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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a plaintiff's appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Barabanki, who allowed an appeal by defendants against a decree of the Munsif in a suit for possession. The material facts are:

  • On 10-7-1923 Irshad Husain executed a simple mortgage in favour of defendants 1 and 2.
  • On 13-1-1928 Irshad Husain executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the appellant (the subsequent mortgagee); this later mortgage is described as less relevant to the preliminary point but central to possession issues.
  • Defendants 1 and 2, relying on their 1923 mortgage, obtained a decree against the mortgagor but did not implead the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee (the appellant) in that suit.
  • The decree was executed and transferred to the Collector, who granted a self-liquidating mortgage for 20 years under Section 17 of the Debt Redemption Act; in execution of that order the defendants obtained actual possession of the plots on 21-9-1945, which were then in the appellant's possession.
  • The appellant's objection under Order 21, Rule 100 CPC was dismissed; he was directed to seek his remedy in a proper forum, and on 17-10-1946 he instituted the present suit for possession.
  • The Munsif decreed the suit for the plaintiff (appellant). On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed that decree and remanded the case to the trial court to ascertain the amount payable by the plaintiff to defendants under the prior mortgage. The plaintiff appealed to this court (second appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court was an order under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC (and hence appealable), or whether it was a remand under the appellate Court's inherent powers (and hence not appealable).
  2. Whether the plaintiff (the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee and possessor) is entitled to possession without being required to redeem the prior simple mortgage held by defendants 1 and 2, who obtained execution and actual possession without impleading the subsequent mortgagee.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents / Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that they were entitled to rely on their earlier (prior) mortgage as a defensive shield in the suit for possession, even though they had not impleaded the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee in the earlier suit leading to the decree.
  • They further argued that the plaintiff could not obtain possession of the property except upon payment (redemption) of the amount due under the defendants' earlier mortgage.
  • On the preliminary procedural point, respondents contended that the remand made by the lower appellate Court was not an order under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC (and therefore not appealable) but was instead a remand under the inherent powers of the appellate court; reliance was placed on Order 41, Rule 23 CPC and authority cited in support.

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's primary contention on appeal was that the lower appellate Court was wrong to require or compel the plaintiff (the subsequent mortgagee and possessor) to redeem the prior mortgage held by defendants 1 and 2 before obtaining possession.
  • The appellant relied on the fact that defendants had not impleaded him in the earlier suit and that their subsequent acquisition of possession (through Collector's self-liquidating mortgage in execution) did not render their possession lawful against a subsequent usufructuary mortgagee who was in possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Barkat Beg v. Azim, 1943 Oudh W.N. 310 (A) Held that where no question was left undecided by the trial court a remand was not under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC but under Section 151 CPC; such a remand was not appealable. The Court distinguished Barkat Beg on its facts: in that case no question had been left undecided by the trial court, whereas in the present case a question (amount payable under the prior mortgage) had been left undecided. Consequently Barkat Beg did not assist the respondents' objection and was held inapplicable.
Sengamuthu Gounder v. Thayarammal, AIR 1940 Mad 646 Principle that a prior mortgagee who omits to implead a subsequent mortgagee and obtains a decree and enters into possession may set up his mortgage in defence (though his right to enforce it may be time-barred). The Court acknowledged the rule but distinguished the present case: although the general principle permits a prior mortgagee to set up his mortgage defensively, defendants here had not lawfully ousted the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee; their possession (obtained without impleading the subsequent mortgagee) was treated as unlawful and could not justify compelling redemption by the subsequent mortgagee.
Sarda Prasad v. Kanhai Lal, AIR 1933 All 412 Same or similar principle as above concerning rights of a prior mortgagee who obtains decree and possession without impleading subsequent mortgagees. The Court relied on the principle but held that in the circumstances of this case (possession obtained without impleading the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee and via a Collector's order) the defendants' possession did not entitle them to compel redemption; the plaintiff's right to possession prevailed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the matter in two stages: first the procedural preliminary objection on competence of the appeal against the remand order, and second the substantive question of possession and redemption.

