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Case Number

Ex. Second Appeal No. 1814 of 1947

Attorney(S)

Satish Chandra
A. Banerji

Judges

Malik, C.J
Chaturvedi, J.

Acts

U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. 3 of 1947), which Act
SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
decrees.6. Section 15 of Act 3 of 1947
S. 3.7. Act 3 of 1947
Section 1(3)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malik, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are four special appeals arising out of four suits which raise the same point of law.

The plaintiffs (landlords) filed four suits for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profits on 2 April 1946. Notices for ejectment had earlier been given on 11 August 1945 requiring the tenants to vacate by 31 August 1945. The plaintiffs obtained permission from the District Magistrate to institute the suits on 28 February 1946. The trial Court decreed the suits on 30 September 1946.

The defendants (tenants) appealed. During the pendency of the appeals, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. 3 of 1946) came into force on 1 October 1946. That Ordinance was later replaced by the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. 3 of 1947), enacted on 31 March 1947 and made retrospective to be deemed effective from 1 October 1946.

The appeals were heard on 24 January 1947; objections based on the Ordinance were taken in the appellate Court but the appeals were dismissed and the trial Court decrees for ejectment affirmed. The plaintiffs applied for execution of the decrees. In the executing Court the defendants objected relying on Section 14 of the Act, but those objections were dismissed on 10 March 1947. Execution appeals by the defendants were dismissed on 30 August 1947.

Four execution second appeals were filed in this Court and, on 13 September 1950, a learned single Judge allowed those second appeals (i.e., in favour of the defendants). The learned Judge nevertheless granted leave to the plaintiffs (decree-holders) to file special appeals. Those special appeals are the subject of the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, by reason of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, decrees for eviction obtained before the Act's commencement have become un-executable and the defendants cannot be ejected from the premises they occupy.

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holders (Appellants) — Plaintiffs

Reliance on Section 15: appellants argued that S.15 governs these cases and, because decrees had been passed in their favour, no objection to execution could be raised at this stage.
Further urged that the defendants had raised certain pleas in the first appellate Court (relying on Ss.7 and 8 of the Ordinance) which were overruled or withdrawn; therefore, those objections could not now be re‑raised in the executing Court.
Argued that an appeal is a continuation of the suit; because appeals were pending when the Act was deemed in force on 1 October 1946, S.15 applies to suits in this stage.

Judgment‑debtors (Respondents) — Defendants

Contended that the suits had been decided on 30 September 1946 (i.e., before the Act came into force), so Section 14 is the section applicable to these cases.
Argued that the phrase "except on any of the grounds mentioned in S.3" in Section 14 should be read as referring only to grounds (a) to (f) specified in S.3; on that reading, a decree obtained before commencement would not be executable unless one of those specific grounds existed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Raj Narain v. Sita Ram, AIR 1952 All 584 (A)	Held that S.15 was intended to apply not only to suits pending in the trial Court but also to a suit in its later stages right up to the Court of final appeal.	The Court noted this Division Bench decision is binding and relied on it to support the proposition that S.15's scope extends to later stages of a suit (and used it to reject the narrower interpretation in Chand Shankar).
Chand Shankar v. Sukh Lal, AIR 1951 All 383 (B)	A learned single Judge held that the words "on any of the grounds mentioned in S.3" are confined to grounds (a) to (f) of S.3.	The Court disagreed with this interpretation, concluded it produces an absurdity, and held that Chand Shankar was not correctly decided; accordingly, the Court did not follow that decision in the present cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Overview of statutory provisions considered

The Court analysed Sections 3, 14 and 15 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (with the Act deemed in force from 1 October 1946). It set out the plain text of Section 15: "In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.3". Section 14 was quoted to show that decrees for eviction passed before the commencement of the Act would not be executable except on the grounds mentioned in S.3 (subject to the proviso as to reasonable rent).

The Court identified the central interpretive problem: whether the phrase "the grounds mentioned in S.3" refers solely to grounds (a)–(f) listed in S.3 or whether it also includes the circumstance in S.3 that, even when grounds (a)–(f) do not exist, a landlord may still file a suit if he has obtained the previous permission of the District Magistrate.

The Court rejected the narrow reading (that "grounds mentioned in S.3" means only (a)–(f)) because that reading would produce an anomalous and inexplicable result: Section 3 permits a landlord to file a suit with the District Magistrate's permission when grounds (a)–(f) are absent, yet under the narrow reading Section 15 (covering pending suits) would bar any decree for eviction even where such permission had been obtained. In other words, a landlord could be permitted to bring a suit with the District Magistrate's sanction but would be absolutely barred from obtaining a decree under S.15 — an outcome the Court found to be gratuitously self‑defeating and inconsistent with legislative purpose.

To avoid this absurdity and to preserve a consistent legislative scheme covering all stages, the Court held that the phrase "grounds mentioned in S.3" must be interpreted to include: (i) the specific grounds (a)–(f) listed in S.3, and (ii) the additional circumstance that the suit had been filed with the prior permission of the District Magistrate (i.e., permission of the District Magistrate is to be treated as an additional ground).

