Single Judge's order: the order dated 5 August 1954 which invalided/discharged the respondent cannot be upheld. The respondent's discharge was quashed by the Single Judge and, in consequence of this dismissal of the appeal, that quashing stands (the respondent was to be reinstated as directed by the Single Judge).
  • The State is liable for costs as ordered by the Court.

Broader implications:

  • The court applied existing principles concerning probationary rules and incapacity in employment and affirmed that removal on grounds of incapacity that pre-existed appointment and was not acted upon during probation cannot be justified without observance of constitutional protections.
  • The opinion invoked Article 311 and prior authorities to emphasize that compulsory invaliding of a government servant operates as a dismissal (punishment) within the meaning of Article 311(2) unless the procedural safeguards are complied with.
  • No statement in the opinion indicates that it purports to lay down a novel legal rule beyond the application of the cited rules and precedents to the facts of this case.

    The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another v. Dr. K.R Anand .

    Mootham, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Mehrotra dated the 20th October, 1955, which gives rise to a question of some interest.

    2. The relevant facts are these: The respondent, who had obtained the degree of M.B, B.S from the King Edward Medical College, Lahore, in 1939, migrated to India from Pakistan in 1947. He applied for appointment in the Public Health Service of this State, and on the 20th June, 1949, he was appointed temporarily in that Service for a period of six months in the Dehra Dun district. By a subsequent order dated the 24th June, 1950, he was appointed as Medical Officer in the Service on two years' probation from the date on which he had originally joined namely the 20th June, 1949. On the 16th October, 1950, he was informed by the Director of Medical and Health Services, U.P, that the post to which he had been appointed was permanent and pensionable and that he would be confirmed in it in due course provided his work was satisfactory. The period of probation expired on the 19th June, 1951. No formal order was made confirming the respondent's appointment but he continued in the service of the State, and on the 2nd September, 1952, he was posted to Saharanpur as Malaria Survey Officer—a post which it appears he held until some date in August, 1954, when he was discharged from Government service. In April, 1950, during the period of probation, the respondent had appeared before, and had been found fit by, a State Medical Board. It seems that he suffered from a stammer, and on the 3rd July, 1954, he again appeared before the State Medical Board at Lucknow and that the Board on this occasion considered the respondent “to be completely and permanently incapacitated for further service on any account in consequence of impediment of speech and to have lost all earning capacity.” It was in consequence of this report that the State Government by an order dated the 5th August, 1954, directed that the respondent “be invalided out of Government service and discharged with effect from the date of relief”. The appellant protested both to the Director of Medical and Health Services, U.P, and to the Governor against his discharge, but without avail. The respondent then filed a petition in this Court in which he challenged on various grounds the validity of the order discharging him from service. Mehrotra, J., was of opinion that although the respondent had not been formally confirmed in his appointment he was in the permanent employment of the state and could not be discharged save in accordance with the provisions of R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as they then stood. As it was not in dispute that rule had not been complied with the learned Judge allowed the petition, quashed the order of discharge and directed the respondent be reinstated. The State Government now appeals.

    3. The first problem which arises is to determine the nature of the respondent's engagement with the State at the time his services were dispensed with. For this purpose it is necessary to refer to the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules of which Rules 18 (excluding sub-R. (ii) which is not relevant), 19 and 20 read as follows:—

    “(i) Recruits directly appointed shall be on probation for two years and will draw a pay of Rs. 200 per mensem during the first year and Rs. 215 per mensem on completion of the first year of service. On confirmation they shall be placed at the Rs. 230 stage of the time-scale of pay for future entrants laid down in Rule 21(a). Temporary or officiating service shall count towards probation.

    (ii) …………………………

    “19. The services of a probationer may be dispensed with by the Government at any time during the period of probation or at its end. The Government may also extend the period of probation in the case of any particular member for any further period up to one year.

    20. A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment when—

    (a) he has completed the prescribed period of probation, and

    (b) the Government are satisfied that (i) he is sufficiently acquainted with all local enactments relating to public health, municipal and district organization, the administrative work of local bodies, and the relations of those bodies to the various departments of the Government; (ii) he is otherwise fit for confirmation, (c) All confirmations under this rule shall be notified in the Government Gazette.”

    4. In my opinion a recruit directly appointed (such) as was the respondent) is appointed to a permanent post on probation. The period of probation is ordinarily two years but may in the case of any particular member—the use of the word ‘member’ in R. 19 is significant—be extended for any further period up to one year, and during the period of probation the services of the member may be dispensed with at any time. There is no provision for the probationary period exceeding three years and in no case, in my opinion, can a member, on probation, after the expiry of that period or such reasonable time thereafter as is necessary for the Government to decide whether on a review of his Work during the probationary period, his services should be dispensed with.