Procedural issue — competence of appeal against remand:

  1. The respondents argued the remand by the lower appellate court was not under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC and thus not appealable. The Court examined whether the remand was made under O.41 R.23.
  2. The trial court had framed three issues; one issue expressly asked: “Is the plaintiff entitled to possession without paying the prior mortgage, as alleged?” However, the trial court did not frame an issue or find what amount would be payable under the prior mortgage if redemption were necessary.
  3. The Court referred to the amended form of O.41 R.23 as applicable in the State (per Allahabad High Court amendment), which permits an appellate court to remand where it has reversed a decree and all questions arising in the case have not been decided.
  4. Because the specific question of the amount payable under the prior mortgage had arisen in the proceedings and had been left undecided by the trial court, the remand by the lower appellate court was properly characterized as a remand under O.41 R.23 CPC. The decision in Barkat Beg was distinguished on the ground that in that case no question had been left undecided.
  5. Accordingly, the preliminary objection that the appeal against the remand was incompetent was rejected.

Substantive issue — possession and redemption:

  1. The Court examined the factual matrix: defendants were prior simple mortgagees with a 1923 mortgage who obtained a decree but did not implead the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee; execution led to a Collector's order granting a self-liquidating mortgage and defendants obtained actual possession of plots occupied by the subsequent mortgagee.
  2. The Court acknowledged the established rule (citing Sengamuthu Gounder and Sarda Prasad) that a prior mortgagee who omits to implead a subsequent mortgagee and obtains decree and possession may set up the mortgage defensively in a suit by the subsequent mortgagee; however, the subsequent mortgagee cannot be compelled to redeem unless he is sued and the prior mortgagee's position is recognized defensively.
  3. The Court found that in the present case defendants' entry into possession was not lawful vis-à-vis the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee: the defendants had succeeded in getting possession via the Collector's order without considering the claims of the subsequent mortgagee and without impleading him in the earlier suit.
  4. The Court held that mere possession obtained in that manner did not confer on the defendants the same lawful status as would follow from a prior mortgagee's lawful possession after due process. Even a mortgagor would not be entitled to dispossess a subsequent mortgagee except by due course of law.
  5. Therefore, the lower appellate court's direction that the plaintiff must redeem the prior mortgage before obtaining possession was held to be erroneous. The trial court's finding in favour of the plaintiff (that he was wrongfully dispossessed and entitled to possession) was the correct conclusion on the facts and law as applied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession against defendants 1 and 2. The Court therefore concluded:

DISPOSITION: APPEAL ALLOWED. The plaintiff's suit for possession is decreed with costs in all the courts. Leave to appeal under Chapter 8, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court is granted.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff (the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee and prior possessor) obtains a decree for possession against defendants 1 and 2 and is awarded costs; the lower appellate court's remand ordering redemption was reversed as to the substantive requirement to redeem before possession.
  • Procedural consequence: The Court found the remand by the lower appellate court was properly under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC because a question (the amount payable under the prior mortgage) had arisen and been left undecided by the trial court; hence the appeal against the remand was competent.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and distinguishes established authorities (as summarized above) but does not state that it is laying down a new general principle beyond the application of existing law to the facts; the direct legal consequence is confined to the parties (i.e., that defendants' possession obtained without impleading the subsequent mortgagee did not entitle them to compel redemption by the subsequent mortgagee).

