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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S. C. Khare
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • V.G Oak, J.
Acts
  • Companies) Decisions Act 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955).
  • Companies) Act, 1955.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S. C. Khare
  • Standing Counsel
Judges
  • V.G Oak, J.
Acts
  • Companies) Decisions Act 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955).
  • Companies) Act, 1955.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Ram Kishun Tandon v. Officer-in-charge, Central Bank of India Ltd., Mutthigunj Branch & Chief Agent, Central Bank of India, Kanpur

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed by Ram Kishun Tandon, formerly employed as a cashier at the Central Bank of India Ltd., Mutthigunj Branch, Allahabad, against the Officer-in-charge of that branch and the Chief Agent, Kanpur. In September 1954 the Bank levelled charges of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of Rs. 8,520 against the petitioner and suspended him. He was prosecuted under section 408, I.P.C., and subsequently acquitted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Allahabad, on 30-9-1955.

Despite the criminal acquittal, the Bank initiated (or proposed to initiate) departmental disciplinary proceedings aimed at dismissing the petitioner. The petitioner sought writs (mandamus and certiorari) contending that departmental action after acquittal was prohibited — a contention supported by reference to awards of Industrial Tribunals (notably the Sastri Tribunal and another presided over by Sri Gajendragadkar) and to the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decisions Act, 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955), which gave effect to those awards. The respondents opposed the petition and filed a counter-affidavit; the petitioner filed an affidavit in support.

Documentary annexures before the Court included: Annexure A (call to explain shortage; also records period of absence 24 Aug–10 Sep 1954), Annexure B (note by Chief Agent alleging misappropriation of Rs. 8,520), Annexure C (petitioner's explanation), Annexure D (order to continue suspension despite acquittal), and Annexure E (show-cause notice repeating the misappropriation charge and asserting the Bank's liberty to dismiss on grounds of gross misconduct/criminal misappropriation).

The petition was ultimately dismissed with costs; the interim stay order dated 11-5-1956 was withdrawn.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proposed departmental action concerns the same subject-matter as the criminal prosecution for which the petitioner was acquitted (i.e., alleged misappropriation of Rs. 8,520).
  2. Whether the Sastri Tribunal Award (and related awards) prohibit a management from taking departmental disciplinary action against an employee after acquittal by a criminal court.
  3. Whether the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decisions Act, 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955), by enforcing those awards, creates a statutory duty on managements such that a writ of mandamus would lie to enforce compliance.
  4. Whether writ remedies under Article 226 (mandamus or certiorari) are appropriate against the respondents in the circumstances of this dispute between private parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Bank's proposed disciplinary action after his criminal acquittal is unlawful because industrial tribunal awards (the Sastri Award and another Award) had recommended that departmental action should not be taken after acquittal by criminal courts; those awards were enforced by Central Act No. 41 of 1955.
  • Because the Awards were given statutory effect by Act No. 41 of 1955, the petitioner contended that the managements are under statutory obligation not to institute disciplinary proceedings after an acquittal and sought writ relief accordingly.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that departmental action is not prohibited and that disciplinary proceedings may be permissible despite the criminal acquittal.
  • The counter-affidavit asserted an additional allegation of "gross misconduct" alongside the criminal misappropriation charge, but it did not provide particulars of that alleged misconduct beyond the misappropriation allegation.
  • Counsel for respondents (Mr. S.N. Verma) relied on Annexure A (which records the petitioner's absence from duty 24 Aug–10 Sep 1954), suggesting a conceivable alternative ground (absence without permission) for disciplinary action.
  • Mr. S.C. Khare argued that the respondents were under a statutory obligation not to take disciplinary action under Act No. 41 of 1955; however, he also accepted limitations to the availability of writ relief in the case's circumstances (as reflected in the Court's discussion).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying legal principles to the facts and documentary record:

