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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Roy, J.) — Revision Application by Haveli Ram

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Haveli Ram, was charged by a Magistrate under Sections 482, 483 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.). On the evidence produced, the Magistrate concluded that offences under Sections 482 and 483 were not established but convicted the applicant under Section 486, I.P.C., sentencing him to six months' rigorous imprisonment. The Sessions Judge maintained both conviction and sentence on appeal. The applicant sought revision in this Court.

Substantively, Messrs Lever Brothers (India) Limited (a company registered under the Indian Companies Act) manufacture soaps sold under registered trade-marks (including “Sun-Light,” “Lux” and “Lifebuoy”). Complaints arose that spurious soaps with wrappers and imprints colourably imitating the company’s wrappers were being sold in Kanpur. Investigations by the company led to police searches. In a search of the applicant's shop (mohalla Dal Mandi, Collectorganj, Kanpur) on 4 April 1951, police recovered 36 dozen cakes of soap bearing the imprint and wrapper of “Sunlight,” 3 dozen cakes bearing the imprint and wrapper of “Lifebuoy,” and two genuine “Sunlight” cakes. Some recovered items were displayed on the sale counter; others were found in wooden boxes, almirahs, and on the shop floor.

The recovery was recorded in a police recovery memo. At trial the applicant disputed the recovery (asserting only two genuine cakes were actually recovered) and alleged police malice arising from an earlier complaint about irregularities in a neighbour's search. Prosecution witnesses included company investigators and police officers; the defence produced five witnesses. Cross-examination and evidence established the presence and display of the offending soaps in his shop, and both courts below found the wrappers and imprints to be colourable imitations of the genuine goods.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the material facts and evidence established an offence under Section 486, I.P.C. (which refers to counterfeiting a trade-mark or property mark), or whether Section 486 was improperly applied because the case involved a colourable imitation rather than counterfeiting.
  2. Whether the facts and evidence instead established an offence under Section 480, I.P.C. (use of a false trade-mark) punishable under Section 482, I.P.C., and thus whether the conviction should be altered to reflect that offence.
  3. What sentence should be imposed if the conviction is altered to an offence punishable under Section 482, I.P.C., having regard to the applicant’s circumstances and time already undergone in custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant contended that the police search recovered only two genuine cakes of soap from his shop and that the rest of the alleged offending goods were not recovered from his premises.
  • He alleged police malice: that he had earlier pointed out irregularities when his neighbour’s shop was searched and that the police, annoyed, fabricated the present case.
  • Counsel for the applicant argued that Section 486, I.P.C. deals with counterfeiting a trade-mark or property mark and that the present case did not involve counterfeiting but only colourable imitation; therefore Section 486 was not applicable.
  • Relying on Nehal Chand v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 102), learned counsel urged that persons who merely sell or stock goods bearing a false trade-mark cannot necessarily be held to have committed the offence under Section 480 or to have abetted it; thus the accused should not be held liable on the facts of that precedent.