    Haji Muzahir Ali v. Lachman Prasad

    1. This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment of the District Judge of Barabanki who allowed the appeal instituted by the defendants against the decree of the Munsif of Barabanki in a suit for possession. In order to appreciate the controversy in this case, a brief reference to facts may be made at the outset. One Irshad Husain made a simple mortgage of his property on 10-7-1923, in favour of defendants 1 and 2. He subsequently made a usufructuary mortgage of the property in favour of the appellant on 13-1-1928, but this is not very relevant for the purposes of this appeal. The defendants 1 and 2, who were the ample mortgagees, obtained a decree on the basis of their mortgage dated 10-7-1923 against the mortgagor but in the suit, however, they failed to implead the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee, who is the appellant in the present appeal. After obtaining the decree on the basis of the prior mortgage dated 10-7-1923, defendants 1 and 2 put it into execution against the mortgagor and this execution was transferred to the Collector.

    2. The Collector granted a self-liquidating mortgage for 20 years in respect of the property under Section 17 of the Debt Redemption Act, and in execution of this order the defendants 1 and 2 on 21-9-1945, obtained actual possession of the plots which were in the possession of the appellant. The appellant filed an objection under O. 21, R. 100 of the CPC but this objection was dismissed and he was ordered to seek his remedy in the proper forum; He then instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal on 17-10-1946.

    3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit and contended that they were entitled to use their earlier mortgage as a shield in defence of the suit for possession although they did not implead the plaintiff, who was the subsequent transferee in the suit brought by them on the basis of their mortgage. It was further contended on their behalf that the plaintiff could not obtain possession of the property except on payment of the amount due to defendants 1 and 2 under the mortgage held by them.

    4. The learned Munsif who tried the case found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. The defendant, however, went up in appeal. The lower appellate court reversed the finding of the learned Munsif and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff ought to redeem the mortgage on the basis of which the self-liquidating mortgage was granted by the Collector in execution of the decree passed on the basis of that mortgage. He, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court with directions to find the amount payable by the plaintiff to the defendants under the prior mortgage. The plaintiff has come up in second appeal against this order of remand.

    5. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents on the ground that an appeal against the order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court was not competent. The learned counsel relies on the provisions of O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC and it is contended that the case has not been decided by the trial court on any preliminary point and as such the remand made by the lower appellate Court should be deemed to be a remand under the inherent powers of that Court and not under the provisions of O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC. It is now a well settled law that a remand not made under the provisions of O. 41, R. 23 or under O. 41 R. 25 of the CPC would be a remand under the inherent powers of the appellate Court and as such an appeal would not lie against such an order of remand. The only point which arises for consideration, therefore, is whether the order passed by the lower appellate Court was an order under O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC.

    6. The trial court had framed three issues in this case and one of the issues was:

    “Is the plaintiff entitled to possession without paying the prior mortgage, as alleged?”

    7. No issue was framed by the trial Court as to what amount was payable under the prior mortgage if the plaintiff was allowed possession on his paying off that mortgage. O. 41, R. 23 was amended by the Allahabad High Court and this rule as applicable to this State is as follows:

    “Where an appellate Court has reversed a decree and all questions arising in the case have not been decided the appellate court may if it thinks fit……….”

    8. The amended rule, therefore, clearly shows that wherever it is found that all points arising in the case have not been decided by the trial court, it would be open to the appellate Court to remand the case under O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC. A remand under O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC would, therefore, be competent even if an issue has not been specifically framed but the question did arise and has been left undecided. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that no issue has been left undecided has, therefore, no force.

    9. Admittedly the question did arise in the Court below as to what amount would be payable in case the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff should pay up their mortgage before seeking possession was held to be well-founded and this question was not decided by the trial Court. It was precisely on account of this omission of the trial Court that the case had to be remanded by the lower appellate Court to the trial Court for a finding on this point when the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was liable to redeem the mortgage held by the defendants before being put in possession of the property.

    10. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the respondents on this preliminary point, — ‘Barkat Beg v. Azim’, 1943 Oudh W.N 310 (A), is of no assistance to him. In the reported case no question had been left undecided by the trial court and it was held that the remand was not one under O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC but one under Section 151 of the CPC and as such an appeal was not competent. In the present case a question had definitely been left undecided by the trial court and the order of remand passed by the lower appellate court was evidently under the provisions of O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent has, therefore, no merits.

