Desai, J.:— On an application by Sukhdeo, applicant, notices were issued to the opposite ??? upon them to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of the court of Panchayati Adalat, Rampur Athiri. The opposite parties have appeared and we have heard their defence.

On 28th and 29th March, 1950, two complaints were filed in the Panchayati Adalat of Rampur Athiri against the applicant on the allegations that several tenants had paid rent to the applicant, that he had not granted receipts to them saying that he was not dishonest and that he was in the habit of not issuing receipts. The Panchayati Adalat took cognizance of the complaints and summoned the applicant for trial under section 290, Indian Penal Code. In the complaints no law was quoted under which the applicant had rendered himself liable to prosecution and apparently the Panchayati Adalat thought that the allegations in them made out an offence punishable under section 290, Indian Penal Code. There was no quorum on 9th April, 1950 and the cases were adjourned to 23rd April, 1950. I be opposite-party No. 3, Kedar Nath is the Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat. On 12th April, 1950, an article was published in a weekly paper known as Gramwasi; the gist of it is as follows:—

“Kedar Nath Sarpanch of Rampur Athiri has informed us that Sukhdeo has told all tenants who had become Bhumidars that he would issue receipts to them only on their paying full rent to him be has not issued receipts to those who paid only part of the rent and they are being pressed to pay the full rent. They are also being threatened that if they do not pay the full rent, they would be ejected from the land. In addition, zamindars have stopped the tenants from taking wood; so the latter are finding great difficulty in constructing their houses. The district authorities should take immediate steps to remove this trouble of the Bhumidhars.”

The Panchayati Adalat held proceedings in the cases on 23rd April, 1950 and 10th May, 1950 and convicted the applicant under section 290, Indian Penal Code on 13th May, 1950. The applicant filed an application in revision against the judgment of the Panchayati Adalat and it is pending in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

The opposite-party No. 1 is the editor of the Gramwasi. The opposite-party No. 2 was said to be its joint editor, but, in fact, is the sub-editor. The opposite-party No. 1 is also a member of the Provincial Congress Committee and the opposite-party No. 2 is the President of the District Congress Committee and member of the All-India Congress Committee.

The case for the applicant is that the Gramwasi has a wide circulation in the district of Mirzapur including village Rampur Athiri and that the article contains falsehood and was calculated to incite prejudice against him so that he might not have a fair hearing in the Panchayati Adalat and in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in revision. He admitted that he had not granted receipts to his tenants and pleaded that printed receipt-books, which are sold in the treasury, were out of stock and the tenants refused to accept manuscript receipts.

Opposite-party No. 3 said in his reply that it was admitted by the applicant that he had not granted receipts, that the rest of the contents of the article did not refer, to him in particular, that he had no intention of prejudicing the fair trial of the cases and that in case he was guilty of contempt he offered an “unqualified apology”. The opposite-parties 1 and 2 pleaded that they had no knowledge of any case pending before the Panchayati Adalat and that the article did not refer to any case; they also offered unqualified apology if they had unconsciously committed the offence of contempt of court.

Under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act this Court has the same jurisdiction, powers and authority “in respect of contempts of courts subordinate” to it as it has, and exercises, in respect of contempt of itself. The only condition is that where a contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, this Court can not take cognizance of the contempt.