Prosecution / Findings Supporting Conviction

  • Prosecution evidence established recovery of 36 dozen “Sunlight” imitation cakes, 3 dozen “Lifebuoy” imitation cakes, and two genuine “Sunlight” cakes from the applicant’s shop, some of which were displayed for sale.
  • Both the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge found that the imprints and wrappers were colourable imitations of the genuine wrappers used by Lever Brothers (India) Limited.
  • The Magistrate concluded that Sections 482 and 483 were not made out but that an offence under Section 486 was established; the Sessions Judge concurred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nehal Chand v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 102 Authority relied on by defence to argue that mere sellers or stockists of goods bearing a false trade-mark may not be held to have committed the offence under Section 480 or abetted it; fact-specific limitation of Section 480’s application. The Court distinguished this authority on the facts: in the present case the applicant used wrappers/imprints in a manner reasonably calculated to cause belief of a trade connection with Lever Brothers, so Nehal Chand was held to be factually distinguishable and not determinative for acquittal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. Examination of Section 486, I.P.C.: The Court noted that Section 486 refers to counterfeiting a trade-mark or property mark and requires proof of counterfeiting. The Court considered whether the present facts amounted to counterfeiting or to a colourable imitation outside the strict scope of Section 486.
  2. Distinction between counterfeiting and colourable imitation: The Court concluded that the present case involved colourable imitation rather than literal counterfeiting. Because Section 486 specifically mentions counterfeiting, the Court held Section 486 was not properly applicable to these facts.
  3. Identification of the correct offence: The Court reasoned that the facts and evidence established the use of a false trade-mark within the meaning of Section 480, I.P.C., which is an offence punishable under Section 482, I.P.C. The Court articulated the legal test: the decisive question is whether the alleged false trade-mark was likely to deceive purchasers into believing they were buying goods of the actual manufacturer. The test focuses on the overall impression created in the mind of a probable purchaser — not on exact or side-by-side copying. Minor differences are immaterial if the general idea conveyed is similar and likely to mislead.
  4. Application of the test to the facts: The Court found that the wrappers and imprints used by the applicant were similar in design, shape and colour-scheme to the complainant’s markings and thus were calculated to mislead buyers. The display and possession of these marked goods in the applicant’s shop contributed to the conclusion that he had used a false trade-mark in a manner reasonably calculated to suggest a trade connection with Lever Brothers, Limited.
  5. Treatment of the precedent relied upon by defence: The Court considered Nehal Chand v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 102) but found it distinguishable on its facts. In Nehal Chand there was no question of use of a mark on goods or packages in the sense present here; the factual matrix differed so that the decision did not require the Court to acquit in the present case.
  6. Revision power and alteration of conviction: Under Sections 439 and 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) the Court has power in revision to alter findings and sentences (subject to limits on enhancement). Exercising that power the Court concluded that the appropriate conviction was under Section 482, I.P.C. (for an offence under Section 480), rather than Section 486.
  7. Sentencing analysis: The Court considered mitigating circumstances urged by the applicant: he was a refugee from the Punjab, he dealt in general merchandise and stocked genuine Lever Brothers soaps alongside the offending goods, and he was not alleged to be a manufacturer of spurious goods. The Court balanced the need for deterrence against the applicant's circumstances and observed that substantial market flooding with spurious goods warranted drastic steps generally. Given the circumstances and the applicant’s time already spent in custody (about one month and eight days), the Court concluded that reducing the sentence to the period already undergone would serve the ends of justice.
  8. Ancillary orders: The Court maintained the order of forfeiture of the offending articles and left the applicant on bail, directing that he need not surrender to his bail.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court allowed the revision in part and altered the conviction. Specifically:

The applicant's conviction under Section 486, I.P.C. was set aside and he was convicted under Section 482, I.P.C. (for an offence under Section 480, I.P.C.).

Sentencing outcome: The sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the applicant (about one month and eight days). The order of forfeiture of the offending articles was maintained. The applicant, who is on bail, was directed not to surrender to his bail.

Implications: The direct consequences are limited to the parties in this case — alteration of the convicted offence from Section 486 to one punishable under Section 482, reduction of sentence to time already undergone, and maintenance of forfeiture and bail. The opinion distinguishes an existing precedent (Nehal Chand) on factual grounds; it does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond applying established tests for deceptive similarity (the "totality of impression" test) in the context of false trade-marks. No broader or additional precedential effect is discussed in the opinion.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

    Haveli Ram v. State

    Roy, J.:— This is an application in revision by Haveli Ram. He was charged by the Magistrate under Secs. 482, 483 and 486, I.P.C Upon the evidence that was produced before the Magistrate, the Magistrate was of the opinion that offences under Sec. 482 and 483, I.P.C were not made out, but the offence under sec. 486, I.P.C was established. The learned Magistrate accordingly convicted the applicant under Sec. 486, I.P.C and sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment. In appeal before the learned Sessions Judge the conviction and sentence were maintained. The applicant has accordingly come up in revision to this Court.

    2. The facts may be briefly stated. Messrs Lever Brothers (India) Limited is a joint stock company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. They are manufacturers of certain well-known brands of soap known as the “Sun-Light” soap “Lux” and the “Lifebuoy” soap. The names and the labels of these soaps are registered under the Trade Marks Act. The company received complaints that spurious soaps with colourable imitation of the wrappers were afloat in the market in place of their genuine soaps at Kanpur. Accordingly the Company deputed its own officers to look into the matter. As a result of their inquiry the matter was put into the hands of the police. The police made certain searches; and search of the shop of Haveli Ram the applicant, situate in mohalla Dal Mandi, within police circle Collectorganj in Kanpur, was also effected. As a result of that search 36 dozen cakes of shop marked with the imprint of “Sunlight” soap with wrappers of the same description and three dozen cakes of soap with the imprint and wrapper of “Lifebuoy” soap along with two cakes of genuine “Sunlight” soap were recovered from his shop. Some of these soaps were displayed for sale by the applicant at the sale counter of the shop while the rest were kept in wooden boxes and in almirahs and also on the floor inside the shop itself.