    5. Rule 20 states the conditions subject to which a probationer shall be confirmed. It imposes a duty on the Government to confirm the probationer in the circumstances therein stated, and that duty is one which the Government has to perform if at all, at the expiration of the period of probation.

    6. In the present case the Government did not confirm the respondent at the end of his period of probation. He admittedly was allowed to continue in Government service for three more years. In such circumstances it appears to me that there are only two possibilities: that respondent's further employment must be either permanent or temporary. I am disposed to think that the former view is the better, and that if the Government does not exercise its right under R. 19 to dispense with a member of the service during or at the end of his period of probation, but retains him in its employment, it must be deemed to have confirmed him in his appointment. It is not however necessary for me to express a final opinion on this point for, whichever be the correct view, a second question arises. It is, whether it was within the power of the Government to terminate the Respondent's employment whether permanent or temporary in the circumstances which obtain in this case without affording him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. Now the Government had dispensed with the respondent's services because he has been declared on medical grounds to be unfit for retention. It is a condition implied in an ordinary contract of service that it comes to an end in the event of a supervening incapacity of an employee as Bramwell, B said in Jackson v. Union Mrine Insurance Co. Ltd. L.R 10 C.P, 125 at 145. “Thus, A enters the service of B and is ill and cannot perform his work. No action will lie against him; but B may hire a fresh servant and not wait for his recovery if his illness would put an end, in a business sense, to their business engagement, and would frustrate the object of that engagement.” This principle was recognised in the later cases of Poussard v. Spiers and Pond 1 Q.B.D, 410. and Storey v. Fulham Steel Works Company 24 T.L.R 89., and in my view it applies also in the case of Government servants. But on such materials as is before us—and I do not think it is disputed by learned counsel—the physical defect from which the respondent suffered, namely a stammer, is not something which came into existence after he had entered into the service of Government but was a defect from which he suffered, and must have been known to have suffered, at the time of his appointment. In fact it seems that he has been removed for a defect which he had when he was engaged and for which, if it impairs his efficiency, his services could have been dispensed with during the probationary period. I know no principle of law which would justify the respondent's removal after being in the service of the State Government for five years for a physical defect which he possessed, and was known to possess, at the time he was first employed. In the circumstances I do not think that the respondent's removal from service can be justified on the basis of an implied condition of his employment, and that therefore his discharge, whether he be a permanent or temporary servant, involves the forfeiture of the rights which in either case he possessed. It accordingly amounts to a punishment as defined in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union Of India 1958 A.I.R S.C page 36 and Art. 311(2) of the Constitution is attracted. The respondent admittedly was not afforded an opportunity of snowing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and I am of opinion therefore that the order dispensing with his services dated the 5th August, 1954, cannot be upheld. I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

    7. Dayal, J.:— I agree. It is not the case of the appellant that the services of the respondent were terminated during his period of probation. The services have not been dispensed with in the exercise of the powers given by Rule 19 of the United Provinces Public Health Service Rules. The respondent's services have been dispensed with because he has been found by the Medical Board to be completely and permanently incapacitated for further service on any account in consequence of the impediment of speech and to have lost all earning capacity. The question is whether the State can terminate his services even for this reason without complying with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. I am of the opinion that it could not. The respondent has to be given an opportunity to show cause why his services be not terminated on account of the report of the Medical Board. However slender the chances, the respondent could have done his best to show that the report of the Medical Board was not to be accepted in its entirety and that he could still efficiently discharge the duties of some of the posts in the service, if not of some others which required a considerable amount of speaking by him. His attempt could be a reasonable one in this case in view of the facts that he suffered from stammering from his birth as mentioned by him in his letter to the Director of Medical and Health Services (Annexure ‘D’ to his affidavit), that he was considered fit by the Medical Board in 1950, that appointment to the service is made after an examination by a Medical Board and that the first Medical Board in 1954 certified that he was fit for service, that this stammering did not interfere with the efficient discharge of his duties of field work as Malaria Survey Officer and that it would stand in his way if his duties involved prolonged speeches or addressing of big audiences. Of the three doctors who were members of the second Medical Board one, a Military officer, expressed the opinion that the impediment of speech was a minor defect and was not enough to cause rejection as to his fitness for continuance in service. We have not been referred to any provision of law which authorises the State compulsorily to invalid out a Government servant. The compulsory removal of a Government servant on the ground of ill health amounts to dismissing him on a finding that he is unfit to discharge the duties of his office. A dismissal on such a charge must come within the ambit of Art. 311 of the Constitution.

    SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 495 OF 1955

    8. By the Court—The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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    The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another v. Dr. K.R Anand .
    (Apr 29, 1958)