Panchayati Adalats have been constituted in this Province under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act (Act No. XXVI of 1947). They have been given exclusive jurisdiction to try certain criminal cases, civil suits and cases under the Land Revenue Act vide sections 50(3), 52, 64 and 70. They have been given the power under section 63 to bind down persons to keep the peace and to impose fines not exceeding Rs. 100. They have to maintain records, and have to follow certain rules of limitation. They have power to issue summonses to witnesses and to punish those who disobey them. Section 53 permits them to receive such evidence in a suit, case or proceeding as the parties may adduce and empowers them to call for such further evidence as they may consider necessary. It is their duty to ascertain the facts of every suit, case or proceeding by every lawful means in their power and there after to make such decree or order as may seem to them just and legal. They have to follow the procedure prescribed by or under the act and not that of the Code of Civil or Criminal Procedure. They are not bound by the Indian Evidence Act. If there has been a miscarriage of justice or there is an apprehension of miscarriage of justice in any case, suit or proceeding pending before a Panchayati Adalat, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Munsif or the Sub-Divisional Officer respectively, is empowered by section 85 to cancel the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat with regard to the suit, case or proceeding, or quash any decree or order passed by it. Subject to this provision a decree or order of a Panchayati Adalat is final and not to be questioned in any court; see section 85(5). It is clear that Panchayati Adalats, as the name itself indicates, are “courts” within the meaning of the Contempt, of Courts Act. It was not contended before us that they are not “courts.”

The only contempt that may be made out against the opposite-parties is that of interfering with or prejudicing parties litigant during litigation or of obstructing or interfering with the due course of justice. There is no question of other kinds of contempt the Panchayati Adalat has not been scandalized nor has it been disobeyed.

The publication of the article would certainly interfere with the due course of justice and prejudice the applicant in the cases. The article made no reference to the cases pending and did not purport to be a record of the proceedings held in the Panchayati Adalat. As a matter of fact, nothing had been done in the cases before the publication. The questions whether the applicant had refused to grant receipts to his tenants and whether he was justified in doing so were under investigation before the Panchayati Adalat, but the article took them to be established facts and thus poisoned the atmosphere in which the trial was to Lake place. So also the reference to the demand for unpaid balance of rent and the threat to eject the tenants if they did not pay the balance. All these matters related to the applicant. The allegation about the stopping of tenants from taking wood is made against all the Zamindars, including the applicant. Even if this matter is ignored on account of its being in relation to the Zamindars in general and not to the applicant in particular, the publication of the other matters would interfere with the proper course of justice. The V reason why the publication or articles like the one with which we have to deal is treated as a contempt of court is:

“because their tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive the Court of the power of doing that which is the end for which it exists—namely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference solely to the facts judicially brought before it. Their tendency is to reduce the Court which has to try the case to impotence, so far as the effectual elimination of prejudice and prepossession is concerned. It is difficult to conceive an apter description of such conduct than is conveyed by the expression ‘Contempt of Court’. (See Wills, J. in Rex v. Parke.”

Wills, J. stated in Rex v. Davies:

“Courts or the administration of justice exist for the benefit of the people, that for the benefit of the people their independence must be protected from unauthorised interference, and that the law provides effective means by which this end can be secured.”

In Parke's case he was found guilty of contempt of court for publishing in his paper the Star statements with respect to the past life of Dougal who was at that time under trial for an offence of forgery. The statements “were unquestionably calculated to produce the impression that, apart from the charges then under enquiry, he was a man of bad and dissolute character.” Davies also published in his paper certain articles reflecting upon the character and antecedents of Henrietta Hunter, who was being prosecuted for abandonment. They were “calculated to give an exceedingly unfavourable impression of the prisoner.” Both the publications were held to tend to poison the stream of justice. Another case in which the publication of certain matter in a newspaper was found to amount to contempt, of court is the King v. The Editor of the Daily Mail Ex parte Farnsworth. Farnsworth was tried before a court martial on charges of desertion and loss of kit and was found guilty and sentenced. The findings and sentence of the court martial were subject to confirmation, but before the confirmation the Daily Mail published the article purporting to give some account of the proceedings at the court martial. It contained some mis-statements of fact which conveyed a false impression as to the character of Fransworth and which “might easily tend to prejudice his case and would be calculated seriously to thwart and interfere with the due administration of justice.” Another similar case is the King v. Editor, Printers and Publishers of the Daily Herald, Ex parte the Bishop of Norwich in which during the investigation of charges brought by the Bishop of Norwich against the Rector of Stiffley under the Clergy Discipline Act the Daily Herald published articles, one supposed to contain statements made by a woman with whom the rector was alleged to be on intimate terms, and the others containing statements by the rector himself, about the charges against him. The publication was found to be contemptuous. The publication under consideration is similar to those publications.