    3. The recovery was made according to law under a proper recovery memo, prepared by the police. At the trial the applicant contended the this shop was no doubt searched by the police in his presence on the 4th of April, 1951, but he contended that only two cakes of genuine soap were actually recovered from his shop and the rest of it was not at all recovered from there. His defence further was that he had incurred the wrath of the police by reason of the fact that when the shop of his neighbour Naraindas Chimanlal was being searched by the police, there were certain irregularities and illegalities and he had the temerity of bringing that to the notice of the police on which account the police got annoyed against him and the police accordingly bolstered up a false case against him. Evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution in the testimony of Sri M.V Peter, Officer In-Charge, Legal Department, Messrs Lever Brothers (India) Limited, Sri Bhagwan Swarup Saxena, Trade Marks Investigator of Lever Brothers (India) Limited, and Sri Ram Nath, Ganeshi Lal and Sub-Inspector Manzoorul Nabi. There was also the evidence of Sub-Inspector Ram Singh of the Special Investigating Staff, C.I.D, Kanpur, and Police Constables Sughar Singh and Bharat Singh. On the side of defence five witnesses were produced, namely, Banwari Lal, Sobh Raj, Jagdish Narain, Ram Kumar and Sheocharan Lal. It was brought out in the cross-examination of Sub-Inspector Manzoorul Nabi that some of the offending articles were displayed for sale by the accused at his sale counter and the rest were kept in wooden boxes inside the shop as well as in almirahs and also on the floor of the shop. It was further established beyond any shadow of doubt that 36 dozen cakes of soap bearing the imprint and wrapper of “Sunlight” soap and 3 dozen cakes of soap bearing the imprint and the wrapper of “Lifebuoy” soap together with two cakes of genuine Sunlight soap were recovered from the possession of Haveli Ram the applicant. As has been found by the learned Magistrate, the soap had been exposed for sale at the shop. Both the courts below have found that the imprint and the wrappers were colourable imitations of the genuine soap manufactured by Messrs Lever Brothers (India) Limited. Upon the finding aforesaid the Magistrate was of the opinion, and with that opinion the learned Sessions Judge has concurred, that the charge under Sec. 482 or under Sec. 483 was not made out but an offence under Sec. 486, I.P.C was established. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that Sec. 486, I.P.C mentions that whoever sells or exposes or has in his possession for sale or any purpose of trade or manufacture, any goods or things with a counterfeit trade-mark or property mark affixed to or impressed upon the same or to or upon any case, package or receptacle in which such goods are contained shall, unless he proves that having taken all reasonable precautions against committing an offence under this section he had at the time of the commission of the alleged offence no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade-mark, and that on demand made by or on behalf of the prosecutor he gave all the information in his power with respect to the persons of whom he obtained such goods or things, or that other-wise he had acted innocently, shall be punished. It has been argued that since in the present case the allegation is not of counterfeiting a trade-mark or property mark, the case could not come within the four corners of Sec. 486, I.P.C Sec. 486, I.P.C refers to counterfeiting a trade-mark or property mark. The present case is not a case of counterfeiting. Here it was a colourable imitation of the trade-mark or property mark of genuine “Sunlight” and “Lifebuoy” soap manufactured by Messrs Lever Brothers, Limited. Consequently Sec. 486, I.P.C was not in my opinion properly applied to the case. The facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on the record, however, establish an offence under Sec. 480, I.P.C punishable under Sec. 482, I.P.C The question in a case like this always is whether the alleged false trade-mark was likely to deceive the buyers in thinking that they were buying not the goods of the actual manufacturer, but that they were buying goods of some other manufacturer. The test is not that the trademark in question is an exact or substantial copy of the trade-mark used by the complainant, but whether the imitation of the trade-mark of the complainant has been done in a manner likely to cause the trade-mark in question to be mistaken for the trade-mark of the complainant. It is the totality of impression which is likely to be left by the trade-marks in the mind of a probable purchaser that has to be considered. The differences on non-essential points are not important. What is important is the main idea conveyed to the mind by the two trade-marks. If the marking on the goods or on the package in which the goods are marketed are similar in design, shape and colour-scheme with the marking of the complainant, as they are in the present case, it must be held that, although there may be differences in detail between the two markings, the markings used by the accused were calculated to mislead the buyers. The test of comparison of the marks side by side is not always a sound one, since a purchaser will seldom have the two marks actually before him when he makes his purchase; and marks with certain minor details or differences may yet have an element of similarity which will cause deception, more especially if the goods are in practice asked for by a name which denotes the mark or the device of the name on it. In the present case the wrappers and the imprints on the offending articles used by the applicant for the purposes of sale and exposed by him for sale may reasonably be said to have calculated to cause it to be believed that the goods so marked or any goods contained in any such receptacle so marked have connection in the course of trade with a person with whom they have not any such connection, and such a use could be the use of a false trade-mark within the meaning of Sec. 480, I.P.C punishable under Sec. 482, I.P.C

