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  • provisions of Sec. 3(a), U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
  • provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sec. 3(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Sec. 106, Transfer of Property Act.
  • Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of Sec. 3(a), U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
  • provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Sec. 3(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Sec. 106, Transfer of Property Act.
  • Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, a sub-tenant occupying a shop in Aminabad. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was in arrears of rent amounting to more than Rs. 362/14/- as of April 1951. A notice demanding payment of arrears within one week and possession of the shop at the end of the tenancy month was sent by registered post on 9th April 1951, with an acknowledgment purportedly signed by Om Prakash. The plaintiff instituted the suit on 17th May 1951, claiming possession, arrears of rent, and damages for use and occupation after tenancy determination. The defendant contested the suit, particularly arguing that default had not occurred until after the expiry of one week following 11th April 1951 (date of notice delivery), and that the notice was not validly served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Both lower courts ruled in favor of the plaintiff, leading to this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant should be deemed a defaulter only after the expiry of one week following the delivery of the notice, effectively extending the one-month period prescribed under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act.
  2. Whether the notice demanding rent arrears was validly served on the defendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, considering the mode of service by registered post and the identity of the person acknowledging receipt.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendant contended that he could not be considered a defaulter until one week after 11th April 1951, as the plaintiff had given a week's time for payment, which should be added to the one-month period under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act.
  • The defendant argued that the notice was not served personally upon him, thus rendering the suit invalid for want of proper notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Reliance was placed on two precedents, Gokul Chand v. Shib Charan and Gobinda Chandra Shah v. Dwarka Nath Patita, which required personal delivery of notice, to support the contention that the notice was not validly served.
  • The defendant asserted on oath that he did not receive the notice, challenging the presumption of service under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The plaintiff maintained that the one-month period under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act runs from the date of service of the notice, and the additional one week mentioned in the notice does not extend this statutory period.
  • The plaintiff argued that the notice was validly served by registered post as per the amended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which allows service by post as an alternative to personal delivery.
  • The plaintiff contended that the acknowledgment signed by Om Prakash, who received the notice at the defendant's shop, was sufficient proof of service, and that the defendant failed to prove that Om Prakash was not his servant, agent, or family member, thus failing to rebut the presumption of proper service under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gokul Chand v. Shib Charan (9 A.L.J. 574) Requirement of personal delivery of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act prior to amendment. Held not applicable as the case predates the 1929 amendment allowing service by post; thus, it does not assist in interpreting the current law.
Gobinda Chandra Shah v. Dwarka Nath Patita (19 C.W.N 489) Requirement of personal delivery of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act prior to amendment. Similarly disregarded due to being decided before the 1929 amendment; the court found it irrelevant to the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the relevant statutory provisions and factual matrix as follows:

  • It interpreted Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, concluding that the one-month period for payment of arrears runs from the date of service of the notice and is not extended by any additional grace period mentioned in the notice itself.
  • The court noted that the notice was sent on 9th April 1951 and served on 11th April 1951, and since the suit was instituted on 17th May 1951, the defendant was in arrears for more than one month, authorizing the plaintiff to sue without District Magistrate’s permission.
  • Regarding service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court highlighted the 1929 amendment which introduced service by post as a valid alternative to personal delivery.
  • The court rejected the appellant's reliance on pre-amendment cases requiring personal delivery, emphasizing that the amendment allows notice by registered post without personal delivery.
  • The acknowledgment signed by Om Prakash was considered sufficient proof of service. The defendant failed to prove that Om Prakash was not his servant, agent, or family member, thus failing to rebut the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
  • Consequently, the court upheld the findings of the lower courts that the notice was validly served and the defendant was in default.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court affirmed the validity of service of notice by registered post under the amended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and confirmed that the statutory one-month period for payment of arrears is not extended by any additional time mentioned in the notice. The defendant is ordered to vacate the premises within two months and pay mesne profits at the agreed rent. No new precedent was established; the decision directly enforces the existing statutory framework and prior amendments.

    L. Balgovind Rastogi v. Bhargava School Book Depot

    Singh, J.:— This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and for ejectment from a house.