I do not think that the fact that the Panchayati Adalat had the power to receive any evidence which it thought necessary and that it was its duty to ascertain facts of the cases by every lawful means in its power, makes the publication no contempt. The Panchayati Adalat could ascertain the facts by lawful means. It would not be lawful to ascertain them from an article published in a paper. It could not convict a man simply because somebody wrote an article in a paper that, he had committed the offence with which he was charged. Reading an article on a certain matter in a newspaper does not amount to ascertaining the facts of the matter. Moreover, administration of justice is pre-judicated not only by poisoning the mind of the court, but also by poisoning the atmosphere in which the trial is held, on account of which persons may not readily come forth to give true evidence. In the present case there was likelihood of the danger that nobody would depose in favour of the applicant.

If a landlord habitually does not grant receipts to a tenant he is liable to be punished under section 239 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939. An offence punishable under section 239, United Provinces Tenancy Act is not made cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat. It is not mentioned among the offences which are within its jurisdiction and we were not referred to any government notification which might have conferred jurisdiction upon a Panchayati Adalat to try such a case. The Panchayati Adalat itself did not purport to try the applicant under section 239, United Provinces Tenancy Act and has not convicted him under it. It assumed the jurisdiction over the cases on the supposition that the offence committed by the applicant is one punishable under section 290 Indian Penal Code which is one of the sections mentioned in the Panchavat Raj Act. section 290 Indian Penal Code punishes a person who commits “public nuisance.” Not issuing receipts to tenants can never amount to committing a public nuisance and it was an erroneous view of the Panchayati Adalat that the complaints against the applicant made out an offence amounting to the commission of a public nuisance. Not only had the Panchayati Adalat absolutely no jurisdiction over the complaints but also it is beyond comprehension how any Panchayati Adalat could have ever thought that it had. Public nuisance is defined in section 268, Indian Penal Code and the definition so clearly excludes a case of habitually refraining from issuing receipts to tenants that I am surprised that the Panchayati Adalat of Rainpur Athiri thought that the applicant was guilty under section 290, Indian Penal Code. The fact, however, is that it considered that the applicant was guilty under section 290, Indian Penal Code and proceeded to try him for that offence. Once it assumed jurisdiction, nobody could prejudice mankind against the applicant before the cause was heard. It was likely that ultimately the Panchayat would hold that no offence under section 290, Indian Penal Code was made out and that the only offence made out was that punishable under section 239, United Provinces Tenancy Act and quash the proceedings or re turn the complaints to the complainants to present them before a competent court. An offence of contempt by prejudicing the mankind against the persons before the cause is heard can be committed not only when the cause is actually being heard but also just before it is taken to a court, provided that its being taken to the court is imminent. In the present case even if it be said that the proceedings before the Panchayati Adalat were without jurisdiction and hence void and that the particular kind of contempt could not be committed against the court of the Panchayati Adalat the contempt would certainly be committed of the court which would ultimately have jurisdiction over the complaints and to which they would be transferred by the Panchayati Adalat itself or presented by the complainants on receiving them back from Panchayati Adalat. The fact that the Panchayati Adalat erroneously took cognizance of the complaints will, therefore, not prevent its being condemned in this particular manner.