  1. Subject-matter identity: The Court first examined whether the departmental action related to the same subject-matter as the criminal prosecution. The criminal charge (and acquittal) concerned alleged criminal breach of trust in relation to Rs. 8,520. The annexures before the Court showed that departmental action (notably the show-cause note, Annexure E) repeated that charge. Annexure A also revealed the petitioner had been absent from duty between 24 August and 10 September 1954, which could give rise to a distinct disciplinary charge (absence without permission). Because it was not entirely clear that the disciplinary proceeding related to a different matter, the Court treated identity of subject-matter as uncertain.
  2. Construction of the Sastri Award: The petitioner relied on the Sastri Award. The Court analyzed two specific paragraphs of that Award: paragraph 505 and paragraph 521, both located in Chapter XXV (which deals with recruitment, conditions of service and disciplinary action). Paragraph 505 contained a general discussion suggesting departmental action after an acquittal would generally be inappropriate, but the Tribunal did not state an absolute prohibition; the paragraph was therefore characterised as containing general/directory guidance rather than a mandatory rule.
  3. Paragraph 521 of the Sastri Award: By contrast, paragraph 521 (and its sub-paragraphs, including sub-paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(c) and sub-paragraphs (9) and (10)) set out specific procedural directions. Paragraph 521 expressly contemplated that, even if an employee were prosecuted and subsequently acquitted, "it shall be open to the management to proceed against him" under the disciplinary provisions set out in those sub-paragraphs. The Court held that paragraph 521 permitted disciplinary action after an acquittal, and that the specific procedural recommendation in paragraph 521 should prevail over the general guidance in paragraph 505.
  4. Statutory effect of Act No. 41 of 1955: The Court considered the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decisions Act, 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955), which had the effect of declaring valid certain Awards given by Industrial Tribunals. The Court concluded that the Act's main effect was to validate the Awards; it did not itself create a new statutory duty on managements beyond recognising the validity of those tribunal Awards. The Court expressly concluded that the Act did not place the Awards on a pedestal equivalent to a decree of a civil court and did not independently create a statutory duty enforceable by mandamus.
  5. Principles governing writs of mandamus and certiorari: The Court referred to the nature of mandamus (citing Halsbury's Laws of England for general propositions about mandamus as a remedy that enforces public duties and statutory duties). The Court emphasised that for mandamus to issue to enforce a statutory obligation, the statute must impose a duty. Because the validated Awards did not, in the Court's view, impose enforceable public statutory duties on the private respondents in a manner that would attract mandamus, and because neither respondent was a State or statutory body, issuance of either certiorari or mandamus was inappropriate.
  6. Discretion and adequacy of alternative remedies: The Court noted that even if there were a breach of the Award, alternative remedies against the respondents might exist (as conceded by Mr. S.C. Khare), but that the petitioner had not established that such alternatives were inadequate. Combined with the uncertainty about subject-matter identity and the permissive language in paragraph 521, the Court found the case unsuitable for extraordinary writ relief under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition under Article 226 was dismissed. The interim stay order dated 11-5-1956 was withdrawn. The petition was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that no writ (mandamus or certiorari) was issued to restrain or otherwise direct the respondents regarding the proposed departmental disciplinary proceedings; the Bank may proceed subject to applicable law and the limits discussed by the Court.
  • The Court concluded that the Sastri Award does not categorically prohibit departmental proceedings after a criminal acquittal; paragraph 521 of that Award permits disciplinary action and contains procedural directions for it. Paragraph 505 was treated as general/directory guidance and not an absolute bar.
  • The Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decisions Act, 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955) was held to validate the Awards but not to create an independent statutory duty enforceable by mandamus against private parties in the present circumstances.
  • No new legal precedent was announced by the Court beyond its application of the Awards and statutory construction to the facts of this case; the decision resolved the petition on its own factual and legal record without establishing a broader rule that departmental action is always permissible or prohibited after acquittal.
R.G.D

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Petition dismissed."

Show full summary ...

    Ram Kishun Tandon v. Officer In Charge Central Bank Of India Ltd.