The Court explained that Sections 3, 14 and 15 together were intended to cover all stages: S.3 governs suits to be filed after commencement of the Act (permitting filing if (a)–(f) exist or with District Magistrate permission); S.15 governs suits pending on commencement; and S.14 governs decrees obtained before commencement which are executed after commencement. Reading S.3 consistently across these sections promotes uniform rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants at the three stages.

On precedent, the Court observed that the Division Bench decision in Raj Narain favored an expansive application of S.15 (covering later stages) and is binding; by contrast, the single Judge decision in Chand Shankar took the narrow view which the Court regarded as wrongly decided and therefore declined to follow it.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEALS ALLOWED.

The Court allowed the special appeals brought by the plaintiffs (decree‑holders). It set aside the orders passed by the learned single Judge (who had earlier allowed the execution second appeals) and restored the orders passed by the lower appellate Court.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

The orders of the learned single Judge are set aside and the orders of the lower appellate Court are restored.
Restoration of the lower appellate Court's orders means the earlier appellate determinations (which affirmed the trial decrees and had dismissed the defendants' execution appeals) stand.
No order as to costs was made because learned counsel for the appellants did not ask for costs.

Broader legal implication (interpretative rule announced by the Court in this opinion):

The Court interpreted "the grounds mentioned in S.3" in Sections 14 and 15 to include not only grounds (a)–(f) expressly listed in S.3 but also the circumstance where the suit was filed with the prior permission of the District Magistrate. This reading avoids an absurd inconsistency and aligns the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants across Sections 3, 14 and 15.
The Court expressly declined to follow Chand Shankar (single Judge decision) and noted that a contrary view taken by a Division Bench in Raj Narain is binding on it.

B/R.G.D

Final line in the opinion: "Appeals allowed."

Show full summary ...

Sunder Lal And Another v. Mohammad Ishaq .

Malik, C.J:— These are four special appeals arising out of four suits. But they can be disposed of by one judgment as the point for decision is the same in all the four cases.

2. The plaintiffs, who are the landlords, filed four suits for ejectment, arrears of rent and also for mesne profits on 2-4-1946. These suits were decreed on 30-9-1946. Before filing the suits, notices for ejectment were given on 11-8-1945, and the tenants were required to vacate by 31-8-1945. The plaintiffs had also applied for permission to the District Magistrate and the permission to file the suits had been granted on 28-2-1946. After the decrees, the defendants filed appeals. During the pendency of the appeals, an Ordinance known as U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946, (Ordinance No. 3 of 1946), was passed which came into force from 1-10-1946. The Ordinance was replaced on the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. 3 of 1947), which Act was passed on 31-3-1947, and was made retrospective and was to be deemed to come into force from 1-10-1946. The appeals came up for hearing on 24-1-1947, and though certain objections were taken in the Court of appeal based on the Ordinance, the appeals failed and were dismissed and the decrees for ejectment passed by the trial Court were affirmed.

3. The plaintiffs filed applications for execution of the decrees and in the executing Court the defendants raised objections relying on Section 14 of the Act that the decrees were not executable. The objections were dismissed on 10-3-1947. The defendants filed execution appeals which were dismissed on 30-8-1947. Thereafter there were four execution second appeals filed in this Court, which were all allowed by a learned single Judge on 13-9-1950. The learned Judge, however, gave leave to file special appeals and these appeals were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs decree-holders.

4. The only point for decision in these appeals is whether, by reason of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, the decrees have now become un-executable and the defendants cannot be ejected from the premises in their occupation.

5. On behalf of the decree-holders-appellants reliance is placed on S. 15 and it is urged that the cases are governed by S. 15 and decrees having been passed in favour of the appellants no objection can be raised now to the execution of the decrees. It is urged that the defendants had taken the plea in the Court of first appeal that no decree should be passed and had relied on the provisions of Ss. 7 and 8 of the Ordinance, but those objections were overruled or withdrawn and the defendants could not in the executing Court raise objections to the execution of the decrees.

6. Section 15 of Act 3 of 1947 is as follows:

“In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3”.

7. Act 3 of 1947 as has been already said, was made retrospective and Section 1(3) provides that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 1-10-1946. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that an appeal is a continuation of a suit and as on 1-10-1946, or soon thereafter appeals were filed, the suits having been decided on 30-9-1946, S. 15 was applicable and no reliance can be placed by the judgment-debtors on S. 14. On behalf of the judgment-debtors, however, it is urged that the suits having been decided on 30-9-1946, the section applicable is Section 14 of the Act.

8. Section 14 is as follows:

“No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed, against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3:

Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord ‘reasonable annual rent’ or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher.”

9. In — ‘Raj Narain v. Sita Ram’, AIR 1952 All 584 (A), it was held by a Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, that S. 15 was intended to apply not only to suits pending in the trial Court but also to a suit in its later stages right up to the Court of final appeal. It is not necessary for us in these cases to go into that question as, in our view, whether S. 14 or S. 15 applied the result is the same.

10. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtors respondents has urged that the worlds “except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3” in Section 14 of the Act mean grounds (a) to (f) of S. 3. Section 3 of the Act lays down, as has been held in the case of ‘Raj Narain, (A)’, cited above, that if the grounds mentioned in S. 3 exist or any of them the landlord can file a suit for ejectment of a tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate. These grounds are set out in cls. (a) to (f) of S. 3. If, on the other hand, grounds (a) to (f) do not exist, a landlord has no right to file a suit for ejectment unless he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. It is said that under Ss. 14 and 15 the fact that a suit has been filed after the permission of the District Magistrate would not entitle the landlord to eject the tenant, or to obtain a decree for ejectment. He can obtain a decree or claim ejectment only if grounds (a) to (f) exist. The Legislature has made it now clear, and it was also decided in ‘Raj Narain's case, (A)’, that if a landlord has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate, he has a right to eject the tenant even if grounds (a) to (f) do not exist. If he has not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate, then he can file a suit for ejectment only on grounds (a) to (f) mentioned in S. 3.

11. In — ‘Chand Shankar v. Sukh Lal’, AIR 1951 All 383 (B) a learned single Judge of this Court held that the words “on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3” mean and are confined to grounds (a) to (f) of S. 3. This interpretation, however, leads to this absurdity, and we say that with great respect, that while S. 3 allows a landlord to file a suit for ejectment, in a case where grounds (a) to (f) do not exist, if he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate S. 15 provides that even if he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate, no decree for ejectment shall be passed.

12. In other words, while in one section of the Act the landlord has been authorised to file a suit for ejectment provided he has obtained the District Magistrate's permission, in another section of the same Act there is a complete bar that in spite of such permission no decree shall be passed for ejectment. We fail to see what object there could be in allowing a suit for ejectment to be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate, if S. 15 is so interpreted as to mean that there was a complete bar against a decree for ejectment being passed.

13. No doubt the Act was passed for the protection of the tenants as there was a great dearth of housing accommodation, and there was a possibility that the tenants would be harassed by the landlords who would try to eject them and get higher rent from others who may be in such need of accommodation that they may be compelled to submit to the terms imposed by the landlords. The legal right of a landlord to give notice for ejectment under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and then to file a suit for ejectment of a tenant was restricted by providing in Section 3 of the Act that the landlord will have the right to file a suit for ejectment in cases coming under cls. (a) to (f) and if a case does not come under cls. (a) to (f), the Legislature left the discretion to the District Magistrate to grant permission in a proper case. This was done as it was not possible for the Legislature to foresee and provide for all possible contingencies. The District Magistrate was excepted to safeguard the interests of both landlords and tenants and grant permission to file a suit where he was satisfied that the landlord wanted to eject the tenant for some good cause.

14. In our view, in Section 15 of the Act the words “except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3” must be interpreted to include not only grounds (a) to (f) mentioned in S. 3, but also the additional ground that the suit for ejectment had been filed with the permission of the District Magistrate. No difficulty would have arisen as regards the interpretation of this section if after cls. (a) to (f) the Legislature had added a cl. (g) to the effect that “a suit can, however, be filed for ejectment with the previous permission of the District Magistrate.” The mere fact, that it was not done by a separate clause, and the provision for filing a suit with the permission of the District Magistrate occurs at the beginning of the section, should not make any difference in the interpretation of the section.

15. It must also be remembered that Ss. 3, 14 and 15 were intended to cover all possible cases. Section 14 was confined to cases where decrees had been obtained before 1-10-1946, and the decree was put into execution for ejectment of the tenant after 1-10-1946; S. 15 was intended to cover all pending cases, that is, all suits or appeals pending at the time when the Act came into force, i.e, 1-10-1946; and S. 3 covers all suite which were to be filed after the commencement of the Act. The whole field was thus covered and there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to treat the landlords and the tenants differently at the three stages under these three sections. It would be reasonable to expect that the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants were intended to be the same under these three sections.

16. Under S. 3 a suit for ejectment could be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate or if grounds (a) to (f) existed. Section 15 must be interpreted to mean that a decree shall not be passed unless grounds (a) to (f) existed or permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained, which is to be treated as an additional ground; and S. 14 must be interpreted in like manner.

17. With great respect to the learned single Judge, we are not satisfied that ‘Chand Shanker's case, (B)’ was rightly decided. As a matter of fact, a contrary view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in ‘Raj Narain's case, (A)’, which is binding on us.

18. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the orders passed by the learned single Judge are set aside and the orders passed by the lower appellate Court are restored. Learned Counsel for the appellants does not ask for costs and we, therefore, do not pass any order as to costs in these appeals.

B/R.G.D

19. Appeals allowed.

Sunder Lal And Another v. Mohammad Ishaq .

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malik, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holders (Appellants) — Plaintiffs

Judgment‑debtors (Respondents) — Defendants

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sunder Lal And Another v. Mohammad Ishaq .

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