This Court has superintendence over the Panchayati Adalat. But it can punish a contempt of it only if it is subordinate to this Court within the meaning of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In State v. Brahma Prakash, a Full Bench of this Court has expressed its view that the subordination contemplated by section 2 of the Act is judicial subordination. The Full Bench had to deal with contempt of the courts of a Judicial Magistrate and a Revenue Officer, judgments of judicial Magistrates and Revenue Officers come before this Court in appeal and revision and consequently the court of a judicial Magistrate and a Revenue Officer were held to be subordinate to this Court within the meaning of section 2. It is not possible to say the same thing in respect of a Panchayati Adalat because its judgments and orders would never come before this Court in appeal or revision. As I said earlier, no appeal is provided from a decision of a Panchayati Adalat at all. The only remedy of a person aggrieved by it is to apply in revision to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Munsif or the Sub-Divisional Officer as the case may be and he has no further or additional remedy. Learned counsel for the applicant relied upon Article 227 of the Constitution of India as making a Panchayati Adalat judicially subordinate to this Court. Under the article “Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals”; without prejudice to the generality of that provision, the High Court may call for returns, make and issue general rules, prescribe forms and settle tables of fees. We have to see what is the meaning of “superintendence”? The word has been borrowed from the English Law and for the proper understanding of its meaning one would have to go through the history of English Law.

Disobedience to the King's writ was a contempt of the King and from an early period the offender could be attached summarily. The power to imprison and fine those guilty of contempt seems to have been originally used, firstly, to punish direct disobedience to the process of the court, and secondly, to punish all kinds of irregularities and misfeasances of officials of the court. Later courts started punishing others for contempts in their presence, on the theory that “the offence being done in the face of the court the very view of the court is a conviction, in law.” See Holdsworth's “A History of English Law”, Fifth Edition, Vol. III, pp. 391 and 392. The King's Council and later the Star Chamber possessed for long a jurisdiction over contempts committed against any court. On the abolition of the Star Chamber and the jurisdiction of the Council in 1641 the King's Bench assumed that jurisdiction. “It was then able the more easily to do so because it could be represented as a supplement to and a corollary of its powers to correct “misdemeanours extra-judicial, committed by or occurring in all inferior courts; and as a consequence of the fact that it had inherited from the Star Chamber the position of custos morum of all the subjects of the realm.” See Holdsworth's History of English Law, Vol. III, p. 393, citing R. v. Davies and R. v. Daily Mail. Wills, J. observed in R. v. Parke (3) at page 442:—

“This Court exercises a vigilant watch over the proceedings of inferior courts, and successfully prevents them from usurping powers which they do not possess, or otherwise acting contrary to law. It would seem almost a natural corollary that it should possess correlative powers of guarding them against unlawful attacks and interferences with their independence on the part of others.”

Powers grew and courts started punishing contempt summarily without having recourse to an indictment and to a verdict of the jury. This development was partly due to statutes which gave the courts in certain cases power to inflict punishment after examination without a trial by jury and partly to the example of the Council and of the Star Chamber.

The superior courts of common law were the three courts of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer which sat at Westminister. They were called “superior” in contradistinction to inferior courts, which, among other incidents, had only a limited and local jurisdiction, could not grant a new trial on merits and were liable to have their proceedings removed into, and reviewed by, the superior courts. (See Blackstone's Commentaries by Warren, p. 514). The court of Queen's Bench was the suprerfie court of common law in the kingdom exercising a high and transcendent authority, “keeping all inferior jurisdictions within their due bounds and removing their proceeding where it may be deemed necessary, to be determined by itself, or prohibiting their progress below.” (Warren, p. 522). It also superintended all civil corporations, commanded Magistrates and others to do what their duty required in every case where there was no specific remedy and protected the liberty of the subject by speedy and summary interposition. Wills, J. observed at page 38 in Rex v. Davies that very great trust was reposed in the court of King's Bench in respect of its control and superintendence of all inferior courts and that it was in a special manner the guardian and protector of public justice throughout the kingdom. He repeated at page 43 that it was its peculiar function to exercise superintendence over the inferior courts and confine them to their proper duties. In the words of Cockburn, C.J in The Queen v. Lefroy, the superior courts “were originally carved out of the one supreme court, and are all divisions of the aula regis, where it is said the King in person dispensed justice, and their power of committing for contempt was an emanation of the royal authority, for any contempt of court would be a contempt of the sovereign.”