    1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of writs of mandamus and certiorari. Ram Kishun Tandon petitioner was employed as a cashier in the Central Bank of India Ltd., Mutthigunj Branch, Allahabad. The Officer-in-charge, Central Bank of India Ltd., Mutthigunj Branch, Allahabad and the Chief Agent, Central Bank of India, Kanpur are the two opposite parties in this petition. The petitioner's case is that in September 1954, the Bank levelled against the petitioner charges of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money. The petitioner was suspended from service. The petitioner was also prosecuted in the criminal court under S. 408, I.P.C But the criminal court acquitted the petitioner on 30-9-1955. In spite of the acquittal from the criminal court, the Bank is taking departmental action against the petitioner in order to dismiss him from service. Such departmental action is prohibited under the law.

    2. The reason is that certain industrial disputes were, at one time, referred to an Industrial Tribunal commonly known as Sastri Tribunal. That Tribunal gave an award recommending that, departmental action should not be taken after acquittal by criminal courts. There was a subsequent award by another Tribunal presided over by Sri Gajendragadkar. These two awards were enforced by the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decisions Act 1955 (Central Act No. 41 of 1955). So the proposed departmental action against the petitioner is illegal.

    3. The opposite parties have opposed this petition on the ground that, departmental action is not prohibited. The petitioner has filed an affidavit in support of his petition. One L.N Varshney, Officer-in-charge of the Central Bank of India Ltd., Mutthigunj Branch, Allahabad has filed a counter-affidavit.

    4. The first point for consideration is whether the departmental action against the petitioner is with respect to the same matter, for which he was prosecuted in the criminal court. The judgment of the criminal court shows that the charge against Ram Kishun Tandon was that he committed criminal breach of trust with respect to a sum of Rs. 8,520/-. The judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Allahabad is dated 30-9-1955. Prior to the decision by the criminal court some departmental action was taken against the petitioner. On 30-9-1954 the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation about the shortage of a sum of Rs. 8,520/-. That note is annexure “A” to the petition.

    5. Annexure “B” dated 14-10-1954 is a note prepared by the Chief Agent, Kanpur. In annexure “B” it was stated that, Sri Tandon misappropriated a sum of Rs. 8,520/-. Annexure “C” is an explanation furnished by the petitioner. Annexure “D” dated 28-10-1955 is the order of the Chief Agent directing that the petitioner will continue to remain under suspension in spite of the acquittal by the criminal court. Annexure “E” dated 9-1-1956 is a note by the Sub-Agent calling upon the petitioner to show cause why his service should not be dispensed with. Annexure “E” also repeats the charge of misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 8,520/-.

    6. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit it is stated:

    “Apart from the charges of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust there is also a charge of gross misconduct on the part of the petitioner.”

    7. But the counter-affidavit does not give any details of the alleged misconduct apart from the misappropriation of money. In the last paragraph of Annexure “E” the Sub-Agent wrote; “The Bank has full liberty to dispense with his service on grounds of gross misconduct, criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust.” Here again no details of the alleged criminal misconduct were disclosed. Mr. S.N Verma appearing for the respondent referred to annexure “A”.

    8. In annexure “A” it was mentioned that, Ram Kishun Tandon was absent from duty front the 24th August to the 10th of September, 1954. So a possible charge against the petitioner can be for absence from duty for a week without permission. It is, however, obvious that, the main charge against the petitioner is the alleged misappropriation of the sum of Rs. 8,520/-.

    9. The petitioner relied upon the Sastri Award for his contention that, departmental action after an acquittal from a criminal court is barred. The passage in question appears in) paragraph 505 of the award. That passage has been quoted in paragraph 16 of the affidavit. A perusal of paragraph 505 of the award shows-that, although the Tribunal considered that departmental action after an acquittal would be in general inappropriate, the Tribunal did not lay down that departmental action should be prohibited in all such cases. The Tribunal remarked that the acquittal should not be lightly challenged by departmental enquiry. In paragraph 505 of the Award it was contemplated that, in certain cases disciplinary action might be necessary in spite of acquittal from a criminal court.

    10. Mr. S.N Verma, on the other hand, relies upon paragraph 521 of the Sastri Award. Paragraph 521 of the award ran thus:

    “A person against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken should, in the first instance, be informed of the particulars of the charge against him;……… With this object in view we give the following directions:

    (2)(a) When in the opinion of the management an employee has comitted an offence……. the bank may take steps to prosecute him…….

