Desai, J.:— The applicant was ejected when he was a minor in 1953 under the U.P Tenancy Act. On attaining majority he filed a suit giving rise to this writ petition for possession under Sec. 183 of the U.P Tenancy Act. On that date the suit was time barred. He claimed that the period of limitation for the suit began on the date on which he attained majority. In other words, he sought the benefit of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act. The Board of Revenue held that Sec. 6 did not apply in a proceeding governed by the U.P Tenancy Act and that consequently the period of limitation could not be computed from the date on which he attained majority. Sri J.N Chaterji contends that this view of the Board of Revenue was wrong.
2. The U.P Tenancy Act is a special or local law laying down its own periods of limitation for the suits brought under it. Under Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act, Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act would apply to any suit under the U.P Tenancy Act, but Sec. 6 will not apply unless it was made applicable. The U.P Tenancy Act has not made Sec. 6 applicable to a suit brought under it. Sri J.N Chatterji, however, contended that Sec. 3 itself lays down that subject to the provisions of certain sections including Sec. 6, a suit brought after the expiry of limitation prescribed for it in the schedule shall be dismissed as barred by time.
3. What he meant was that on account of these words Sec. 6, as well as other sections enumerated in Sec. 3, become automatically applicable in a suit to which Sec. 3 would apply. What Sec. 3 lays down is that a suit brought after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed for it in the schedule must be dismissed, except in the circumstances mentioned in Secs. 4 to 25. The provisions of Secs. 4 to 25 are by way of exception to the provisions of Sec. 3. Sec. 29 lays down that the provisions contained in Sec. 3 shall apply, and those of Sec. 6 shall not apply, to a suit covered by the U.P Tenancy Act. There is no conflict between the provisions of Sec. 3 and of Sec. 29; while laying down that the limitation for ordinary suits will be governed by the provisions of Sec. 6, the Legislature could, and did, lay down that limitation for suits under special and local acts will not be governed by them. The benefit of the exception contained in Sec. 6 has been expressly withheld by the Legislature from persons proceeding under local and special Acts. Therefore, the exception contained in Sec. 6 cannot be availed of in a suit under the U.P Tenancy Act. Any other interpretation of the words “subject to the provisions” occurring in Sec. 3 will render meaningless and void of contents the provisions of Sec. 29(2). Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act applies to every suit and if its applicability compulsorily brought with it the applicability of the provisions of Secs. 4 to 25, there would have been no sense in enacting the provisions of Sec. 29(2). The Board of Revenue rightly held that the applicant was not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act. In any case the view taken by it cannot be said to be so manifestly wrong as to justify our interference with it.
4. The petition is dismissed.
5. Petition dismissed.