The distinction between courts of record and courts that are not of record goes back to very early times when the King asserted that his own word as to all that had taken place in his presence was incontestable. He communicated this privilege to his own special court; his testimony as to all that had been before it was conclusive. Thus the formal records of the King's court cannot be disputed and herein it differs from inferior courts which keep no such formal records. It is the infallibility of its formal record which is the earliest mark of a court of record. Gradually the courts of record developed other characteristics. The method of questioning its decisions was a writ of error, while the method of questioning decisions of courts not of record was a writ of false judgment. It alone could fine and imprison. (See Holdworth's History of English Law, Vol. V, pp. 157-158). All courts of record have the power to fine and imprison for any contempt committed in the face of the court, because the power is necessary for the due administration of justice to prevent the court being interrupted. But it is quite another thing to say that every inferior court of record shall have the power to fine and imprison for contempt of court when that contempt is committed out of court. Only a superior court of record has this power of punishing contempt committed out of court. That is why in The Queen v. Lefroy the county court was held to have no power to punish contempt committed ex facie.

“The present King's Bench Division of the High Court stands in the place of the three ancient Superior Courts of Common Law, and besides representing the powers and exercising the authority of the Courts of Pleas and Exchequer inherits all the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of King's Bench,” [Wills, J. in Rex v. Davies.] The King's Bench Division has the power to punish contempt of inferior courts; see the cases of Davies, Parke, the Daily Mail and the Daily Herald. I have already mentioned the two-fold basis of this jurisdiction.

A brief account and history of courts in India is given by G.N Das, J. in Mahnabi Prosad v. Basudeb Paul. The East India Company established a Mayor's Court in 1726 and it administered English Law. When the company obtained a grant of the Dewany of the then provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765 it took over the administration of the Civil and Revenue justice in the territory and established provincial courts in 1772. Appeals from these courts lay to the Sudder Dewany Adalat consisting of the Governor General and members of his Council. In 1773 a Supreme Court as a Court of Record was established in supersession of the Mayor's Court. After the mutiny of 1857 the Government of India Act (21 and 22 Vict. Cap. 106) was enacted. All the Company's powers vested in the British Crown. The first Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1859. In 1861 the Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict. Cap. 104) was enacted; it established High Courts which received their Letters Patent. In 1862 the High Courts superseded the old Sudder Dewany, Nizamat Adalat and Supreme Courts at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. Up to 1861 the Courts had no statutory power of revision over inferior courts. Under section 9 of, the Charter Act the High Courts were invested with jurisdiction and all powers and authority which were possessed by the abolished courts. Section 15 laid down that each of the three High Courts established under the Act had “superintendence over all Courts which may be subject to its appellate jurisdiction” and had power to call for returns and direct the transfer of any suit or appeal from one court to another. The Charter Act was repealed by the Government of India Act, 1915. Section 106 of it laid down that the High Courts were established as courts of record, and would have jurisdiction and powers and authority in accordance with the Letters Patent and subject to the provisions of the Letters Patent would have all powers and authority which were vested in them at the commencement of the Act. Section 107 laid down that each of the High Courts had superintendence over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Then came the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 224 of it provided that every High Court would have superintendence over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, but made it clear that no High Court would have any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. This restriction on the High Courts' power of superintendence did not exist in the previous Government of India Acts and does not exist in the present Constitution. The Constitution was in force when the contempt was committed. Article 227 reads as follows:

(1) “Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals * * *

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision the High Court may (a) call for returns from such courts;

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees * * *.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal * * * relating to the armed forces.”