    (c) If he be acquitted, it shall be open to) the management to proceed against him under the provisions set out below in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) infra relating to discharges…….”

    11. Sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) of paragraph 521 contain detailed instructions about disciplinary action. It will be seen that, disciplinary action after an acquittal was permissible under Cl. (c) I of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 521 of the Award.

    12. The two paragraphs discussed above-appear in Chapter XXV of the Sastri Award. The general heading of Chapter XXV is; “Method of recruitment, conditions of service, termination of employment, disciplinary action, etc.” Chapter XXV has been divided into five sections. Section 1 deals with the method of recruitment. Section 2 deals with the terms and conditions of service. Paragraph 505 appears in S. 2 of Chapter XXV of the Award. Section 3 deals with the-procedure for taking disciplinary action. Paragraph 521 appears in S. 3.

    13. The scheme of Chapter XXV of the Award suggests that, paragraph 505 contains general discussion about the conditions of service. The recommendation contained in paragraph 505 was directory and not mandatory. The specific recommendation of the Tribunal on the question of disciplinary action is to be found in paragraph 521 of the Award. Paragraph 521 permits departmental action after acquittal from a Criminal court. I, therefore, do not think that, under the Sastri Award a management is altogether prohibited from taking departmental action, after the acquittal of an employee from a criminal court.

    14. It will be noticed that, this is a dispute between private parties. The State is not a party to the present petition. Neither of the two opposite parties is a statutory body. Mr. S.C Khare urged that the opposite parties were under statutory obligation not to take recourse to disciplinary action against the petitioner.

    15. Reliance was placed upon Central Act No. 41 of 1955. Section 3 of the Act lays down that the appellate decision shall have effect subject to the modification recommended by the Bank Award Commission. Section 6 of the Act deals with the powers to remove difficulties. It appears that there was some doubt about the validity of the two Awards given by the two Industrial Tribunals in succession. In order to remove that doubt, Parliament passed the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Act, 1955. The main effect of Act No. 41 of 1955 was to declare the validity of the Awards. The Act by itself does not create any statutory obligation against any person.

    16. The nature of mandamus has been discussed in Halsbury's Laws of England, third edition, Volume II, in S. 151 at page 84. The order of mandamus is an order of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation, or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Again in S. 170 at page 90 the law is stated thus:

    “An order of mandamus will be granted ordering that to be done which a statute requires to be done, and for this rule to apply it is not necessary that the party or corporation on whom the statutory duty is imposed should be a public official or an official body. In order, however, for an order of mandamus to issue for the enforcement of a statutory right, it must appear that the statute in question imposes a duty.”

    17. Mr. S.C Khare urged that under Act No. 41 of 1955 there is a statutory duty on every management as laid down in the Sastri Award. I do not think that Act No. 41 of 1955 creates any specific statutory duty. As discussed above, this statute merely declares the validity of certain awards given previously in industrial disputes. I do not think that the awards recognised by Act No. 41 of 1955 can be placed on a higher footing than a decree of a civil Court. Mr. S.C Khare does not suggest that, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus in order to enforce a decree of a civil court.

    18. Neither of the two respondents is a-judicial body or a tribunal. There is no question of the issue of a writ of certiorari. Even a writ of mandamus would not be appropriate in the present case. Mr. S.C Khare conceded that, if the proposed disciplinary action against the petitioner amounts to violation of the Sastri Award, it is possible to take some action against the respondents. But Mr. Khare urged that, that alternative does not give an adequate remedy to the petitioner.

    19. In the first place it is not quite clear whether the subject matter of the disciplinary action against the petitioner is identical with the charge disposed of by the criminal court. Secondly, disciplinary action after an acquittal is not barred even under the Sastri Award relied upon by the petitioner. Thirdly, the respondents, are not under any statutory obligation under Act No. 41 of 1955. For all these reasons, this is not a fit case for issuing any writ or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition is dismissed with costs. The stay order dated 11-5-1956 is withdrawn.

    R.G.D

    20. Petition dismissed.

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    Ram Kishun Tandon v. Officer In Charge Central Bank Of India Ltd.
    (Nov 7, 1957)