    2. It appears that the defendant-appellant was a sub-tenant of the plaintiff in occupation of a shop in Aminabad the monthly rent of which was Rs. 28/14/-. According to the allegations of the plaintiff the defendant was in arrears in the matter of rent to the tune of more than Rs. 362/14/- in April 1951. A notice was sent to him demanding payment of arrears of rent within a week and possession of the shop at the end of the month of tenancy, on the 9th of April 1951. This notice was sent by registered post (acknowledgment due) and an acknowledgment purporting to have been signed by one Om Prakash was received by the plaintiff. The plaintiff waited till the 17th of May 1951 and then instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal for possession and arrears of rent. He also claimed damages for use and occupation for the period following the determination of the tenancy. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds. Two of the main grounds which have now been pressed in appeal are that the defendant had not been in default till after the expiry of one week after the 11th of April 1951 when the notice is said to have been delivered. The second point urged was that the notice had not been served upon the defendant and as such the suit was bad for want of a valid notice under Sec. 106, Transfer of Property Act. Both the courts below found in favour of the plaintiff and have decreed the claim for possession and arrears of rent. The defendant has now come up in second appeal.

    3. The first point urged on behalf of the appellant is that the appellant should not be deemed to have been a defaulter till the expiry of one week after the 11th of April 1951 inasmuch as the plaintiff had given a week's time to the defendant for payment of rent and this period of one week should be added to the period of one month mentioned in Sec. 3(1)(a) as it stood at the time when the suit was instituted. The relevant part of Sec. 3(a) of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act as it stood on the date of institution of the suit is as follows:—

    “No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:—

    (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord.

    4. A perusal of the provisions of law mentioned above shows that what was necessary to make a tenant a defaulter was that he should have wilfully failed to pay arrears of rent within one month after a notice of demand had been made. In the present case the notice was sent on the 9th of April and was served on the 11th of April 1951. The present suit was instituted on the 17th of May 1951. The defendant was therefore in arrears for a period of more than a month on the date of the suit and according to the provisions of Sec. 3(a), U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the plaintiff had a right to file a suit without any permission from the District Magistrate. The contention that one week's period mentioned in the notice sent should be added to the period of one month mentioned in Sec. 3(a) does not find support in law and has no force.

    5. The other point raised was that notice had not been delivered to the defendant personally and reliance has been placed on two cases, Gokul Chand v. Shib Charan . 9 A.L.J, 574. and Gobinda Chandra Shah v. Dwarka Nath Patita . 19 C.W.N 489.. Both these cases were decided before Sec. 106, Transfer of Property Act, was amended by Act XX of 1929. Before this amendment the relevant words of the section were as follows:—

    “Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and tendered or delivered either personally to the party who is intended to be bound by it, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.”

    6. Under the provisions of Sec. 106 mentioned above it was necessary to prove that the notice had been delivered either personally to the party or to one of his family or servants. There was no provision for service of notice by post and this provision was introduced by the Amending Act XX of 1929. The relevant part of Sec. 106 as amended in 1929 is as follows:—

    “Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.”

    7. The purpose of the amendment, evidently was to make service by post an alternative provision for giving the notice under Sec. 106. The words requiring the delivery or tender of notice to the lessee “personally or to one of his family or servants” did not apply to a notice sent by post. The two cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are therefore of no material assistance in interpreting the law as it stands now.

    8. It has further been urged that the defendant had stated on oath that notice had not been received by him and it is argued on the basis of this statement that the presumption which arose under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act stood rebutted. Under the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended it is not necessary that a notice sent by a registered post should be delivered personally to the lessee or to one of his family or his servants. In the present case notice had been received by somebody who signed as Om Prakash on behalf of the addressee. The defendant must have been in the know of the person who signed the notice when it was delivered at the defendant's shop and this being exclusively within his knowledge it was his duty to have proved that this person who signed as Om Prakash was neither his servant nor agent nor a member of his family and in the absence of proof on this point the presumption which arose in the case of a registered letter delivered at the shop could not be rebutted. The view taken by the two courts below that the notice was served is therefore correct.

    9. No other point has been pressed in arguments. As a result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to the respondent. Stay order is vacated. Leave to file an appeal has been asked for but I see no good ground for grant of leave to appeal. The prayer is therefore rejected. The defendant is allowed to vacate the premises within a period of two months for which lie will have to pay mesne profits at Rs. 28/14/- per mensem.

    10. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    L. Balgovind Rastogi v. Bhargava School Book Depot
    (Apr 10, 1957)