It Mall be seen that up to 1915 a High Court had all the powers which were exercised by the Supreme Court and the Sudder Dewany and Nizamat Adalats, and also had superintendence over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction. In exercise of these powers a High Court could set aside an inferior court's order that was ultra vires or without jurisdiction or could compel it to do its duty and exercise jurisdiction where it had failed to do so; see Anand Chand Bhuttacharjee v. Carr Stephen, Tej Ram v. Harsukh, Girdhari Singh v. Hurdto Narain Singh, Mohammad Sulmman Khan v. Fatima(4), Shiv Nathaji v. Joma Kashi Nath(5), Abdullah v. Salaru(6), and Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Tara Nath(7). In Anand Chand Bhuttacharjee's case the High Court of Calcutta, exercising its power of superintendence, set aside a District Magistrate's order ostensibly passed under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code as ultra vires. In Tej Ram's case it was pointed out that the Sudder Dewany Adalat had no power to exercise judicial functions in any case in which, its right of interference was not declared by any law and that no power of revision was conferred even by the Letters Patent; it was consequently held that a High Court had no revisional power to interfere with or set aside judicial proceedings of a subordinate court, and that section 15 of the Charter Act conferred administrative authority and not judicial powers. But it was made clear that a High Court was competent in the exercise of its power of superintendence to direct a subordinate court to do its duty or to abstain from taking action in matters of which it had no cognisance, though it could not interfere and set right orders on the ground that they proceeded on an error of law or fact. This case was relied upon, though not without some criticism, in Mohammad Sulaiman Khan's case Edge, C.J did not limit the power of a High Court to pases in which a subordinate court had declined to hear or determine a suit or application within its jurisdiction and preferred not to use the words “administrative authority” or “judicial superintendence.” Straight, J. was of the opinion that the word “superintendence” contemplated and included powers of a judicial or quasi-judicial character apart from those conferred by section 622, Civil Procedure Code, at the same time he considered that section 622 might be accepted as enacting the extent to which the High Court should ordinarily interfere with a subordinate court's findings. In Girdhari Singh's case the judicial Committee upheld the issue by a High Court of a writ of mandamus to a subordinate court i.e do what it ought to have done (namely, to confirm an auction sale). The High Court of Bombay discussed the superintending jurisdiction of a High Court an detail in Shiv Nathaji's case. The learned judges observed at p. 371:

“The visitatorial or superintending power of a Supreme Court is so necessary, and almost indispensable in a statute withdrawing cases under the statute from its control. When such a statute has been made a mere pretext, or has been wholly misapplied, the case should be treated as one not really arising under the statute, but on an evasion or perversion of the statute, and, as such, subject to the general control of the court, by which a rational application is to be secured to both the positive and the negative, provisions of the law.”

They pointed out that the superintending jurisdiction was established in a manner analogous to that of the Queen's Bench, that the High Court's interference was limited to “grave and patent error not otherwise to of remedied”, and that the superintending function view to compel the exercise of judicial authority on the subject by the elements composing it, and by reference to the prescribed, or intended, external conditions; and to exact obedience to the law of procedure in gathering materials for adjudication, and in giving effect to them. They referred to the exercise by the Queen's Bench of its superintending and visitatorial jurisdiction through, the issue of writs of certiorari (to withdraw to itself the proceedings in which some illegality or irregularity requires its interference to prevent a defeat of justice), mandamus (to enforce the use of powers improperly declined), and prohibition (to check an assumption or excess of jurisdiction). In Abdullah v. Salara, Knox and Airman, JJ. said, that the power of superintendence was different from that of appeal or revision and was exercised regardless of statutory provisions re appeal or revision as a third, kind of interference, that it was derived from English Law which did not rccognize any revisional power and conferred upon the King's Bench the power of superintendence to correct judgments of lower courts. Their Lordships of the judicial Committee decided in the case of Nihnoney Singh Deo that an unauthorized assumption or jurisdiction by a subordinate court could be revised by the High Court under section 15 of the Charter Act. It is clear from these authorities that the power of superintendence was not merely administrative and included the power to interfere with judicial orders of subordinate courts though only in a limited manner, that is, only to check the assumption, or excess, of jurisdiction or to compel the exercise of jurisdiction wrongfully declined, and not to substitute own judgment, whether on a question of fact or on a question of law, in place of the subordinate court's.

