Mootham, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Chaturvedi dated the 7th February, 1957, dismissing a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. On the 22nd October, 1955 the appellant who was a police constable, was served with a charge sheet under Sec. 7 of the Police Act in which it was alleged that he had been remiss in the discharge of his duties as a police officer and unfit for the same in that he had committed certain acts of misconduct, particulars of which were specified in the charge. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, who conducted the inquiry found the charges to be established, and by an order dated the 22nd May, 1956 he dismissed the appellant from police force. The appellant then appealed to the Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Bareilly, but his appeal was dismissed by an order dated the 12th October, 1956. The appellant then filed a petition in this Court in which he questioned the validity of the order dismissing him from service on a number of grounds. That petition was dismissed by Mr. Justice Chaturvedi by the order which is the subject of the present appeal.
2. One point only has been argued on behalf of the appellant. It is that as the acts of misconduct which formed the basis of the charge against the appellant under Sec. 7 of the Police Act were committed by him more than three months prior to the date upon which he was served with the charge sheet, a departmental trial under Sec. 7 of the Act was barred by Sec. 42 of that Act.
3. This contention was raised before the learned Judge and was rejected by him. Mr. Justice Mehrotra in Mohammad Hanif Ashan Ullah Khan v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar 1957 A.I.R All. 634. has also held that the provision of Sec. 42 of the Police Act have no application to a departmental trial under Sec. 7 of that Act. With that view we are, with respect in entire agreement.
4. Sec. 42 of the Police Act provides that all actions and prosecution against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act, or under the general police powers given thereby, shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed. It is not suggested that the proceedings against the appellant amount to a prosecution, but it is argued that such proceedings are included within the word actions as used in this section. We, however, agree with Mr. Justice Chaturvedi that the word actions as used in this section means a civil suit. That that is so is, in our opinion made clear by the second paragraph of Sec. 42 the opening words of which are “No plaintiff shall recover in any such action if tender of sufficient amend shall have been made…..” It is further to be observed that Sec. 42 must be read in conjunction with the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act of 1871, which provides that:
“So much of Sec. 42”—that is of the Police Act—
“as relates to the limitation of suits is repealed.”
5. As a consequence of this repeal it was held in Mohammad Sharif v. Nasir Ali A.I.R 1930 All. 742. that after the coming into force of the Indian Limitation Act of 1871 the period of limitation for suits (which before that Act came into force would have fallen within the ambit of Sec. 42) is governed by the Indian Limitation Act and not by that section.
6. Sec. 42 is intended as a protection to police officers against actions and prosecutions brought by a third party, in respect of anything done or intended to be done by them in the performance of their duties. It has no relation to departmental enquiries instituted under Sec. 7.
7. We are accordingly of opinion that there is no substance in this appeal, which is dismissed.
8. Appeal dismissed.