    4. Learned counsel for the applicant, relying upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Nehal Chanel v. State of Bihar A.I.R 1954 Pat. 102. has urged that persons who merely sell or stock the goods of the manufacturer who uses a false trade-mark cannot be held to have either committed the offence under Sec. 480 or to have abetted the commission of it. In that case there was no question that the goods were marked or that any goods, package or other receptacle meant to contain goods manufactured by other persons had been used. There what the Court was concerned with was the marking of a case or package of biris manufactured by the accused. Upon a consideration of the facts and circumstances of that particular case it was held that Sec. 480, I.P.C was not applicable. The present case is different on facts. In this case the applicant cannot be said to have marked goods or any case, package or other receptacle containing goods, but he certainly used in a case, package or other receptacle with mark thereon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to be believed that the goods so marked or any goods contained in any such receptacle so marked have a connection in the course of trade with Messrs Lever Brothers, Limited, with whom they have not any such connection. In my opinion therefore the decision in Nehal Chand v. State of Bihar referred to above is distinguishable on the facts. I am also of opinion that having regard to the fact of this particular case the applicant-must be deemed to have used the false trademark within the meaning of those words under Sec. 480, I.P.C punishable under Sec. 482, I.P.C

    5. Under the provisions of Sec. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Sec. 423 of the same Code this Court has got the power in revision to alter the finding and maintain the sentence or, with or without altering the same, reduce the sentence, or with or without reduction or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature of the sentence but subject to the provisions of Sec. 106, sub-sec. (3) not so as to enhance the same. Acting under these provisions I am of opinion that the conviction should in the present case be altered from Sec. 486 to one under Sec. 482, I.P.C

    6. There is next the question of sentence. It has been urged on behalf of the applicant that the applicant is a refugee from the Punjab and he has at his shop general articles of merchandise inclusive of soap in which he also stocked genuine Sunlight soap and it has been contended on that basis that, even if spurious soaps were found at his shop for which he himself was not personally liable because he himself had not manufactured them, a lenient view of the sentence should be taken, although technically he may be said to have committed an offence under Sec. 482, I.P.C The evil of selling spurious goods instead of genuine goods is no doubt on the increase and in certain matters our experience is that the market is flooded on an unprecedented scale with such spurious goods. Drastic steps should therefore be taken to eradicate this evil. In the present case, however, having regard to the fact that the applicant is not said to be a manufacturer of spurious goods and also having regard to the fact that he is a refugee from the Punjab and he deals with general articles of merchandise inclusive of soap, where he keeps genuine products of Lever Brothers, Limited, as well, it would serve the ends of justice if the sentence is maintained and reduced to the period already undergone by him. In the present case it appears from the record that he has undergone about one month and eight days of imprisonment. That would serve as an eye-opener to the applicant. Under the circumstances I allow the application in revision to this extent that, while setting aside the conviction and sentence of the applicant under Sec. 486, I.P.C I convict him under Sec. 482, I.P.C and sentence him to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him. The order of forfeiture of the offending articles is maintained. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender to his bail.

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    Haveli Ram v. State
    (Sep 5, 1955)