The Government of India Act of 1915 made no change in the powers of a High Court it recognized its power of superintendence over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction without any restriction. Sundar Nath v. Barana Nath, Vedappan Surveyuei v. Perianan Surveyvei, Piggot v. Ali Mohammad Mondal, Emperor v. Balkrishna Govind Kulkurni, Chaturbhuj v. Emperor, Balkrishna Hari Phansalker v. Emperor, and Firm Ganesh Das Shankar Lal v. Firm Asa Anand Radhe Shyam decided that the power of superintendence could be used to set aside an order passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or to compel the subordinate court to do its duty. Section 435(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure absolutely prohibits a High Court's sending for the record in a proceeding under Chapter XII, but Walsh, J. observed in Sundar Nath's case at page 366 that the High Court could interfere with a Magistrate's order in a proceeding under Chapter XII if it was totally without legal foundation or legislative authority or if the provisions of the Chapter had not been complied with. In Balkrishna Govind Kulkurni's case Macleod, C.J pointed out at page 612 that the High Court had responsibility for the administration of justice not only by itself but also by all inferior courts and that it was its duty to see that they did not exceed their powers. In Piggot's case the High Court of Calcutta, in exercise of the power of superintendence, issued a consequential direction in a case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. This Court revised a subordinate court's order passed under section 36 of the Legale Practitioners Act in Chaturbhuj v. Emperor according to the Special Bench, which decided the case of Balkrishna Hari Phansalker, the power of superintendence included that of superintendence not only on the administrative but also on the judicial side. The Special Bench went to the length of saying that under that power of superintendence a High Court could correct any error in a judgment. In the case of Firm Ganesh Das Shankar Lal the High Court of Lahore set aside an interlocutory order on the ground of its causing grave and irreparable injustice. Other cases which decided that the power of superintendence could be used to rectify an error which was so manifest as to amount to injustice are Venkatanagapushanam v. Ramaswami, Mst. Maharoop Kuer v. Mahabir Singh, Mehdunnissa Begum v. Sewak Ram, and In Re Kadhori(8). Wort, J., in exercise of his power of superintendence, granted temporary injunction which was refused by a Munsif in the case of Mst. Maharoop Kuer. The relevant observation, at page 164, in the case of Mehdunnissa Begum seems to be obiter dictum. In Kadhori's case, Walsh, J. exercised his power of superintendence and set aside, what he termed “a perfectly childish” order of a Munsif issuing notice to a litigant to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of his court by using objectionable language in an application for restoration of a suit. In Adya Saran Singh v. Jagannath a District Judge returned a memorandum of appeal on the ground that the appeal lay not in his Court but in that of the Commissioner, the Tenancy Act provided no appeal from such an order and this Court, though it relied on Mohammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima, refused to interfere with it in exercise of its power of superintendence. With great respect to the learned Judge, I think that Mohammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima did not prevent his directing the District Judge to entertain and hear the appeal, if he thought that he had jurisdiction which he had declined. Of course a High Court, in exercise of its power of superintendence, cannot correct a judicial order on the ground of a mistake even if of law, which does not go to the root of the jurisdiction, but it does not mean that it cannot interfere with any judicial order at all. An order assuming jurisdiction where none exists or declining jurisdiction where it does exist, is also a judicial order and can be revised by a High Court under its superintending power. I find that whatever power of superintendence a High Court had up to 1915 continued up to 1935.