    11. The only point pressed on behalf of the appellant in this case is that the lower appellate Court was in error in forcing the plaintiff to redeem the mortgage held by the defendants. The facts of this base are somewhat unusual and no authority bordering on the point in issue in this case has been cited by learned counsel for the parties. It is not disputed that the plaintiff was in possession of the land in dispute under a possessory mortgage made by Irshad Husain in 1923. The mortgage held by the defendants was a simple mortgage executed in 1923. No doubt the defendants were earlier mortgagees but they were simple mortgagees and on the basis of their earlier mortgage, they obtained a decree. In execution of this decree, they were certainly entitled to put the whole of the mortgage property to auction but as they did not implead the subsequent usufructuary mortgagee, they could not obtain actual possession of the property. They put their decree into execution and the Collector without considering the claims of the usufructuary mortgagee who was no party to the execution proceedings, ordered a self-liquidating mortgage to be granted to the defendants and luckily for themselves, defendants 1 and 2 obtained actual possession of the plots.

    12. The lower appellate court has put defendants 1 and 2 on the same plane as a prior mortgagee getting into possession of the property in execution of his decree. It is now well settled law that a prior mortgagee, who omits to implead a subsequent mortgagee and obtains a decree and then gets the property sold and enters into possession of the property, is entitled to set up his mortgage in defence, though right to enforce it may be time-barred vide — ‘Sengamuthu Gounder v. Thayarammal’, AIR 1940 Mad 646 (B) & — ‘Sarda Prasad v. Kanhai Lal’, AIR 1933 All 412 (C). The subsequent mortgagee, however, cannot be compelled to redeem the earlier mortgage and it is only if he institutes a suit that the prior mortgagee, omitting to implead the subsequent mortgagee, can set up a mortgage as a shield.

    13. In the present case defendants 1 and 2 were not entitled to get into possession of the property which was in the possession of the subsequent mortgagee as an usufructuary mortgagee and his possession on the property though obtained under colour of a self-liquidating mortgage is unlawful. He would be on the same level as a prior mortgagee entering into forcible possession of the property in the possession of a subsequent usufructuary mortgagee. The mere fact that somehow the prior mortgagee has succeeded in entering into possession of the property would not give him the same status as would be available if a prior mortgagee gets into lawful possession of the property. The prior mortgagee gets all the rights of the mortgagor by putting his mortgage into effect without impleading the subsequent mortgagee, but even the mortgagor was not entitled to take possession of the property in the possession of the subsequent mortgagee except in due course of law.

    14. I am unable to agree with the view taken by the lower appellate court that as the prior mortgagee is in possession of the property and the plaintiff, who is a subsequent mortgagee, has filed a suit for possession, the plaintiff should be asked to redeem the mortgage held by defendants 1 and 2. The learned District Judge has observed that it was not open to defendants 1 and 2 to successfully defend a suit if brought by the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, but as the suit which has given rise to this appeal was a regular suit, it was open to defendants 1 and 2 to set up their mortgage. As remarked above defendants 1 and 2 were not in lawful possession of the property, as they were not entitled to oust the plaintiff under the decree obtained by them on the basis of their earlier mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee. The plaintiff asked for the simple relief of possession on the allegations that defendants 1 and 2 have entered into possession without any right inasmuch as the decree obtained by defendants 1 and 2 could not be execute against the plaintiff who was no party to the decree obtained by defendants 1 and 2.

    15. The view taken by the trial court appears to me, therefore, to be the correct view and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession against defendants 1 and 2 as he was wrongfully dispossessed by them. As a result the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit for possession is decreed with costs in all the courts. Leave to appeal under Chap. 8, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court is granted.

    B/D.H.Z

    16. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Haji Muzahir Ali v. Lachman Prasad
    (Dec 2, 1953)