The Government of India Act of 1935 undoubtedly effected a change in the power of superintendence by providing that it could not question an inferior court's judgment that was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That explains why one comes across no case after 1935 deciding that a High Court can prohibit the assumption, or excess, of jurisdiction, or direct the exercise of jurisdiction, under its superintending power. Pashupati Bharti v. Secretary of State contains an authoritative interpretation of section 224 of the Government of India Act. A High Court refused to grant a certificate of fitness of appeal and the aggrieved party applied to the Federal Court to revise the High Court's order. The Federal Court rejected the application saying that there was no provision for such revision; when its inherent powers were invoked, it replied:

“We know of no authority for the proposition that a court by the exercise of its inherent powers can extend its appellate jurisdiction or increase its revisional authority over other courts. *Nor is any support for the theory of an inherent power to be found in the analogy of the revisional and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts in British India. That jurisdiction is entirely a creature of statute, e.g section 234 of the Act of 1935 and section 115 Civil Procedure Code. Outside the statutory provisions no High Court has any inherent powers of revision over subordinate courts within its jurisdiction, such for example as the court of King's Bench in England has for centuries exercised over courts inferior to itself; and if there have been during recent years tentative efforts on the part of one or two High Courts to assert such powers, they have now been decisively negatived by sub-section (2) of section 224 of the Act of 1935.”

In Bhagaban Dayal Sahu v. Chandulal it was laid down that section 224 has no application of itself to legal proceedings. When a defendant, aggrieved by an order of a Civil Judge refusing to decide the question of jurisdiction first as a preliminary issue, came to this Court invoking its power of superintendence, Ismail, J. refused, observing that:—

“It is not the function of this Court under section 224 of the Government of India Act to interfere with the judicial orders of the subordinate courts”; see The Muljee Sicka & Co.…Applicants; v. Municipal Commissioner, Bombay…Opponents. it was recognized that the power of superintendence included the power to revise subordinate court's orders but pointed out that in view of sub-section (2) of section 224 a High Court could not then revise a subordinate court's order under its power of superintendence. It was because of this restriction on the power to revise a subordinate court's order that the power of superintendence was interpreted to mean only administrative power. Bose and Sen, JJ. observed in Balkrishna Narain v. Colonel N.S Jatar:—

“The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the actions of Courts subordinate to it. On its administrative side the power is known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side it is known as the duty of revision.”

This observation also is based on sub-section (2) of section 224. In Jahnabi's case G.N Das, J. said at page 542 that the change made in section 224 shows that:—

“the section is confined to the administrative functions of High Courts and does not give the High Courts any right of judicial interference.”

In the instant case we are governed by Article 227 of the Constitution. There is no such restriction on the power of superintendence as was imposed by sub-section (2) of section 224 by the Government of India Act of 1935, and now the power of superintendence is exactly what it was up to 1935. The Constituent Assembly, when it removed the restriction, must have done so with full knowledge of the interpretation placed upon the power of superintendence conferred by the Charter Act and the Government of India Act of 1915. The Constituent Assembly must be taken to have approved of that interpretation when it restored the statutory law that existed prior to 1935. The case of Jahnabi Prasad was decided before the present Constitution came into force and is of no assistance except in so far as it interprets the previous law. My finding is that this Court has now the same power of superintendence which it had up to the passing of the Government of India Act of 1935. In exercise of it, it can check the assumption or excess of jurisdiction by Panchayati Adalats or compel them to exercise their jurisdiction and do their duty. They are, therefore, judicially subordinate to this Court.

In view of the apologies tendered by all the three opposite-parties I do not think it necessary to take any severe action against any of them. The main responsibility lies on opposite-party no. 1 who got the matter published in the paper and he should be saddled with the costs of these proceedings including fee of the learned Government Advocate which may be assessed at Rs. 160. Subject to this the apologies may be accepted.

Dayal, J.:— I agree.

By the Court—We accept the apology of J.N Wilson and Kedar Nath Tiwari and cancel the notice issued against them. We find Brij Bhushan Misra guilty of contempt of Court, but, in view of his apology, pass no order against him except that he should pay the costs of the applicant assessed at Rs. 200 and also the Government Advocate his fee, which we assess at Rs. 160.

Notice cancelled.